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Preface
The aim of this book is to provide a better understanding of the impact of 
the economic crisis of 2008 on social policy and welfare state development 
in Europe and North America. We have sought to capture the varied na-
tional experiences of the crisis as well as relate the various welfare issues to 
their wider intellectual and historical context in order to get a better grasp 
the nature and scope of the crisis. 
The book is a collection of 16 previously unpublished research chapters 
selected from papers presented at a conference titled “Crisis and Renewal: 
Welfare States, Democracy and Equality in Hard Times”, held in Reykjavik 
in June 2011. The conference was hosted by three Nordic centres of excel-
lence, NordWel (The Nordic Welfare State—Historical Foundations and Fu-
ture Challenges), EDDA, Center of Excellence, and REASSESS (Reassessing 
the Nordic Welfare Model). We are indebted to these centres for sponsor-
ing the conference and the preparation of this book. We would also like to 
thank the conference-organising committee which included professor Pauli 
Kettunen (Helsinki University) and Klaus Petersen, director of the Centre 
for Welfare Research (University of Southern Denmark, Odense), on behalf 
of NordWel, and Irma Erlingsdóttir (University of Iceland) and Sigríður 
Þorgeirsdóttir (University of Iceland) from EDDA. Special thanks goes to 
Sveinn Máni Jóhannesson, the coordinator of the conference, for his effec-
tive and diligent work. Two anonymous referees have critically reviewed the 
book and given constructive comments on its content. We are indebted to 
people who have given us invaluable assistance during the process of pre-
paring the book, especially Heidi Haggrén, the coordinator of NordWel, and 
Neal O’Donoghue for his thorough language editing. Last but not least, we 
are grateful to the participants of the conference and in particular to those 
who have contributed to this volume.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
From boom to crisis
Rarely in modern history has there been such a rapid shift in the world’s 
economic fortunes as during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
From the early 1990s until 2007, industrial economies enjoyed an unusually 
long period of economic prosperity, with output growing faster than the 
population, international trade paving the way for increased productivity, 
and living standards generally on the rise. The general public enjoyed the 
biggest rise in disposable income and private consumption since 1945. 
But the boom proved to be fragile and built on weak foundations. The 
oversized financial sector and high leverage of huge macroeconomic imbal-
ances posed a major threat to stability. Cheap credit from East Asia fuelled 
ever-higher levels of private and corporate debt, creating a bubble economy 
that would burst in 2007–2008. The near collapse of the financial system 
triggered the biggest economic recession worldwide since the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s, quickly developing into a major economic crisis as output 
and employment contracted.1 This was no ordinary recession. Output in the 
OECD countries stagnated in 2008 and fell by 3.6 per cent in the follow-
ing year.2 Although growth resumed in many countries in 2010, economic 
recovery has been weak and uneven; some countries, especially in South-
ern Europe, have even fallen back into recession. The bank-fuelled financial 
crisis soon turned into a sovereign debt crisis as many states, particularly 
in the Eurozone, attempted to save their banking sectors and the economy. 
The Eurozone crisis has compounded the economic situation in Europe and 
remains one of the biggest problems of the world economy.
1 For international macroeconomic trends, see OECD 2009–2012, and IMF 2009–2012.
2 OECD 2012b. 
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The events of 2008 were more than an economic crisis. They triggered 
a serious political crisis as the failure of the financial system created a deep 
distrust not only of the financial elite but of political institutions as well. In 
countries from Iceland to Greece, Hungary to Spain, it produced a major 
political turmoil involving power shifts and protests in which fundamen-
tal issues about legitimacy, governance, and responsibility in the political 
system were called into question. In many countries, demands for radical 
reforms were made, calling for changes in both the political and economic 
order. 
It is difficult to generalize about the short-term costs and outcome of 
the crisis because national experiences vary greatly in terms of its econom-
ic, political and social impact. While the epicentre was the United States, 
the biggest economy in the world, the crisis hit countries worldwide. Some 
countries, especially those with a well-financed and well-regulated finan-
cial system like Norway, Canada, and Australia, suffered much less than the 
liberal market economies of the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Denmark, whose financial sectors had expanded greatly in the preceding 
decades. Many of the newly emergent market economies in the Balkans and 
South-Eastern Europe were hard hit and even more so the four Eurozone 
nations of Southern Europe, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, as a result 
of low growth and huge national debt. Two of the most serious casualties 
of the crisis, Ireland and Iceland, both of which are dealt with in this book, 
pursued expansionist monetary policies and had lax frameworks for their 
financial sectors, which became ‘too large’ compared to the size of the do-
mestic economy, exposing the countries to the vagaries of the international 
economy. But their responses to the crisis were very different. In Ireland the 
state assumed full responsibility for bank losses and took the path to auster-
ity with serious consequences for individual and social welfare, whereas in 
Iceland the government was unable to save the banks —they were simply 
too big to be saved—and embarked on the road to relatively quick recov-
ery through huge depreciation of the national currency and a programme 
developed with the IMF which included a fiscal consolidation based on a 
mixture of expenditure reductions and revenue increases.
introduction
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The hardship of millions of people in the wake of the crisis is reflected in 
the big rise in unemployment, which peaked at 8.3 per cent in OECD coun-
tries in 2010.3 Again, national experiences vary greatly; in Northern Europe 
the unemployment rates have varied between 5 and 10 per cent, while the 
high unemployment countries of Southern Europe, Ireland, Hungary, and 
Estonia have had rates well above 10 per cent. The United States was an early 
casualty of the crisis with unemployment rising fast from early 2008: figures 
would peak at 9.6 per cent in 2010 before subsiding relatively rapidly in 
the following years. In countries like the United States where many workers 
have to rely on employers’ provision for access to health insurance instead 
of government-funded health insurance, losing one’s job can mean losing 
health care coverage and other fringe benefits.
The severity of the crisis has forced governments to intervene in the fi-
nancial system and the economy more generally on an exceptional scale. 
Governments have borne a large part of the costs of the crisis through vari-
ous measures to support financial institutions and private firms. Support 
packages by means of capital injection, purchase of assets guarantees, and 
central bank support were implemented between 2008 and 2010, ranging 
from zero in several countries to 267 per cent of GDP in Ireland. UK and US 
support packages were valued at over 80 per cent of GDP.4 Shrinking public 
revenue and rising social costs as a result of increasing unemployment and 
economic hardship have put a further squeeze on the public sector, leading 
to huge fiscal imbalances and accumulation of public debt.5 
Social policy responses: retrenchment or renewal?
The economic crisis has posed a serious challenge to welfare states, shak-
ing their financial, social and political foundations. This is certainly not the 
first crisis—material or ideological—of the welfare state, for there has been 
almost a permanent debate since the 1970s over the welfare state in crisis.6 
3 OECD 2012c.
4 Farnsworth & Irving (eds) 2011, 15–21.
5 The average gross debt in the G7 countries in 2007 was 73 per cent of GDP, increasing to 99 per cent 
of GDP in 2009; cf. Farnsworth & Irving (eds) 2011, 17.
6 Hemerijck 2013.
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The current crisis, however, stands out in the severity and global spread of 
the economic downturn, which makes the challenge ever more formidable. 
How have welfare states responded to the economic crisis in terms of social 
policy? Has the crisis heralded a new phase in the development of the wel-
fare state, the age of austerity, with deep cuts in social spending and the roll-
ing back of established entitlements? Or, are there signs of renewal in which 
the opportunities opened up by the extraordinary situation created by the 
crisis have been seized to reform social policy?7 
The multifarious experiences and outcomes of the recent crisis conveyed 
in this book render bold generalizations hard to make. We know, at least, 
that the neoliberal version of market economy has been discredited and the 
spell of inevitability which it cast over the world’s economy has been broken 
by the dramatic events of the last five years. There was a strong tendency 
both in social theory and public debates to postulate the inevitability of neo-
liberal globalization by arguing that its innate logic would move nations to 
converge on laissez-faire capitalism. The European ‘social market economy’, 
with its generous welfare systems, was seen as an anachronism in the global-
ized economy.8 The course of events—and the empirical research—suggests 
that such propositions are exaggerated if not outright wrong. Rather than 
social change being directed by some irresistible social forces, the evidence 
suggests that different societies respond to similar challenges in a variety of 
ways and that these various responses are contingent on numerous factors.
Throughout much of the world the response of states has been ‘the re-
turn of political economy’ in which governments have expanded their ac-
tivities and played a more active role in society. Not only have they pro-
vided massive guarantees for banks’ debts and assets and injected capital 
into ailing banks but they have also expanded their role as regulators of the 
financial sector, coordinators of institutions and actors on the market, and 
providers of social policies to reduce the costs of change. Regulation of the 
financial sector, nationalization, higher taxes, Keynesian economics—all are 
7 See discussion on the welfare state as a casualty of the financial crisis in Hemerijck 2013 and Farn-
sworth & Irving (eds) 2011.
8 See for example McGovern, Hill, Mills & White 2007; Rodrik 2011; Hemerijck 2013. 
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on the political agenda, although it remains to be seen whether they herald 
a long-term shift towards a more ‘coordinated capitalism’.9
The ‘stress test’ of welfare states has particularly focussed on their fi-
nancial capability in the face of fiscal deficits and huge public debt incurred 
by the crisis.10 In response, many countries have implemented measures to 
tighten public finances by a combination of tax increases and savings. One 
path is fiscal prudence, cutting state expenditures and retrenching the wel-
fare state in order to balance budgets and reduce public debt. There has been 
a clear move to austerity in Britain and Ireland as chapters five and seven 
in this book show. In Britain, prime minister Cameron framed ‘the need’ 
for austerity within the rhetoric of creating the ‘Big Society’, a concept that 
referred to the empowerment of civil society actors with charities and vol-
untary groups stepping in and fulfilling some of the tasks performed by the 
state.11 The government set out a radical agenda that included major changes 
to the funding of higher education, a controversial reorganization of the 
NHS, and a significant overhaul of the welfare system.
The other path is the social investment strategy and stimulation of the 
economy and applies countercyclical measures to boost the economy and 
compensate those that have been hurt economically by the crisis. Various 
stimulus packages have been put together for those purposes, most notably 
in the United States where the first two years of the Obama administra-
tion saw the adoption of potentially substantive change in US social policy. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, a wide-ranging economic 
stimulus package, was pushed through, including measures that eased the 
eligibility requirements for food stamps and unemployment benefits. Health 
care reforms were also enacted despite formidable opposition. Iceland is 
another example of a country that adopted this strategy, or what has been 
termed a heterodox mix of balanced budgets combined with a Keynesian 
emphasis on shifting the burden insofar as possible from the poor and onto 
the more affluent. These two different models suggest that while circum-
9 Stiglitz 2010; Wade 2009; Magnus 2011.
10 Atkinson 2009.
11 BBC News, 19 July 2010: ‘David Cameron Launches Tories’ “Big Society” Plan’.
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stances impose considerable constraints on the options available to govern-
ments, wholesale austerity is neither inevitable nor feasible.
Comprehensive welfare systems, which require large social expenditures 
that typically account for 20–30 per cent of GDP in the more advanced coun-
tries, have now been subject to cuts in various fields. Yet, social expenditure 
ratio has risen across the OECD countries from 19 per cent to 22 per cent 
between 2007 and 2009 and has remained high since.12 This is not only be-
cause of slow or declining GDP but also because of an increase in real social 
spending. Again, there are great variations between countries. The largest in-
crease in real social spending was in Korea, Switzerland, and Norway, while 
hard hit countries like Italy, Portugal and Iceland had the smallest increase; 
in Hungary and Greece there was a substantial decline in social spending. 
The rise in social expenditure is largely a result of the social safety net acting 
as an automatic stabilizer by reducing the impact of the economic downturn 
through social benefits and social assistance.13 In the wake of the crisis the 
more comprehensive welfare states in Europe showed remarkable resilience 
in reducing the impact of deteriorating living standards and in ameliorating 
social hardship. Some, like the Nordic countries, were even able to increase 
social investment. The general picture is, of course, more complicated and 
as the unfolding sovereign debt crises in Europe coupled with low economic 
growth has put further pressure on public finances, many governments have 
increasingly resorted to social retrenchment.14 
The theme and structure of the book
The theme of this book is the impact of the recent economic crisis on wel-
fare and social policy in Europe and North America. It seeks to address 
such fundamental questions as the following: What are the actual social 
policy changes resulting from the economic crisis? Has social policy been 
characterized by retrenchment policies that emphasize fiscal prudence or 
countercyclical measures designed to boost the economy and compensate 
12 OECD 2012a, 1. 
13 Andersen 2012.
14 Hemerijck 2013, chapter 9; Farnsworth & Irving (eds) 2011; Vis, van Kersbergen & Hylands 2012.
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those people economically hurt by the crisis? Have budget cuts been used to 
reinforce neoliberal ideological agendas of reducing the role of the state in 
society? Has the crisis affected men and women in different ways, or people’s 
attitudes towards gender roles and the gendered division of labour, both 
within the home and between the home and the labour market? How sensi-
tive are policy makers to the gender dimension in responses to economic 
crises and in strategies to promote employment and equality in the labour 
market? How has economic crisis affected the basic democratic institutions 
and political landscapes?
These different questions are addressed by the book’s 20 contributors, 
who come from different disciplines within the humanities and the social 
sciences, giving the book a distinctive interdisciplinary character as well as 
different perspectives on crises and social welfare. Because the book con-
tains both general surveys and country-specific studies and touches on a 
wide range of issues, it provides a broad view of the present crisis, even as 
it places the crisis in a historical context. It has a considerable geographic 
spread, including Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, with a strong representation of 
crisis-ridden countries such as Iceland and Ireland.
The book is divided into four sections. The first section seeks to put the 
relationship between welfare states and crises in a wider intellectual and his-
torical context. Considering the development of the concept of welfare and 
its ideological environment in a long-term perspective, Michael Freeden, 
in chapter two, maintains that welfarism has always been difficult to clas-
sify within the standard ideological groupings and the indeterminacy of 
its conceptual apparatus can illuminate some of the reasons for the current 
crisis of the welfare state—a crisis of conviction as well as of material fact. 
In recent decades, Freeden argues, there have been attempts to redefine the 
ideological and conceptual framework of welfarism. Firstly, the central issue 
in theoretical debates is no longer the scope and scale of state intervention; 
with governance replacing government as the focus of attention, the em-
phasis has shifted to processes of policy delivery. Secondly, there has been 
a tendency to replace ‘the language of citizenship that underpinned much 
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twentieth-century welfarism with that of clientism’ in which individuals are 
increasingly seen as customers and recipients of services. Thirdly, compared 
to its optimal early twentieth-century meanings, the notion of human rights 
has undergone a narrowing at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
evidenced by the attempts of contemporary discourse to recalibrate welfare 
rights as private, egoistic and even anti-social—claims that can damage so-
cial stability and undermine the so-called rationality of markets.
In chapter three, Christopher Lloyd explores the development of social 
democratic welfare capitalism (SDWC), which he sees as the ‘the hegemonic 
regime’ of the Western world since the 1940s. This regime is now under 
threat from the deteriorating fiscal capacity of states, the decline in power 
and legitimacy of its principal institutions such as unions and political par-
ties, and the rise of societal forces that reject the authority of the liberal-cap-
italist state. Lloyd asks if SDWC will emerge intact from the current crisis 
or be transformed into something else and argues that there is a case to be 
made for a positive vision of SDWC’s future. The industrial maturation in 
the world economy will continue to produce social democratic demands as 
massive dislocations and rising standards of living around the world pro-
duce popular pressure for social reform. More controversial is Lloyd’s argu-
ment that there may be a sociobiological support for the viability of wel-
fare society in light of new research which shows that impulses for fairness, 
egalitarianism, and democracy are deeply inherent in the human behaviour. 
In chapter four, the last in the section, Diane Perrons locates the roots 
of the current recession in the rapid expansion of inequalities fostered by 
neoliberal global development. Grounding her analysis in both Keynesian 
economics and Polanyi’s theory of the double movement, she argues that it 
is necessary to re-establish social control over markets, which left to their 
own devices are insensitive to social needs. Perrons concludes the section on 
a positive note by offering constructive feminist proposals for transforma-
tive policies that redress gender and social inequalities by giving priority to 
reproduction over production. 
The second section presents a variety of studies on the welfare conse-
quences of the crisis in order to assess policy reactions and constraints. 
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While the United States and the United Kingdom both belong to a welfare 
state archetype frequently referred to as ‘liberal’ or ‘Anglo-Saxon’, their re-
actions to the recession differed substantially, with the former opting for a 
modest stimulus and the latter for all-out austerity. In chapter five, Daniel 
Béland and Alex Waddan provide an account of these different develop-
ments and trace them to institutional factors that shape both the agenda 
setting and policy outcomes in those two countries.
Iceland is something of a poster child for those that oppose austerity 
measures, as chapter six shows. Stefán Ólafsson reviews indicators of the 
level of living in Iceland following the collapse of the banks and relates the 
results to the policy emphasis of the Icelandic government, which empha-
sized sheltering the vulnerable insofar as possible and shifting the burden 
onto the more affluent while maintaining strict fiscal discipline. While the 
recession has indubitably imposed considerable hardship on large sections 
of Icelandic society, the evidence suggests that this emphasis mitigated the 
worst effects of the crisis and has been effective in promoting economic re-
covery.
Mairéad Considine and Fiona Dukelow compare the 1980s recession to 
the current crisis in Ireland, one of the most serious casualties of the current 
crisis. Chapter seven outlines how these crises manifested themselves in 
economic and social terms, and explores the policy responses and the man-
ner in which they were framed. Although the economic and fiscal narra-
tives were broadly similar, the different nature of the economic shock in the 
1980s and the political and social conditions in which it played out resulted 
in more substantial instances of welfare resilience. The neoliberal influence 
on the economic and social architecture of the state weakened the social 
solidarity that underpins social welfare and explains the extensive welfare 
retrenchment in the current crisis.
In chapter eight, Guðmundur Jónsson and Magnús Sveinn Helgason 
offer an insight into the crisis in Iceland by focusing on one of the great-
est consumer booms and declines of any developed country over the last 
two decades. Public discourse has assigned the consumer an important role 
in the advent and the unfolding of the economic crisis. Reckless spending 
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and excessive consumption are seen as a major contributory factor to the 
crisis. The authors present a quantitative analysis of the rapid rise and fall 
of private consumption between 1994 and 2010 that focuses on changes in 
consumption patterns and growing debt financing of consumption. From a 
different perspective, consumer experiences and their attitudes to consump-
tion, debt, and economic well-being are explored by means of an interview 
study.
The increasing burden of pension systems has been one of the major 
challenges of welfare states in recent times. Matti Hannikainen examines 
this specific policy area in Finland in chapter nine, showing how economic 
crisis have paved the way for radical pension reforms. But the outcomes 
of these reforms cannot be described simply in terms of retrenchment nor 
can they be explained in terms of capital imposing its interests on society as 
such. It is rather a story of conflict and cooperation between different inter-
ests, with labour market organizations playing a central role in determining 
the outcomes.
The third section is concerned with gender perspectives of the economic 
crisis, gender equality, and gender roles. In chapter ten, Jyl Josephson looks 
at how the crisis has been construed in gender terms in the United States 
through the concept of ‘mancession’. While men suffered more job loss than 
women following the onset of the recession, the popular discourse of man-
cession suggested that women were in fact gaining from the recession rather 
than loosing somewhat less than men. The mancession story has proven to 
be a persistent myth, even as women are benefitting less from the recovery 
than men, which may in itself be the result of recession-related unemploy-
ment being framed as primarily affecting men.
In chapter eleven, Ivett Szalma and Judit Takács offer a sophisticated 
analysis of European survey data that measures attitudes towards gender 
roles. They find that the crisis does not affect gender roles in a straight-
forward manner. Its consequences pull in different directions, affecting the 
attitudes of different groups in different ways. They conclude that the crisis 
does not have a direct impact on gender role attitudes but that it operates on 
them indirectly through the myriad of circumstances that it affects.
introduction
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In a case study of Iceland presented in chapter twelve, Ingólfur V. Gísla-
son identifies three main developments during the recession in Iceland that 
pull in somewhat different directions. Firstly, the labour market position 
of men and women became increasingly similar on account of men loos-
ing more jobs than women and experiencing a larger reduction in working 
hours. Secondly, women increasingly moved into positions of decision mak-
ing. These changes moved Iceland further towards gender equality. On the 
other hand he argues that reactions to the crisis at both state and municipal 
level may pull in the opposite direction, citing the partial retrenchment of 
paid parental leave in particular. His conclusions are cautiously optimistic. 
Insofar as such policy changes will be undone as the economy recovers, he 
sees little reason to expect that the crisis will have a negative impact on gen-
der inequality in the long run.
Hanna-Kaisa Hoppania focuses on social care services in Finland 
in chapter thirteen. She challenges the discourse on population aging by 
placing it in a political context. Specifically, she points to the roots of the 
problem in the neoliberal concern with efficiency that has turned the care 
relationship into a customer/provider relationship. The issue of elder care 
tends to be presented in terms of procedural fairness but says nothing of the 
distributive patterns of care labour, formal or informal. Hoppania argues 
that we should instead construct elder care policy that requires not only new 
legal regulation but social change too.
The last section of the book examines the political responses to the crisis 
and the possibilities of long-term reform—from resurgent activism to radi-
cal constitutional reform. Despite evidence contradicting the inevitability 
of austerity and neoliberal convergence, it seems difficult to break the hold 
that neoliberalism has on the political imagination. There is ample reason 
for the opponents of neoliberalism to worry that the correct lessons from 
the current recession are not being learned. In chapter fourteen, Jane Kelsey 
provides a detailed account of the obstacles they face. Whereas it is conven-
tional to see embedded capitalism and neoliberalism as opposites, Kelsey ar-
gues that neoliberalism itself has become embedded in institutional frame-
works at both the national and the international level. Thus it is not simply 
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ideational sclerosis that stands in the way of reform but rather a Ulyssean 
commitment to staying the course however appealing the Siren-like alterna-
tives may seem.
In chapter fifteen, Fiona Dukelow provides an account of the economic 
and political discourses prevailing in Ireland during the present crisis and, 
in particular, she explores the ideational conditions that facilitated ‘the rap-
id self-directed’ turn to austerity. She pays particular attention to taxation 
and public expenditure decisions and how they were linked to beliefs about 
global competitiveness that significantly narrowed the field of policy op-
tions. 
Michael Kuur Sörensen tells a similar story about Denmark in chapter 
sixteen. He examines the discourses of the 1970s on both sides of the politi-
cal spectrum and contrasts them with the discourses emerging in wake of 
the 2008 crisis. He argues that the earlier recession bolstered welfare state 
scepticism on the right, while the present recession has raised doubts in the 
welfare state’s social democratic heartland.
In the last chapter of the book, chapter seventeen, Vilhjálmur Árnason 
focuses on democracy in Iceland before and after the banking crisis. He 
identifies critical flaws in liberal democracy as practiced in Iceland in the 
years before the banking crisis. It may be claimed that Iceland has seen some 
democratization in the wake of the crisis, with national referendums playing 
a larger role than ever before. Árnason, however, is highly critical of these 
developments, putting them down to distorted republican reaction that ex-
ploits a weakness in Icelandic society. Rather than throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater, he makes a constructive proposal about how Icelandic 
democracy must be reformed.
introduction
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CHAPTER 2
The conceptual morphology of welfare:  
A site of ideological indeterminacy
michael freeden
For J. A. Hobson, who shares with Richard Titmuss the distinction of being 
Britain’s most innovative welfare theorist, welfare concerned the ‘relations 
between economic and ethical, or human, values’. It assumed ‘organic unity, 
the good life as a whole’ and it married the individual as a ‘psycho-physical 
organism’ to considerations of ‘social welfare, implying that societies gener-
ated their own standards of well-being.’1 His work was a milestone in what 
may be termed welfarism, arguably the most important body of political 
thinking to emerge on the domestic front of a number of European societies 
in the twentieth century. To be more specific, we should be talking about a 
cluster of welfare ideologies displaying Wittgensteinian family resemblanc-
es, while exhibiting some pronounced differences as well. Thus, the social 
democratic belief systems of Nordic states, with their advanced languages 
of social rights, overlap heavily with the left or new liberalism that emerged 
over a century ago in the UK, while continental Christian democratic prin-
ciples share some communitarian features of unconditional social responsi-
bility with non-conservative welfare thinking.
Ideologies always are combinations of concepts such as liberty, justice, 
power, or equality, but they order those concepts in different configurations, 
just as one could construct different rooms with the same modular units of 
furniture. Political concepts are essentially contestable; that is to say, each 
1 Hobson 1929, 11–17.
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concept contains more conceptions than can be expressed in any single ut-
terance (among the conceptions of equality, for instance, we find identity, 
similarity, equality of need, of merit, or of outcome, but no meaningful sen-
tence can combine them all). Ideologies serve to decontest such multiple 
and often conflicting conceptions of the concepts they harbour. Their aim 
is to compete over the control of public political language and consequently 
over public policy by insisting that the conceptual configurations they pro-
mote are the ‘correct’ ones. Of course, each ideology may tease out differ-
ent meanings from the same concept. There are both logical and cultural 
constraints on the acceptable combinations that constitute an ideology, but 
it is important to recognize the flexibility and mutability of ideologies over 
time and across space when we assemble them in their loose families, and 
to abandon the view of ideologies as necessarily rigid, doctrinaire or unduly 
abstract. Doing so enables us to investigate the field more closely. The fact 
that we refer to the welfare state as a set of institutional structures and prac-
tices, yet have no name for the ideology that has both shaped and accompa-
nied it, tells us something about the relative invisibility of that ideological 
stream. No less importantly, the rigidity and conventionalism of much ideo-
logical analysis has resulted in the difficulty of classifying welfarism within 
the standard groupings of liberalism or social democracy, particularly when 
the latter are caricatured as mutually exclusive rather than as possessing per-
meable and overlapping boundaries. 
Such caricatures have often been politically motivated, as different ide-
ational movements profess paternity over welfare thinking while dismissing 
out of hand competing claims for such paternity. As late as the 1970s, for 
instance, the British welfare state was presumed to be the product of Labour 
socialism. Such misperceptions of liberalism resonate even now under the 
rhetorical cloak of neoliberalism. But we currently possess a far more subtle 
understanding of the genealogy of the welfare state. The story of twentieth-
century welfarism is related on the surface to the rise and partial decline of 
the left-liberal ideology that launched it in Northern and Western Europe 
a century and more ago, even though within left-liberalism itself some ten-
dencies were hostile to a fully-fledged vision of welfare. Although crises of 
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welfare are usually related to economic constraints, to institutional short-
comings, to welfare expansion and growing demands on welfare services, 
and to a disconnect between policy intention and outcome, I want to suggest 
that the underlying conceptual contestations of welfarism contained from 
their inception the potential of disrupting an ideational concord. Appreciat-
ing such an underlying disorder sheds light on the potential fragility exhib-
ited by ideological solutions to policy challenges when welfare systems come 
under pressure.
Welfarism was mooted as a solution to a series of problems that became 
salient towards the end of the nineteenth century, while at the same time 
it reflected extraordinary developments in thinking about human nature, 
social relationships, time, and predictability. Historically, the concept of 
welfare was crafted from a number of antecedent concepts that underwent 
mutation, both as part of an evolutionary process and because they crossed 
the paths of other concepts. Some of the reasons for the current crisis—a 
crisis of conviction as well as of material fact—can be located in the indeter-
minacy of the conceptual apparatus at the disposal of the welfare discourse 
coined a century and over ago—one that has undergone mutation as well as 
mutilation. Some conceptual meanings were appropriated by certain ideolo-
gies, others were dismissed because of their colonization by ideologies hos-
tile to this or that conceptual interpretation—of organicism, work, welfare 
itself. The debris of those collisions between ideologies—as the features of 
one ideology became intertwined with, or conversely expelled, the features 
of another—reshaped clusters of meaning. Thus the linking of liberty and 
progress, for example, pushed conceptions of liberty that were neither pur-
posive, nor beneficial to the agent, off the ideological agenda, and enhanced 
the notion that the concept of human (and social) progress was a form of 
personal growth that also contributed to the freeing of human capabilities.
The evolution of welfarism
During the formative period of welfarism, in a significant shift of expecta-
tions, states and governments began to focus not merely on power and ag-
grandizement, not even on wealth formation and accumulation as ends in 
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themselves, but on the individual satisfaction that social arrangements could 
deliver. Two movements of thought contributed to that shift in particular: 
the first was utilitarianism; the second, early nineteenth-century socialist 
utopianism. Benthamite utilitarianism introduced a vitally new perspec-
tive on the central disposition of human beings. In a return to a psycholo-
gism last seen in such powerful measure in Hobbes’s state of nature, but 
equipped with very different assumptions, individuals were defined as plea-
sure maximizers. Gone was the quasi-legal language of contract theory with 
its agency-oriented rationalism and its assumed voluntarism. Instead came 
the identification of a fundamental feature of human conduct that necessi-
tated certain organized social arrangements that would assist in promoting 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. A generation or so later, John 
Stuart Mill crucially transformed that appreciation of the individual as a 
seeker of self-expression from pleasure to happiness to well-being, creating 
an important base from which to interpret welfare as tantamount to human 
flourishing. The quantitative computation of the utilitarians was replaced by 
qualitative assessment, in contradistinction to many current assessments of 
the welfare state that are once again embedded in measurement.
Quite separately, continental protosocialists, as well as Marx himself, 
were recognizing an aspect of being human that was to obtain central, if con-
troversial, significance in later welfarism. In the words of Saint-Simon, ‘we 
regard society as the ensemble and union of men engaged in useful work.’2 
That opened up possibilities both for capitalism and for socialism, with Marx 
tipping the balance in favour, in his words, of work as ‘vital activity’3—a life-
enhancing property of being human. The notion of industry was linked not, 
as is now the vernacular practice, to the large-scale technologies and facto-
ries involved in producing mass goods, but to the dedication and satisfaction 
that labour could elicit in individuals. A remarkable shift of emphasis took 
place, accentuating the producer-oriented act of production side by side with 
the consumer-oriented product. Work was released from its connotations of 
drudgery and rendered synonymous with self-realization, with tapping into 
2 Saint-Simon 1975, 158.
3 Marx 1977, 81.
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the essence of being human. That is patently manifest in Hobson’s writings. 
That is why the phrase ‘from welfare to work’—the dichotomizing mantra of 
American welfare policies—is alien to that early idea of welfare. Work was 
crucial to human well-being itself, and the implicit inclusiveness of the hu-
man condition resisted the morphological association of welfare with tem-
porary assistance to marginalized social groups. In welfare legislation that 
comprehensive idea of work was expressed in measures to alleviate the dehu-
manizing condition of unemployment, while the right to work was frequent-
ly trumpeted by socialists—in both cases not merely as a means to assuage 
poverty. Utilitarianism and its qualitative offshoots converged on those early 
socialisms on three dimensions: in an adherence to the notion of a science 
of society, in an egalitarian view of the status of members of a society, and in 
regarding human self-fulfilment as the highest state of both individual and 
social life. Power, defence, wealth making, and individual freedoms retained 
their position as principal aims of government or civil society, but some im-
portant markers towards welfarism had been laid down. 
The potentially radical feature—now in decline—of pinning welfare 
hopes on an active state was originally the outcome of three preceding intel-
lectual developments: first, the increasing acknowledgement of social inter-
dependence as a structural inevitability as well as an enriching human re-
source; second, the epistemological recognition of future time as involving 
risks and uncertainties and hence requiring planned anticipatory responses 
that aimed at partially controlling the future; and third, a belief that democ-
racy was endowed with taming and mitigating attributes that could coun-
terbalance the reductionist view of the state as an instrument of external 
and sectional power. These transformations breathed discursive persuasive-
ness into the ideational power of welfarism. That said, the germs of current 
tensions and crises may be found even in the most positive and optimistic 
initial visions of welfare, or perhaps precisely because such optimism tended 
to paper over discernible cracks. The ideals of welfarism always contained 
the possibility of serious contention in their very conceptual construction. 
The ideational solutions that were so grandly broadcast at the time were 
themselves also responsible for unforeseen complications at the ideological 
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level, fragmenting available and future policy options, and weakening the 
effects of welfarism.
The first ideational development was the dominance of a particular 
view of organicism that was pivotal in disseminating strong versions of 
welfarism. That dominance was of a specifically liberal kind. Rather than 
submerging individualism in a suffocating social container, the idea of hu-
man interdependence that socialists and left-liberals developed more or less 
independently of each other invoked a powerful sense of mutual sustenance, 
as is evident in Ernst Wigforss’s matching of liberty and community.4 As 
the liberal theorist L. T. Hobhouse crisply put it, ‘[m]utual aid is not less 
important than mutual forbearance, the theory of collective action no less 
fundamental than the theory of personal freedom.’5 The specific twist of or-
ganicism in liberal welfarist thinking was, as Hobson, Hobhouse’s colleague, 
understood it, in its insistence that the flourishing of the individual—the 
part—was absolutely vital to the health of the whole; otherwise the social 
body would atrophy.6 That injection of liberalism into welfare state think-
ing cannot be overestimated.7 The conceptual fluidity of the notion of or-
ganicism was harnessed in a very different direction than that traced by its 
authoritarian and even totalitarian implications. Such flexibility is a typi-
cal feature of ideologies, seeking to retain existing terminology in order to 
create a semblance of continuity, while divesting concepts of some existing 
meanings and replacing those with new ones. 
Regrettably for the visionaries of liberal welfare, however, the organic 
analogy turned out to be ill-equipped to protect welfare theory and prac-
tice, even though Titmuss would resurrect that idea in the mid-twentieth 
century.8 One problem with such welfarist thinking was that it assumed an 
implicit teleology in which a point would be reached beyond which substan-
tive structural change was no longer required—as in much utopian think-
ing, to which it was a second cousin. That assumption posited an idealized 
4 Tilton 1991, 39–69.
5 Hobhouse 1911, 124.
6 Hobson 1909, 71–87; Hobson 1914, 304; Hobson 1906, 496. 
7 Freeden 1978.
8 Titmuss 1963, 39.
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and unrealistic trajectory virtually immune to disruption—hardly a formula 
for coping with the messiness of the real world. Organic harmony and uni-
ty could therefore be misinterpreted as entailing an ultimately static state, 
where order and stability are important side effects. No less significantly, 
those side effects were shunted into stage centre by reluctant conservative 
converts to welfarism. For conservatives, the crucial aspect of organicism 
was not as a metaphor of mutual dependence but as one of natural continu-
ity—hardly an idea that would encourage radical thinking. In their hands it 
took the wind out of the sails of a vision of human regeneration. The attrac-
tion of organicism diminished sharply after World War 1, replaced by plu-
ralist theories that extolled the significance of distinct groups, while the rise 
of the extreme organicism of totalitarian systems deterred further thinking 
on those lines, in a manner not dissimilar to the post-1980s disinclination of 
post-communist societies to consider social democracy as a separate ideolo-
gy far removed from communism. The seeds of future crisis were contained 
in the tension between that tightly-knit view of society and its increasing 
rejection both as fact and as desideratum.
The second ideational development at the end of the nineteenth century 
saw another milestone in the emergence of welfarism, relating to a modified 
view of human nature. Once again, older conceptualizations were retained, 
but their relative weight was sharply reduced. The mid-nineteenth century 
view of human beings as active agents, aggressive entrepreneurs, and auton-
omous self-developers was not abandoned, but its unacceptable social costs 
became plainer to see as the century drew to an end. Alongside a more acute 
sense of social interdependence there arose a complementary conception 
of human nature that reacted against the assumption of internal individual 
strength and its corollary—the moral condemnation entailed by the inabil-
ity to display such strength. It was becoming evident that human frailty was 
not a defect or suboptimal condition, but normal.9 Moreover, it was ubiq-
uitous, affecting rich and poor alike. Irrespective of the curse of poverty, 
human beings often could not cope with existential contingencies such as 
9 Freeden 2003.
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disease, old age, unemployment, and ignorance. The world of insurance had 
of course focused heavily on selected risk, but life was now seen as inher-
ently risky, and human fragility was recognized as ubiquitous and hence as 
a social concern, for reasons both linked to humanism and to sound eco-
nomics. Hence the introduction for the first time of national budgets that 
incorporated financial planning for a number of years ahead; hence also the 
preoccupation with the future timeline of current members of society as old 
age threatened over the horizon, and with the future vitality of society at 
large in welfare legislation for children. Those were not merely humanitar-
ian acts but forms of social investment—as was the Fabian ‘endowment of 
motherhood’ movement and the attraction of eugenics for the left.10 
The introduction of uncertainty concerning human nature weakened 
teleological views of individual progress inherited from the Enlightenment. 
Instead, the belief in progress was shifted to a new certainty about the efficacy 
of organized social solutions. But to complicate matters further, while that 
welfarism raised expectations about the temporal trajectory of satisfying a 
broad range of human needs, those expectations became increasingly unat-
tainable—both as quasi-utopian in principle and because growing financial 
constraints ensured that their delivery was unrealistic. Some see this as the 
welfare state being the victim of its own success, but the point is that ab initio 
the criteria of ‘success’ were elusive, vague and contestable. The seeds of future 
ideological crisis were contained in the dual uneasy fit between two compet-
ing conceptions of human nature—self-sufficient and monadic, or fragile and 
interdependent—and between two views of future need-satisfaction—deter-
minate and finite, or indeterminate and infinite—which have battled it out in 
the arena of welfarism ever since, with diverse ideologies attaching differen-
tial weight to each. The two latter views may themselves be further divided. 
For some conservatives the determinate and limited nature of human needs 
allows welfare policies to be contained; for other conservatives the insatiabil-
ity of human greed will lead to a drain on national resources that welfarism 
perniciously encourages. For progressives, to the contrary, human needs are 
10 Freeden 2005.
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open-ended and reflect the capacity of the human race to self-evolve and self-
direct rather than inducing anxiety about a bottomless pit of desires. 
The third ideational development accompanied the rise of mass democ-
racy, which fomented great hopes in the domain of welfarism accompanied 
by what turned out to be grand illusions. The gradual democratization of 
Western societies had held out the prospect of a benevolent state, answerable 
to its members and sensitive to their needs. The language of state activity be-
gan to soften: the earlier term ‘state interference’11, indicating dislocation of 
normal processes and practices, gradually made way for ‘state intervention’, 
which implied sorting out a problem, and the even later phrases state ‘regu-
lation’ and ‘enablement’. That crescendo of warming to the state was predi-
cated on democracy minimizing the gap between rulers and ruled, with the 
state becoming an organ of social self-government, drawing in civil society 
as a friendly co-partner. But the short-lived honeymoon with the state ac-
tually piled up future problems and false expectations, overestimating the 
convergence of a rational and ethical popular will, given the exciting fruits 
of state enablement. The same democratic participation that was essential 
to tailoring welfare requirements to actual needs also unleashed a diversity 
of social fantasies about welfare, positive and negative, that was to become 
increasingly problematic. The supposed insatiability of wants, for instance, 
led large sectors in democratic welfare states either to fear the financial bur-
dens and the free-riding of some, or to pin their hopes on welfare expertise 
and continual improvement in such areas such as health and education as 
a civil right—both tendencies often translated into the languages of party 
politics. Paradoxically, the very democratization of societies that initially 
alerted them to the severe problems of social diswelfare also legitimated dis-
agreement about social ends and encouraged the expression of conflicting 
demands and of the dissent that pluralism brought in its wake. 
Welfarism was also inspired by another highly significant development 
in liberal thought epitomized among others by Mill: the division within lib-
eralism between a horizontal and a vertical dimension. The horizontal spa-
11 See for example Ritchie 1891. 
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tial liberalism focused on creating areas that detached the public from the 
private, on constitutionalism, on the separation of powers, and on reducing 
the role of government in social affairs. But to that was now added a tem-
poral liberalism of growth, aiming at civilizing individuals and encouraging 
them to work out their variable potentials.12 Welfare was thus endowed with 
the elements of an historical project, a dynamic that would be realized in the 
continuous extracting of human capacity as the ultimate end of a good soci-
ety. It was not a condition but an indefinite process. Far from involving mere 
techniques of redistributing material goods, welfarism revolved around the 
socially aided emancipation of human capacity that enabled each individual 
to progress along her or his personal trajectory. The main institutional con-
sequence was once again the recalibrating of the role of the state as both 
enabler and intervener. Liberalism reduced, without entirely abandoning, 
its commitment to keeping the state at bay and to permitting individuals to 
pursue their own desires irrespective of the needs of others. 
Two democratic dilemmas 
The early liberalism at the heart of welfare assumed a harmony that did not 
incorporate liberalism’s late twentieth-century sensitivity to dissent, plu-
ralism, and multiculturalism. Those nibbled away at any shared vision of 
human flourishing by challenging such joint standards, particularly in the 
area of cultural expression and group choices. That pluralism would have 
disturbed the founders of the welfare state, because it deviated from the gen-
erally unitary conception of the social good they had entertained. Notions 
of the common good optimistically suggested a singular view of social bet-
terment, from which all social groups would benefit equally—because of the 
assumed identity of their needs in a macro sense, independently of the cul-
tural reformulations of such needs. But the mitigating of liberal universal-
ism through multicultural agenda—regarded by welfare thinkers as the next 
desirable stage of liberal inclusiveness—was also accompanied by anxieties 
about the kind of egalitarianism that was emerging, anxieties that of course 
12 Freeden 2008.
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did not emanate solely, or even mainly, from the welfarist camp. The lib-
eral, not Marxist, vision of a ‘classless society’ and an undifferentiated nation 
had eliminated many social distinctions with which people felt comfortable, 
while generating a feeling of financial burden cultivated by social egoisms. 
Already at the outset of the twentieth century the ‘bitter cry of the middle 
classes’13 became an issue with which welfare providers had to contend as 
redistribution began to bite. 
The upshot was the emergence of two democratic dilemmas. The first 
was potentially self-destructive. Put bluntly, if welfarism was an ideology 
of the centre-left, there was no reason to expect that a legitimate demo-
cratic system, with a normal spread of ideological positions that waxed and 
waned with the vicissitudes of political fortune, would invariably maintain 
allegiance to welfare ideals. Only a forced conception of welfare that per-
manently ranked it at the apex of social priorities, endowing it with the ca-
pacity to trump other social values aspiring to political dominance, could 
have survived the unavoidable precariousness of political contingencies. 
That naiveté was indeed evident among the early welfare visionaries but was 
incompatible with another supreme twentieth-century value from which 
welfarism itself arose—respect for the indeterminacy of the democratic pro-
cess. The seeds of future crisis were contained in a clash between the rosy 
belief in the rational singular integrity of social visions and policy, and a 
fundamental misconstrual of the incipient heterogeneity and disruptiveness 
of democracy, with its periodical rejections of altruism and inclusiveness.
The second democratic dilemma—a perennial one, but at the heart of 
some welfare policies, notably those pertaining to health provision—was 
the need to maintain expertise, a problem mirrored for instance in current 
environmental policy. Who knows? Who advises? Who decides? What con-
stitutes a repository of knowledge? Regularly, liberal paternalist undertones 
crept into the debates, and the democratic gap persisted. Early welfare think-
ers recognized that ‘the present movement for social reform springs from 
13 A campaign by the journalist G. R. Sims in the Tribune newspaper during 1906. See also ‘The bitter 
cry of the middle classes’, Speaker, 11 August 1906.
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above rather than below.’14 The British social reformer C. F. G. Masterman 
referred to the settlement movement in which university graduates worked 
for a while in poor urban areas as—and I write this with some personal 
embarrassment—‘designed to place the culture and intellect of Oxford and 
Cambridge at the service of the poor and ignorant.’15 Liberals were hardly 
immune from mild forms of paternalism drawing their ideology away from 
egalitarianism; indeed, no welfare project can avoid that to some degree. 
The second dilemma illustrates one liberal weakness, underestimating 
the role of power in delivering welfare goods—power being an inherently 
unequal feature of the political—both through appeals to extra-democratic 
expertise and through overestimating the capacity of the state to deliver 
policies against resistance of whatever kind, or alternatively to fail in the 
delivery of such power acts. That problem has bequeathed its own categories 
of crisis, split neatly between the fear of an overbearing state and the dis-
dain for an incompetent one. Yet the archetypal liberal unease with power 
and the ostensible liberal preference for rational consensus were never un-
equivocally borne out in actual liberal discourse. Note a telling sentence in 
a UK Liberal party pamphlet on national insurance in 1914: ‘Compulsion 
means simply a larger freedom.’16 Rousseau would have concurred. Welfare 
as a voluntary ideal required far too much starry-eyed hope, while lacking 
coordination and efficiency. But welfare policies, like all policies, require 
power in the form of decisions, co-ordination, the ranking of priorities, and 
the mobilization of support. None of these comes naturally. 
The microanalysis of welfarism reveals from the outset a multifarious set 
of competing ideas, often sheltering under the same labels and employing 
similar language. However, the ideological splits in determining the rela-
tive positioning of welfare within a basket of social values became evermore 
evident—and I refer here only to those who broadly supported the welfare 
state. Sometimes an attempt is made to obfuscate differences; at other times 
a struggle over colonizing and owning a central concept is unmistakable. 
14 Atherley-Jones 1893, 629.
15 Masterman 1901, 3.
16 ‘Why the Insurance Act was made compulsory and why it should remain compulsory’.
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For, as noted earlier, ideologies—welfarism is no exception—are always sites 
of competition over the control of public language. The mere presence of the 
same master concepts in more than one ideology tells us nothing about the 
work they do in each ideology, about their relative weight, or about the se-
lected conceptual components that are packed into the concept. Welfare it-
self is such a concept, indeterminate enough to host contradictory, let alone 
divergent, meanings. Thus, conservatives attached welfare to providing in-
creased industrial efficiency and promoting social order; social democrats 
and liberals linked it with nourishing social solidarity and human growth; 
and some socialists reluctantly tolerated it as a stage on the road to com-
mon ownership and distribution. Nationalist and populist undertones also 
abounded, as with the notion of Folkhemmet. Even among the high priests 
of welfarism there were inevitable squabbles about priorities and conceptual 
clusters.
Conceptual recalibrations and resurrected contestations 
More recently, the competing debates surrounding welfarism have been 
subject to some crucial ideological and conceptual attempts at redefining 
the linguistic and rhetorical frameworks through which welfare policies 
and the welfare state have been approached. To some extent, thinking about 
welfare has gone full circle in recent decades, with arguments relating to a 
very thin understanding of welfare seemingly echoing nineteenth-century 
positions that only a generation ago appeared to have been discarded, if not 
buried. Yet this is not a question of simple historical replication. Three issues 
are of particular interest. First, within the profession of welfare theorists, 
policy analysts, and political scientists, the role and very presence of the 
state has come under increased questioning. The issue is no longer whether 
the state is too interventionist, too neutering of individual initiative or, con-
versely, insufficiently endowed with distributive powers. Rather, the theory 
of the welfare state has become a victim of the decline of theories of the state. 
With governance replacing government as the focus of attention, the em-
phasis has shifted to processes of policy delivery. On the one hand, welfare 
policies are deemed successful if they meet criteria of accountability, audit, 
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and transparency.17 As one Swedish commentator has put it, the change is 
one from ‘doing the right thing’ to ‘doing the thing right’.18 On the other 
hand, they are deemed successful if what is known as ‘evidence-based’ social 
policy can demonstrate statistically that certain mass outcomes have been 
produced. What was assumed a century ago now has to be proved, as more 
sophisticated understandings of the path from policy inception to policy 
delivery have moved centre stage. The immediate impact of that is to high-
light the so-called ‘technicalities’ of welfare policy. They are taken as given 
and uncontroversial, whereas in effect they mask the ideological implica-
tions of those policies and sideline the macro-visions of welfare necessary 
to mobilize democratic support for welfarism—once again expertise replac-
ing ethical public engagement. More recently, notions of performance ac-
countability identify the legitimacy of a policy with achieving targets or with 
consumer satisfaction.19 In the latter case the old quantitative utilitarianism 
re-emerges in a new form, while collective and communitarian underpin-
nings of welfarism are bypassed.
Second, there has been an attempt—especially notable in public jar-
gon—to replace the language of citizenship that underpinned much twen-
tieth-century welfarism with that of clientism. That marketization of social 
relationships, so that individuals become customers and recipients of ser-
vices, is much more conspicuous than it was when welfarism emerged as a 
partial antidote a century ago. The use of ‘customer’ to replace ‘passenger’, 
‘patient’, or even ‘citizen’ introduces a monolithic, dehumanizing catego-
rization instead of the multifarious subtlety of past welfare languages that 
identified diverse social ills. Furthermore, although economic and financial 
activity were valued as major forms of social contribution, what is different 
now is the absence of mitigating rules of social comportment or ostensible 
morality that took the edge out of blatant consumerism. What is nowadays 
referred to as the re-emergence of civil society often masks a shrinkage of 
civility and of the salience of citizenship.20 This rawer, and more pervasive, 
17 Olssen 2010, 8–9.
18 Lindvert 2008.
19 Bevir 2010, 36–37.
20 For a discussion of such complexities, see Cohen and Arato 1994, 464–471. 
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type of marketization, with its disengagement from social planning and dis-
tributive justice21, implies a passive and non-participatory status in which 
redress for wrongs can be gained mainly through complaints to service pro-
viders rather than through the public and parliamentary discourse on which 
the welfare state pinned its hopes. That break-up and individuation have 
weakened the hold of welfare visions on the public imagination. The idea of 
citizenship at the heart of twentieth-century welfarism was predicated on a 
significant mixture of components that included a threefold set of catego-
ries: recognition of the worth of an individual as a full legal member of a 
society and as a bundle of needs (rather than wants) whose satisfaction was 
essential to human functioning and flourishing; participation in the goods a 
society had to offer; and the giving of full expression to the communal and 
interdependent features of human existence.22 Since the late twentieth cen-
tury that complex conceptualization of citizenship has been partly eroded.
 What is now popularly known as neoliberalism has endeavoured—with 
moderate success only—to colonize the ideological space that a social lib-
eralism inhabited during the heyday of welfarism. This crisis is less one of 
welfarism itself and more about the ideological contestation between a lib-
eralism necessary for welfarism to flourish and a market-inspired pseudo-
liberalism. That neoliberalism has aggressively expanded the concept of 
liberty to occupy almost all the space within liberal ideologies, a space usu-
ally shared also with notions of individual development and mutual sup-
port.23 That emaciation of liberalism cannot sustain the thick ideology of the 
welfare state and can only retain a conception of welfare by resorting to its 
minimum humanitarian role as handouts to those unsuccessful in free com-
petition. If the nineteenth-century social stigma of degenerate pauperism 
has been mitigated, the economic stigma of failure and the ethical stigma 
of individual irresponsibility are still not far beneath the surface, while the 
deregulatory frameworks for treating those have become procedural rather 
than substantial. The mood of resentment evident against welfare state re-
21 King & Ross 2010, 48.
22 Freeden 1992, 185–186; Isin & Nielsen, 2008. 
23 See Steger & Roy 2010.
part i: welfare and crises
44
distributions a century ago has been revitalized. That is not to suggest that 
neoliberalism has been victorious. It is a virulent and damaging form of 
attack on welfarism, and it exploits very efficiently some of the earlier cri-
tiques that lurked beneath its surface, but it has not been fatal. 
Third, the notion of human rights has undergone shrinkage in relation 
to its optimal early twentieth-century meanings. A right is always a cap-
sule that protects and prioritizes something considered to be socially and 
humanly valuable; it is always a right to the important value enshrined in 
its grammatical structure. But there has been an awkward shift in the di-
rectional flow of rights. The ‘discovery’ of welfarism was that rights had 
social origins and were intended to promote social needs alongside indi-
vidual ones; that rights were a gift from society to enable its members to 
flourish and obtain all that was truly valuable in social life. Rights thus con-
stituted part of the language of recognition and inclusion, and they were 
campaigned for by those already benefiting from society—social reformers, 
educationalists, radical politicians—to endow the have-nots. All that was 
beautifully encapsulated in Titmuss’s phrase ‘the right to give’ in which al-
truism was considered a privilege granted to members of a society. That 
altruism was deemed to enhance the character of human interdependence.24 
Contemporary discourse has disparagingly attempted to reverse that flow 
by discursively recalibrating welfare rights in particular as private, egois-
tic and potentially anti-social claims that can damage social stability and 
undermine the so-called rationality of markets. Instead, it focuses on the 
older libertarian rights to non-interference, and on the traditional view of 
many individual rights as conditional upon the discharge of social respon-
sibilities.25 And the multiculturalism discovered by a humane liberalism has 
ignited populist fears about immigration that place welfare rights on the 
defensive. As was the case a century ago, the moral strengths of liberalism 
are accompanied by its Achilles’ heels. 
Welfarism has encompassed many significant elements. It has linked 
older notions of individual development with an ethos of mutual coopera-
24 Titmuss 1973, 272.
25 Etzioni 1995.
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tion. It has emphasized the role of the state as a promoter of regenerative 
social visions. It offers a gentler view of human nature, allowing the han-
dling of individual fallibility without stigma. It has united liberal and social 
democratic languages in a powerful combination. It has espoused a univer-
sality of regard and treatment, while remaining alert to different claims in 
and across societies. It has also been too naively optimistic, has raised social 
expectations and fear in almost equal measure, has subscribed implicitly to 
forms of paternalism, and has underestimated the democratization of poli-
tics that spawned it and concurrently facilitated its (partial) erosion. And it 
has proved vulnerable, though not fatally so, to other ideologies that have 
raised their profile once again since the last quarter of the twentieth century 
and that have undermined the fullness of the notion of citizenship that wel-
farism embraces.
At any point in time and location in space, various conceptual combina-
tions will create dominant and recessive versions of welfarism, when major 
components of one strand appear as minor components of the other. That 
does not necessitate ideological crises but it requires ideological generos-
ity, political patience, and the longer view—qualities that governments and 
democratic electors do not possess in abundance. For some, that may be a 
good reason to remove the fluctuations of welfare policy from exaggerated 
subservience to the democratic process when that process is counterpro-
ductive to welfare visions. For others, it may require the wresting of power 
away from bureaucracies, or at least the retrieval of popular ideological ac-
countability instead of performance accountability. Alternatively, we may 
need slightly to lower our expectations of what welfare and the welfare 
state can provide, while still regarding welfarism as the greatest ideological 
achievement of the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 3
Welfare state and capitalist crisis
christopher lloyd
Four main tendencies or transformations, running to some extent counter 
to each other, have been evident throughout the crisis of Western capital-
ism since 2008 and which have roots from well before the crash. Do they 
together point to something fundamental about the trajectory of the world 
political economy today and into the future, with profound consequenc-
es for Western welfare states? More particularly, has the Western welfare/
developmental state model been wounded fatally by the crisis and by the 
deeper instabilities that the crisis revealed? The answer depends on the na-
ture of the crisis and on the deeper tendencies within the West and within 
capitalism as a wider world of structural tendencies.
The first tendency, actually a transformation, has been the severe loss 
of fiscal capacity and the consequent ideological and practical reassertion 
of austerity in parts of the advanced regions of Europe and in the United 
States. Depression in economic and social senses and retrenchment have 
been the outcomes of the bursting of the boom phase. The contradiction 
of the attempted maintenance of the advanced welfare state while privati-
zation, marketization, and financialization grew apace has become intoler-
able in many places. That is, the contradiction between market and state lies 
at the heart of the crisis. A private, bank-fuelled, speculative crisis turned 
into a state debt crisis as many states, having negligently failed to prevent 
financialization and the bubble, attempted to save their banking sectors and 
their economies—and therefore their fragile and limited political control—
through bailouts using public debt to be repaid by tax payers. 
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The second tendency has been a bifurcation within the OECD zone. 
Some countries, notably the Nordic countries, Canada, Japan, and the coun-
tries of Australasia, have not had a sovereign debt crisis as such yet (despite 
high levels of public debt in some countries), have not experienced depres-
sion, and have not instituted austerity measures. Their state sectors have 
remained more or less as before and public debt has grown only slightly.
The third tendency, uninterrupted for decades in some places, has been 
the rapid growth and development, despite the Western crisis, of the newly 
emergent Asian economies, notably China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, 
more recently Indonesia, and now joined in high growth by some other 
countries, notably in Latin America. While there has been some economic 
slowdown, these countries and the Asian region generally have continued to 
industrialize rapidly but from a low base.
The fourth tendency, gathering strength since the early years of the first 
decade of the twenty-first decade, has been a revival and/or continuation 
of the commodities boom in those regions with well-established primary 
export sectors (the Middle East, Russia, Australasia, Canada) and the spread 
of the new commodities bonanza to new areas in Central Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.
Together these tendencies have been taken to point to both the seeming 
exhaustion of the Western model and the switch of the centre of world de-
velopmental dynamism to Asia and its commodity satellites in Australasia, 
Latin America, and Africa. But things are not so simple. For example, the 
impact of the crisis on welfare provision has been uneven. Severe public aus-
terity in some places has occurred with maintenance of the status quo in oth-
ers. As the cases of the Nordic countries, Germany, the Low Countries, the 
countries of Australasia, and Canada show, the Western model has not been 
much eroded yet in those places despite limited degrees of budget austerity 
implemented in 2012 after the ending of the countercyclical stimulus poli-
cies begun in 2009. In other places, especially in southern Europe, Ireland, 
and the UK, it has. The election of Francois Hollande in France on a social 
democratic platform is an indicator of the anti-austerity countermovement, 
although the translation of ideology to action is yet to happen there.  
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In order to grasp the nature of the crisis of the Western Model and its 
prospects of survival or destruction, we have to identify its main underlying 
features and how it got to be in such a crisis state, a process that began in 
the 1970s.  
Social democratic welfare capitalism since the 1970s: reformed 
but not transformed
Social democratic welfare capitalism (SDWC) grew out of the post–World 
War II historic settlement that had roots as far back as the advent of so-
cial democratic ideological and political movements in the late nineteenth 
century. This development was in turn produced by industrialization and 
proletarianization. Sidetracked and yet enlivened by the Great Depression 
and the war against Fascism, SDWC came into maturity from the mid-1940s 
and grew in power and spread throughout subsequent decades. By the late 
1960s and early 1970s, SDWC had become a hegemonic regime throughout 
the Western advanced world and its offshoots. The system was centred on 
developmental, regulatory, and welfare states and the maintenance of pro-
grammes of competitive national capitalism. But when the Western boom 
ran out of steam in the mid-1970s the consequent rise of neoliberal ideology 
seemed to push the Western system in a new anti-state direction.  
It is clear, however, that the Western state model was not overthrown 
in the 1970s–1980s by neoliberal retrenchment. The social democratic he-
gemony that all mainstream political parties had converged upon proved 
very resilient. The model was reformed, not transformed, in two phases. In 
the first, from early 1980s until early 1990s, there was indeed a reduction 
of the centricity of the state and its welfare system. The so-called ‘deregula-
tion’ phase did partially ‘wind back the state’ in terms of the institutional 
and ideological balance between state and market. Secondly, from the early 
1990s came the rise of ‘regulatory capitalism’1 during which the distinctions 
between state, market, and capital became more blurred as states privatized 
some of their productive capacity and so erstwhile state enterprises ceased 
1 Levi-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2008.
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to be both market dominators and substantive market regulators. Many 
markets, crucially the capital and labour markets, were ‘freed’ to varying 
degrees from direct state controls but not actually deregulated as neoliberal 
ideologists wished. New formal regulatory institutions to ensure ‘market ef-
ficiency and fairness’ were created en masse. But so-called market efficiency 
did not solve the problem of unemployment and underemployment that 
persisted since the 1970s.  
Thus the state’s place in the overall political economy, while reformed 
since the early 1980s, was not very significantly changed in the macroeco-
nomic sense by neoliberalism. The system of state welfare and redistribu-
tion plus most public infrastructure remained in place alongside the new 
regulocracy.2 A significant change would have seen taxation as a propor-
tion of GDP decline significantly from the levels of the 1950s–1970s and the 
privatization of most state assets and services but this did not happen. The 
revenue continued to be spent on state welfare, public health, public trans-
port, public education, public broadcasting, and so on, despite some privati-
zations. The redistributionist SDWC model continued to be supported even 
though the capital market had been freed to a large extent and the labour 
market was ‘freer’ than hitherto in some countries. The degree of privatiza-
tion that occurred did not represent a transformation of SDWC in a macro 
sense but just a change within the regulatory system, one with, however, 
profound later consequences because of the failure of that regulatory system.
The other great changes in the world political economy since the early 
1990s were the collapse of communism and the efflorescence of capitalism 
outside the Western heartland.  This efflorescence is crucial for understand-
ing both where the West is today and what could happen next. The world 
economy has become globalized. It is only about 20 years since the Internet 
began to take off, 20 years since the collapse of communism in Russia, and 
20 years since Deng Xiaoping’s ‘southern tour’ consolidated the capitalist 
road in China. The pace of change has been enormous. The new technical-
economic mode of accumulation, based on IT, the Internet, mobile tele-
2 This is Braithwaite’s collective term to describe the greatly increased role of ‘independent regulators’ 
within regulatory capitalism.
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phony, investment banking, currency speculation, and revolutionized air 
transport, created 16 years of unprecedented growth in trade and develop-
ment. Capitalism spread to almost every village and individual in the world.
Deep structure of the Western crisis
The capitalist efflorescence in the East has thrown into sharp relief the par-
ticular nature of the advanced Western model and its history, particularly 
the path dependent nature of the social democratic accommodation be-
tween state and market, on one hand, and the contradictions and instabili-
ties the success of this model have engendered by the twenty-first century, 
on the other. The capacity of the model to respond to the crisis is in doubt 
because of the extent to which it has evolved in recent decades. Destabilizing 
developments have included: 
(i) De-industrialization and financialization 
The significant shift since the early 1990s within the accumulation structure 
in the West from industrial to finance capital has highlighted the original 
connection of social democratic states with industrialization. The matura-
tion of industrialization, achieved by the 1960s in most Western states, the 
resulting accumulation crisis of the 1970s–1980s, and then the shift to post-
Fordist de-industrialization and the rise of the knowledge industries of the 
quaternary sector began to make redundant the developmental state indus-
trial and employment strategy. Economic and technological transformation 
has shifted the ground from under a significant element of the SDWC re-
gime, politically based as it was on the organized industrial working class. 
Without supporting a technological determinist thesis, perhaps we can add 
to Marx’s rhetorical comment about the hand mill giving a society with a 
feudal lord and the steam mill giving a society with an industrial capitalist 
that the Internet and the mobile phone have given us a society with a mer-
chant banker and a hedge fund speculator. The figure of the entrepreneurial 
industrialist was emblematic until the 1980s, or even until the 1990s in the 
form of the software developer, but has been replaced by the financial wiz-
ard of the merchant bank and hedge fund since the 1990s.
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As the social structure of capitalist accumulation in the advanced so-
cieties has now moved well beyond the industrial, Fordist imperatives of 
organizational management, so the connections between workplace, labour, 
knowledge, home life, and civil society are no longer centred on labour 
as such. Knowledge and information production require a quite different, 
more individualized mode of organization of work and social life. The po-
litical economy of knowledge has a regime of regulation based, in part, on 
small workplaces and even the dissipation of workplaces, and emphasizes 
individual and small group creativity at one level or deskilled service activity 
at another level. The growing individuation and precariousness of work has 
now reached more than 30 per cent of the workforce in some countries.3 
Furthermore, the decline of the social embeddedness of work becomes 
more salient in the individualized world of knowledge production and low-
skilled services.4 
The Western financialization was stimulated by the capital requirements 
and speculative opportunities of the newly industrializing regions and 
lacked effective state regulation once the globalization era began. The major 
shock from 2008 has not undermined the trend. This looks like a permanent 
shift. The place of financial institutions and finance capital seems set to re-
main dominant in the West. The problem of recycling the massive surpluses 
of the newly industrializing regions (especially China) and of the newly rich 
resource exporters (such as Norway, Australia, Brazil, Russia, and the Gulf 
States) riding on their backs will only grow. While the Western institutions 
are still the globally dominant players, the biggest sources of funds are now 
elsewhere.
(ii) Declining state capacity
Within this financialization context, the crisis has caused a severe erosion of 
fiscal capacity of some Western states to support their high levels of social 
welfare and public infrastructure with the corresponding decline of social 
3 See Standing 2011.
4 A radically individualized, dystopic future world of cybernetics and knowledge is described in the 
pages of cyber-punk science fiction, the leading exponent being William Gibson; see especially All 
Tomorrow’s Parties, Pattern Recognition, and Spook Country.
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stability and consensus. Furthermore, the economic competition from the 
East is eroding the comparative economic and therefore fiscal strength of 
the West.  
(iii) Aging population
The demographic transition to a more upwardly skewed aging population 
is presenting a great financial challenge of upward rather than downward 
intergenerational transfers, adding to the fiscal crisis.
(iv) Ultramodernist erosion of state legitimacy
The fiscal crisis is exacerbating the existing erosion of legitimacy and sup-
port of the Western state model among significant sections of the popu-
lace on the grounds of the increasing failure of the system to deliver desired 
social, political, cultural, and environmental outcomes. Disadvantaged and 
marginal social groups have declining faith in a redistributive and protective 
state to deliver social improvements in a crisis context. Liberal social and 
environmental activists are losing faith in what has always been a compro-
mised capitalist state. The power of elite social networks and their isolation 
from civil society has increased as the marketization process and inequal-
ity have grown since the 1980s. And the trend towards ultramodernist in-
dividual subjectivity leaves the political process open to populist politics 
of right and left. Within the increasingly pervasive mediascape, populist 
politics are able to grow where there is little authoritative corrective (from 
unions, churches, the state) to mass expressions and transmissions of fear 
and prejudice. 
(v) Selfish, bad-faith, opportunistic politics
The contradictory success of liberal social democracy as a modernizing and 
wealth-producing programme that has led to greater individual freedom, 
more consumerism, and ultramodernist culture, within the confines of the 
state, was bound to lead to resistance to state pressure for conformity. Many 
leaders have done little to oppose xenophobic nationalist attacks on the eth-
nic diversity that has directly resulted from Western capitalism’s need for 
christopher lloyd – welfare state and capitalist crisis
55
cheaper labour supplies in earlier decades, as well as from the failure of post-
colonial development and post-imperial dislocations in the poorest nations.
Egalitarian democracy, full employment, and social welfare do ame-
liorate discontent, but ethnic diversity adds a new pressure. Bad-faith and 
hollowed-out politics has little to offer in the current context of economic 
recession, financial greed, unemployment, ethnic resentments, individua-
tion, and growing inequality. The hollowing out of the political institutions 
and the rise of extremist scapegoating leaves a political vacuum. But could 
this (probably inevitable) phase be a passing one? There is some reason to 
think so as discussed below.
So, have we come to the point where the long-run attempt by social de-
mocracy to reform capitalism in such a way that it is at once economically 
dynamic and also socially stable and politically legitimated through deliver-
ing full employment and equality and security via a fiscally capacious state 
has run its course? It was always an impossible task to maintain the regime 
indefinitely in its fully developed form. In fact the high point of social dem-
ocratic management lasted only a couple of decades. Forms of capitalism are 
always more or less unstable with inherent contradictions and it is remark-
able that SDWC has lasted so long.
Three visions of the SDWC future 
This severe crisis has prompted three visions of the SDWC future, all of 
which see it being transformed into a different mode of capitalism. Two 
of them may be regarded as pessimistic and the third optimistic, but all of 
them see the role of the state being greatly reduced and inequality worsen-
ing.
Regulatory capitalism and the non-state trajectory
First is the view that the centrality of the state in the production/market 
nexus will be further eroded due to economic stagnation and the fiscal in-
capacity of the state. The state’s directly interventionist role will decline due 
to loss of fiscal capacity and ideological opposition, leading to further priva-
tization and individualization, with consequential growing inequality and 
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social segmentation. But this also means there has to be more and improved 
formal regulation of the regulatory capitalist kind. That is, the state’s role 
shifts from being a central economic actor to being the ultimate regulator of 
private activity. In this vision of a more fully marketized society, social rela-
tions are mediated by rationally regulated market relations rather than by 
collectivism organized through the publicly interested state and its embed-
dedness in local social capital. One’s individual consumer/financial power 
will determine one’s life course and standard of living.
Second, and related to the first vision, is the continuing de-legitimation 
and decay of the central institutions that have underpinned the Western 
model, leading to a cascade downwards of agency from state to local and/
or issue-specific coalitions and groups acting more or less spontaneously. 
Some of these groups, such as El Quaeda and criminal syndicates, have dark, 
sometimes very violent, agendas. Some, such as NGOs and protest move-
ments, are aimed at restoring the balance of the public interest at a local level 
against state and capital (for example, Syriza in Greece).  
We can call this broad phenomenon the ‘non-state trajectory’, the logic 
of which could (but may not) lead eventually to a semi-disorganized, even 
multitudinous society without overarching institutions of regulation, con-
trol, and authority. The strong bourgeois state will supposedly wither away 
to be replaced, it is expected by some such as Hardt and Negri5, by strong 
local agency and cooperative communities.  
A reinvigoration of social democracy? A contingent possibility?
Against these pessimistic visions of the SDWC future is the third, optimistic 
vision of a possible reinvigoration of SDWC and the adoption of the model’s 
regulatory and social regime by other regions. The foundation for this vision 
is an understanding of the deeper causes of social democracy’s emergence 
and strength in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which per-
haps can be replicated elsewhere. Could those conditions be reproduced 
elsewhere in a general sense such that social democratic solutions would 
5 Hardt & Negri 2000 and 2004
christopher lloyd – welfare state and capitalist crisis
57
come to the fore again in the history of capitalism? And, furthermore, ac-
cording to this scenario, social democracy could be reactivated in the West-
ern postindustrial context as a consequence of the current crisis, a crisis that 
will not be overcome by the wholesale erosion of the Western state’s role 
in social and economic management. But the regulatory capitalism trend 
is likely to be experienced for some time yet as the Western financial and 
political elites attempt to grapple with the crisis through a marketization 
process. All crisis moments are pregnant with contingency.
While the concepts of ‘regulatory capitalism’, with its analysis of the 
marketized state as at least compliant with capital or perhaps dissolved into 
capitalism, and of the ‘delegitimised state’, with its corresponding collapse 
of agency to local non-state coalitions, do have significant overlapping em-
pirical merit, they do not tell the whole story of what has happened in re-
cent decades. As mentioned earlier, the state has remained significant in the 
Western world and, despite the rise of the regulocracy and of the non-state 
actors, the structure of social provision and welfare via the state or state-
mandated contributions has remained more or less intact and in some areas 
even been strengthened. Moreover, the regulocracy of finance capitalism 
clearly failed in the latter part of the first decade of the twenty-first century 
and quasi-Keynesian direct state intervention was required, at least to begin 
with. Regulatory capitalism as a coherent system that was supposed to make 
markets operate efficiently and produce optimal outcomes in investment, 
production, and consumption, failed to prevent old-fashioned speculative 
greed from severely damaging the quality of life and life chances of mil-
lions of people. Indeed, we should not have expected otherwise, as Wolfgang 
Streeck has cogently argued6, for capitalism is essentially constructed on 
the rewards to greed. And, furthermore, despite 16 uninterrupted years of 
economic expansion after 1992 in many countries, the problem of unem-
ployment persisted in all OECD countries at the peak of the boom. The 
capitalist system in its various regulatory modes, however we conceptualize 
it, has not worked in the interests of all the people of Western countries.  
6 Streeck 2009 and 2010. 
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Thus despite the rise of the regulocracy, it is clear that the state and its 
public agencies and services have actually not yet been extensively incor-
porated into the private market system. Large-scale, non-profit, non-mar-
ketized public services (in health, education, welfare, transport, and other 
areas) still persist throughout the developed Western world, especially in 
Northern Europe, and in some places such public sectors require taxation 
levels of half of GDP, as Amartya Sen recently pointed out in a powerful 
critique of market failure.7 The political support for public provision and 
redistribution via the state still seems to be strong. At least, until now. 
The social democratic state is still strong but the tipping point could be close
We do now seem to be at a possible tipping point away from the social dem-
ocratic state. The contradictions between, on the one hand, the surviving 
elements of the social democratic state and the public support for public ser-
vices, and, on the other, the shift to regulocracy, privatization, the economic 
disaster of the failed financialization strategy, the fiscal deficiency, and the 
rising xenophobia have together produced this crisis moment. The current 
round of severe retrenchments and privatizations that is just beginning in 
some places is going to open the contradictory divisions further. But there is 
already a political backlash against retrenchment and unemployment, as ev-
idenced by elections and social movements in several European countries. 
Nevertheless, the potential for collapse of the Western model in response to 
endogenous and exogenous pressures is increasingly real. Democracy itself, 
the very core of the social democratic tradition, is under pressure in some 
places as xenophobic and illiberal responses to crisis resurrect old extrem-
isms in Europe.  
The reinvigoration vision of SDWC’s future
On the other hand, there is still the positive vision about the social demo-
cratic future to be considered. This is based on a longer and deeper view of 
the historical and evolutionary foundations of SDWC as a regime of capi-
7 Sen 2009.
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talist regulation with a particular connection to, firstly, the way in which 
capitalism evolves as an integrated system of political, economic, and social 
development and, secondly, to the deep, largely subconscious, sociobiologi-
cal nature of humanity.  
The roots of SDWC lay in nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, 
which was based on massive rural-urban social dislocations, mass proletari-
anization, and mass class exploitation, all of which made it highly unstable 
and prone to revolutionary destruction. Capitalism increasingly required 
educated workers and education helped produce mass political and social 
consciousness. Political, economic and social demands were bound together 
in the movements and organizational coalescences of working classes for 
redress in the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth cen-
tury. Socialism was a class response in pursuit of equality, social stability, 
social and employment security, and social inclusion. By 1900, democratic 
socialism or social democracy (SD) ceased to be revolutionary and was 
opposed to communism, as well as to fascism and militarism, all of which 
aimed to greatly circumscribe or completely destroy capitalism and liberal-
ism. And then a crucial, contingent economic condition for the flourish-
ing of SD was the upswing of economic fortunes in the post-1945 decades, 
thanks, reflexively, in part, to social democracy itself both domestically and 
globally via the Bretton Woods system. All of these conditions for SD’s origi-
nal emergence still exist today in many parts of the world, most notably in 
China, India, and SE Asia. 
Furthermore, we have to ask about the origins of the human sociobio-
logical impulses towards and expressions of equality, fairness, social empa-
thy, and social justice that underlay this movement from within early indus-
trial society for democracy, cooperation, and social redress, and why they 
remain so powerful today.
Given these foundations, then, the argument here for a positive vision of 
SDWC’s future is in three parts.  
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(i) Industrial maturation produces social democratic demands
All forms of capitalism, once they develop economically towards indus-
trial maturity, give rise to demands not just for constitutional and work-
place reform but for social fairness and security as well. The assertion here 
is that these demands are an inherent evolving tendency of all capitalism. 
Of course there is a big assumption here—namely, that all forms of capital-
ism will eventually produce mature industrial economies with high aver-
age standards of material living with the corresponding growth in the fiscal 
capacity of states and that their politics will also be liberalized by popular 
pressure from below in such a developmental process. This has not always 
happened in the past.8 
Over recent decades we have seen development in the direction of 
SDWC in some maturing, prosperous East Asian countries, notably Singa-
pore, South Korea, and Taiwan, just as Japan had done earlier. Pressures 
from below are growing in Hong Kong, Thailand, China, and South East 
Asia. The massive dislocations as well as rising standards of living of earlier 
epochs are occurring again. The various forms of authoritarian state capi-
talism that now exist in China, Russia, MENA, and parts of Latin America 
and Africa are undergoing a rapid evolution in their economic and political 
structures. We have seen democratic uprisings in many countries in recent 
times. The Arab Spring is one large manifestation of this. Old demands for 
civil and workplace rights have become new again. The people of China, 
MENA, South East Asia, and elsewhere are no different in their social and 
political expectations than those of Europe in earlier times.  
(ii) Sociobiological impulses for fairness, equality, and empathy
The second part of the argument concerns the motivations and social in-
teractions of humans as sociobiological beings. There is growing evidence 
from sociobiological research that socially egalitarian, cooperative and 
democratic impulses are deeply inherent in the human behavioural domain. 
8 The so-called ‘middle-income trap’ has meant that in some places capitalism has failed to become 
dynamic and transformative in this Western manner, notably in Latin America, the Middle East, and 
parts of Asia. 
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A desire for fairness and reciprocity seems to be the most powerful impulse 
(but not the only one) in human interaction and social agency in all societies 
at whatever level of economic development.9 The new research shows that 
the structuring process of social reproduction that unites agency and struc-
ture has a strong tendency towards cooperation and equality at various lev-
els of hierarchically organized societies. Of course fairness and reciprocity 
are constrained and organized institutionally by power structures and rules. 
The rise of powerful and undemocratic elites and classes and the process of 
industrialization have together everywhere produced greater inequality but 
also rising affluence. Pressures from popular movements for reform in the 
direction of greater democracy, equality of power and wealth, and account-
ability of governments have so far had many successes and there is every 
reason to think they will continue to be powerful forces.
However, will the deep impulses for fairness, egalitarianism, and democ-
racy lead to the maintenance of social democratic structures in the postin-
dustrial, ultramodernist, more individualized world? This question prompts 
two others: Is cooperation and egalitarianism always humanely progressive 
and inclusive, or does it also have a dark side of xenophobia and exclusion? 
And does social democratic capitalism have to be essentially the same as 
hitherto, that is, centred on the liberal state? These are now key questions, 
for it is the liberal, inclusive and progressive social democratic state that is 
in crisis, financially, culturally and politically.
(iii) The possibility of a social democratic renewal in a multi-ethnic, knowl-
edge-based society
Thus the third part of this argument concerns postindustrial and multi-
ethnic societies. If social democracy was and continues to be a product 
of industrial maturation and social development, what happens when the 
manufacturing sector declines to be only a relatively insignificant propor-
tion of economies that have become knowledge-based, de-unionized, in-
dividualized, and multi-ethnic? Will the sociopolitical imperatives of the 
9 Gintis, Bowles, Boyd & Fehr 2003; Henrich & Henrich 2007; Fong, Bowles & Gintis 2004; Rifkin 
2010; Singer 1999; de Waal 2009; Corning 2011. 
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newly dynamic and now dominant knowledge and financial sectors have 
any vestige of the social democratic agenda centred on the collective public 
provision of welfare and services via an interventionist state? And will the 
chief supporters and beneficiaries of the state welfare system be happy to 
extend their ‘entitlements’ to newly arrived ethnic groups? Here the argu-
ment comes back in part to sociobiology and also to a new conception of 
cooperative society and politics that owes something to the non-state vision.
Towards a wider vision of agential micro-macro interactions and 
democracy: beyond state and market centrism
A new discourse about postindustrial information society is now coalesc-
ing around biopolitical theory (Foucault), communitarian and egalitarian 
communication (Esposito), localized mutualist democracy (Glasman), and 
sociobiological insights about human sociality, equality, empathy, and ca-
pacities.10 This rethinking is also drawing on an older stream of theory com-
ing from Marx, Weber, and especially Polanyi, about the structural inter-
connections of economy, society, and culture, which supersedes reductive 
materialist explanations of social structuring. Perhaps these can provide a 
way for understanding how the essence of social democracy, understood 
broadly as the institutionalization of a stabilizing regime of political econo-
my through welfare and equality, a regime centred on egalitarian cooperative 
arrangements, could be recovered by a certain structure of communication 
and social interaction at a more micro level of agency. Such cooperative ar-
rangements can include but are wider than the state. This view is based on 
the understanding that the old, delegitimated social democratic agency ex-
ercised collectively only via the increasingly discredited top-down state and 
other centrally focused institutions, such as unions, cannot be resuscitated 
due to their erosion by the ultramodernist development of individuation, 
ultra-subjectivity, and democratization in recent decades. 
While Hardt and Negri’s argument about how the central agential insti-
tutions of the Western world are collapsing into a multitudinous flatland of 
10 Cf. Gintis and Bowles et al. 2003; Henrich & Henrich 2007; Corning 2011; Singer 1999; Sen 2009;  
Rifkin 2010; de Waal 2009.
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micro-interactions is a confronting one, it ignores the inherent possibility of 
community and communitarian politics (including association and partici-
patory democracy) arising from the cooperative instincts of humanity. In-
deed, structure and local agency and their interpenetration seem always to 
re-emerge even if the state is weakened or non-functional. The myopic focus 
on the state has become a weakness of much of the theorizing about welfare 
and democracy within the ultramodernist era. Esposito’s ‘revitalisation of 
politics’, like Sen’s and Nussbaum’s emphasis on capabilities, and Glasman’s 
emphasis on mutualism, gives greater ground for hope than Hardt and Ne-
gri’s neo-Hobbesian vision of disorder or the aridity of regulocracy and 
marketization. Streeck’s analysis of the capitalism-democracy connection as 
a set of ‘border crossings’ and advocacy of the democratization of capital11 is 
now showing the way to a new emphasis on the necessity for politics.
Indeed, a fundamental concern and dilemma for advocates of SDWC 
has always been of how the interrelationship between individual, society, 
and economy, which fundamentally are in tension or even contradictory, are 
best administered within a democratic but capitalist political economy. The 
regulatory capitalism vision does not help here for it replaces democracy 
with supposedly enlightened administration in the interests of efficiency, 
assuming it can be made to work. The non-state trajectory does contain an 
idea of democratic governance, but the status of capitalism is unresolved. 
Can capitalism, with its essential greed, inequality, and periodic catastro-
phes, ever be tamed and really stabilized by voluntary coalitions? This is the 
central political question now facing many countries. Can there be a new 
conception of the democratic society at both national and global levels that 
goes beyond social democracy? 
The innate nature of capitalism as a system that promotes greed, com-
petition, inequality, and contested exchange, is no different in essence in 
its knowledge-based form. Social solidarity always has to be nurtured and 
protected against its enemies. In the dissipated knowledge economy, the lo-
cating of politics at a more micro level of cooperation and then applying 
11 Streeck 2011, 2012.
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political power to the macro economy and society, is of fundamental impor-
tance to the future of social democracy. But an active and democratic state 
is also necessary to provide essential forces of peace, security, and stability, 
as well as welfare, none of which can be provided adequately by local, non-
state agencies. Weak and dysfunctional states that cede powers to non-state 
forces usually lead to catastrophes, many examples of which we have seen 
recently. Authoritarian states are of course just as dangerous.  
Thus the democratic control and use of state power is a crucial issue 
more than ever in the ultramodern society with its individualism and social, 
cultural and ethnic diversity. The new kind of state has to be one of radical 
responsiveness to both democratic processes and real world problems. State 
actors that do not respond actively risk being removed very quickly through 
political pressure from below. Solving problems of the social embedded-
ness of markets and environments, rather than carving out self-interested 
terrains, has to be the aim of state action. Overcoming problems of ethnic 
integration, for example, is an urgent issue. The role of progressive non-state 
groups as well as progressive state-level politicians is essential in this process 
of confronting xenophobic forces.
That the current global crises of finance capital, global migration, pov-
erty, and the natural environment, are testing and breaking the limits of 
social democracy (let alone revealing the abject failure of neoliberalism and 
marketization) shows the necessity of a new/old approach to politics and 
policy. Advanced capitalism has become increasingly influenced by agen-
tial-political processes and in the twenty-first century the power of ideology, 
culture, and politics to mould economies and societies makes the future less 
path-dependent and more open to collective agency. 
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CHAPTER 4
Gender, inequality and the crisis
diane perrons
The contemporary economic crisis that started in late 2007 in the United 
States and the United Kingdom was sparked by mismanagement of capital 
markets in the financial centres of the Western world, but underlying causes 
are deeply rooted in the neoliberal model of global development in general 
and in the increase in inequality with which it is associated in particular. As 
the processes generating current inequalities are so profound and so embed-
ded within neoliberalism, it is necessary both to challenge rather than inten-
sify the current neoliberal orthodoxy and to consider alternative analyses of 
and resolutions to the crisis. More specifically, it is important to recognize 
connections between economic and social processes and between growth 
and welfare, and by doing so to potentially identify more economically sus-
tainable and socially just ways to organize societies. The central problem is 
how to establish a relationship between the economy and society such that 
the economy serves society rather than the reverse. To address this question, 
I draw on the work of contemporary feminist and heterodox economists 
who highlight the connections between inequality and the crisis, who are 
critical of existing state responses, and who instead, and in different ways, 
advocate forms of Keynesianism. In addition, I refer to Karl Polanyi1, who 
analysed the tension between states and markets and between those press-
ing for self-regulating markets and those pressing for greater social control 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to the work of fem-
1 Polanyi 1957.
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inists, including Nancy Fraser2, who argue that neither Keynesianism nor 
Polanyian resolutions go far enough and that more transformative policies 
are required to secure more equitable and inclusive development, especially 
with respect to gender.
The intensity of the ‘global’ financial crisis varied, being most severe 
first of all in the United States, the United Kingdom, Iceland and Ireland, 
and subsequently in the smaller European States in the Eurozone, but many 
countries throughout the world were affected. Following this crisis there has 
been a prolonged period of slow or negative economic growth, termed an 
austerity crisis in these same countries. While the first crisis can be attrib-
uted to the intensification of market processes, in particular labour market 
and financial deregulation, the second is more directly related to govern-
ment responses and it is more accurate to describe it is a North Atlantic 
crisis3, as elsewhere, particularly in the emerging economies, economic 
growth continues, albeit at a lower rate. Nonetheless, both crises can be 
linked to the pursuit of neoliberalism. As many aspects of the financial crisis 
were global, I begin the chapter by outlining the association between neo-
liberalism and rising inequality at a fairly abstract and theoretical level and 
identify the role of inequality in generating the crisis. I then discuss different 
analyses of the crises and responses by focusing on differential understand-
ings of the appropriate relationship between the economy and society. As 
the depth of the crisis and the subsequent policy response varies between 
these countries, the final section of the chapter then turns more specifically 
to the United Kingdom. 
Despite its failure to secure economic recovery in the two years since its 
introduction in 2010, the UK coalition government persists with the oxy-
moronic policy of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’: a policy which attempts 
to generate growth through austerity. Unemployment remains high, and 
many people, especially those on low earnings, disproportionately women, 
are experiencing declining welfare as social benefits are cut. Yet earnings 
of the top decile continue to rise. If there is any validity in the argument 
2 Fraser 2011.
3 Krugman 2012.
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that inequality was a cause of the current crisis, then austerity policies of 
this kind cannot provide a resolution. In this respect, rather than society 
reigning in the economy as would be expected in a Polanyian double move-
ment of capitalism, the UK government instead intensified neoliberalism4, 
making the self-regulating market the organizing principle of society.5 This 
strategy is not only divisive, but is also unlikely to secure its stated objectives 
of restoring economic growth, so it is crucial to think of alternative models 
of development as well as why neoliberalism remains so resilient.   
Neoliberal globalization, growth and inequality
The era of neoliberalism has been associated with economic growth and ris-
ing affluence and in many ways it is correct to state that society as a whole 
has never been more opulent.6 Since the mid-1970s, world income has dou-
bled, and for unprecedented numbers of people what Keynes7 termed ‘the 
economic problem’, namely, the provision of basic survival needs including 
food, shelter, and clothing, has been resolved. Whether this association is 
causal is more questionable, as both China and India have deviated from 
neoliberalism yet fared significantly better than those in postsocialist Soviet 
countries and Latin America8 that implemented radical neoliberal reforms. 
These contrasting experiences led to a growing recognition that neoliberal 
growth policies recommended, even enforced, by supranational institutions 
from the 1980s until the early twenty-first century were not reflected in su-
perior economic performances. In parallel, the economic crisis has been 
deepest in those countries most exposed to free markets, so Mexico, the 
Baltic States, the United Kingdom and the United States fared much worse 
than China, Brazil, or the Nordic countries (with the exception of Iceland).9 
At the same time inequality has increased within and between countries. In 
the last thirty years labour’s share of value added has fallen in a wide range of 
4 Grimshaw & Rubery 2012.
5 Polanyi 1957.
6 Sen 1999.
7 Keynes 1931.
8 See Dunford & Yeung 2011; Quah 2011; Martínez, Molyneux & Sánchez-Ancochea 2009. 
9 See Perrons 2011. 
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countries10 and inequality is approaching levels not seen since the 1920s in 
the United States and the United Kingdom.11 The extent of earnings inequal-
ity and the degree of subsequent redistribution varies considerably between 
countries but is a widespread and enduring feature of neoliberalism and, as 
a number of feminist and heterodox economists have argued, was one of the 
underlying causes of the ‘global’ financial crisis.12 The foundation for this 
argument is set out below.
Just as the Great Depression of the 1930s was preceded by high levels of 
inequality, so too was the crisis of 2007.13 But what are the analytical connec-
tions between inequality and crisis? What processes led to rising inequality, 
and how are these processes related to the growing significance of the fi-
nance sector? Finally, in what ways are these processes and effects gendered? 
The overall increase in inequality is associated with labour’s declining 
share of value added and how this has impacted most on low-paid workers, 
reflected in the polarization of earnings during the last three decades. In the 
United Kingdom, the earnings gap between the 90th and 10th decile of the 
income distribution increased from nearly 3 to 3.6 times and in the United 
States from 3.8 to nearly 5 times as much.14 A variety of interrelated pro-
cesses have contributed to this outcome including: increased global com-
petitiveness; the diminishing power of organized labour to protect the wage 
share15; and the legitimation of shareholder value, through which returns to 
shareholders are regarded as a cost of production, rather than a post-pro-
duction distribution of profit.16 These processes in turn can be linked to the 
way that states have been able to secure support for neoliberal market val-
10 This fall in labour’s share of income was not confined to the United States. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) found this pattern in 51 of 73 countries for which data was available between the 
early 1990s and 2007. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) World economic outlook also identi-
fies this trend and finds that labour’s share of value added fell most in sectors where qualification 
requirements were low. INEQ, Europe’s inequality challenge, found that earnings rose more slowly 
than productivity for 61 per cent of EU workforce between 2003–2006. See also Perrons & Plomien 
2011. 
11 Atkinson, Piketty & Saez 2011.
12 Stiglitz 2012a & 2012b; Seguino 2010.
13 Stiglitz 2012b.
14 OECD 2011.
15 INEQ 2009; Perrons & Plomien 2012.
16 Froud, Leaver & Williams 2007.
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ues, in particular privatization and deregulation, to their ability to portray 
the market as an efficient, effective and just means of allocating resources, 
and through the manner in which individual returns come to be regarded 
as a reflection of individual endeavour. In this way neoliberalism constitutes 
an entire ‘political rationality that … reaches beyond the market’17 and lib-
eral hegemony is secured by presenting ‘as a moral exigency what is really a 
political decision.’18
From the perspective of ensuring overall economic and social reproduc-
tion, such gains to capital and increases in inequality can, as history shows, 
be counterproductive; wage suppression depresses overall aggregate effec-
tive demand and limits profitable investment opportunities as higher wage 
earners have a lower marginal propensity to consume compared to low 
earners. The only way for working people to try to maintain their standard 
of living and for the state to try to maintain effective demand is therefore 
through expanding debt. This expansion of debt, together with the difficul-
ties of securing profit through more traditional product markets, led to the 
development of ever more complex and allegedly risk-free financial prod-
ucts as investors searched for new profitable opportunities. The connections 
between these financial products and the real economy became increasingly 
tenuous. With respect to the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
financial products were in effect recycling the debt that had financed con-
sumption, including mortgages, among low and middle income groups, as 
they tried to sustain the socially accepted standard of living in the context 
of falling incomes. The decline in real incomes in turn made the repayment 
of debt difficult. The outcome was the subprime crisis in the United States, 
shortly followed by a similar crisis in the United Kingdom, with the crisis 
cascading into the wider financial crisis among Western economies at the 
end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
This analysis suggests that rather than focusing only on the banks and 
financial markets, attention also needs to be given to more fundamental 
changes in the economy. It was these deep-seated changes, particularly 
17 Brown 2003, 5.
18 Mouffe 2000. For a fuller discussion of these mechanisms, see Dunford & Perrons forthcoming. 
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those associated with rising inequalities, that led to finance becoming such 
an important economic activity, and that led people to incur increasing 
amounts of debt that they were unable to repay.19 Crucial, then, is an analy-
sis of the profound economic restructuring that took place in the context of 
neoliberal globalization in the decades preceding the financial crisis. Here I 
focus only on changes in the labour market that are associated with widen-
ing inequality.
Inequality and gender inequality in the labour market
Understanding the underlying processes that generate increasing earnings 
inequalities is clearly a prerequisite for redressing rising earnings and en-
during gender inequalities. Orthodox explanations for rising wage inequal-
ity in OECD countries emphasize globalization, migration, and trade on the 
one hand and skill-biased technological change on the other.20 Debates be-
tween these perspectives continue, but in essence, both relate to a polariza-
tion in employment composition, with increases in well-paid professional 
and managerial jobs and lower-paid work in personal services and security 
occurring whilst middle-level manufacturing work is off-shored. Paul Krug-
man argues that while there is merit in each of these approaches, neither 
can provide a convincing explanation for the dramatic widening of earnings 
inequalities in the United States, especially in the top decile, and suggests in 
addition that social norms have become more tolerant of greater inequali-
ty.21 Clearly, if wages are determined by social norms rather than any notion 
of marginal productivity, then it becomes possible to question the current 
earnings profile and the current high levels of inequality. Moving beyond 
Krugman, it is important to unpack these social norms and consider how 
they have been generated. Do they, for example, reflect social values and 
preferences, or do they reflect uneven power relations? It would seem that 
these social norms are gendered, insofar as they privilege traditionally ‘male’ 
aspects of employment linked with managing the economy and money over 
19 Stiglitz 2012b.
20 OECD 2011.
21 Krugman 2002.
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those aspects of waged and unwaged labour linked with society and social 
reproduction, a set of circumstances not conducive to equitable or socially 
sustainable well-being.
Even in the twenty-first century, and across the globe, women continue 
to be overrepresented in the five C’s: cleaning, catering, caring, clerking, and 
cashiering, whilst men are overrepresented in the four M’s: management, 
money, materials, and machinery. These jobs are associated with differ-
ent spheres of human activity, different economic properties, and different 
rates of pay. In general terms, women’s jobs are much more likely to be re-
lational and concerned with caring and provisioning and as a consequence, 
are highly labour intensive with limited potential for productivity increases 
without changing the character of the work. These properties not only make 
it difficult to measure output but also mean that the relative costs will tend 
to rise over time.22 What is less clear is why work in these sectors is not re-
garded as being more skilled, and why the social value of this form of work is 
not recognized and rewarded more handsomely, especially as good quality 
care work creates positive social externalities in terms of more educated and 
rounded social citizens.23 Recognizing these market imperfections and the 
social externalities arising from care work undermines market or marginal 
product valuations and provides an economically rational argument for the 
workers employed in this sector to receive a larger share of social output. 
Arguably, the social value is far higher than that arising from the work of 
highly paid workers in finance, where, in the United Kingdom, overall an-
nual and hourly average earnings are approximately twice those of all other 
employees.24 While the precise scale of this difference varies between loca-
tions, the existence of this gendered difference does not. The fact that an 
executive from a failed United Kingdom bank was retained to advise on its 
22 As these properties are rarely acknowledged in social policy, rising costs are often attributed to 
an assumed inefficiency of the public sector and as a consequence, social care has largely been 
privatized. The private producers often struggle to make profit and many do so by restricting their 
services to an elite or subsidized clientele and by employing people with labour market disadvantage 
on low wages, especially women and migrants. For a fuller discussion of the contrasting economic 
properties of different kinds of work and care work in particular, see Folbre & Nelson 2000.
23 Elson 1998.
24 Metcalfe & Rolfe 2009.
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restructuring at a monthly salary equivalent to three-and-a-half times the 
annual salary of a childcare worker with twenty years’ experience provides 
a telling illustration of comparative values, but whether the scale of the dif-
ference would be widely supported if known is more questionable.25 Joseph 
Stiglitz26 also highlights the lack of public knowledge about comparative 
wage differences and the disconnection between wages and marginal pro-
ductivity. He contrasts financiers, who receive much larger private rewards 
than innovators, who in his analysis make a far higher contribution to so-
cial value. This differential again raises questions about how elites, such as 
these financiers, are able to press and legitimize their claims. More generally, 
questions surround the formation of a neoliberal mode of governmental-
ity27, in which market outcomes are widely believed to be rational and de-
served while market imperfections are forgotten. Market imperfections can 
account for the comparatively low value of work disproportionately carried 
out by women, but more work needs to be done in terms of explaining the 
processes through which work becomes gendered.
These comparative differences in pay also reflect the long-standing dual-
ism between production and reproduction, and the relative priority given to 
the economy, understood as productive, over society or social issues, which 
are seen to be associated with reproduction and redistribution. Narrowing 
the differences in social rewards through distributional changes would re-
duce inequality without necessarily affecting the overall level of economic 
activity. Indeed, it might even have a positive impact on the latter, owing 
to the higher marginal propensity to consume among low income earners 
compared to those on higher pay. This dualism between production and 
reproduction lies at the heart of long-standing feminist concerns regarding 
both the value of different forms of work and the construction of knowl-
edge, and perpetuates the separation of the economy and society. Feminist 
scholars advocate a broader understanding of the role of the economy as one 
25 The information regarding the bankers’ salary is from Treanor 2009; the figure for the childcare 
worker’s pay is from Payscale 2009. 
26 Stiglitz 2012a.
27 Brown 2003a.
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of provisioning for social welfare28 and in this respect there are some paral-
lels with the work of Karl Polanyi29, who highlighted the need to challenge 
market priorities and re-embed the economy in society in order to prevent 
social disintegration, issues discussed further below. 
Economy and society—changing the priorities
From the outset the European Union has aimed to achieve economic and 
social cohesion, but economic and social issues have always been treated 
separately in EU policy, with economic issues dominating the policy agenda 
and subject to stronger monitoring and enforcement. By contrast, social 
policies are largely aspirational and much less onerous in terms of compli-
ance requirements. This differential treatment rests on the assumption that 
the economy and economic policies are wealth creating or productive while 
social policies are unproductive, concerned with redistributing rather than 
creating wealth. The ideas that economic growth itself can be redistribu-
tive or that social policy can be economically productive are rarely, if ever, 
contemplated.   
These understandings of the relationship between the economy and so-
ciety are shared by many states, but the extent to which economies are regu-
lated varies and changes over time. It was precisely this relation between 
the economy and society that Polanyi analysed in the Great Transformation, 
and, in the context of the current crisis of neoliberalism, his analysis has 
renewed significance. Polanyi’s key arguments are that self-regulating mar-
kets—that is, markets or economies that are free from the political sphere—
are not natural phenomena but rather are consciously created and yet in-
herently unstable. Without political control, self-regulating markets would 
create a ‘stark utopia’ and ‘could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society.’ As a consequence, 
society will ‘inevitably take measures to protect itself.’30 Polanyi argues that 
the movement to establish a self-regulating economy by disembedding the 
28 Elson 1998; Folbre & Nelson 2000.
29 Polanyi 1957, 3.
30 Polanyi 1957, 3.
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market from political control is met therefore by counter movements that 
seek to re-establish political control and re/embed the market into society. 
Polanyi called this tension or movement back and forth between economic 
freedom and social control the double movement of capitalism.31 Looking 
back to the crisis conditions of the 1920s when economic liberalism reigned 
supreme, Polanyi comments that 
the repayment of foreign loans and the return of stable currencies 
were recognised as the touchstone of rationality in politics; and 
no private suffering, no restriction of sovereignty was deemed too 
great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity. The priva-
tions of the unemployed made jobless by deflation; the destitution 
of public servants dismissed without a pittance; even the relin-
quishment of national rights and the loss of constitutional liberties 
were judged a fair price to pay for the fulfilment of the requirement 
of sound budgets and sound currencies, these a priori of economic 
liberalism.32
These comments have resonance with contemporary politicians’ state-
ments advocating austerity. David Cameron, the UK prime minster, con-
tinued to reiterate his faith in the need for market discipline even after 
two years of austerity policies and low or zero growth, and similarly justi-
fied a series of public expenditure cuts and further liberalization of the 
economy: 
Getting our debt under control is necessary for growth. But it’s not 
sufficient. Our responsible fiscal policy is being matched by active 
monetary policy. … Fiscal responsibility and monetary activism is 
the right macroeconomic mix for our over-indebted economy. But 
the additional ingredient that government will deliver and needs to 
do even more of is a radical programme of microeconomic reform 
31 Polanyi 1957, 130.
32 Polanyi 1957, 148.
diane perrons – gender, inequality and the crisis
77
to make our economy more competitive—including competitive tax 
rates, planning reform and deregulation.33
These values and beliefs stressing the efficacy of liberalization, self-reg-
ulating markets, and balanced budgets were questioned in the 1930s and 
have been questioned by contemporary critics who advocate a return to 
the Keynesian policies that were first introduced in the mid-1930s. At that 
time states began to manage their currencies and pursue more widespread 
regulation through economic management, in response to the Great De-
pression, before further expansion with the development of the welfare state 
after 1945. This turnaround led Polanyi to remark that ‘[u]ndoubtedly, our 
age will be credited with having seen the end of the self-regulating market.’34 
These remarks are paralleled in 2008 by Eric Hobsbawm, who remarked on 
a BBC current affairs programme that
[i]t’s the end of this particular era. No question about it. There will 
be more talk about Keynes and less talk about Friedman and Hayek 
… We now know that the era has ended. [But] we don’t know what’s 
going to come.35
When the economy seemed on the point collapse in 2008, official atten-
tion turned to alternatives, and Keynes was once more on the agenda, albeit 
briefly. There are several reasons for supporting this perspective. First, inter-
national evidence shows that countries that least adhered to the neoliberal 
model have experienced higher levels of economic growth in the past three 
decades and a less serious economic crisis.36 Second, while inequality is in-
creasing everywhere in Europe (pre- and post-tax), states with more direct 
control over their economies and that engaged in stronger redistribution, 
such as the Nordic states, are in general performing better than the United 
Kingdom, where austerity policies have been pursued with enthusiasm even 
33 Cameron 2010.
34 Polanyi 1957, 148.
35 Hobsbawm 2008.
36 See Dunford & Yeung 2011; Martínez, Molyneux & Sánchez-Ancochea 2009; Quah 2011.
part i: welfare and crises
78
though the scale of the sovereign debt is low compared to Spain, Greece, or 
Ireland. Third, as Paul Krugman shows theoretically and empirically, the 
policy of expansionary fiscal contraction is unlikely to lead to economic re-
covery.37 He demonstrates how pursuit of austerity in a time of low growth 
is unlikely to restore growth or reduce the public sector deficit owing to 
reduced tax income and increased necessary expenditure on the unem-
ployed, both of which prevent deficit reduction. Indeed he maintains that 
‘the austerity programs that were supposed to restore confidence not only 
aborted any kind of recovery but produced renewed slumps and soaring 
unemployment.’38 In addition he points out how the high level of inequality 
is a major reason why the economy is still so depressed and unemployment 
so high on account of insufficient effective demand. Krugman’s forecasts 
were realized in UK government statistics for the summer of 2012, which 
showed negative growth and increased public sector borrowing.39 
Krugman’s remedy for this situation is essentially Keynesian. In effect, 
he advocates any kind of government expenditure to boost demand and re-
store economic growth, though in passing suggests that in the United States 
the re-employment of teachers dismissed with the cuts would offer a sig-
nificant boost to the economy. Robert Skidelsky is more explicit, suggesting 
that while any expenditure that maintains aggregate demand would work, 
‘capital investment is better, because it creates identifiable future assets that 
promise to fund themselves and improve growth potential.’40 Neither Skidel-
sky nor Krugman take gender issues or the role of social reproduction into 
account, tending instead to assume that social welfare expenditure is less 
productive. From a feminist perspective, therefore, these leading heterodox 
economists’ resolutions represent a missed opportunity.
37  Krugman 2012.
38 Krugman 2012.
39 ONS 2012a & 2012b. 
40 Skidelsky 2011.
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Feminist alternatives
Feminist writers argue that the Keynesian approach does not go far enough 
and more transformative policies are required in order to take account of 
gender and social inequalities and to redress the mistaken priority given to 
production over reproduction.
Nancy Fraser offers a critique, not of Keynes, but of Polanyi, and argues 
that while a Polanyian approach calls for greater activity of the state to pro-
tect society from the free market outcomes, this call is for the state and soci-
ety in their existing hierarchical and gendered forms.41 So while Polanyi saw 
a tension or double movement between market freedom and social control, 
Fraser seeks to transform the state to overcome existing unequal and hierar-
chical relations within society and the state, so leading to a triple movement. 
Polanyi highlighted the existence of limits to the applicability of the mar-
ket mechanism, especially with respect to land, labour, and capital, which 
he termed fictitious commodities. He points out that labour, for example, 
consists of human beings who require a living wage and could die if unable 
to find work or if dependent on market rates, but he did not challenge the 
concept of wage labour or its hierarchical character. Similarly to Keynes and 
many contemporary economists, he paid no attention to gender issues or to 
the unpaid work or caring aspects of social reproduction. In contrast Fraser 
advocates transformative policies that redress these inequalities and offers a 
more cohesive and egalitarian form of development. In this regard she looks 
towards some of the contemporary protest groups outside of orthodox po-
litical parties, focusing, for instance, on the policies advocated by feminists 
and by movements such as Occupy, the Indignados, or the 99 Percenters.42 
Fraser acknowledges that it is unclear where transformative politics might 
lead, and that there is a risk that these can lead into regressive as well as 
progressive directions. 
Recognising the anarchic character of these movements and how it is 
easier to gain widespread support for single-issue campaigns than to secure 
sustained support for a broader range of policies, the ideas of feminist econ-
41 Fraser 2011.
42 Fraser 2011.
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omists, including, for example, the UK Women’s Budget Group (WBG), po-
tentially provide a more promising way forward, as they offer a critique of 
current government policies and suggest alternative policies that aim to sig-
nificantly modify rather than completely overthrow the existing order. Their 
‘alternative F’ plan argues for public investment in social as well as physical 
infrastructure and increased expenditure on education, health, social care, 
public transport, and green energy. This increased spending would boost 
consumption, provide the necessary increase in demand, and generate tax 
revenues that would in turn finance the government spending. In addition, 
such expenditure is likely to create employment amongst relatively low in-
come people and especially amongst women, which would not only redress 
some of the adverse consequences and uneven impact of the pursuit of aus-
terity policies to date, but also have a more than proportionate impact on 
expenditure given the higher marginal propensity to consume among lower 
income earners. This approach would seek to establish a ‘virtuous circle of 
expansion rather than viscous circle of decline.’43 The underlying rationale 
here is pure Keynes—that ‘expenditure creates its own income … look after 
unemployment and the budget will look after itself.’44 This solution is more 
complicated in a global economy, as increasing the wage share and being at-
tentive to the requirements of reproductive work could reduce competitive-
ness. However, this argument is premised on the acceptance of a profit-led 
model of growth. As Stephanie Seguino and Caren Grown45 have pointed 
out, the economy could equally be viewed as a ‘closed wage-led economic 
system’. Working out what this means in practice, combined with specifying 
more precisely and getting political support for the feminist alternative F 
plan for development, is a task that requires urgent attention. 
43 WBG 2012.
44 Keynes 1983.
45 Seguino & Grown 2007.
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Conclusion
The present time, 2012, is one of extreme uncertainty. The political debate 
moves back and forth between those advocating more deregulation and 
those advocating more social control. Just as in the 1930s, not all commen-
tators accept the Polanyian or Keynesian view that self-regulating markets 
are unsustainable. Instead they take the contrary view that it was purely ‘the 
incomplete application of its principles that was the reason for every and any 
difficulty laid to its charge’ and as a consequence call for more deregulation 
and austerity.46 What is certain is that Polanyi was wrong when he claimed 
that his age had seen the end of self-regulating markets. Hobsbawn, too, un-
derestimated the resilience of neoliberalism.47 At the time of writing—sum-
mer 2012—the UK government still upholds the idea that self-regulating 
markets represent the ideal economic model, despite two years of expan-
sionary fiscal contraction, mounting criticism not only from heterodox and 
feminist economists but also from the IMF48, evidence that shows all the 
hallmarks of a depression with either very low or zero growth, a clear lack of 
effective demand, and, in complete contrast to their intentions and predic-
tions, increases in government borrowing owing to falling tax revenues yet 
fixed welfare expenditure, linked to unemployment even though (or even 
because) public sector investment has fallen. Explaining the rigid adherence 
to these policies and why the ideas of feminist and heterodox economists are 
overlooked is clearly important but lies beyond the purview of this chapter.49 
46 Polanyi 1957, 148.
47 Hobsbawm 2008.
48 IMF 2012.
49 See Dunford & Perrons forthcoming for a provisional attempt to do so.
part i: welfare and crises
82
References
Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, & Emmanuel Saez (2011) ‘Top Incomes in the Long 
Run of History’. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 49, No. 1, 3–71.
Brown, Wendy (2003) ‘Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’. Theory and Event, 
Vol. 7, No. 1 2003, 1–43.
Cameron, David (2010) ‘Transforming the British Economy: Coalition Strategy for Econo-
mic Growth’. A transcript of a speech given by Prime Minister David Cameron on 28 
May 2010. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/transfor-
ming-the-british-economy-coalition-strategy-for-economic-growth/> (accessed 24 
March 2013).
Dunford, Michael & Godfrey Yeung (2011) ‘Towards Global Convergence: Emerging Eco-
nomies, the Rise of China and Western Sunset’. European Urban and Regional Studies, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, 22–46.
Dunford, Robin, & Diane Perrons (forthcoming) ‘Power and Privilege: the Gendered Dyna-
mics of Contemporary Inequality’. In Mary Evans (ed.) Handbook of Feminist Theory. 
London: Sage.
Elson, Diane (1998) ‘The Economic, the Political and the Domestic: Business, States and 
Households in the Organisation of Production’. New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No.2, 
189–208.
Folbre, Nancy, & Julie Nelson (2000) ‘For Love or Money—Or both?’. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives Vol. 14, No.4, 123–140.  
Fraser, Nancy (2011) ‘A Polanyian Feminism? Re-reading The Great Transformation in 
the 21st century’. University of Cambridge Lecture Series. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.crassh.cam.ac.uk/events/1534/> (accessed 24 March 2013).
Froud, Julie, Adam Leaver & Karel Williams (2007) ‘New Actors in a Financialised 
Economy and the Remaking of Capitalism’. New Political Economy, Vol. 12,  No.3, 
339–347.
Grimshaw, Damien & Jill Rubery (2012) ‘The End of the UK’s Liberal Collectivist Social 
Model? The Implications of the Coalition Government’s Policy During the Austerity 
Crisis’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, No.1, 105–126.
Hobsbawm, Eric (2008) ‘Eric Hobsbawm says the free market has created great instability’. 
Talk on the Today Programme. London: BBC. Online. Available HTTP: <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7677000/7677683.stm> (accessed 24 March 2013).
ILO (2008) World of Work Report 2008. Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globali-
sation. Geneva: International Labour Office.
IMF (2012) United Kingdom 2012 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report No. 12/190. 
Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12190.
pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013).
IMF (2007) World Economic Outlook Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/pdf/text.pdf> 
(accessed 24 March 2014).
INEQ (2009) European Policy Brief No. 4, 2009. Online. Available HTTP: <http://
ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy-briefs-inequality_en.pdf> (accessed 
24 March 2013).
Keynes, John M. (1931) ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’. In John M. Keynes, 
Essays in Persuasion. London: Macmillan.  
diane perrons – gender, inequality and the crisis
83
Keynes, John M. (1983) The Collected Works of John Maynard Keynes: Volume 29. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Krugman, Paul (2012) End This Depression Now! New York: Norton.
Krugman, Paul (2002) ‘For Richer’. New York Times, 20 October 2002. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.pkarchive.org/economy/ForRicher.html> (accessed 24 March 
2013).
Martínez, Juliana, Maxine Molyneux & Diego Sánchez-Ancochea (2009) ‘Latin American 
Capitalism: Economic and Social Policy in Transition’. Economy and Society, Vol. 38, 
No. 1, 1–16.
Metcalf, Hilary & Heather Rolfe (2009) Employment and Earnings in the Finance Sector: A 
Gender Analysis. EHRC Research Report 17. London: Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission.
Mouffe, Chantal (2000) The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso.
OECD (2011) Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Paris: OECD.
ONS (2012a) Public Sector Finances. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
dcp171778_276550.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013).
ONS (2012b) Gross Domestic Product Estimates. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.ons.
gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_264972.pdf> (accessed 24 March 2013).
Payscale (2009) Salary Survey Report for Job: Child Care / Day Care Worker. Online. Avai-
lable HTTP: <http://www.payscale.com/research/UK/Job=Child_Care_%2F_Day_
Care_Worker/Salary> (accessed 24 March 2013).
Perrons, Diane (2012) ‘“Global” Financial Crisis, Earnings Inequalities and Gender: 
Towards a More Sustainable Model of Development’. Comparative sociology, Vol. 11, 
No. 1, 202–226.
Perrons, Diane & Ania Plomien (2012) Why Socio-Economic Inequalities Increase: Facts and 
Policy Responses in Europe. European Commission: Brussels.
Polanyi, Karl (1957) The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Quah, Danny (2011) ‘The Global Economy’s Shifting Centre of Gravity’. Global Politics, Vol. 
2, No. 1, 3–9.
Seguino, Stephanie (2010) ‘The Global Economic Crisis, Its Gender and Ethnic Implica-
tions, and Policy Responses’. Gender and Development, Vol. 18, No. 2, 179–199.
Seguino, Stephanie & Caren Grown (2007) ‘Gender Equity and Globalization: Macroeco-
nomic Policy for Developing Countries’. In Irene van Staveren, Diane Elson, Caren 
Grown & Nilufer Çagatay (eds) Feminist Economics of Trade. London: Routledge.
Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Skidelsky, Robert (2011) ‘The Relevance of Keynes’. Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 
35, No.1, 1–13.  
Stiglitz, Joseph (2012a) The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our 
Future. London: W. W. Norton and Company.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2012b) ‘Macroeconomic Fluctuations, Inequality and Human Develop-
ment’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal 
for People–Centred Development, Vol.13, No. 1, 31–58.
Treanor, Jill (2008) ‘Lloyds Offers Sidelined HBOS Head £60,000-a-Month Consultancy Role’. 
Guardian, 5 November 2008. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
business/2008/nov/05/andy-hornby-lloyds-tsb-hbos> (accessed 24 March 2013).
WBG (2012) The Impact on Women of the Budget 2012. London: UK Women’s Budget 
Group. Online. Available HTTP: <http://wbg.org.uk/pdfs/The-Impact-on-Women-
of-the-Budget-2012-FINAL.pdf > (accessed 24 March 2013).

Part II
IMPACT – RESPONSES

87
CHAPTER 5
The new politics of austerity in the United 
Kingdom and the United States
daniel béland and alex waddan
Much of the literature on the development of social policy, and particular-
ly the work that has elaborated typologies of welfare states, has tended to 
group the United States and the United Kingdom together. Perhaps most 
influentially, Esping-Andersen categorized the United States and the United 
Kingdom as ‘liberal’ regime types with regard to their social policy struc-
tures.1 In addition, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature also tends to see 
both countries as occupying a similar space in terms of their political econo-
my.2 On the other hand, another literature has drawn attention to the insti-
tutional differences between the two countries, contrasting the fragmented, 
multi-tiered US government structures, where power can be divided be-
tween competing institutions, which may in turn be controlled by different 
parties, with the more concentrated UK parliamentary system, where a ma-
jority government, relying on strong party discipline, is better able to enact 
its legislative agenda.3 
Taking into account these similarities and differences, this chapter ex-
amines how these two countries reacted to the fiscal and economic crisis 
that came to dominate the socioeconomic landscape by the end of 2008. 
Was social policy adapted in an expansionary manner designed to com-
pensate those people economically hurt by the crisis? Or, was the focus on 
retrenchment policies, with the emphasis on the need to maintain ‘budget 
1 Esping-Andersen 1991.
2 Hall & Soskice 2001.
3 Steinmo & Watts 1995.
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responsibility’ in the light of the fiscal crisis brought on by the collapse of the 
financial sector and the decision, in both countries, to bail out ailing banks? 
Furthermore, the chapter investigates the extent to which the institutional 
context helped or hindered political actors in their efforts to successfully 
enact their preferred social policy proposals. 
The economic and political impact of the crisis
Few industrialized countries escaped the effects of the economic and fi-
nancial crisis that became apparent through late 2008. Initially at least, the 
Unites States and the United Kingdom found themselves in the eye of the 
storm. These two countries were particularly vulnerable to the impact of 
the crisis in the financial sector as they had economies that had become in-
creasingly, and disproportionately, reliant on activity in that sector since the 
mid-1980s.4 Through the 1990s and the new century’s first decade ‘high 
finance’ had seemed a driver of economic activity and only ‘when the crisis 
struck did it become clear that the growth of Wall Street and the City actu-
ally exposed their home nations to special risks’.5 And by late 2008, it was 
evident that both the United States and the United Kingdom were being hit 
hard by a major financial and economic crisis, which was in turn inevitably 
going to impact social policy programmes in both countries. 
In the United Kingdom, real GDP shrank by 0.1 per cent in 2008 and 
then contracted by 4.9 per cent through 2009.6 In the quarter running from 
August to October of 2008, the unemployment rate stood at 6.0 per cent, 
which was an increase from 5.6 per cent in the previous quarter.7 A year 
later that figure had risen again to 7.9 per cent.8 By the quarter November 
2011 to February 2012, unemployment had increased to 8.4 per cent. And 
particularly hard hit were the young, with 20.8 per cent of persons aged 
16–24, who were not in full-time education, unemployed at that time.9 
4 Gamble 2009.
5 Krugman & Wells 2009.
6 OECD 2012.
7 Office for National Statistics 2008.
8 Office for National Statistics 2009.
9 Office for National Statistics 2012.
daniel béland and alex waddan – the new politics of austerity in the uk and the us
89
In the United States, the immediate effects were perhaps even starker. 
By late September 2008, it became obvious that the United States was being 
hit hard by a major financial and economic crisis.10 In fact, during the third 
quarter of 2008, the country’s GDP measured in constant US dollars con-
tracted by 2.7 per cent. The economic situation became even worse during 
the following quarter, as the GDP contracted by a dramatic 5.4 per cent.11 
As for the unemployment rate, it increased from 5.1 per cent in March 2008 
to a peak level of 10.1 per cent in October 2009.12 After staying above 9 per 
cent throughout 2010 and most of 2011, the unemployment rate had de-
clined to 8.6 per cent in November 201113, but this remained much higher 
than average by US standards. The most alarming aspect of this situation 
was the high number of unemployed who had been out of work for long 
periods of time. The recession also hit ethnic and racial minorities espe-
cially hard, as Hispanics and African-Americans suffered from significantly 
higher than average unemployment rates.14 As for the working population, 
the economic context forced many people to reduce their hours or take a 
part-time job, which increased underemployment. Finally, the mortgage 
crisis dramatically increased the number of foreclosures, pushing a growing 
number of people out of their homes. In 2009, for example, ‘[a] record 2.8 
million properties with a mortgage got a foreclosure notice … , jumping 21 
percent from 2008 and 120 percent from 2007’.15 These brief remarks sug-
gest that unemployment rates do not tell the whole story of the economic 
suffering witnessed in the United States in the aftermath of the Great Reces-
sion. 
Furthermore, although economic insecurity associated with income in-
stability and limited health insurance coverage in the United States already 
affected large segments of the population before the Great Recession16, the 
crisis exacerbated economic and social anxiety, even among citizens who 
10 Béland & Waddan 2011.
11 US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010a.
12 US Department of Labor 2010.
13 Wiseman 2011.
14 US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2010a.
15 Adler 2010.
16 Hacker 2006.
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remained fully employed. One important difference between the welfare 
states of the United Kingdom and the United States is that in the former, 
access to health care is guaranteed for all the country’s residents through 
the government-funded National Health Service (NHS), while in the latter 
access to health insurance for many workers is very often provided by an 
employer. This means that losing one’s job in the US frequently means los-
ing health care coverage and other fringe benefits, which makes the spectre 
of unemployment particularly frightening in a country where government-
granted social protection remains limited in scope.17
Despite the similar economic trajectories, the initial partisan conse-
quences in the two countries diverged. In the United Kingdom, the Labour 
government, headed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, which was in power 
when the crisis manifested itself, delayed calling an election until as late as 
possible. In the election in May 2010 the voters rejected the government, 
with the Conservatives becoming the largest single party. In contrast, in the 
United States, the political pendulum swung to the left in November 2008, 
as the Democratic candidate Barack Obama won the presidency and the 
Democrats achieved significant majorities in both chambers of Congress. 
But in both countries the partisan picture was complex. In the United King-
dom, the Conservatives did not gain enough parliamentary seats to form 
a majority government. After some days of discussion, the uncertainty 
was resolved by the formation of a coalition government with the Liberal 
Democrats joining the Conservatives. This was the first formal coalition in 
the United Kingdom since the Second World War, and the unusual nature 
of this arrangement meant that the normal authority of a UK government, 
based on the support of highly disciplined single majority party, was poten-
tially compromised. In the United States, even though the Democrats held 
significant majorities in both chambers of Congress and even though that 
party was more ideologically coherent than in much of its recent history18, 
the Obama administration and the party’s Congressional leaders, due to the 
absence of UK-style party discipline, could not rely on those majorities to 
17 Béland 2010.
18 Cook 2009.
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deliver unconditional support for their legislative program. In any case, that 
Democratic domination of the elected federal institutions was short-lived. 
In the November 2010 mid-term elections, the Republicans made sweep-
ing gains. That party took control of the House of Representatives with the 
biggest gains in a single election since 1938. In addition they gained several 
Senate seats, importantly meaning that the Democrats no longer had the 60 
votes needed to overcome a filibuster. This represented a major turnaround 
in political fortunes and meant that the institutions of government in Wash-
ington, DC, were divided between the two parties, making decisive legisla-
tive action highly unlikely. In contrast, in the UK, despite the inconclusive 
result of the 2010 general election, some institutional stability was restored 
when the Conservative-led coalition government committed itself to serv-
ing a full five-year term in office. 
The move to austerity in the United Kingdom
As the 2010 general election approached, the three major parties in the 
United Kingdom all agreed that ‘hard times’ were ahead, but there were 
some differences about how quickly that austerity should bite. Brown’s gov-
ernment had in fact responded to the crisis with some efforts at stimulus 
such as a temporary reduction in VAT from 17.5 per cent to 15 per cent 
and a Car Scrappage Scheme. But in the 2010 campaign, Labour, along with 
the Liberal Democrats, acknowledged that deficit reduction was necessary 
and promised significant fiscal tightening. The Conservatives said that they 
would deliver deficit reduction more promptly. This was in the context of 
the sharp rise in public deficits. In 2007/2008 the UK government’s public 
sector net borrowing (PSNB) requirement equalled 2.38 per cent of GDP. By 
2009/2010 that figure had jumped to 10.37 per cent.19
In fact six months before the general election, in October 2009, at the 
Conservative Party annual conference, then shadow chancellor George Os-
borne emphasized that an incoming Conservative government would need 
to make significant spending cuts in order to tackle ‘the largest deficit in 
19 Office for National Statistics 2010.
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our modern history’.20 At this point, anxious to avoid accusations that pain 
would be inflicted on the least well-off, Osborne said that he would not re-
verse the decision taken by Labour to introduce a new top rate of income 
tax of 50 per cent for people earning over £150,000. In a further effort to 
diminish the notion that they were the party of the rich, the Conservative 
leadership proclaimed, ‘we’re all in it together’.21 Also, wary of the party’s 
traditional political vulnerability with regard to guardianship of the NHS, 
Conservative leader David Cameron talked of his own gratitude to the NHS 
and the party’s manifesto promised to ring-fence health care spending, thus 
implying that the NHS would be protected against the forthcoming budget-
ary squeeze. Given this commitment, which was not explicitly matched by 
Labour, it might seem that the Conservatives were anxious not to be seen 
as threatening the central features of the welfare state. Yet at the same time, 
contradicting that impression, the Conservative plans for deficit reduction 
relied much more heavily on spending cuts than tax increases, by a ratio of 
four to one, than Labour who promised a ratio of two to one, with the Lib-
eral Democrats calling for a ratio of two and a half to one.22 All three parties 
were vague about where they would cut, preferring to emphasize projected 
efficiency savings rather than too explicitly laying out where future pain 
would come. Overall, therefore, the 2010 general election campaign ‘was 
based on big similarities and big differences’ among the three main political 
parties.23 
More generally, in an effort to reconcile the potentially contrary messag-
es coming from the Conservative side, Cameron framed the language about 
‘the need’ for austerity within the rhetoric of creating the ‘Big Society’, a con-
cept that referred to the empowerment of civil society actors. This suggested 
that charities and voluntary groups could step in and fulfil some of the social 
functions being performed by the state. Echoing the conservative critique 
that too much government intervention in economic affairs crowded out 
private sector economic activity, as expounded by Cameron, the concept 
20 Wintour 2009.
21 Wintour 2009.
22 Chote, Crawford, Emerson & Tetlow 2010.
23 Smith 2010, 830.
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of the Big Society implied that too much government involvement in social 
policy had effectively crowded out non-state socially responsible activity. 
The Conservative Party election manifesto opened by extolling the idea: ‘It 
is a change from one political philosophy to another. … In a simple phrase, 
the change we offer is from big government to Big Society’.24 In one speech 
Cameron described the Big Society as ‘a guiding philosophy—a society 
where the leading force for progress is social responsibility, not state control. 
It includes a whole set of unifying approaches—breaking state monopolies, 
allowing charities, social enterprises and companies to provide public ser-
vices, devolving power down to neighbourhoods, making government more 
accountable’.25
One aspect of the Big Society rhetoric is that it did seem to distinguish 
Cameronism from Thatcherism and the latter’s, somewhat misquoted, as-
sertion that there was no such thing as society. But critics alleged that this 
apparent difference was misleading and that the Cameron-led Conserva-
tives were just as committed to downsizing the welfare state as Thatcher 
had been in the 1980s, and particularly those elements of state support that 
helped the least well-off.26 Importantly, however, the idea provided some 
grounds for reconciling Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, as they 
formed the post-election coalition government. For example, when set-
ting out plans for public sector reform in December 2010 Liberal Democrat 
leader and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg explained: ‘The prime min-
ister has coined the phrase Big Society while the Liberal Democrats tend to 
talk about community politics or just liberalism. But whatever the words we 
use, we are clear and united in our ambition to decentralize and disperse 
power in our society and that shared ambition is one of the of the bonds that 
will keep our coalition strong.’27 Further to this, the mantra ‘we’re all in this 
together’ chimed with the Liberal Democrat emphasis on ‘fairness’. All this 
language suggested that the pain of austerity was to be shared, but it did not 
speak directly to the level of austerity that was to be introduced, nor did it 
24 Conservative Party 2010, vii.
25 Smith 2010, 828.
26 Beresford 2011.
27 Wintour & Curtis 2010.
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explicitly address the question of how the public sector was to be reduced.
What quickly emerged was that the coalition government was to pur-
sue a radical agenda in that fiscal retrenchment included spending cuts that 
were ‘very large, precipitate and intended to set the United Kingdom on 
a different spending trajectory’.28 Given that the Conservatives were the 
dominant partner in the coalition, it was unsurprising that the speed and 
direction of deficit reduction reflected Conservative priorities more than 
Liberal Democrat preferences, but the scale of the proposed cuts meant that 
this alliance between the two parties, which was not one that had been read-
ily talked about before the election, would likely come under considerable 
pressure. Those figures in the Liberal Democrat camp, such as Vince Cable, 
who became the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in 
the new government, were perceived as being on the left of that party were 
unlikely accomplices to some of the planned cuts in social security spend-
ing.29 On the other side of the equation, the more right-wing forces on the 
Conservative backbenches, disappointed that their party had not won an 
outright parliamentary majority, would not want to see the speed of change 
significantly slowed by the junior party in the coalition. For both party lead-
erships the problem of controlling their potentially restive MPs was exacer-
bated by the need to maintain party discipline in the House of Lords where 
the pressure to acquiesce to the party leadership is less compelling than in 
the Commons. When the House of Lords votes on legislation passed in the 
House of Commons it cannot veto that legislation, but if a bill is defeated in 
the Lords it causes delay and can embarrass the government into making al-
terations to the original bill. Together, these features suggested the possibil-
ity of an unusual institutional dynamic in UK politics with a greater degree 
of uncertainty about whether the government would be able to impose its 
will on parliament with as much authority as normal. 
Two years after its formation there were considerable signs of strain in 
the coalition and the continuing harsh economic climate meant that the 
28 Taylor-Gooby & Stoker 2011, 4
29 It is very important to distinguish between what is meant by ‘social security’ in the United Kingdom 
where the term refers to a variety of benefits and in the United States where Social Security is the 
public pension scheme. 
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original timescale for achieving deficit reduction had been extended be-
yond the five-year parliamentary term. At times clashes about which Liberal 
Democrat ideas would be included in the coalition’s programme were very 
public, but, critically, there had not been any significant retreat from the 
goal of deficit reduction. Furthermore, the language of austerity was supple-
mented with a discourse about the need for welfare system reform. And, 
while some Liberal Democrat backbenchers voted against the government, 
there was sufficient parliamentary discipline for the coalition government 
to be able to set out a radical agenda in a series of budget measures and 
spending reviews in its first two years in office. This agenda included major 
changes to the funding of higher education, a highly controversial reorgani-
zation of the NHS, and a significant overhaul of the welfare system. 
To various degrees these measures were all justified by the austerity 
agenda. When justifying the need for NHS reform Prime Minister Cam-
eron maintained that ‘the NHS faces enormous financial pressures in the 
years ahead’ and that ‘[i]f we want to deliver better results for patients, we 
need modernisation’.30 On the other hand, the nature of some of the reforms 
suggests an agenda that goes beyond simply saving money to deal with 
the immediate fact of the deficit. For example, encouraging private sector 
providers to compete with NHS providers and increasing the financial au-
tonomy of NHS hospitals led critics to accuse the Government of opening 
the door to the partial privatization of the NHS.31 Furthermore, the scale of 
the cuts to welfare32 and importantly the accompanying emphasis on mov-
ing people from welfare to work, which included controversial new tests to 
check whether people on long-term disability benefits were really unable to 
work, indicated an ideological pattern reminiscent of that which had pre-
vailed in the United States in 1996, when a major federal welfare reform 
centred on workfare was adopted.33 On the other hand, unlike in the United 
States, where Republicans refused to countenance any tax rises as part of 
measures to reduce the deficit, Conservatives in the United Kingdom did 
30 Cameron 2011.
31 Toynbee 2011.
32 See Joyce 2012.
33 Weaver 2000.
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agree to some revenue-raising instruments as part of the deficit reduction 
package. These instruments mostly came in the form of indirect taxation, 
such as increasing the rate of VAT to 20 per cent. Interestingly, however, 
in the spring 2012 budget, the top rate of income tax, which had only just 
been increased from 40 per cent to 50 per cent, was lowered to 45 per cent. 
In any case, the tax changes were secondary in their aggregate impact to the 
proposed spending cuts. And these plans amounted to ‘an austerity package 
greater than any retrenchment since the end of the Second World War and 
a restructuring of Beveridgean proportions’.34
Responding to the crisis in the United States
Considering the economic problems facing the United States at the time, 
it is easy to understand why Barack Obama’s discourse about change and 
enhanced social protection resonated with so many voters during the last 
weeks of the 2008 presidential race, at a time when the country’s economy 
began to collapse. In 2009, once in the White House, the new Democratic 
president benefited from the fact that, as a consequence of the 2008 federal 
elections, Democrats now controlled both chambers of Congress, a situation 
that traditionally facilitates reform, despite the lack of strict party discipline. 
This majority did enable the passage of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA). A wide-ranging economic stimulus package that sur-
passed anything attempted in the United Kingdom35, the ARRA included 
emergency social policy measures that eased the eligibility requirements 
for Food Stamps and unemployment benefits.36 Yet beyond the adoption of 
these emergency measures, key reform efforts did not move as quickly as the 
White House had hoped. This was especially the case with regard to the am-
bitious health care initiative launched by the White House not long after the 
beginning of the Obama presidency. Comprehensive health care reform had 
been a long-term goal of many Democrats and one that had been consistently 
thwarted, most recently in 1993–1994 during the presidency of Bill Clinton.
34 Taylor-Gooby 2012, 62
35 Ashbee 2011.
36 Béland & Waddan 2011.
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President Clinton had taken a top down approach to the legislative pro-
cess but, adopting a different strategic method, the Obama administration 
allowed both House and Senate leaders to design their own health propos-
als. This was designed to give Congress a greater sense of ownership of re-
form but it also meant that the legislative process dragged on, giving plenty 
of opportunity to Republicans and their new Tea Party allies to attack what 
became known on the political right as ‘Obamacare’. Although the United 
States spent more than any other country on health care while leaving more 
than 45 million citizens without health care coverage, it proved hard for 
Democrats to sell the reform to the public.37 This was the case because of 
the complexity of the measures proposed and because Republicans rejected 
reform while exacerbating the anxieties of people who already had insur-
ance coverage and feared that efforts to both expand coverage and control 
costs would reduce the quality of the care available to them. 
In the end, after much political drama and the signing of special agree-
ments with key segments of the health sector, the president signed a major 
health care legislation in March 2010. Reflecting the institutional compro-
mises that are almost inevitable in the US context, this was not as ambitious 
as some liberals had expected. In particular, the so-called ‘public option’, 
which would have further increased the role of the federal government in 
health care markets and was part of the bill passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives, was not enacted by the Senate and was not part of the final 
law. Nevertheless, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
should transform the US health care system in a gradual manner, as some of 
key provisions like the expansion of Medicaid and the introduction of state-
run health insurance exchanges, along with the controversial insurance 
mandates, will take place in 2014 and beyond. In June 2012, the Supreme 
Court upheld the PPACA, including the mandates, thus removing a promi-
nent judicial threat to the legislation and the re-election of President Obama 
in November 2012 ended the Republican hopes of repealing the legislation.
37 Jacobs & Skocpol 2011.
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The first two years of the Obama administration did, therefore, see the 
adoption of potentially substantive change in US social policy. Whatever the 
accusations made by its opponents, the PPACA will not turn the US health 
care arrangements into a UK-style NHS or a Canadian single payer system, 
but in expanding insurance coverage to many millions of Americans it will, 
if fully implemented, constitute a social policy reform with significant redis-
tributional consequences.38 But any expectations that this heralded a new 
New Deal were dealt a severe blow in the November 2010 midterm elec-
tions. At this point the long and bitter debate over health care and, especial-
ly, the enduringly negative economic situation, helped Republicans retake 
control of the House of Representatives, which they had lost to Democrats 
back in 2006. Many of the new Republican Representatives elected in 2010 
came to Washington with the explicit backing of the Tea Party movement, 
which both advocated massive cutbacks in government spending and rein-
forced the Republican taboo concerning tax increases, believed to be bad 
for the economy, even when they only affect the wealthy. This Republican 
tax creed clashed with President Obama’s proposal to phase out tax cuts 
for the wealthy adopted during the Bush years. At a more general level, the 
issue of how to tackle growing federal deficits and the so-called ‘debt crisis’ 
became a central issue in 2011 in US political debate just as it was in the UK. 
Although Democrats and Republicans could not agree on how to tackle this 
problem, , all major political actors had recognized the sheer size of the fis-
cal challenge with the White House expecting the annual federal deficit to 
reach 1.65 trillion dollars in that year. Because this amounted to nearly 11 
per cent of GDP, the United States faced ‘the largest deficit as a share of the 
economy since World War II’.39 While the return to large federal deficits had 
begun during the Bush years as a consequence of massive federal tax cuts 
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Great Recession reduced federal 
revenues and increasing economic and social spending all at once, which led 
to larger and larger deficits.40  
38 Jacobs 2011.
39 Paletta & Boles 2011.
40 Béland & Waddan 2012.
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Although both Democrats and Republicans agree that something must 
be done to tackle this problem, there is no consensus at all about how to 
achieve this task. Beyond the above-mentioned clash over the acceptability 
of tax increases affecting the wealthy, other issues oppose Democrats and 
Republicans. For instance, there is no agreement on the scope and the na-
ture of the cuts in federal spending necessary to balance the budget. More 
important from a social policy standpoint, the two largest federal social pro-
grammes, Medicare and Social Security, have been brought to the centre 
of this new fiscal austerity debate. For instance, Republicans talked openly 
about a most controversial idea: moving Medicare away from the social in-
surance logic that has characterized the popular health programme for the 
elderly and the disabled since its inception in 1965. The so-called 2011 ‘Ryan 
Budget,’ named after Tea Party supporter and Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on the Budget Paul Ryan (Wisconsin), proposed the effective trans-
formation of Medicare into a voucher system that would not do more than 
help recipients purchase private health insurance coverage. For left-leaning 
commentators like Paul Krugman41 who strongly opposed this change, as 
does President Obama, the implementation of the Ryan plan would lead to 
the end of Medicare as a social insurance program. 
The example of Medicare suggests that the advent of larger federal defi-
cits in the aftermath of the Great Recession has created a political opportu-
nity for conservative Republicans to aggressively push for market-friendly 
social policies and the radical downsizing of the federal welfare state they 
had previously accepted as an established part of the policy landscape. From 
their perspective, large federal deficits are as much a political opportunity 
to advance their long-held pro-market and ‘small government’ creed as they 
are a genuine fiscal challenge. This convergence between the federal fiscal 
crisis and long-term conservative Republican goals has exacerbated the re-
turn to the politics of austerity in the United States. In addition to these 
remarks about federal politics we must stress the deep fiscal troubles facing 
many states like California. The fiscal crisis in these states has exacerbated 
the turn to austerity in the United States.42    
41 Krugman 2011.
42 Béland & Waddan 2012.
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Because Democrats remained in control of both the White House and 
the Senate throughout 2011 and 2012, this pro-market, smaller-government 
agenda remained primarily an oppositional discourse rather than a set of 
actual policies, as both President Obama and the Democratic majority in 
the Senate had no problem vetoing conservative legislative proposals like 
the above-discussed ‘Ryan Budget.’ Because of the growing ideological di-
vide between Democrats and Republicans as well as this institutional situ-
ation related to what is known in the United States as ‘divided government’, 
stalemate and bitter disagreement became the dominant trend in federal 
politics. The debate that took place during the summer of 2011 over the 
increase of the federal ‘debt ceiling’ illustrated this partisan and institutional 
logic, as Republicans pushed the White House to support major budget cuts 
and reject any tax hikes in exchange for the necessary increase in the federal 
‘debt ceiling’, which had been a routine decision in the past but one that 
Republicans now decided to use in order to advance their austerity agenda. 
In late July, the debt ceiling agreement approved after weeks of bickering 
included over two trillion dollars in spending cuts over ten years. While 900 
billion dollars in deficit reduction were specified in the agreement, a newly 
created bipartisan congressional commission was tasked with the challeng-
ing mission of finding an extra 1.2 trillion dollars in spending cuts.43 In the 
late autumn, partly because of the extreme partisanship prevailing in Wash-
ington, the commission proved unsuccessful in reaching a deficit reduction 
agreement.44 After this failed cooperation, and as the 2012 elections drew 
closer, the prospects of meaningful progress in terms of either deficit reduc-
tion or social policy reform grew bleaker. 
Yet, reflecting the high-stakes debate, this lack of legislative action did 
not diminish the volume of the debate. By the autumn of 2012, a clear choice 
had emerged between the presidential candidates. President Obama advo-
cated the introduction of a so-called ‘Buffett Rule’, which meant that the 
very wealthiest Americans would pay minimum levels of taxation45, while 
43 Hulse & Cooper 2011.
44 Cowan & Ferraro 2011.
45 Calmes 2012.
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Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, publicly embraced Paul 
Ryan’s controversial plans46 by naming Congressman Paul Ryan as his Vice 
Presidential nominee, thus publicly embracing Ryan’s controversial plans. 
Discussion 
The discussion in this chapter about the United Kingdom and the United 
States suggests that, although the two countries have much in common as 
far as welfare regimes, economic regulation, and historical ties are con-
cerned, major institutional differences between the two countries help ex-
plain key differences in the way they have dealt with the economic crisis, 
from a fiscal and a social policy standpoint. These institutional differences 
impact policy outcomes when combined with specific partisan realities that 
reflect the changing electoral fortunes of the main political parties operat-
ing in each country. On one hand, in the United Kingdom, party discipline, 
even in a context of a coalition government, helped Prime Minister Cam-
eron and his colleagues implement a bold austerity agenda tempered only by 
relatively modest concessions to Liberal Democrat junior coalition partners. 
On the other hand, in the United States, despite being in power since early 
2009, President Obama faced major obstacles to reform related to the ab-
sence of strict party discipline within his own party and, after the November 
2010 election, opposition from Republicans then in control of the House of 
Representatives. In the last two years of Obama’s first mandate, ‘divided gov-
ernment’ frustrated both parties, further complicating the universally tricky 
politics of austerity, as it had done for President Reagan in the 1980s.47 After 
November 2010, ‘divided government’ in a time of extreme partisan and 
ideological polarization paralysed federal law-making.   
In terms of policy outcomes, in the United States, despite these institu-
tional obstacles characteristic of its politics, the presence of a Democrat in 
the White House favoured the enactment of one major social policy initia-
tive in the field of health care reform. And yet this reform was more modest 
than liberals had hoped, in large part because of the concessions on issues 
46 Cushman 2012.
47 Pierson 1994.
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like abortion necessary to get conservative Democrats on board in the ab-
sence of strict party discipline.48 In the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
domination of the coalition government explains why fiscal austerity mea-
sures were rapidly implemented after the May 2010 election. Importantly, 
in the highly unusual and potentially uncertain context of coalition politics, 
the Liberal Democrats, who have suffered severe stress as they have retreated 
from pre-election policy positions, have largely remained loyal to that aus-
terity agenda. By contrast, no coherent austerity policy has emerged in the 
context of ‘divided government’ in the United States. The 2012 elections re-
inforced the pattern of divided government, which means that the argument 
over the merits of a programme of austerity as against a more progressive 
approach to fiscal and social policy in difficult economic times is likely to 
continue. On the other hand, while neither party leadership is in a position 
to exercise clear authority, President Obama’s position has been strength-
ened by his re-election with the result that any future fiscal negotiations 
will include discussion about raising extra revenues from higher-income 
Americans, as well as cutting social policy spending. In addition, Romney 
and congressional Republicans were committed to repeal the health care 
reform enacted in 2010. Obama’s re-election, therefore, was critical to the 
implementation of that reform. These remarks indicate that electoral out-
comes do matter, as political actors from different parties favour alternative 
policy solutions. For example, the Labour party in the United Kingdom and 
Democrats in the United States are more likely to see virtue in raising taxes 
on the wealthy as a means of balancing budgets than their Conservative and 
Republican counterparts. On the other hand, in both countries the capacity 
to implement preferred solutions is constrained by the wider institutional 
environment, though much more so in the United States than in the United 
Kingdom. 
48 Jacobs & Skocpol 2011.
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CHAPTER 6
Crisis and recovery in Iceland
stefán ólafsson
From bubble economy to financial collapse
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland was often described as one of the 
economic miracles of the postwar period in Europe. A great leap forward 
had occurred during the Second World War, with the period between 1960 
and 1980s showing the highest growth rates. By 1980 Iceland had become 
a regular member of the group of 10–15 most affluent nations within the 
OECD. The UN’s Human Development Index of 1980–1985 ranked Iceland 
amongst the top ten countries.1 By 1990 various levels of living indicators 
were comparable to those of the Scandinavian nations.2
From the late 1990s this already successful society became the subject of 
an unusual neoliberal experiment that produced an excessive bubble econ-
omy between 2003 and 2008. Neoliberalism had started to gain ground in 
politics and the economy from the early 1980s, as in many other advanced 
nations. This involved a growing belief in the benevolence of unfettered mar-
kets, privatization, tax favours to firms and investors, and a laissez-faire atti-
tude towards the role of government in finance and the economy in general.
Iceland’s entry into the European Economic Area Zone (EEA) in 1995 
introduced the four freedoms of the European Union into the Icelandic po-
litical economy, with full freedom for the flow of capital across borders be-
ing the most novel and consequential aspect. The privatization of the main 
state banks, starting in 1998, proved to be a major turning point. When 
1 Ólafsson 2008.
2 Ólafsson 1990.
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the banks were fully privatized at the beginning of 2003, their new own-
ers turned them overnight into aggressive investment banks. They greatly 
increased their participation in leveraged mergers and acquisitions, first 
within Iceland and then to a greater extent in neighbouring countries.
External debt escalated and excessive risk behaviour became predomi-
nant in the Icelandic financial and business environment, driven by the 
quest for accumulation of assets, profits, and bonuses.3 With the easy flow 
of borrowed foreign capital at low interest rates, the economy had ample 
resources for rapid growth, which soon turned into an excessive specula-
tion bubble.4 Already by end of 2004, Iceland had become the world’s most 
heavily indebted economy, measured as gross external debt in per cent of 
GDP. Before the collapse of the banks in October 2008, the foreign debt had 
grown to about eight times the size of the country’s GDP, a high-risk situa-
tion and totally unsustainable once growth slowed down.5
IMF and others have claimed that Iceland’s financial crisis is the most 
costly in history in relation to GDP.6 So this was an excessive affair by all 
accounts. The collapse of the Icelandic financial system that followed in Oc-
tober of 2008 was also an extreme event, with the three main banks falling 
within a period of ten days. The financial system as a whole came almost to 
a standstill. 
The collapse was multi-dimensional. It started as a fall in the stock mar-
ket that gathered momentum from the autumn of 2007, and as a deprecia-
tion of the national currency (Icelandic krona) that started in the last two 
months of 2007, gathering speed towards the spring of 2008. Then the cur-
rency stabilized during the summer. When the banks fell in October the 
currency took another large dive; altogether it fell by close to 50 per cent 
from peak to trough. 
So the bursting of this asset and speculation bubble involved a stock 
market crash, a currency crash, and a banking collapse, and in their wake 
came an economic and political crisis, along with a profound loss of confi-
3 Aliber & Zoega 2011; Ólafsson 2011.
4 Cf. Kindleberger & Aliber 2005; Minsky 2008/1986.
5 Buiter & Sibert 2008; Ólafsson 2011; Aliber & Zoega 2011; PIC 2010.
6 IMF 2009.
part ii: impact – responses
108
dence in institutions and politics amongst the general public. On the whole 
one can say that the collapse and the crisis that followed were events of 
historic proportions for Icelandic society, events that caught the attention 
of the international media, giving them a star role at the beginning of the 
global financial crisis. Iceland was the canary bird in the coal mine of neo-
liberal financialization.
The internal consequences were large. The gross domestic product con-
tracted by some 10 per cent in two years (2009 and 2010), unemployment 
went up from about one to 2 per cent in 2007–2008 to about 9 per cent in 
2009. Real earnings were lowered drastically, private consumption contract-
ed by some 24 per cent from 2007 to 2009, and debts of households, firms, 
and the government escalated.7 The biggest crisis to hit Iceland since the 
Second World War was an irrefragable fact.
In what follows I will give an account of how Iceland coped with this 
large-scale crisis. Iceland had to apply to the IMF and neighbouring coun-
tries for emergency assistance, loans, and guidance. Now, in 2012, about 
three and a half years after the collapse, we can see that in many ways Ice-
land put together a policy strategy that seems to have been rather unique for 
a country in the custody of the IMF. Iceland’s strategy was for example very 
different to that of Ireland8, which also went deeply into financial crisis. 
The banks in Iceland were too big in relation to the national economy for 
them to be saved, unlike in Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, and many 
other Western countries. But what will interest us here is primarily how the 
burden of the crisis was shared in Iceland and how government strategy 
facilitated the path through the crisis towards resurrection.
From a neoliberal regime to a social democratic regime
The government that came to power after the banking collapse was a so-
cial democratic government that pledged itself to rule by the principles of 
a ‘Nordic welfare government’. This pledge was seen as involving a primary 
emphasis on sheltering the lower- and middle-income households against 
7 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012a.
8 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012a; Thorhallsson & Kirby 2011; see also chapters 8 and 17 in this volume.
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the vagaries of the crisis. The government also aimed to increase equality in 
the distribution of levels of living, to soften the blow to the living standards 
of the nation, to reduce unemployment, and to soften the worst debt burden 
of households, as far as governmental finances allowed. The new govern-
ment’s goal was in effect to turn Icelandic society around, away from the 
model of unrestrained finance and more in the direction of the Nordic wel-
fare state model. Prior to the crisis, by contrast, the Chamber of Commerce 
and politicians on the right had preached that Iceland should stop looking 
to the other Nordic nations for a model.
On the eve of the collapse Iceland had some distinctly neoliberal charac-
teristics in its regime. Finance had come to dominate the economy and pol-
ity; speculation with borrowed money prevailed in many industries, includ-
ing the fishing sector; a laissez-faire attitude towards regulation and restraint 
prevailed within the public administration; privatization and deregulation 
were championed; the tax rate on business profits had been lowered from 
about 45 per cent to 15 per cent; taxation on financial earnings was at 10 per 
cent, one of the very lowest such rates within the OECD; the tax burden on 
lower income groups had increased due to a reduction of the personal tax al-
lowance; social security benefits lagged behind wages in the labour market; 
and income inequality was increasing at an unprecedented rate.
The association of neoliberalism with inequality is well established. In 
welfare research it has been repeatedly documented that the English-speak-
ing nations that generally pursue market-leaning policies and maintain less 
egalitarian welfare states have higher levels of inequality in income and liv-
ing standards distribution than the Nordic welfare states as well as many of 
the north-western countries on the European continent.9 After neoliberal 
policies came to greater prominence from the late 1970s and early 1980s on-
wards, specifically promoted by the governments of Margret Thatcher in the 
United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the USA, inequality levels started 
climbing. This was a major reversal of developments after decades of slowly 
increasing equality from the end of the Second World War.10 
9 Esping-Andersen 1999; Pontusson 2005; Salverda, Nolan & Smeeding 2009.
10 Atkinson & Piketty 2007 and 2010; Bartels 2009; OECD 2011.
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As can be seen from Figure 6.1, income inequality increased drastically 
in Iceland from around 1995 to 2007. In fact the increase seems to have 
been more rapid than was evident in any other Western nation during the 
postwar period.11
The increases in the Gini coefficients up to 2007 were large indeed by 
any standard. For all disposable earnings (black columns), the increase in 
the Gini during the ten-year period from 1998 to 2007 was 79 per cent. If 
we look at disposable earnings excluding capital gains, the increase in the 
period is 30 per cent. The OECD considers an increase in the Gini inequal-
ity coefficient of 12 per cent or more in a period of ten years to be a ‘large 
increase’ (OECD 2008 and 2011). On both accounts the increase in Iceland 
is way beyond the OECD reference. 
The increase in income inequality from 1995 was primarily due to in-
creased financial earnings and redistribution effects of the tax and benefits 
system. The effects of the tax and benefits system were more decisive in the 
11 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012b; Kristjánsson & Ólafsson 2009.
Figure 6.1. Income inequality development in Iceland, 1993–2010
Note: Gini coefficients shown separately for total disposable earnings and disposable earnings excluding 
capital gains. 
Source: Icelandic tax data; analysed by Social Research Institute.
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earlier part of the period, while financialization effects were more predomi-
nant from 2003–2007.
The line in Figure 6.1 shows the difference in the amounts of the two 
Gini series. It shows the effect of the capital gains factor of financial earn-
ings on the level of inequality. Since capital gains largely stem from activities 
on the financial market (the buying and selling of stock market shares and 
securities, and the selling of other assets), it is a good indicator of the specu-
lation or bubble effect on inequality. On the whole the increase of financial 
earnings account for about two thirds of the increased inequality from 1995 
to 2007. They run disproportionally to the highest income groups and are 
also taxed at lower rates than other incomes. Hence the large inequality ef-
fect. Reduced equalization effects of the income tax and benefits system ex-
plain the biggest part of the remaining third.12 
The change towards more equality from 2008 to 2010 is also large in-
deed. This shift is a result both of diminished financial earnings and the in-
creased equalization effect of the tax and benefits system. The swing towards 
more equality can thus be partly linked to the social democratic policy ef-
fect, promoted by the present government. 
Another way to more directly assess the effects of policy during the crisis 
is to look at how the inevitable burdens of the crisis were shouldered by dif-
ferent income groups. Figure 6.2 does this by comparing how real dispos-
able earnings changed in ten income groups (deciles) in Iceland and Ireland.
The columns in the figure show accumulated changes in real disposable 
earnings in the respective income groups. Thus the lowest 10 per cent of 
households in Iceland lost 9 per cent as did the next decile, while the low-
est decile in Ireland lost 26 per cent of their purchasing power from 2008 
to 2009, in the first part of the crisis. The Icelandic figures cover the whole 
of the contraction period (2008–2010). As can be seen in the figure, the cut 
in real earnings gradually increased in Iceland as one moves up the income 
ladder: the middle groups lost 14 per cent, while the top decile group lost 
by far the most at 38 per cent. The opposite is the case in Ireland, where the 
12 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012b.
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burden falling on the higher groups gradually lowered until we come to the 
highest income decile, which actually increased its real disposable earnings 
by 8 per cent while the lower groups shouldered the crisis.13 Since 2009 Ire-
land has gone through repeated austerity packages that have levied further 
burdens on lower and middle income groups.
In Iceland in 2009 minimum pensions were increased by 20 per cent and 
minimum wages were raised marginally, as were welfare benefits, which also 
became more targeted at the lowest income groups. The changes in the taxa-
tion system in effect lowered the real tax burden on lower income groups 
and increased the tax burden on the higher groups. The increased tax bur-
den primarily fell on the top 40 per cent of households. Hence redistribution 
was a prominent feature of the Icelandic crisis strategy. By comparison, the 
Irish policy had opposing features to those just outlined for Iceland (e.g., 
minimum wages, pensions, and benefits were cut). 
13 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012.
Figure 6.2.  Cuts in real disposable earnings of households during the 
crisis, by income groups: Iceland 2008–2010 and Ireland 
2008–2009 compared
Notes: Income deciles, from lowest incomes (group I) to highest (group X). Capital gains are excluded 
from disposable earnings.
Sources: Stefán Ólafsson and Arnaldur Sölvi Kristjánsson 2012 and Eurostat. EU-SILC.
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Iceland’s way through the crisis
In 2012, three-and-a-half years after the spectacular collapse of the Icelan-
dic financial system, we are in a position to assess how Iceland tackled the 
crisis in terms of social and economic policy. What we find is that Iceland’s 
approach appears to have been quite successful to date.14 We also find that 
Iceland has partly designed its own policy approach, in cooperation with the 
IMF, exemplifying its own special strategies. I explain here the main charac-
teristics of this approach and how it has worked in practice.
The main characteristic of the approach is an emphasis on redistribu-
tion, through the tax system and the social protection system, along with 
debt relief measures that were disproportionally aimed at the middle and 
lower income groups. Redistribution meant that the need for classic austeri-
ty measures in the form of public expenditure cuts, was not as great as other-
wise would have been. Various efforts to alleviate unemployment were also 
implemented. While the Icelandic krona had exaggerated the bubble econo-
my effect prior to the crisis, its depreciation (which started at the beginning 
of 2008, well before the collapse of the banks) helped export industries to 
maintain their operations after the collapse. The cost of that depreciation, 
however, fell squarely and severely on households, which suffered a big cut 
in real earnings (through price inflation and lagging incomes) along with an 
increased debt burden. That cut in living standards fell disproportionally on 
higher income households, partly due to the policy of redistribution.15
The overriding concern of the government had, of course, to be to res-
urrect the financial system, including the Central Bank, which literally be-
came bankrupt. The public deficit was -14.5 per cent at the beginning of 
the crisis and its reduction and levelling became the prime goal of the IMF 
programme, as well as the goal of paying back the emergency loans obtained 
from the IMF and the other Nordic nations. In addition, a large part of the 
business sector went deep into debt problems and many firms and house-
holds went bankrupt. The task of maintaining continued operation of so-
ciety and economy became a major concern for both the government and 
households, something that in a normal year is taken for granted. 
14 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012; Ólafsson, Kristjánsson & Stefánsson 2012; IMF 2012.
15 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012.
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The leader of the IMF delegation described Iceland’s experience as a ‘near-
death experience’.16 The major aim of the IMF programme was to prevent fur-
ther depreciation of the currency, ensure fiscal sustainability, and restructure 
the financial sector. In order to give the government breathing space, the au-
tomatic stabilizers were allowed to work fully in the first crisis year and capital 
controls were introduced to create fiscal space and facilitate currency stabili-
zation. The programme had dated goals for financial recovery and economic 
progress, but it was up to the government to choose the tools and strategies, 
such as finding the right balance between expenditure cuts and tax increases.17
With the public finances in ruins, the task of sheltering households from 
the vagaries of the crisis was a challenging task indeed. Still, one of the aims 
of the government was to use the social protection system to obtain such 
goals. The strategy of redistribution was a major vehicle of this policy ap-
proach and combined an increase of some welfare expenditures with cuts 
in others, even as remaining expenditures became in many cases more di-
rected at the vulnerable groups in society.
On the whole social protection expenditures increased by 4.2 per cent 
in real value kronur from 2007 to 2010, with an increase of 11.6 per cent for 
transfers to households, while expenditures on services were cut by nearly 
3 per cent in the same period.18 Expenditures on pension benefits were in-
creased by a generous raising of the minimum pension, which however ben-
efited disability pensioners more than old-age pensioners. Family benefits 
expenditures did not register real increases, but here, as with O–A pensions, 
more targeting meant that the lowest earners saw some increases (thus birth 
leave expenditures for example were cut significantly but child benefits in-
creased slightly). 
Of course expenditures on unemployment benefits increased massively 
(by some 600 per cent) and expenditure on labour market measures in-
creased by 60 per cent in real terms. The same applies to interest cost rebates 
for housing loans, which were increased by some 60 per cent in real value. 
16 Thomsen 2011.
17 See the IMF yearly staff reports on Iceland from 2008 through April 2012.
18 Statistics Iceland; Ólafsson, Kristjánsson & Stefánsson 2012
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Sources: Statistics Iceland and Eurostat.
Figure 6.3.  Real change in GDP by quarters (diagram A) and unem-
ployment in some crisis-ridden countries  (diagram B), 
2007–2011
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In many ways the welfare strategy had the characteristics of being strategic 
in application, seeking cuts where possible (mainly in service provisions, 
higher pay levels, occupational benefits in the public sector, and administra-
tive costs) and increasing expenditure where it was deemed of the utmost 
importance to reach the goals of sheltering the more vulnerable. 
So how successful were these strategies in resurrecting Icelandic society 
from the ashes of the collapse?
Touching bottom and rising again
When we survey the quarterly economic growth record through the crisis, 
we see that the economy was slowing down already by the second quarter 
in 2008 and by the third quarter it was already negative by 0.4 per cent (see 
Figure 6.3.A). So the contraction had started already before the collapse of 
the banks. The major contraction then came in 2009, the average being reg-
istered at 6.8 per cent for the year. This stretched into 2010 but already by 
the third quarter of that year there were signs of a turnaround with reduced 
contraction; by the fourth quarter it stood at -0.4 per cent. The year of 2011 
then showed strong growth in all quarters and the first quarters of 2012 
display a similar growth record. 
The prognosis of the Central Bank for 2012 is a growth of 2.5–3 per cent, 
which is good by international standards. For comparison, the 2012 prog-
nosis for the EU is 0 per cent and for Ireland it is 0.5 per cent. Some of the 
crisis-ridden countries will continue to contract this year (2012).
Looking at unemployment development (Figure 6.3.B) in some of the 
countries that went deep into crisis, Iceland compares quite well. Iceland’s 
unemployment went from less than two per cent before the crisis to just over 
nine per cent when it topped (in second quarter of 2009). Apart from that 
quarter, Iceland’s unemployment rate remained below the EU average. After 
topping, it has come down very slowly until the present year, when it seems 
set to reach its lowest level after the onset of the crisis. The prognosis of the 
Directorate of Labour is that the unemployment level will be around five per 
cent during the summer of 2012.
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Latvia, another country that went deep into the financial crisis, went 
much higher on unemployment than Iceland, peaking at close to 20 per cent 
in the first quarter of 2010 and coming down to about 14 per cent by end of 
2011. All the other countries in the diagram continue to show high unem-
ployment levels, and some of them, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, are 
still experiencing an increase in their levels.
So on the whole, one can say that Iceland touched bottom rather soon 
after the collapse and has been firmly on the upswing from 2011. Compared 
to the other European countries that went deep into crisis, Iceland seems to 
be recovering rather well. 
Real wage development and private consumption through the crisis pe-
riod tell a similar story (Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4.  Real wages 2000–2012 (diagram A), and a comparison of 
private consumption amongst selected crisis countries, 
2008–2011 (diagram B)
Note: Real wages show 12-month change, February to February. 
Sources: Statistics Iceland and Eurostat.
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Real wages came down by about 12 per cent altogether between 2008 
and 2010.19 There was a collective bargaining round in the spring of 2010 
that led to some increase in real wages during the summer of 2010 but that 
came down again (due to rising inflation) in early 2011. Then the spring 
of 2011 saw another bargaining round that put the rise in real wages on a 
firmer footing. In 2011 real wages increased by 2.2 per cent (February 2010 
to February 2011), while the 12 months increase from 2011 to 2012 was 
about 4.6 per cent. That increase was in effect larger than any yearly real 
wage increase in Iceland since 1998. It was in fact the highest yearly rise in 
13 years. These figures clearly indicate the strength of the recovery.
It is also interesting to survey the development of private consumption 
through the crisis years. Consumption went down by some four per cent 
on average in EU countries in 2009 and then recovered the following year. 
But countries hard hit by the crisis, such as the Baltic States, Ireland, and 
Iceland, experienced a significantly larger cut in consumption, especially 
Iceland and Latvia, whose figures went down by some 20 per cent already 
in 2009.20 
Greece only experienced a consumption cut in 2011, but given the pros-
pect there at the time of writing (May 2012), its figures seem set to go much 
further down in 2012 and most likely the next year as well. Ireland’s con-
sumption figures came down slower than Iceland’s and Latvia’s to begin with 
but have continued contracting longer, that is, every year from 2009 through 
2011. 
Iceland, however, took a deep dive at the start in 2009 but then saw sig-
nificant increases in consumption levels both in 2010 and 2011. These in-
creases indicate that there is a close relationship between private consump-
tion and real wages. Intersecting with rising wages from spring of 2010, 
private consumption already showed some increase in the latter part of that 
year and then more firmly in 2011. In terms of overall volume, Iceland’s 
consumption level may equal or rise above the level of 2008 in 2012. 
19 Note that real household earnings came down more, since lower work volumes and reduced benefits 
added to the cut in real wages. A changed tax burden also affected that outcome.
20 Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2012a; Eurostat.
stefán ólafsson – crisis and recovery in iceland
119
Due to higher price levels Icelanders are of course getting less for their 
consumption money in 2012 than before the crisis. But the consumption 
level of 2007–2008, at the height of the bubble economy, was unsustainable 
given the overrated currency value at that time and the role of borrowed 
money as a source of consumption in some cases. However, the development 
of both wages and private consumption does support the analysis above on 
the country’s path through the crisis. The Icelandic economy reached bot-
tom in the latter part of 2010, when its climb up from the ashes started, to be 
then firmly consolidated from 2011 onwards.
Figure 6.5.  Debt of households (diagram A) and subsidies for 
 mortgage interest costs as % of housing intrerest cost 
 (diagram B), 1993–2011
Sources: Ólafsson, Kristjánsson and Stefánsson 2012. Icelandic tax data.
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Debt relief issues 
Debt accumulation is the most deadly feature of a bubble economy. On the 
eve of the collapse, Iceland’s foreign debt amounted to almost eight times 
the country’s GDP.21 Most harmful in the case of Iceland was the debt ac-
cumulation of the financiers and business speculators who were responsible 
for the big majority of foreign debts. But the household sector also increased 
its debt level, particularly rapidly after the private banks entered the housing 
loans market in 2004, offering new loans, refinancing of older mortgages, 
and greater use of increased asset prices as collateral for higher loans. The 
loans offered were also increasingly awarded for up to 40 years, which made 
possible more stability in the debt burden of servicing the higher debt lev-
els. While Iceland had a housing bubble from 2004 onwards, this was only 
a minor part of the overall bubble. The business speculation constituted the 
bubble’s main feature and its most harmful aspect. 
Figure 6.5.A shows how the debt level of households increased up until 
the crisis and how it has come down again in the period 2009–2011.
The housing debts had almost doubled from 2000 to when they topped 
in 2008, but other loans (e.g., car loans and other consumer loans) actually 
increased somewhat faster. So the debt burden had already materialized be-
fore the collapse. Since the onset of the crisis, the average debts have come 
down again. In 2011 both the housing and consumer debts were at a similar 
level as their 2006 levels in real krona values.22 
The IMF has recently estimated that between 15 and 20 per cent of house-
hold debts were already strategically written off by early 2012 (IMF April 
2012, chapter 3). On the other hand most housing loans are indexed to prices, 
so for most homeowners the principals on their loans have actually increased 
with rising inflation. Even though debt levels have come down on average, 
and more so for the lower- and middle-income households, it is the reduc-
tion in disposable earnings that has made the debt burden (interest cost as a 
per cent of real disposable earnings) relatively higher than before the crisis.
21 Ólafsson 2011; Aliber & Zoega 2011.
22 Central Bank of Iceland 2012; Ólafsson, Kristjánsson & Stefánsson 2012.
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So the government policy for debt relief and court actions against for-
eign currency nominations of consumer loans has significantly eased the 
burden of housing loan repayment. In addition the governmental subsidies 
for interest cost on housing loans were greatly increased. This increase is 
also shown in Figure 6.5.B, in which the subsidies as a percentage of the in-
terest cost on housing loans are presented. On average the government paid 
30.9 per cent of the interest cost on housing loans for households in 2010, 
representing an increase from 15.6 per cent in 2007. In fact the subsidy was 
higher in 2010 than it has ever before been. 
So as of 2010 the government is paying on average close to a third of 
the interest cost of housing loans, which most likely is a very high level by 
international standards.
Figure 6.6.  Redistributive effect of the subsidy for the interest cost on 
housing loans, 1993–2010
Note: The subsidy as a proportion of housing interest cost in three income groups: lowest decile, median 
decile, and the top decile.
Sources: Ólafsson, Kristjánsson and Stefánsson 2012. Icelandic tax data.
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Another feature of the housing loans subsidy that is also of importance 
for assessing the Icelandic approach to crisis management is the fact that it 
was targeted more at lower- and middle-income households, thus also gen-
erating a redistribution effect, as shown in Figure 6.6.
Here the subsidy is shown as a proportion of the interest cost on housing 
loans for three income groups: the lowest decile, the median decile, and the 
top decile. The subsidy is greatest for the lowest income group, accounting 
for almost 45 per cent of the interest cost on their housing loans in 2010. 
This level is similar to that which had prevailed in 1995, before it was gradu-
ally eroded towards 2005. In 2010, the median decile groups were receiving 
a subsidy of 35 per cent of their interest cost from the government, a high 
figure never before seen for that group in Iceland. The highest decile group 
(the top 10 per cent of households) had seen its subsidy go down from 10 
per cent in 1993 to zero in 2006. They did, however, receive a subsidy of 
almost 10 per cent of their cost again in 2010, due to the relatively flat-rate 
part of the subsidy.
And so, as the above figures testify, the redistribution effect was clearly at 
work in the government measures for debt easing and debt relief. 
Conclusions
Iceland’s extreme bubble economy was a fairly typical speculation boom, fed 
by debt accumulation and a laissez-faire attitude towards regulation.23 A 
combination of historical accidents in an environment of growing neoliber-
alism paved the way for the world’s biggest bubble economy and the biggest 
financial collapse when it finally burst in 2008. The by now all-too-familiar 
global setback in finance and economy, as well as in politics, ensued.
However, Iceland touched bottom relatively soon after the collapse and 
has been on a firm upward swing from late 2010 or the beginning of 2011. 
In this chapter I have focused on the governmental strategy of sheltering 
the lower- and middle-income groups against the vagaries of the crisis. It 
emerges that Iceland developed its own approach towards crisis resolution, 
which involved a great emphasis on redistribution. 
23 Minsky 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff 2009.
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Redistribution was firstly aimed at welfare expenditures (cuts in some 
areas, increases in other areas, and increased targeting of expenditures on 
lower income groups with cuts directed at higher income groups). Secondly, 
the redistributive effect of the income taxation system was also significantly 
increased. Hence the reduction of real disposable earnings of lower income 
groups was softened, while heavier burdens were levied on the highest in-
come groups, particularly on the top 40 per cent of households. The strategy 
of redistribution in effect reduced the need for classical austerity measures, 
which are likely to dampen economic activity and increase unemployment.
These distributive strategies were joined with stimulus-oriented mea-
sures in the labour market, from special measures for activation, education, 
and retraining, as well as for more direct job creation. Money from the un-
employment benefits fund helped finance some such activation projects and 
pension funds investments facilitated the restructuring of some companies 
and the financing of job-creating projects, such as those in infrastructure. 
The overall strategy, along with the programme of the IMF, seems to 
have succeeded in many ways. Iceland is now firmly placed on the path of 
sustainable growth and has already graduated from the IMF programme by 
starting to pay back the emergency loans it received from IMF, other Nordic 
nations, and Poland, in fact before such time as stipulated in the loan agree-
ments.
Levels of living are also gradually improving and the income distribu-
tion has moved sizably towards greater equality. Iceland is now again more 
in line with the Nordic welfare society model than it was in the decade lead-
ing up to the collapse.
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CHAPTER 7
Ireland’s economic crises in recent historical 
perspective: From resilience to retrenchment 
in the Irish welfare state?
mairéad considine and fiona dukelow
Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of the two most recent severe economic 
crises on the Irish welfare state. It focuses on the constellation of political, 
social and economic ‘problem pressures’, the manner in which these were 
brought to bear on debate about austerity and retrenchment, and their influ-
ence on the trajectory of the welfare state during both periods, namely the 
1980s and the present. Documentary evidence of the nature and complexity 
of the various pressures is necessarily brief; the main focus lies in an ex-
amination of the relative importance and influence of socioeconomic prob-
lem pressures, the delivery of policy solutions, the nature of social welfare 
reforms, and the manner in which these are framed during the respective 
crisis periods. This chapter explores these issues in order to elucidate the ex-
tent to which the ‘severity of economic pressures’1 may act alongside wider 
political and social factors as enablers of welfare retrenchment and/or as si-
multaneously contributing to a degree of welfare resilience, also influenced 
by these same pressures. Taking these two periods in tandem for the pur-
pose of analysing the impact of economic crises on the Irish welfare state, 
we explore the possibility of ‘multicausal explanation’2 in understanding 
1 Pierson 2001, 456.
2 Starke 2005, 32.
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the conditions in which welfare resilience may be weakened, thereby mak-
ing way for more systematic welfare retrenchment over time. It could be 
argued that there is limited merit in examining these two economic crises. 
Their origins are largely, but not altogether, different. The economic and fis-
cal conditions that preceded them are markedly different in terms of GDP 
and relative standard of living, and there are issues around timeframe(s), the 
impact of greater European integration, and Ireland’s position vis-à-vis eco-
nomic globalization. There is undoubtedly validity to these points, but the 
question of why the Irish economic crisis of the 1980s was frequently used 
as a reference ‘event’ about the manner in which current policy responses 
should be considered still remains open. This may be viewed as a largely 
domestic political question, but it has wider application too; the idea of so-
cial and political learning3 has been identified as a factor in the politics 
of welfare retrenchment, even if the narrative surrounding it often fails to 
underscore the distinct dynamics at play in each crisis period.
Irish economic crises of the 1980s and the first decade of the 
new century in context 
Ireland was an outlier in not following the broader European trajectory 
of welfare state development in the post–World War II period. Due to the 
dominance of Catholic conservatism, a dependence on agriculture and an 
economic policy of protectionism, and the relative success of conservative 
and populist politics over the political left, it was not until the 1960s that 
policies promulgating ideas around ‘a just society’ began to gain traction 
in mainstream Irish political discourse. As a consequence, core elements of 
the welfare state (e.g., the health system) were only established on a statu-
tory basis during the 1970s, while the social welfare system had just entered 
its first real expansionary phase. The Irish economy was a ‘late developer’ 
and the 1960s and 1970s essentially marked the first decades of Irish in-
dustrial development, although the standard of living remained well below 
the European average, and poverty and unemployment were serious social 
problems.4 
3 Pierson 2001, 453.
4 Considine & Dukelow 2009.
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Ireland’s economic crisis of the 1980s had its origins in the 1970s, al-
though it follows a somewhat different path to that of other countries. 
Despite unfavourable international economic conditions after the first oil 
crisis, Ireland recovered quickly owing to a strong performance in interna-
tional trade and the shift from the long-standing policy of balancing cur-
rent expenditure with current revenue provided leeway for policymakers; 
however, keeping this in check was to prove increasingly difficult.5 Subse-
quent years saw some expansion of the welfare state and efforts were made 
to broaden the tax base. However, the Fianna Fáil government returned in 
1977, reversed many of the tax initiatives, preferring a more expansionary 
and pro-cyclical approach involving capital spending and growth in public 
sector employment. Inflation had become a serious problem and by the time 
the second oil price shock hit, Ireland was less able to counter its effects. 
Economic stagnation became a significant difficulty from the early 1980s, 
with sluggish growth rates for several years and minor dips into negative 
growth. In this respect, the economic trajectory of the 1980s crisis is mark-
edly different to the present crisis. Table 7.1 provides an outline of key eco-
nomic data for both periods. 
The unprecedented economic growth of the late 1990s and early years 
of the new century’s first decade came to an abrupt end when the property 
bubble burst just as the impact of the global financial crisis was being felt. A 
domestic boom in property and consumption during the new century’s first 
decade was facilitated by the ready availability of credit, low interest rates, 
and a poorly regulated banking sector. Impressive economic growth rates 
(average GDP growth 5.5 per cent 2001–2007) masked the growing instabil-
ity of the tax base which had become increasingly reliant on transactional 
taxes, allowing the low-tax economic model to be pursued and go largely 
unchecked. Ireland entered recession in September 2008 and the economy 
contracted severely; real GDP declined by 12.4 per cent between 2007 and 
2010.6   While government revenue fell by one-third in three years7, it was 
5 Dukelow 2011.
6 Department of Finance 2012.
7 Department of Finance 2012.
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the depth of the Irish banking crisis and the policy response to it (namely 
the Bank Guarantee Scheme) that resulted in the most intractable difficul-
ties surrounding the fiscal crisis. Direct support for the banking system 
reached €63 billion by 20118, representing 38 per cent of GDP9, making Ire-
land’s response to the banking crisis the most expensive to date. 
The economic trajectory of the 1980s was one in which the policies at-
tempting to counter severe inflation and economic stagnation took several 
years to bear results and all the while the national debt grew, threatening 
economic sovereignty. Inflation ran at 21 per cent in 1982 and was reduced 
to 3 per cent in 198610, while the exchequer borrowing requirement aver-
aged 13 per cent between 1979 and 198711, by which time the debt to GDP 
ratio was 117 per cent, up from 87 per cent in 1982.12 This fiscal situation 
8 Dáil Éireann 2011.
9 IMF 2011.
10 FitzGerald 1992.
11 Hardiman 2000.
12 Somers 1992.
Table 7.1. Key economic indicators
Indicator/Year 1986 2011
GDP growth –0.4% 0.7%
Unemployment 17.4% 14.2%
Debt to GDP ratio 114% 108%
Forecast 120% in 2013
Government Deficit –7.9% –9.4% of GDP
–13.1% of GDP 
(incl. bank 
recapitalization costs)
Personal Income Taxation Standard rate 35%
Higher rate 60%
Standard rate 20%
Higher rate 41%
Peak-to-trough GDP decline 
1980s and 2007–2010
–0.24% (1982–1983)
–0.4% (1985–1986)
–12.4% (2007–2010)
Sources: Department of Finance, 2012; Eurostat, 2012; OECD, stats various years; Somers 1992.
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marks a point of contrast with the present where the national debt was not 
a problem in the pre-crisis period, as the debt arising from the 1980s was 
paid down by successive governments, and its scale diminished by rapid 
economic growth. The debt-to-GDP ratio increased much more sharply on 
this occasion, from 32 per cent in 2007 to 97 per cent in 2010.13 Largely the 
result of the massive cost of the bank bailout, and compounded by the sharp 
decline in government revenue, the challenges attached to dealing with the 
national debt remain immense. 
Warning signs existed before both crises came to a head. In the case of 
the 1980s, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister of Ireland), Charles Haughey, ad-
dressed the nation about the need for prudence as early as 1980, although 
economists in particular highlighted what they saw as the mismatch be-
tween ‘converting the unanimity that exists among commentators on the 
need for retrenchment into a realistic programme for achieving it’.14 This 
idea of acting swiftly to manage the risks associated with aspects of econom-
ic/fiscal policy emerged as a feature of the ‘political learning’15 surrounding 
the current crisis. The export-led ‘Celtic tiger’ economy of the mid-to-late 
1990s had effectively ceased post-2001, but was augmented by the domes-
tic economy, fed by the property boom and the easy availability of credit. 
Warnings16 about the dangers of an overheated property market, for exam-
ple, were largely dismissed, with key policy actors arguing that Ireland was 
headed for ‘a soft landing’. By mid-2008 it became clear that this was not the 
case, and the coalescence of the bursting of Ireland’s property bubble with 
the global financial crisis brought with it a severe shock to the economy with 
implications for the welfare state. 
Economic, social and political pressure points 
As the crisis of the 1980s continued to deepen, there were significant eco-
nomic and social problem pressures to which there were no easy solutions. 
Unemployment rose sharply (from 6 per cent in 1980 to 18 per cent in 
13 Kinsella 2012.
14 McCarthy & Walsh 1980.
15 Pierson 2001, 453.
16 Ahearne 2005; Kelly 2007.
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1986), while emigration returned to levels not seen since the 1950s, with 
over 200,000 people leaving the country over the decade. Poverty was a seri-
ous issue, with Ireland having one of the highest rates of poverty (Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain were the others) in the EU15 in 1985. Ireland’s demo-
graphic profile was also amongst the youngest in Europe, with all of the cor-
responding demands that this brought in terms of the health, education and 
social welfare systems. GNP per capita remained well below the EU15 aver-
age, at 61 per cent in 1987, the same as was recorded in 1973.17 In contrast, 
by the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century there had been 
a rapid upturn in the standard of living: Ireland’s gross national income per 
capita reached the EU15 average by 2002, and exceeded it by 14 per cent in 
2007. This fell to 8 per cent below the EU15 average by 2010, representing a 
return to Ireland’s position in 1998.18
The remarkable economic turnabout by the late 1990s was accompanied 
by greater investment in social services. Such investment was required to 
address the many infrastructural deficits that remained from their historical 
underdevelopment and to cater for the needs of a fast-growing population. 
The investment may have appeared to be setting the Irish welfare state on a 
different course but needs to be seen in parallel with growing commodifica-
tion in housing and healthcare, which effectively embedded a two-tier ap-
proach to provision in these areas. In terms of social protection, initiatives 
to tackle poverty were developed and some progress was made, although 
these were largely undertaken in isolation from wider debates about in-
equality and not sufficiently broad to alter the nature of redistribution in 
any substantive way. Ultimately the opportunity to reform and make the 
welfare state more robust was missed.19 
The social welfare system has seen a sharp increase in demand as the so-
cial impact of the current crisis unfolded. Department of Social Protection 
expenditure rose sharply (from 8.2 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 13.5 per cent 
in 201020), reflecting in particular the rapid rise in unemployment (from 
17 European Economy in Barry 2003.
18 NESC 2011.
19 Murphy 2010.
20 Department of Social Protection 2011a.
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less than 5 per cent in 2007 to over 14 per cent in 2011). Relative income 
poverty rates fell initially, falling incomes reduced the relative poverty line, 
and the rate fell from 16.5 per cent in 2007 to 14.1 per cent in 2009, but 
has since risen (15.8 per cent in 2010). Deprivation has increased sharply, 
from 11.8 per cent in 2007 to 22.5 per cent in 2010. Children remain the age 
group at highest risk of poverty (19.5 per cent) and they also experience the 
highest rate of deprivation of all age groups (30.2 per cent in 2010). Income 
inequality, having fallen initially (Gini coefficient 31.7 per cent in 2007 and 
29.3 per cent in 200921), has also risen (33.9 per cent in 2010), highlight-
ing the need for the social impact of sustained austerity to be the subject of 
more extensive debate. However, as the Department of Social Protection 
itself notes, ‘the policy agenda for social protection has been to see it as 
exclusively an instrument to reduce government expenditure rather than to 
cushion the economic downturn’.22 
Turning briefly to political pressures, it would seem that both periods 
were affected by uncertainty but in different ways. Three general elections 
were held within two years in the early 1980s, reflecting the political in-
stability of that time, particularly around budgetary matters that ultimately 
led to the collapse of all three governments elected. This contrasts with 
the present period in which the previous Fianna Fáil/Green Government 
(2007–2011) did not dissolve until Budget 2011 was passed, despite the se-
vere electoral consequences. In office since 1997, the re-election of Fianna 
Fáil in 2007 might be taken to imply a high degree of political stability in the 
pre-crisis period. This stability was not sustained, however, as the govern-
ment struggled to come to terms with the unfolding crisis. Ireland signed up 
to its Programme of Financial Support with the EU/IMF amid a high degree 
of uncertainty and confusion regarding these events. The Green Party ulti-
mately withdrew support for their coalition with Fianna Fáil in late 2010, 
although not before implementing a fourth austerity budget. A general elec-
tion followed in 2011, the fallout from which is discussed later.
21 CSO 2011.
22 Department of Social Protection 2011b.
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Revisiting some of the policy ‘turns’ in Irish economic crises 
The manner in which the crises unfolded appears to have an impact on the 
sequence and extent of the overall policy responses put forward. The eco-
nomic crisis of the 1980s might be characterized as something of a ‘slow 
burner’, building up steadily over a number of years with economic stag-
nation, a fiscal debt crisis, and ultimately a public debt crisis. The general 
thrust of government (1982–1987) policy was directed at curbing inflation, 
limiting public spending, and increasing taxation to reduce the deficit and 
improve macroeconomic conditions. Long-standing inequities in taxation, 
which precipitated public discontent demonstrated in the tax marches of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s and in the fact that ‘higher taxation was never a 
deliberate policy of the Irish state’23, provided the backdrop to the taxation 
strategy of the 1980s. Higher rates of taxation were severe in their impact on 
ordinary workers. By 1985, taxes on personal income and goods and ser-
vices accounted for 75 per cent of the total tax take, while the proportion of 
revenue raised from property and company profits had fallen sharply.24 Re-
ducing the personal income tax burden became a key plank of fiscal policy 
in subsequent years, an issue which returned to prominence in the latter 
half of the new century’s first decade, although with key differences in the 
approach to taxation.
Resources were undoubtedly severely stretched in terms of the delivery 
of social services during the 1980s; however, a Keynesian bent is evident in 
the political rhetoric of the time with a mix of expansion and retrenchment 
delivered in policy related to the welfare state. Owing in large part to the un-
employment crisis, social welfare expenditure rose substantially from 16.8 
per cent of GDP in 1980 to 21.8 per cent in 1985.25 The more austere policy 
objectives were also tempered by the social democratic orientation of some 
of the senior politicians of this administration:
23 O’Connor 2010.
24 O’Connor 2010.
25 OECD in Considine & Dukelow 2009.
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The difference for us … is not in whether the country’s debt should 
be controlled; it is in how that should be done. In attempting to re-
duce expenditure, we have to reject cuts whose only attraction is 
that they are administratively convenient. ... We must also reject cuts 
which promote inequity. … Abuse must be rooted out wherever it 
exists, but that must be done in the interests of promoting justice and 
not at the cost of social justice.26
In the re-call of the 1980s crisis, it is the Fianna Fáil–led government, 
elected in 1987, that is frequently credited for ‘turning the country around’. 
Their strategy was, on the surface, ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’, an ap-
proach based on the belief that public spending cuts encourage private ex-
penditure and capital investment, and a stronger political narrative around 
‘a disciplined economy where sectional interests do not prevail’.27 This ap-
proach was consolidated by a new phase of social partnership initiated 
in 1987. Those on the union side viewed it as a way of avoiding the worst 
excesses of the more neoliberal wave of retrenchment elsewhere. The Pro-
gramme for National Recovery28 marked the emergence of two decades of 
social partnership, during which time its policy focus broadened substan-
tially. Much has been written about its impact on the nature and quality of 
policy making as it evolved.29 The ‘conflicted experiences’30 of the commu-
nity and voluntary sector in the process, as well as the role of social partner-
ship in the facilitation of neoliberal economic policies more generally, has 
also come in for critical comment.31 Others consider that acceding to this 
process and the demands therein contributed to the excesses of the boom 
years.32 In much of the mainstream political narrative, social partnership 
moved from being regarded as an integral part of the solution in the 1980s, 
to being quickly constructed as part of the problem in the latter part of the 
26 Spring in Dáil Éireann 1986.
27 Mac Sharry in Dáil Éireann 1987.
28 Government of Ireland 1987.
29 Ó Cinnéide 1998; O’Donnell 2001.
30 Meade 2005.
31 Allen 2000.
32 Gurdgiev 2012.
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new century’s first decade. Apart from the public sector pay and reform 
agreement drawn up in 201033, social partnership has all but collapsed. 
Returning to 1987, the new government took on the crisis with more di-
rect policies aimed at cutting expenditure and imposing sharper corrective 
action. It was aided by the emergence of a political ‘consensus’ of sorts when 
the leader of the main opposition party (Fine Gael) committed to support 
the government in the actions it took. Against this backdrop it is noteworthy 
that the social welfare system was largely protected (see Table 7.2), although 
the cutbacks imposed were significant in their impact on other areas of the 
welfare state. Over 6000 public hospital beds were closed, public housing 
output declined sharply, and a freeze in public sector recruitment was im-
posed. Cuts to health and social housing were additionally significant in 
their longer-term legacy of contributing to the subsequent ‘deepening dual-
ism’34 in key aspects of the Irish welfare state. 
By 1990, the budget deficit was reduced considerably, from 11.4 per cent 
in 1987 to 2.2 per cent.35 Capital expenditure was reduced as a percentage 
of GDP, current expenditure remained largely unchanged36, and ‘the ac-
tual expenditure reduction was the outcome of exogenous events as well as 
government policy’.37 On the government spending side, the upturn in the 
UK economy facilitated emigration, which in turn reduced social welfare 
demand, and the fall in interest rates lowered the premium to be paid on 
the government debt38. External factors coalesced to provide more favour-
able conditions overall; an upturn in the global economy, the widening of 
the EU single market, and an earlier currency devaluation improved con-
ditions with Ireland’s main trading partners in the UK. On the domestic 
front, the fiscal situation was strengthened by the impact of EU structural 
funds, and a tax amnesty in 1988 returned a larger than expected revenue 
return. Furthermore, the average industrial wage grew by over 14 per cent 
33 Croke Park Agreement.
34 NESC 2005.
35 Kinsella 2012.
36 Kinsella 2012.
37 Barry 2003, 11.
38 Barry 2003, 11.
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between 1986 and 1989, improving domestic consumption and contribut-
ing to government revenue.39 Taken in these terms, Stephen Kinsella asserts 
that ‘rather than being a role model of expansionary fiscal contraction, the 
1986–1990 period looks more like a proto-Keynesian story, where a laggard 
country converges rapidly to OECD averages of per capita consumption, 
output and (real) growth’.40 
From a social policy perspective, a more complex picture emerges with 
retrenchment in key social services, which was a forerunner to a more sub-
stantive shift in policy emphasis during the 1990s and early part of the new 
century’s first decade. Social insurance benefits were expanded to cover a 
wider range of contingencies (e.g., carer’s benefit) and payment rates im-
proved, while contribution rates were simultaneously reduced.  In fact the 
Social Insurance Fund did not require any exchequer contribution between 
1997 and 200941, perhaps supporting the notion that contribution rates did 
not need to be high, in the short-term at least. The consequences of compar-
atively modest social insurance rates are now being felt as the fund surplus 
was depleted in 2010 and exchequer subvention and higher contribution 
rates appear necessary to sustain the system over the longer-term. Outside 
of the social protection system, supplementary private provision became 
increasingly ‘normalized’ in healthcare, and home ownership retained its 
dominant tenure status. Underpinning these developments was an increas-
ingly neoliberal approach to tax policy and to redistribution more generally, 
paving the way for the dualist liberal model of welfare.   
Turning to the rapid emergence of the crisis in the latter part of the new 
century’s first decade, this was met with substantial and decisive, if not un-
controversial, policy reaction. Beginning with the Bank Guarantee Scheme 
in 2008, the government embarked on a swift course of unprecedented ac-
tion to protect the banks, at enormous cost to the citizens, whilst simulta-
neously developing its strategy of austerity for fiscal and social policy. Five 
subsequent Budgets have since been framed in this way, with ‘fiscal con-
39 Kinsella 2012.
40 Kinsella 2012, 234.
41 Department of Social Protection 2011b.
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solidation’ highlighted as the primary objective to restore the Irish economy 
to health. The budgetary strategy of ‘adjustment’ has been steadfast with 
emphasis placed on the need to do more expenditure cutting than revenue 
raising. This policy has delivered a fiscal adjustment of €25 billion, or 16 
per cent of 2012 GDP since 200842, and expenditure cutbacks account for 
almost two-thirds of the total ‘adjustment’ to date. On the tax side, person-
al income tax bands have been reduced, new taxes have been introduced 
(e.g., Universal Social Charge), and more are planned (e.g., property tax), 
although personal income tax rates have not been increased and there re-
mains a policy preference for indirect taxes/charges (e.g., VAT increase, 
Household charge) to generate extra revenue. This is connected too with 
the wider economic thrust of the policy response, which has been to restore 
Ireland’s competitiveness and reputation as a business-friendly and efficient 
place to do business in.43 Underpinning this approach is a central concern 
with Ireland’s position in the global marketplace and the imperative to re-
store that place via massive fiscal consolidation to return the public finances 
to order. The ‘communicative discourse’44 around the absolute necessity for 
a rapid course of ‘corrective action’ was evident in the political sphere from 
an early stage, and the ‘lessons of the 1980s’ also formed part of the broader 
political narrative:
In the mid-1980s … we almost went under and Ireland was de-
scribed on the cover of The Economist as “the basket case of Europe” 
… We must, however, acknowledge and learn from our mistakes.”45
“We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes made in the 1980s when 
Governments of all hues … failed to tackle budget deficits. The story 
of the 1980s was this failure to take timely action, and it cost an en-
tire generation of Irish people dearly.46
42 Department of Finance 2012.
43 Department of the Taoiseach 2008.
44 Schmidt 2008.
45 Harney in Dáil Éireann 2009a.
46 Gormley in Dáil Éireann 2009b.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the general election of February 2011 delivered 
an unprecedented defeat of the government parties; Fianna Fáil lost 57 of 
their previous 77 Dáil47 seats, while the Green Party lost all six of theirs. 
Fine Gael and the Labour Party were returned to form a coalition govern-
ment, although their electoral success has not altered the overarching policy 
response to any significant extent to date; it would seem that the ‘main-
stream’ policy repertoire around the crisis is largely shared with its prede-
cessors. While there is some acknowledgement of the need for incentives/
investment to encourage economic growth, this is heavily circumscribed by 
the core policy priority of reaching the deficit reduction targets, which is 
often re-enforced by plain speaking reminders that ‘this country is now in 
receivership’48 and reliant on ‘lenders of last resort’.49 While not culpable 
for government decisions in the years preceding the crisis, or those taken 
in its immediate aftermath, including the Bank Guarantee and entering a 
Programme of Financial Support, the current government are, as they fre-
quently argue, left to clean up the mess and hamstrung by the commitments 
contained in the EU/IMF loan agreement. It is possible that, in the short 
term at least, ‘the blame sharing opportunities offered by the institutional 
context’50 has affected the current government responses to ‘increased fiscal 
austerity’.51 The degree to which this argument will hold, however, is a far 
more open question, as the impact of prolonged austerity is increasingly felt. 
Apart from the significance of fiscal constraints attached to being in a 
programme of financial assistance and of the country’s membership of a 
monetary union facing unprecedented crisis, the role of international policy 
actors is also of major significance. Policy responses to this crisis and the 
progress of their implementation are effectively monitored by the EU, ECB, 
and IMF, but over the medium to long term Ireland’s position depends cru-
cially on the stance adopted at a European level. One key problem has been 
that ‘the role of the banking sector in Ireland’s problems has been under-
47 Irish Parliament.
48 Quinn 2011.
49 Howlin 2011.
50 Jensen & Mortensen forthcoming, 23.
51 Jensen & Mortensen forthcoming, 23.
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played, with European policymakers continuing to insist that the euro area’s 
problems are the result of excessive public sector spending’.52 Furthermore, 
uncertainty remains about Ireland’s capacity to self-fund at the end of the 
programme of financial support, particularly in the wider context of the 
ongoing Eurozone debt crisis. Dellepiane and Hardiman’s examination of 
the European context of Ireland’s economic crisis concludes that ‘Ireland 
has made many policy mistakes and is paying a high price for correcting 
them … But the real dynamic for floating the Irish economy off the rocks 
of recession lies outside of its control. The future for Irish growth prospects 
remains deeply tied into the terms of European debate’.53 How this debate 
plays out will be of major significance to Ireland’s economic and social re-
covery prospects.
Resilience and retrenchment in the Irish welfare state?
Returning to the question of welfare state resilience, this section briefly 
considers the course of social welfare reform initiated during both crises 
(see Table 7.2). The social welfare reform agenda of the 1980s took place 
against the backdrop of the first comprehensive review of the Irish social 
welfare system by the Commission on Social Welfare, reporting in 1986. 
While not acted on at the time, it informed political comment and high-
lighted the extent to which the social welfare system required reform to 
improve minimum payment levels, expand existing coverage, and achieve 
an adequate system overall. In addition, commitments given in the 1987 
social partnership agreement to maintain social welfare payments were met 
in subsequent budgets, and the incomes of those in the lowest quintile were 
protected.54 The latter part of the new century’s first decade, in contrast, saw 
a more rapid turn to retrenchment. This took place against a backdrop of 
relatively low, but stable, spending on social welfare (6.7 per cent of GDP in 
2001 and 8.2 per cent in 200755), which subsequently rose sharply; as need 
increased, so too did the level of expenditure required, although this was not 
52 Walshe & O’Leary 2012, 166.
53 Dellepiane & Hardiman 2011, 496.
54 NESC 2005.
55 Department of Social Protection 2011a.
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frequently acknowledged in welfare debates. Policy was initially targeted at 
scaling back universal entitlements (e.g., medical cards for the over 70s). 
Subsequent retrenchment implemented between 2009 and 2012 has been 
broad-ranging in its scope with welfare payment rate cuts, increased condi-
tionality, raised eligibility requirements, greater focus on obligation around 
jobseekers supports, and the introduction of far-reaching systemic reform 
in respect of state pension entitlements and those of one-parent families. 
The latter reforms come with a comparatively short lead in time, the po-
tentially serious longer-term consequences of which remain under debated 
as the economic/fiscal fallout from the crisis continues to take precedence.   
Reliance on social welfare reached unprecedented levels during the 
1980s owing to the unemployment crisis and the age profile of the popula-
tion. Reliance does not equal resilience, however, and aspects of the system 
could be argued to be relatively less embedded than elsewhere at that time. 
The crisis of the 1980s was nevertheless met with a mixture of welfare ex-
pansion and retrenchment but it would seem that certain ideological, politi-
cal and notable social pressures around the extent of poverty and unemploy-
ment may have acted as partial obstacles to more sustained social welfare 
retrenchment.56
As for the current crisis, it was clear from an early stage that the policy 
preference was for spending cuts over revenue raising. Ministers noted that 
welfare spending had increased sharply in the decade prior to the economic 
crisis, and this was acceptable only in so far as the resources were avail-
able. The increase in social spending was frequently cited as having become 
unsustainable, feeding the argument that the social welfare system in par-
ticular was a core contributor to the fiscal crisis. This perspective was not, 
broadly speaking, the subject of much contestation in political and public 
discourse. Whilst alliances of civil society groups and some political inde-
pendents sought to challenge this view, this has proven a difficult task given 
the weakness of the political left and related actors, and the prominence ac-
corded to technical economic discourse in public debate.57 
56 Murphy 2012; Ó Cinnéide & Ryan 2004.
57 Considine & Dukelow 2012; see also chapter 15 in this volume.
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Table 7.2. Key social welfare reforms
Indicator 1980–1986 1987–1989 2009–2012
Payment rates
Social insurance and 
social assistance 
(Weekly Rates)
Rate increases Rate increases (ahead 
of inflation) Higher rate 
increases on lowest pay-
ments (1988–1989)
10% reduction on 
average (except state 
pensions)
Eligibility criteria
Sickness/unemploy-
ment benefit
Earnings-related benefits 
abolished (1982–1984)
Duration of entitlements 
reduced and contribu-
tions required increased 
(2010)
Waiting period extended 
to benefit applications 
(1980–1984)
Unemployment/
Jobseeker supports
‘genuinely seeking work’ 
clause introduced (1984)
Reduced payments for 
failure to take up train-
ing/activation (2011)
Age-related (2010) 
payments introduced 
(significantly reduced 
rates for under 25s)
Universal entitlement
Maternity Grant Abolished (1983) N/A N/A
Early Childcare  
Supplement
N/A N/A Abolished (2009) 
replaced with free pre-
school year
Child Benefit Reduction in rates
Qualification age reduced 
to 18 (2010)
Free Travel Extended to blind pen-
sioners (1984)
Systemic reforms
Family Income  
Supplement
Introduced (1984) Increased payment and 
improved access (1989)
Tighter eligibility - Carer’s 
allowance/benefit and 
home help income 
included in means as-
sessment  (2012–2014)
Pensions National Pensions Board 
established (1986)
Self-employed included 
in PRSI system (1989)
Qualification age increase
Age 66 2014
Age 67 2021
Age 68 2028
One Parent Families Reform of existing 
schemes and introduc-
tion of the Lone Parent 
Allowance (1989)
Qualification age reduc-
tion (based on age of 
youngest child – previ-
ously 18 to 7 years old 
post-2014/5)
Employment/
Activation
First schemes introduced
(1984–1986)
New schemes introduced
(2009–2012)
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Against this backdrop, as Pierson notes, ‘[i]f government policies in-
crease public preferences for private provision, growing hostility towards 
public social programs could be expected to facilitate retrenchment’.58 In 
short, a growing proportion of the population considered that their affin-
ity with the welfare state was circumscribed given the additional protection 
they purchased for themselves, state subsidy for such benefits notwithstand-
ing. The conceptualization of the welfare state in such terms has in a sense 
weakened support for it, and reminds us that welfare retrenchment is not 
always unpopular.59
Conclusion
The idea that ‘intense disequilibria have a major impact on reform dynam-
ics’60 appears to hold some weight in the current context with the sharp 
shock to the Irish economy and fast-precipitating nature of the crisis. The 
rapid turn to austerity was made possible post-2008 when policy actors 
moved to adopt a position of ‘a new reality’, which Ferrera identified as be-
lieving ‘there is no status quo’ and therefore ‘existing arrangements simply 
cannot be sustained’.61 Critically, however, this idea was applied in contra-
dictory ways, providing a rationale for cuts in spending while simultane-
ously justifying the need for unprecedented state support for the banking 
sector. The chapter finds that the conditions in which it has been possible to 
implement more rapid retrenchment may not have been simply economic; 
the more liberal features of the Irish welfare state became embedded during 
the pre-crisis period, providing more enabling conditions for retrenchment. 
By contrast the different nature of the economic shock in the 1980s and 
the political and social conditions in which it played out resulted in some 
more substantial instances of welfare resilience, particularly in respect of 
social welfare. In the meantime the wider neoliberal influence on the eco-
nomic and social architecture of the state has, it would seem, weakened 
the social solidarity that underpins welfare effort, and mainstream politi-
58 Pierson 1994, 16.
59 Giger & Nelson 2010.
60 Pierson 2011, 456.
61 Ferrera, cited in Pierson 2011, 452–453.
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cal discourse has done little to counter this. This particular feature of Irish 
polity has emerged as a significant enabler of welfare retrenchment in the 
current context, with potentially lasting implications for the Irish welfare 
state. Counter-perspectives exist, however, which generally speaking seek to 
broaden the frames of reference applied to the examination of the responses 
to the current crisis and raise wider questions regarding Ireland’s overall 
economic and social trajectory62, offering some prospect that the future of 
the Irish welfare state, and the redistributive values that underpin it, might 
become the subject of more robust debate.
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CHAPTER 8
Icelandic consumers in boom and crisis
guðmundur jónsson and magnús sveinn helgason
Introduction
Analysing the recent economic crisis and the years leading up to it from 
the perspective of consumption and consumer behaviour allows us to see 
how the material circumstances of ordinary people and their households 
changed as a consequence of the changing fortunes of the economy. Con-
sumption is one of the most important indicators of material well-being and 
constitutes a more direct way of measuring how individuals and groups in 
society fare economically than gross domestic product. The dimension of 
consumption therefore gives us a good idea of the welfare impact of booms 
and crises, how individuals and households respond to changes in the eco-
nomic environment, and adjust their spending levels and consumption pat-
terns to fluctuations in their economic circumstances.
Europeans experienced an almost uninterrupted economic growth from 
the early 1990s until the economic crisis hit in 2008. Private consumption 
expenditure was a major source of the growth, rising on average by nearly 
two per cent a year in Western Europe between 1995 and 2007. The rise in 
consumption was, however, very uneven between countries, with Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, and Austria well below the average and Ireland, Finland, Ice-
land, and Norway experiencing the fastest growth, well above three per cent.1 
A total reversal occurred during the recent economic crises when consumer 
spending contracted in most countries, in some by more than 20 per cent.
1 Eurostat (n.d.).
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The aim of this chapter is to acquire a better understanding of the con-
sumption boom and crash in Iceland during these extraordinary years. Ice-
land is an interesting case in point, for it experienced a bigger consumption 
boom than most countries in the first decade of this century, only then to 
become the first and one of the most serious casualties of the economic col-
lapse in 2008. Largely driven by credit, the consumption boom became a 
major contributing factor to the growing household debt that has played a 
prominent part in the political debate since 2008. Understanding the con-
sumption boom is therefore of great interest both to social scientists who 
study Icelandic society and economy and to scholars of consumption more 
generally.
We use two different approaches in our analysis. On the one hand, a 
quantitative analysis is carried out of the trends in private consumption by 
looking in some detail at the main components of this consumption from 
boom to crisis. But the aim is also to explore ordinary people’s perceptions 
of the social and economic impact of the boom and crisis on their every-
Figure 8.1. GDP and consumption per capita in Iceland, 1945–2010
Note: Shaded areas show recessions.
Source: Statistics Iceland. Summary statistics of GDP and GDI 1945–2010.
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day lives with particular attention given to consumption behaviour. For this 
purpose we make use of various qualitative data, primarily interviews with 
over 80 people from all walks of life collected during the deepest phase of 
the recession from 2008 to 2010.2 Although not a strictly representative 
sample, it loosely reflects the composition of the population with regard to 
occupation, age, gender, and place of residence. By analysing how people 
think about their consumption choices, past and present, and how the eco-
nomic crisis affected their consumption decisions, we hope to shed light on 
the nature and causes of the consumer boom.
The consumption boom in Iceland and its sources
For a long time Icelanders have lived in a highly unstable and uncertain 
economic environment in which standards of living have frequently been 
subject to great fluctuations. No country in OECD Europe has had greater 
real output volatility during the postwar period.3 Figure 8.1 shows the 
development of output (GDP) and consumption since 1945, depicting pe-
riods of upswing and downswing in the economy. As the chart indicates, 
consumption has had a tendency to fluctuate much more than GDP. Since 
1945 Iceland has experienced four major recessions with concomitant fluc-
tuations in private consumption, which constitutes a key part of Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP). International comparison of GDP and consumption 
shows that four out of ten ‘consumption disasters’, defined as a contraction 
of consumption by more than 10 per cent, between 1945 and 2006 occurred 
in Iceland.4 The recession of 2008–2010 is Iceland’s fifth and biggest con-
sumption disaster in the postwar period.
After a long recession the Icelandic economy started to recover in the 
mid-1990s, marking the beginning of the longest period of economic 
growth since the end of the Second World War. Between 1995 and 2007, 
2 The interviews were collected as a part of the research project Narrating crisis: Icelanders’ experiences 
of the economic crisis of 2008–2009 and their perceptions of its impact on family, politics and society, 
conducted under the auspices of the Icelandic Centre for Oral History, National and University 
Library of Iceland.
3 Gunnarsson 1992; Daníelsson 2008; Jónsson 2009.
4 Ursua & Barro 2008.
part ii: impact – responses
150
output grew on average by 3.4 per cent annually and private consumption 
even faster at 3.7 per cent. One can even speak of a consumption explosion 
between 2003 and 2005 when the annual increase was nearly 8 per cent. 
The accumulated increase in per capita consumption in real terms for the 
whole period 1995–2007 was no less than 60 per cent. These are remark-
ably high figures in the European context, as only Ireland, at 4.5 per cent, 
experienced a faster growth of private consumption within the European 
Economic Zone during that period (Figure 8.2). At the peak of the boom in 
2007, Iceland took fifth place over countries with the highest private con-
sumption per capita in Europe, after Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, and Norway.5 
5 Eurostat (n.d.). 
Figure 8.2.  Growth of private consumption per capita in Western 
Europe, 1995–2007
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 8.2. Growth of private consumption per capita 
in Western Europe, 1995–2007
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From a strictly economic perspective, the major drivers of rising private 
consumption expenditure were threefold. First, real incomes rose steadily as 
a result of high economic growth. Between 1995 and 2007, GDP per capita 
increased by 49 per cent and household disposable income by no less than 
76 per cent. Iceland was one of the fastest growing economies of Europe 
and became one of the richest countries in the world with per capita GDP 
exceeding that of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic countries 
(with the exception of Norway).
The second source of consumption growth was household borrowing. 
One of the most remarkable features of the consumption boom was the si-
multaneous rise in income and debt as households’ consumption rose well 
above income, no longer limited by family earnings but by how much it 
could borrow. Research shows that consumption in Europe and America 
was increasingly influenced by expected incomes from rising prices of asset 
wealth, especially real estate, as the increasing value of collateral available to 
households relaxed borrowing constraints.6 This wealth effect was clearly 
seen in the asset bubble in the first years of this century as consumption was 
stimulated by greatly increased collateral. 
In a longer term perspective, growth in borrowing in Iceland is associ-
ated with better access to credit and the deregulation of the financial mar-
ket in the 1980s and 1990s. Already in the 1980s, household debt was on 
the increase, partly as a result of easier credit, rising from 17 per cent to 
46 per cent of GDP from 1980 to 1990.7 Households increased their debt 
exposure dramatically in the 1990s, and after the turn of the century, but es-
pecially from 2003 onwards, the newly privatized banks were busy channel-
ling funds from the international wholesale market, awash with low-interest 
credit, into the economy. A borrowing explosion ensued as households and 
firms took advantage of abundant and cheap credit. The household debt/
GDP ratio reached an all-time high in 2007 at 118 per cent, while savings 
declined from 15.5 per cent of GDP on average in the 1990s to 12.0 per 
cent on average from 2004 to 2007. The debt explosion is well captured in 
6 Case, Quigley & Shiller 2005; Sousa 2009.
7 Central Bank of Iceland (n.d.); see also Jetzek 1998, 101–120. 
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the debt-to-income ratio, which rose from just under 150 per cent in the 
mid-1990s to 230 per cent in 2008. By then, the ratio in Iceland was on a 
par with that of the Netherlands and, among other European countries, was 
only exceeded by that of Denmark (Figure 8.3). 
An additional boost to consumption growth was given by the high ex-
change rate of the Icelandic krona, especially from 2003 to 2007, pushed up 
successively by the inflow of credit that was chasing high domestic interest 
rates. Icelandic consumers took advantage of the relatively cheap imported 
goods and services encouraged by the high-value krona and went on the 
biggest spending spree on record. The strong krona during those years also 
encouraged spending abroad. Consumer expenditure on travels abroad shot 
up and shopping trips to Copenhagen, Glasgow, Dublin, and later US cit-
ies became popular. In Britain in 2005, no foreign visitors spent as much 
money per visit as Icelanders did. Icelandic visitors also broke records in 
Figure 8.3. Gross debt-to-income ratio of households in Europe in 2008
Source: Eurostat.
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Denmark in November and December of 2006, spending in absolute terms 
more than any other non-EU nation on ‘tax-free’ goods.8 The current ac-
count was showing the largest deficits in history but did not prompt any 
special measures by the government because loan capital and investment 
continued to flow into the country.
How did the consumption patterns change during the boom years? By 
looking at the components of private consumption using the standard clas-
sification scheme COICOP, we can see how the composition of consump-
tion changes over time. Figure 8.4 shows changes in each COICOP division 
(main category) of per capita consumption from 1995 to 2007, measured as 
annual average changes. Surprisingly, by far the biggest increase occurred in 
communications, rising in real terms by more than 13.5 per cent on average 
8  Office for National Statistics, UK 2010; Fréttablaðið 2006. 
Figure 8.4. Changes in private consumption per capita, 1995–2007
Source: Statistics Iceland.
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each year. The reason for this extraordinary increase can be explained by 
greater spending on mobile phones and, more importantly, on telephone 
services for transmission of data and Internet connections. Tourist expen-
diture abroad came second with an increase of over 9 per cent. Transport 
was in third place with an increase of 6.5 per cent, primarily due to car 
purchases. Icelanders were not only buying more cars but more expensive 
ones, ranging from the popular 4x4 vehicles to luxurious Lexus, Mercedes 
Benz, Audi, and Volvo. These changes clearly show a shift towards a marked 
increase in the consumption of ‘luxurious’ goods, with significantly less of 
an increase in the consumption of more basic consumer goods and services, 
housing, water and electricity, and food and beverages.
Breaking the consumption expenditure data further down even more, 
dramatic changes emerge. Figure 8.5 shows the fastest-growing subdivisions 
over the period 1995–2007. The first horizontal bar represents the category 
of major durables for recreation and culture (caravans, trailers, small aero-
planes, boats, and musical instruments), rising on average by just over 20 
per cent per year. As mentioned before, expenditure on telephone services 
rose rapidly and takes second place with an increase of 18 per cent a year. 
Other categories such as audio-visual instruments (mainly television sets), 
Figure 8.5. Changes in private consumption per capita, 1995–2007
Source: Statistics Iceland.
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financial services, and car purchases grew considerably less but still showed 
quite a substantial increase.
These findings correspond well with common perceptions in Iceland of 
the changing nature of consumption during the boom years when extrava-
gant spending became more pronounced: expensive 4x4 vehicles, caravans, 
and plasma flat screen televisions became symbols of the hyperconsumption 
of those years. The official statistics tell only part of the story of the extrava-
gant consumption that took place in Iceland during the boom years. Ex-
travagant consumption flourished as the fast expanding group of the newly 
wealthy was affirming its status or just consuming for its own pleasure. More 
Bang & Olufsen stereos, Range Rovers and Toyota Land Cruisers were sold 
in Iceland than in many of the more populous countries in Europe. Cara-
vans and yachts became increasingly popular by the moderately affluent 
middle class, while private jets, ski resorts, and soccer teams were strictly 
confined to the superrich.
The collapse of consumption during the economic crisis
The economic boom ended suddenly and dramatically in the autumn of 
2008. The Icelandic banking system collapsed in the first week of October 
when three of the largest banks went bankrupt. The Icelandic krona also col-
lapsed, loosing almost 50 per cent of its value over the year. House own-
ers felt an enormous squeeze as asset prices plunged and mortgages rose 
steeply because most loans were either linked to the consumer price index 
or, even worse, foreign currencies. Thousands of families found themselves 
in dire straits when savings vanished, income shrank, and property value 
took a dive. Iceland entered the biggest downturn in the economy since the 
early 1920s with record unemployment peaking at nine per cent in the early 
months of 2010. The share of indebted households in acute distress is esti-
mated to have shot up to nearly 28 per cent in the autumn of 2009.9 Since 
2011 there has been a slow recovery as economic growth has resumed, but al-
though the debt situation has somewhat ameliorated, the financial situation 
9 Halldorsson & Zoega 2010; Daníelsson & Zoega 2009; Gylfason, Holmström, Korkman, Söderström 
&  Vihriälä 2010; Ólafsson & Vignisdóttir 2012.
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of households, many crippled with debt and dwindling income, is still critical 
and one of the most serious and protracted problems of Icelandic society. 
Iceland experienced one of the largest downturns in private consump-
tion in Europe during the recession. Consumer spending had already been 
on the wane in the second quarter of 2008, indicating uncertainty and 
problems in the economy as the krona depreciated.10 Private consumption 
reached the bottom in the first quarter of 2009, down by no less than 24 per 
cent on 2007. By the last quarter of 2009, household spending levels had, for 
the most part, stopped falling, and in 2010 overall consumption remained 
stagnant, although individual categories changed significantly. The fall in 
consumption occurred with extraordinary speed over a period of around 
18 months. The 2008–2010 recession is one of the biggest ‘consumption di-
sasters’ in Iceland’s postwar history, placing second only to the recession of 
1948–1952 in terms of severity. 
10 Hagtíðindi 2010:3.
Figure 8.6. Changes in private consumption per capita, 2007–2010
Source: Statistics Iceland. 
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The enormous contraction of consumption was accompanied with sub-
stantial changes in consumption patterns. Figure 8.6 shows changes in indi-
vidual categories (divisions) of private consumption between 2007 and 2010. 
The biggest decrease was in tourist expenditure abroad, falling annually on 
average by more than a quarter, or by 60 per cent over the period 2007–2010 
as a whole. Consumer contraction was also big in the following categories: 
transport by 40 per cent; furnishing and household equipment by 33 per 
cent; and clothing and footwear by 27 per cent. Big as these changes were, 
an even greater contraction occurred in some subdivisions. Car purchases 
for example fell by an astonishing 89 per cent over the period 2007–2010, 
and furniture and furnishing and major durables (caravans, trailers, etc.) by 
56 per cent. Interestingly, expenditure in three categories increased slightly: 
housing, water, and fuel by 2 per cent; education by 3 per cent; and health 
by 6 per cent. Such marginal increases were mainly caused by higher import 
prices (e.g., on medicine) as a result of the currency collapse.
The public mood has significantly changed since the collapse of 2008, 
leading to changes in consumer spending and behaviour which the official 
statistics do not always convey.11 The economic crisis heralded new times 
of austerity, bringing shifts in psychology and behaviour in which the vir-
tues of prudence, frugality, and self-sufficiency were extolled. More socially 
and environmentally conscious attitudes towards consumption can be dis-
cerned. Families moved increasingly to homemade produce as manifested 
in vegetable growing, baking, and knitting, all of which became almost na-
tional sports in the wake of the crisis. Even making traditional blood pud-
ding became popular again. There was a revival of the slogan from the 1930s 
Depression ‘choose Icelandic’, whose essential message was that buying Ice-
landic goods was not only patriotic but also considered the best way out of 
the crisis. Icelandic knitwear and design, seeking inspiration in the island’s 
‘cultural heritage’, became fashionable. Holidays at home instead of abroad 
were the proper thing to do. Interest in recycling started to grow, and envi-
11 This account is mainly based on newspapers and other media. See for example Fréttablaðið 6 De-
cember 2008, 42, 16 April 2009 (Markaðurinn), and 29 May 2009, 8; Morgunblaðið 8 March 2009, 4. 
See also Árbók verslunarinnar 2012. 
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ronmentally friendly goods were increasingly well received. Luxuries were 
out; patriotic knitwear was in. Now, as the economy is emerging from the 
crisis, this tendency towards self-sufficiency is on the wane.
Inequalities in consumption
The boom years 1995–2007 were not only a time of increasing prosperity 
but also of rapidly growing income inequality in Iceland. The Gini coef-
ficient of income distribution for Iceland rose from 0.26 in 1994 to 0.44 at 
the height of the boom in 2007.12 This meant that the share of lower income 
earners was rapidly decreasing, while the share of higher income groups was 
relatively rising. The share of the top 1 per cent of income earners rose from 
4 per cent in 1992 to an astonishing 20 per cent in 2007. 
Although real incomes of lower income groups rose significantly dur-
ing the period, allowing them to consume more, an increasing number of 
low-income families were having difficulties in making ends meet towards 
the end of the period. Surveys and research showed that some groups were 
left out in the boom, in particular low-income and unskilled workers, pen-
sioners, the disabled, and single parents.13 Already in early 2008 a growing 
number of families were in arrears on mortgage or rent payments and even 
unable to sustain themselves. During the crisis the number of families in se-
rious financial difficulties shot up, and by 2010 a Statistics Iceland survey re-
ported that 10.1 per cent of households were in arrears on mortgage or rent 
payments in the previous 12 months and 13.3 per cent of households were 
in arrears on other loans during the same period. The figures on mortgage 
arrears were much higher, or 17 per cent in the age group of 30–39 years. In 
2010 almost 50 per cent of households found it difficult to make ends meet.14
In many low- and middle-income families consumption expenditure 
exceeded disposable income. As Figure 8.7 shows, in the period 2006–2008 
income in the two higher income quartiles was higher than expenditure, 
by 5 per cent for the third income quartile and no less than 46 per cent for 
12 All incomes included. See Ólafsson & Kristjánsson 2010; Ólafsson 2008.
13 See for example Rauði kross Íslands 2000; Njáls 2003. 
14 Statistics Iceland 2010.
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the fourth income quartile, while expenditure exceeded income in the two 
lower income quartiles by 15 per cent for the first income quartile and 4 per 
cent for the second quartile. Economic growth, initially based on a revival 
of foreign markets, improvements in terms of trade, and diversification of 
the economy, was increasingly fuelled by abundant cheap credit to finance 
investment and consumption.
Not surprisingly, when the economic crisis hit Iceland the poorer sec-
tions of society took the greatest brunt of the consumption squeeze. Com-
paring the periods 2006–2008 and 2007–2009, the biggest relative fall in 
consumption expenditure was in the lowest income groups, a fall of no less 
than 35 per cent in the first income quartile, 25 per cent in the second, 16 
per cent in the third, and only 1 per cent in the fourth quartile.15 Poverty 
was on the rise as not only the unemployed, the disabled, and low-wage 
single parents were struggling to make ends meet but also formerly rea-
15 Hagtíðindi 2010:3.
Figure 8.7.  Households’ average disposable income and expenditure, 
2006–2008
Source: Statistics Iceland.
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sonably well-off families. Thousands of people in the hardest hit areas—the 
capital and Reykjanes area—had to rely on food and clothing handouts from 
charities, a situation that had hardly been seen in Iceland since the Great 
Depression. 
Experiences of the crisis
Quantitative sources give only a limited picture of the underlying dynamics 
of consumption; we need to understand how consumers themselves viewed 
their decisions and their participation in the broader consumer culture. We 
therefore turn to the aforementioned research project Narrating crisis in 
which over 80 people were interviewed about their experiences of the crisis 
and, in particular, their attitudes to consumption, debt, and economic well-
being. We focus on two sets of questions. On the one hand, how do people 
describe and understand the Icelandic consumption boom prior to the 
crash of 2008, what do they believe motivated people to consume, and how 
do they define ‘excessive consumption‘. On the other hand, how do people 
understand their own consumption choices and their own participation in 
the consumption boom, and how did their consumption change following 
the financial crash in the autumn of 2008. 
The interviewees were in agreement that there was indeed a consump-
tion boom in the years leading up to 2008, many of them describing it as a 
‘consumption orgy’ with ‘everyone’ taking part. One interviewee who had 
returned to Iceland in autumn of 2007 after several years abroad spoke of 
how baffled he was with the atmosphere in Iceland. In general, the inter-
viewees identified the atmosphere as ‘crazy’, citing ‘constant purchasing’ 
and a preoccupation with ‘buying things’ and what these things cost as the 
chief characteristics of the consumer boom. Asked if there had been striking 
changes in the lifestyles of friends or those closest to her, one interviewee 
answered:
Well, not only among my friends, you know. I felt people were speak-
ing a lot about how there was a great boom, and somehow everyone 
was travelling abroad, everyone was building, everyone was buying 
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the nicest and fanciest things, everyone was driving these huge bulky 
4x4 cars, and you know, this was somehow, there was something that 
was just not right.
There is of course no shortage of similar views among commentators 
in the popular press. Since 2008 there has been unanimity in the press and 
wider society that there was indeed a very serious excess of consumption 
during the years leading up to the 2008 crash, and that ‘everyone’ partici-
pated.16
Considering the magnitude of the Icelandic consumer boom, it is re-
markable how few explanations are offered for its emergence in the public 
debate. The single most popular explanation—and the one most frequently 
encountered not only in the popular media but also in financial analyses—is 
that Icelanders are simply unusual spendthrifts and big consumers.17 Ac-
cording to this explanation, the consumption boom was caused then by the 
spending- or consumption-happiness of Icelanders. Interestingly enough, 
the genealogy of this strong consumption urge was, and still never really 
is, given any coherent explanation—it appears to be some kind of national 
characteristic, an expression of Icelanders’ innate nature.18 
We encounter similar explanations in the rare cases where the interview-
ees offer explanations for the consumption boom. One interviewee who lived 
in the countryside talked about how Icelandic farmers had always engaged 
in the pastime of bragging and comparing their livestock or sheepdogs, 
and how the competitive, conspicuous consumption of today was simply a 
modern expression of this old national trait. Others spoke of the consump-
tion boom as an addiction or pathology of some sort: People had somehow 
gone ‘crazy’, or become ‘addicted’ to shopping. This view of the consumption 
boom as a pathological condition has also been common in the press follow-
ing the crash, where it appears almost as a ritualistic cleansing act.
The lack of critical discussion about the origins of the consumption 
16 For a critical view of this consensus, see Fréttablaðið, 7 December 2008, 56.
17 Jónsson 2007; Iceland Chamber of Commerce 2007.
18 Morgunblaðið, 13 July 2004, 24.
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boom and the emphasis on national characteristics as its cause seem to re-
flect the view that the boom was indeed a natural state of affairs; during the 
boom people felt there was nothing really worthy of a deeper explanation. 
The sudden reversal after the crash and a consensus that the consumption 
boom was unnatural or caused by pathology similarly diverts attention from 
larger social or cultural forces, instead focusing on a collective moral failure 
of Icelanders. Here again, the explanation for the consumption boom is to 
be found in the character of the nation, its people, not the social, economic 
or cultural structures.
The elusive concept of national character is hard to work with as an ex-
planatory factor of social phenomena, let alone of historical change. We can, 
however, speculate about pervasive cultural habits that help explain why the 
‘consumption craze’ had such a strong hold on Icelanders. One explanation 
is that consumption decisions are determined more by current conditions 
than future expectations. Historically, the economic environment in Iceland 
has been extremely uncertain, a fact reflected in fluctuating incomes and 
high inflation, both of which have fostered short-term views on household 
financial decisions that are best summed up in the motto ‘better spend the 
money before inflation eats it up’. The household saving rate in Iceland has 
been falling since at least the early 1980s and is very low in international 
comparison.19 
The shifts in consumption did, indeed, catch the media’s attention, espe-
cially the rising luxury fever at the top of the bubble approached in 2006 and 
2007.20 But the media also covered stories on a few groups that voluntary 
‘opted out’ of consumer society by making ‘buy nothing’ pledges and whose 
existence provides ample evidence for seeing a strong anti-consumerist un-
dertone in the ‘krútt’ youth culture of the time.21 During the bubble, Iceland 
also witnessed its first radical anti-consumerist movement since the 1970s 
in the form of the anarchist and radical environmentalist movement that 
19 Jetzek 1998.
20 See for example Fréttablaðið (Markaðurinn), 9 January 2008, 22.
21 The ‘krútt generation’ (or the ‘cuddly generation’) is often associated with environmentalism and 
anti-materialism. See for example Fréttablaðið, 23 September 2008, 24; Morgunblaðið (Lesbók), 25 
October 2008, 11.
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formed around protests against the hydroelectrical projects in the govern-
ment’s industrial policy. These impulses were, however, normally met with 
indifference or scorn. Commentators ridiculed the environmentalists as de-
luded and spoilt middle-class children who were attempting to sabotage job 
creation projects of ‘real’ Icelanders.22
When the bubble burst, the mood of the nation changed rapidly, as criti-
cal discussion flared up on how society had become saturated with exces-
sive consumption and wasteful spending on unnecessary things. Already 
in 2007, articles appeared in the popular press pointing toward the positive 
effects an economic downturn may bring: An old fashioned recession would 
probably be the only thing that could ‘cure’ the luxury fever and bring the 
Icelandic nation out of its collective madness.23
As the debate on the causes and nature of the economic crisis intensified, 
the view that ‘everyone’ had participated in the madness became popular. 
Icelanders as a whole had gone overboard before the crash and consequently 
everyone bore his or her burden of responsibility for the state the country 
was in. The interviews confirm that this view was widespread. The problem 
is, even if everyone is supposed to have participated in the great consump-
tion boom, it is surprisingly difficult to find people who admit to having 
participated. According to a poll in May 2009, only 17 per cent admitted to 
having participated in any excessive consumption or spending.24
Interestingly, this disavowal of participation was also the most striking 
finding of the interviews. While a few of our interviewees admitted that their 
consumption habits were affected by the atmosphere of the boom, there was 
only a handful who admitted that they had themselves participated in the 
‘consumption boom’. Even people who admitted that they had splurged on 
luxuries would stress that they did not, in fact, ‘go overboard’ as others had 
done. They themselves had abstained from the consumption boom and had 
never bought a flat screen TV, travel trailer, or other consumer goods as-
sociated with the boom. Many of the interviewees talked about having ‘al-
22 Fréttablaðið, 13 August 2007, 18.
23 See for example Fréttablaðið 29 June 2008, 8; 1 November 2008, 28; 22 November 2007, 72.
24 Fréttablaðið, 9 May 2009, 36.
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lowed themselves a little more’ without having ‘lost themselves’. Even people 
who admitted to having been quite intense shoppers talked about ‘not really 
having gone all in’ and ‘not having lost their footing’, only to then revert to 
talking about how they had become ‘irresponsible’ about their finances and 
how they had spent their income.
This striking paradox—namely, that people believe that everyone else 
participated in the consumer boom except themselves—is difficult to ex-
plain. At the heart of the problem may be how people define excessive con-
sumption and how people understand ‘going overboard’. The interviews 
indicate that individuals did not see their own consumption at the time as 
‘excessive’ because they felt that they did not consume beyond their means, 
especially if they could point out that they had also saved money and put 
away a part of their pay check each month. Some of the interviewees found 
their debt-financed consumption unproblematic because they had perfectly 
reasonable and realistic plans to pay back their debt and because they had 
made allowances for ‘reasonable’ increases in payments. In effect, these ad-
missions point towards a distinction between excessive consumption asso-
ciated with reckless spending and reasonable consumption associated with 
sensible financial planning. Our interviewees invariably saw their own con-
sumption falling into the second category.
A second explanation of the paradoxical belief in participation has to do 
with the distinction between tangible and intangible consumption.25 Our 
interviewees frequently associated the negative character of the consump-
tion boom with the buying of things and with the tendency of people around 
them to ‘pile things up’, as one respondent described it. They framed their 
own consumption as having been centred on experiences rather than things: 
foreign travel, dining out, and spending on luxury food (‘fine’ or ‘good’ 
food). Participants frequently framed this kind of intangible consumption 
as something positive and even as something different than consumption—
as acts of ‘enjoying life’.
But even if people generally appear to have enjoyed life during the boom, 
25 On materialistic consumption and non-materialistic consumption, see Holt 1995.
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the great majority of our interviewees expressed relief that it had come to an 
end. The only exceptions were those interviewees who found themselves in 
really dire straits, but even they expressed a feeling that the crash was ulti-
mately good for society. Even those who lost out very significantly and had 
to lower their living standards dramatically spoke of being ‘relieved’ and of 
society having lacked ‘humanity’ during the boom. Others spoke of being 
happier now than prior to the collapse, although it is not always clear wheth-
er this increase in happiness has been caused by a scaling down in their 
consumption, or because the reality of the post-crash economic recession 
reduced stress levels that had been caused either by the high flying times of 
the boom or the uncertainty of the crash. Several interviewees talked about 
how the crash and the recession had brought back ‘older and better’ values. 
People had lost sight of what ‘really matters’—namely, friends and family, 
and perhaps frugality as well. In this sense the recession was viewed as a 
‘return to normalcy’. A very common refrain was that ‘all things considered, 
I think we needed this’. 
When asked about how their consumption habits have changed in re-
sponse to the crash, interviewees most commonly pointed to how they 
shopped. Virtually everyone spoke about how the simple task of going to the 
grocery store had become a far more serious project, one involving planning 
and comparison shopping. Participants planned their purchases so that they 
could do them at the low-priced supermarket rather than at more expensive 
outlets, and they looked at the prices in the shelves and planned their shop-
ping in advance rather than ‘simply grabbing something’ or getting a take-
away. Many of our interviewees said that they had regularly made impulse 
purchases at the grocery store, buying new and exotic items they had not 
seen before, and not planning ahead when it came to daily expenditures. 
Now they paid much more attention to prices or compared the relative value 
of different brands or package sizes. 
The interviewees seem to view their own consumption during the boom 
as having been thoughtless—they did not really pay much attention to their 
own spending habits. This may offer a further explanation why people fail 
to recognize that they participated in the consumption boom: They either 
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simply did not notice that they were participating, or alternatively, the con-
sumption boom happened because people were not paying attention to 
what they were spending.
Conclusion
Iceland experienced one of the greatest consumer booms and declines of 
any developed country in the late 1990s and this century’s first decade. The 
almost continuous rise in consumption expenditure from 1995 to 2007 rep-
resents the longest and biggest consumer boom in Iceland’s history, with 
private consumption per capita rising in real terms by no less than 60 per 
cent. Only Ireland experienced a faster growth in Western Europe. 
This rapid expansion of consumption raises a host of questions about 
its role in the economic crisis of 2008 and the dire situation of the heavily 
indebted consumers and their households, an indebtedness which became a 
major concern as the economic crises deepened. In political discourse, con-
sumption has been assigned an important role in the advent and unfolding 
of the economic crisis with consumers being portrayed as both perpetrators 
and victims. For many, excessive consumption is seen as a major contribu-
tory factor to the crisis, a theme that has been played again and again over 
the last four years with many variations. From many corners it is claimed 
that consumers must accept responsibility for their part in the financial cri-
sis—that is, their reckless spending, their excessive consumption behaviour, 
and their irresponsible debt financing.
Households are, of course, responsible for their financial decisions, but 
they are also greatly influenced by the political and economic environment. 
Although many Icelanders were gripped by a ‘consumption craze’, the gener-
al consumer lived in a highly imbalanced society, marred by high inflation, 
index-linked loans and, highly unstable currency, all of which made the fu-
ture insecure and unpredictable. Instead of making moral judgements about 
consumers, we have focused on the material factors that shaped Icelanders’ 
consumption decisions—the rapid rise in disposable income, the access to 
cheap credit, and the strong position of the Icelandic currency—but also on 
ordinary people’s explanations, referring to common madness and traits in 
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the national character.
The rise in private consumption manifested itself most visibly in unprec-
edented accumulation of material wealth and consumer durables such as 
cars, mobile phones, caravans, trailers, and boats, but of the main categories 
in the official statistics of private consumption, the biggest increase was in 
communications, including telephones and telephone services, followed by 
travel expenditure abroad. The ‘turbo consumption’ affected society in many 
different ways. In interviews with over 80 people, participants describe the 
boom years as a ‘consumption orgy’ in which everyone participated. Inter-
viewees tended to explain the consumption boom in terms of personal vic-
es, either as an addiction or as something whose origin lies in the national 
character of Icelanders.
The fall in consumer spending during the economic crisis was even 
more drastic. In response to rapidly contracting incomes and deteriorat-
ing finances, households’ consumption expenditure contracted by nearly 
a quarter between 2007 and 2009, remaining stagnant throughout 2010. 
Consumer goods and services that took the deepest cuts were typically re-
lated to leisure activities such as television sets, caravans, and travel abroad, 
but consumers also significantly reduced spending on cars and household 
equipment. 
The crisis may have rung in new times of austerity, but it has also brought 
about a change in the mood of consumers in which a nostalgia for the past 
and a yearning for more ‘traditional’ values such as prudence, frugality, and 
self-sufficiency have a high premium. It is difficult to say how deep-seated 
this change of mood is, but trends working against the rapid rise of consum-
er spending, higher debt levels, lower house prices, and stagnant incomes, 
indicate that it will take a long time for households to regain balance in their 
finances. 
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CHAPTER 9
Economic crisis and the ageing welfare state: 
Reforming pension schemes in Finland in the 
1990s and early 2000s
matti hannikainen
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the current debt problem in Europe 
continue to create uncertain prospects for economic growth and political 
stability. Moreover, longer life expectancy and an ageing population have an 
effect on the preconditions for maintaining the welfare state institutions. In 
almost all Western and in many Asian countries the number of people older 
than 65 has substantially increased in recent decades. Their proportion of 
the population is expected to exceed 25 per cent in 2040.1 This means that 
a smaller group of employees will have to support a larger group of inactive 
people. Furthermore, an ageing population will almost inevitably increase 
pensions and health care costs.
The interconnection of economic crisis and an ageing population came 
to the fore in Finland already in the early 1990s when the economy plunged 
into the deepest peacetime recession in the twentieth century. The financial 
basis of the welfare state was being rapidly eroded. It forced the government 
and the labour market organizations to renew pension schemes and other 
welfare state institutions. After the recession, reforms continued, and they 
were justified and supported increasingly by the fact that the population 
1 OECD 2011; Bonoli & Shinkawa 2005a, 1–5.
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would be getting older in the next few decades. As a result of these reforms, 
the financial sustainability of the pension schemes improved, which has 
made it easier to adapt to slower economic growth and an ageing population.
In the welfare literature there has been a great deal of discussion about 
changes in welfare state institutions during the past two decades, indepen-
dent of whether there has been radical ‘retrenchment’ or not. These studies 
are often linked to the institutional approach that has become popular in 
economic history and the social sciences.2 For instance, it has been under-
lined that trade unions, or ‘insiders’, have succeeded in preventing many 
changes suggested by governments. However, concentrating mainly on 
changes in institutional frameworks, or on the different typologies of insti-
tutional change, can lead to overemphasizing stability and path dependence. 
Especially with regards to pension schemes, it is often difficult to evaluate 
and measure incremental and cumulative changes that take effect over a 
longer time span, even many decades.3
This chapter deals with the pension reforms in Finland in the 1990s 
and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis focuses on the 
role of labour market organizations, which have played an especially active 
role in pension schemes. During the 1990s recession the trade unions suc-
ceeded in preventing and delaying many radical changes suggested by the 
non-socialist government and employers. However, the following analysis 
highlights that labour market organizations’ strong and long-lasting posi-
tion, an important component of Finnish corporatism, can be explained by 
the success of these organizations in reforming an earnings-related pension 
scheme. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The first section presents the essen-
tial features of Finnish pension schemes and their connection to corporat-
ism. This is followed by an analysis of the recession and the pension reforms 
of the early 1990s. The chapter closes with a discussion on the ageing popu-
lation and the pension reforms in the late 1990s and early years of the new 
century’s first decade. 
2 David 1985; Williamson 1987; North 1990; Rutherford, 1994.
3 Esping-Andersen 1990; Pierson 1994; Hinrichs & Kangas 2003; Bonoli & Shinkawa, 2005b; Vidlund 
2006; Petersen & Petersen 2009.
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Pension schemes in coordinated capitalism 
Like many other latecomers, Finland experienced a rapid catch-up growth 
in the decades following the Second World War, resulting in higher growth 
than in leading countries. In the process of labour re-allocation, factors of 
production moved into the industries with higher productivity.4 
During the catch-up period Finnish society underwent a radical eco-
nomic change. The number of workers in primary production fell, as more 
and more people were employed in the manufacturing industry or in public 
and private services. In 2000, the share of primary production in the eco-
nomically active population was only five per cent. Fifty years earlier, almost 
half of the population was employed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. 
Because of ‘belated’ structural change, the culmination of employment in 
secondary production (i.e., in manufacturing and construction) occurred 
relatively late, in the middle of the 1970s. The proportion of secondary pro-
duction in total employment never reached as high a level as in Sweden, 
for example, and the share of services grew at the same time as secondary 
production grew.5
Scandinavian-style social contracts between employers and employees 
were an important feature in the growth period. The trade unions’ improved 
status in society was visible in the labour market but also manifested in other 
areas, especially in social policy. In fact, economic development, structural 
change, nationwide collective bargaining, and the formation of the welfare 
state were all closely intertwined. Wage regulation was in force almost non-
stop from 1945 until 1956 and was followed by nationwide collective agree-
ments negotiated in industries across the economy. As a consequence, the 
position of the trade unions strengthened from the 1960s onwards.
The first incomes policy agreement between labour market organiza-
tions and the government was signed in 1968. This agreement ‘bundled 
wages, prices, unemployment benefits, pensions, agricultural subsidies and 
numerous other decisions on matters of social policy together into one tight 
package’, as Tapio Bergholm has pointed out. The main aim of this kind of 
4 Kokkinen, Jalava, Hjerppe & Hannikainen 2007; Lindmark & Vikström 2003; Hjerppe 1989.
5 Hannikainen & Heikkinen 2006, 166–170.
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extensive cooperation was to slow down inflation, stabilize the economy af-
ter a currency devaluation, and integrate labour market organizations with 
governmental decision-making.6 
Incomes policy agreements were relatively successful in limiting increas-
es in wages and directing resources to investment. As Barry Eichengreen 
interprets this ‘neocorporatist bargain’ in the European context of the 1950s 
and 1960s, trade unions were provided with ‘assurances that labour would 
share fully in the eventual increase in incomes’.7 ‘Coordinated capitalism’, 
as Eichengreen labels it, worked well in many European countries during 
the Golden Age from the early 1950s until the first oil crisis in the middle of 
the 1970s. Simultaneously with the rise of coordinated capitalism, economic 
growth became rapid and the welfare of citizens improved.
Extensive social policy reforms became an important part of the process 
towards Finland’s modern wage-work society and the welfare state. Struc-
tural change increased the need for social security, and ideological and po-
litical changes such as social equality and the widening of democracy after 
the Second World War increased willingness to carry out social reforms. 
Moreover, economic growth increased resources for the expansion of the 
welfare state. The greater portion of the fruits of economic growth was di-
rected to welfare-increasing policy interventions and targeted especially 
poorer and older people, with the result that poverty decreased. 
An essential part of welfare state reforms was the creation of pension 
schemes.8 The Finnish statutory pension schemes consist of two basic 
components: a national pension and an earnings-related pension. The na-
tional pension scheme has been in force since 1939, and was radically re-
formed in 1957 when a flat-rate system with an earnings-related element 
was introduced. The financing of national pensions was arranged mainly 
on the basis of the PAYGO scheme in which insurance contributions are 
collected each year roughly to the amount needed for the pension payments 
and administrative costs of the year in question. 
6 Bergholm 2003, 62. 
7 Eichengreen 2007, 32. 
8 Hannikainen & Vauhkonen 2012; see also Niemelä 1988; Hellsten 1993; Salminen 1993; Häggman 
1997; Blomster 2004; Kangas 2006; Bergholm 2009.
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The earnings-related pension schemes in the private sector came into 
force in July 1962. In these schemes, accrued (earned) pension rights are 
maintained when an employment contract ends. Employment-based pen-
sions are initially financed by employers and administered by private pen-
sion providers (companies and funds). The employee contribution share has 
been in place since 1993. Although in private sector schemes partial funding 
is used, the majority of pensions paid are financed according to the PAYGO 
scheme. 
Civil servants, municipal employees, and seafarers have their own earn-
ings-related schemes, and in 1970 earnings-related pensions were extended 
to farmers and self-employed persons. For a long time, the public-sector 
earnings-related pension acts were based on the PAYGO scheme, but due to 
the projections concerning the growth of future pension expenditure, fund-
ing was introduced as of the late 1980s. Nevertheless, pensions are mainly 
financed according to the PAYGO scheme. 
All of these pension schemes include old age and disability pensions. 
Obligatory survivors’ pensions were incorporated into the pension schemes 
in the late 1960s. And in the 1970s and 1980s the earnings-related pensions 
were raised, the national pension was reformed, and new possibilities for 
early retirement were introduced. The earnings-related pension gradually 
developed into the most important pension scheme. The national pension 
guarantees a minimum pension level for those with no or only very small 
earnings-related employment pensions.
The pension schemes became an important component of Finnish cor-
poratism. The earnings-related pension scheme in the private sector was 
founded at the beginning of the 1960s as a compromise between employees 
and employers. Afterwards, the labour market organizations explained and 
justified their strong position by regarding pensions as ‘a postponing wage’. 
These factors explained the central role that the labour market organizations 
have later played in pension reforms. 
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From growth to adaptation
The Finnish economy experienced a deep economic crisis in the early 1990s. 
The economy had been booming in the late 1980s and undergoing radical 
changes because of liberalization and deregulation of national and interna-
tional financial systems. Real assets and share prices rose, and runaway risk-
taking increased. Because of an upswing of international business cycles 
and a fall in energy prices, the terms of trade (the ratio of export to import 
prices) improved. When the preconditions for a boom existed, the economy 
overheated as a consequence of insufficient restrictiveness in economic pol-
icy to counteract the boom.9
The deep recession was visible in many ways. Real GDP decreased by 
10 per cent between 1991 and 1993. With falling demand for labour, the 
problem of unemployment rose to unprecedented heights in Finnish his-
tory, peaking at 17 per cent in 1994. One significant aspect of unemploy-
ment was that in addition to large-scale blue-collar job losses, tens of thou-
sands of white-collar workers also suffered unemployment. White-collar 
unemployment reflected structural and technological change and, arguably, 
a too rapid growth in services, especially in the banking industry. Because 
of the high unemployment, decreasing tax revenues, and public support to 
the banking system, the budget deficit rose rapidly, as did public debt. The 
consequences of the recession, then, were a dramatic decline in asset prices, 
numerous bankruptcies, and a severe banking crisis. 
What is more, the recession eroded the financial basis of the welfare 
state institutions and also changed the relative strength of different inter-
est groups in society. When demand for labour diminished, the bargaining 
power of trade unions also decreased. Moreover, the Social Democrats lost 
the parliamentary election in 1991. The Centre Party won, leading to the 
formation of a non-socialist government.
Together with employers this new government began setting an agenda 
for major revision of the welfare system. Both actors wanted to reduce the 
production cost of companies and demanded severe cost reduction. Their 
9 Honkapohja, Koskela, Leibfritz & Uusitalo 2009, 10–30; Heikkinen & Tiihonen 2010, 271–283; 
Kiander 2001, 8–22.
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goal was to cut wages, social security and public expenditures as tax rev-
enues decreased and unemployment increased. 
The result was a confrontation between the government and the trade 
unions in a way not seen in many decades.10 The trade unions were reluctant 
to accept cuts in social insurance, especially unemployment benefits and 
earnings-related pensions. On the trade union side, the government’s action 
was seen as an attack on employees’ rights and the welfare state. The conflict 
proved that there were still old tensions in society, especially between the 
Centre Party and the trade unions. It was also a reminder of ‘the pertinent 
polarity in Finnish society’, as two sociologists, Antti Eskola and Erik Al-
lardt, defined the tension between rural areas and towns in the 1960s.11
The trade unions succeeded in preventing or delaying many reforms 
suggested by the government and employers. However, some significant 
reforms were realized, such as the major pension reforms to public sector 
pensions through the alignment of their benefits with those of the private-
sector pension. As in private-sector pensions, the pension accrual rate was 
set at 1.5 per cent, the pension target level at 60 per cent, and the old-age 
retirement age at 65 years. The public sector pension reform was decided 
by the government without trade union support, and was approved in the 
parliament where non-socialist parties had the majority.
The government and employers wanted to reduce early retirement bene-
fits. Based on the labour market central organizations’ agreement from 1992, 
the individual early retirement age was raised from 55 to 58 years in 1994. 
The individual early pension, which came into force in 1986, was a disability 
pension to which lighter medical criteria were applied and social conditions 
were also taken into account when pension entitlements were assessed. 
Moreover, the conditions for receiving an unemployment pension were 
tightened, but because of high unemployment figures during the recession, 
the growth in number of unemployment pensions continued to rise. Unem-
ployment pensions, introduced in 1971, were originally planned to alleviate 
effects on rapid structural change. They assisted in the streamlining of re-
10 Hannikainen 2012b, 247–285. 
11 Eskola 1963; Allardt 1964.
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gressive industries and companies, but from the 1980s onwards the growth 
in the number of unemployment pensions gave rise to criticism. There were 
two dimensions to the issue. Firstly, some companies used the scheme to 
their advantage since it became a cheaper alternative to disability pensions. 
Especially large companies could decrease pension costs if they succeeded 
to diminish the number of disability pensions, whereas in unemployment 
pensions this kind of mechanism was introduced as late as the end of 1980s. 
Secondly, due to the unemployment pension, the elderly in particular were 
made redundant since they often stood a smaller chance of finding new em-
ployment. For many, redundancy and unemployment meant a permanent 
transition from working life at a considerably younger age than the age for 
old-age retirement.
The trade unions’ action in Finland during the recession can be inter-
preted as a good example of the capability of ‘insider power’12 to prevent 
wage-cutting and welfare state reforms, especially concerning social insur-
ance. Real wages only modestly declined despite the huge increase in un-
employment. However, taking the changes in the pension schemes into ac-
count, wages in a broader sense were not as sticky during the recession as is 
often described in the literature.13
One of the most important phases in the reform process of the pension 
schemes was already seen in the first year of the recession. In the incomes 
policy agreements in the autumn 1991 it was agreed that the employee con-
tribution share of earnings-related pension would be 3 per cent of the sal-
ary in 1993. The earnings-related pension scheme had, from the start, been 
funded by employers alone. It was also agreed that the bill for future con-
tribution increases would be footed equally by employers and employees. 
One important reason for the introduction of the employee contribution 
share was that the government decided in the spring of 1991, six months 
before the labour market organizations’ agreement, to decrease employers’ 
pension contributions. The government tried in this way to increase the 
competitiveness of companies. When the trade unions were not willing to 
12 Blanchard & Summers 1986; Lindbeck & Snower 1986.
13 Hannikainen & Heikkinen 2006, 180–184.
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cut nominal wages, the pension contribution was seen as a tool to decrease 
production costs. 
It seems clear that the employee contribution share would not have been 
actualized in the early 1990s without the recession. During the previous de-
cades, experts had discussed it occasionally, but the deep recession and high 
unemployment forced the trade unions to accept this change. The goal was 
to ensure the financial basis of earnings-related pensions, because the em-
ployee contribution maintained and even increased the total pension contri-
butions. The focus shifted gradually from pension benefits to their financing.
In a longer time perspective, the employee contribution share was useful 
for maintaining sufficient pension finances, but it also clarified the bargain-
ing process in pension policy. It allowed the trade unions to justify, more 
vigorously than ever, their participation in the preparation and decision 
making concerning the earnings-related pension scheme. At the same time, 
employees gained a higher cost awareness of the earnings-related pension 
scheme as the new benefits and the low effective retirement ages became 
Figure 9.1. Pension contribution in Finland, 1962–2011 (% of wages)
Source: The Finnish Centre for Pensions.
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visible in higher pension contributions. 
Ageing population and sustainable pension schemes
Population growth and an advantageous age structure were important fea-
tures in the formation of a wage-work society and the welfare state. Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the population belonged to the working-age 
population (15–64) from the 1960s until the 1990s. After the Second World 
War the labour reserve increased in rural areas as a result of population 
growth—otherwise known as ‘the baby-boom’—and technological change 
in agriculture and forestry, and both population growth and technologi-
cal change made it possible to reallocate labour to growing industries and 
maintain a high total employment (in person years). 
As in other Western countries, the ageing population and a decrease in 
age dependency ratio were predicted in Finland already in the 1980s.14 How-
ever, the challenges posed by the ageing population received wider and in-
creasing attention until the economic situation changed dramatically in the 
early 1990s. The situation gave rise to a discussion about extending working 
life by various means. The aim was to meet the increasing longevity by pro-
moting longer working careers.15 Extending working careers by two or three 
years has been one of the central targets of pension reforms since the 1990s.
The interplay between pensions and the demographic transition is rea-
sonable. If people live far longer than before and far longer than expected, 
employees should stay in their jobs longer, too. Furthermore, another de-
mographic argument supports the higher retirement age—namely, that the 
share of the working age population will inevitably decrease because of lon-
ger lifespans and declining fertility rates. In other words, as the older age 
groups get bigger, the younger age groups get smaller and the concomitant 
decrease in labour input means that generating economic growth becomes 
more demanding. And slower economic growth in turn makes it more dif-
ficult to finance increasing pension costs and other welfare state institutions.
The Finnish economy started to recover in the middle of the 1990s, but 
14 The first thorough analysis in Finland was ‘STAT committee’ (1980); Kohli & Rein 1991, 1–35.
15 ‘Pension committee 1990’, published in December 1991.
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long-term unemployment still remained high. In addition to the severe 
economic recession and high unemployment, the future prognosis of de-
mographic changes through the ageing population forced the cutting of 
pension benefits and the renewal and simplification of the pension scheme. 
Without reforms, pension contributions would have to have risen signifi-
cantly in the future. 
After four years of confrontation between the non-socialist government 
and the trade unions, a new phase of cooperation started in 1995. After the 
parliamentary election that year, a broad coalition government led by the 
Social Democrats promised to respect the cooperative tradition with the 
labour market organizations, but by the same token it decided to cut so-
cial expenditures in order to balance public finances and increase economic 
growth. Reforms in the pension schemes were an essential part of the gov-
ernment’s agenda.16 
The fundamental goal set by the government and the labour market 
16 Government platform 1995. 
Figure 9.2.  Age structure in Finland, 1865–2010 (in %)
Source: Statistics Finland.
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organizations was to improve the financial sustainability of the pension 
scheme and to extend working careers.17 The new pension agreement was 
introduced only one month after the government came to power. This re-
form, which came into force in 1996, included the most significant reforms 
in terms of economic impact: pension indexation was weakened, future 
disability and unemployment pensions were cut, and the calculation of the 
pensionable earnings began to include earnings from 10 years rather than 
four years prior to retirement. 
The work distribution between the pension schemes, pending for de-
cades, was completed when the national pension gradually became fully 
pension-tested as of 1996. This meant that in the future, as the earnings-
related pensions increased, more people would receive only an earnings-
related pension and no national pension at all. Both the weakening of the 
pension index and the abolition of the basic amount of national pension 
provoked criticism of the weakening of ‘promised’ pension benefits, criti-
cism which has gone on for years.
The big pension reform that covered nearly all sections of the pension 
scheme came into force in 2005, after years of preparation. The major fea-
tures of the pension reform were:
•  The actual annual earnings form the basis of the pensionable wage (instead 
of the last working years).
•  The employee may choose to retire anywhere between the ages of 63 and 
68. This meant that the old-age retirement age of 65, legislated original-
ly in the national pension, was replaced in the earnings-related pension 
schemes by a flexible old-age retirement age of 63–68 years. In the national 
pension scheme, the old-age retirement age remained 65 years.
•  The pension accrual was raised to 4.5 per cent between the ages of 63 and 
68, and was 1.9 per cent for those between the ages of 53 and 62. For those 
under 53 it was 1.5 per cent.
•  Pensions accrue from the age of 18 instead of 23 and during periods of 
17 Hannikainen 2012a, 287–347.
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study and childcare.
• The individual early retirement pension was abolished.
•  Entitlement to an unemployment pension (at age 60) expired for those 
who were born after 1949, but they were still entitled to an additional daily 
allowance under unemployment insurance schemes until old-age retire-
ment at age 63. 
•  The life expectancy coefficient came into effect for the first time in 2010 
with the result that future pensions will be automatically cut as expected 
life expectancy increases, unless working careers are prolonged at the same 
time.
All reforms followed the principle that the pensions currently being 
paid, as well as benefits already accrued, did not weaken, which made it 
easier for the trade unions to accept the reforms. As in earlier decades, the 
labour market organizations actively participated in the reform process. The 
advisory and negotiating group of the central labour market organizations 
negotiated all the private sector pension reforms in the 1990s and in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. When agreement was reached in the ne-
gotiating group, the necessary legislation was prepared in cooperation with 
the Ministry and the Finnish Centre for Pensions. The government accepted 
the pension agreement and parliament approved the reforms without any 
significant changes or additions.
In contrast to the pension reform in the 1960s and 1970s, the white-
collar trade unions actively took part in the negotiation process, reflecting 
fundamental changes in the labour force. However, blue-collar workers to-
gether with the employer association still maintained a central position in 
the reforming process. It was difficult for the white-collar trade unions to 
accept the changes to the calculation rules for pensionable wages; that is, 
the actual annual earnings formed the basis of the pensionable wage. They 
argued that this reform was unfair for employees with higher education and 
in careers that offer upward mobility. This dispute prolonged the reforms 
and finally threatened the labour market organizations’ mutual cooperation. 
In the end, it was decided that pensions would be calculated on the basis of 
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earnings from the entire working career, combined with a higher pension 
accrual rate during the final years of a given career.
In addition to pension benefits, the reforms concerned pension fi-
nance.18 Since pension expenditure during the first few decades of the earn-
ings-related pension scheme remained relatively small, pension providers 
collected more assets than they needed to pay running pensions. Against 
securities, employers had an automatic right to borrow back the part of 
earnings-related contributions that was not needed for running pensions 
and administrative costs.
A liberation of the money and exchange markets in the 1980s gradu-
ally led to changes. The automatic premium lending directed at companies, 
for example, lost its significance. As the state became increasingly indebted 
during the recession in the early 1990s, earnings-related pension assets were 
in demand. An increasingly larger share of new investments by earnings-
related pension insurance companies was in Finnish government bonds. 
Compared to other investment objects, they had a competitive interest rate, 
and because they were low-risk investments, they were appropriate invest-
ment objects for earnings-related pension assets.
A change in the financing environment required extensive reforms to 
the investment operations of earnings-related insurance companies, which 
were carried out in 1997 and 2007. The aim of the reforms was to engage in 
more versatile and riskier investment activities by investing an increasing 
share of pension insurance companies’ assets in shares and foreign invest-
ments. The pressure to increase earnings-related pension contributions due 
to an ageing population and the subsequent fading economic growth was 
fought by cutting benefits, prolonging working careers, and increasing fund 
returns.
18 Hannikainen 2012c, 391–447.
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Conclusion 
The deep economic crisis in the early 1990s paved the way for the scaling 
down of pension schemes as well as other social benefits in Finland. During 
the recession, major pension reforms were made to public-sector pensions 
as their benefits were aligned with private-sector pension benefits. More-
over, employee contribution share was introduced to the earnings-related 
pension schemes and early retirement schemes were weakened. As a result 
of the recession and the reforms, the development of the pension schemes 
moved to a new phase—from growth to adaptation.
The reforms continued after the recession when the question of an age-
ing population in the next few decades played an increasingly important 
role in political discourse. The reforms mostly meant decimations of bene-
fits and a slowing down of future pension expenditure growth. The previous 
old-age retirement age of 65 was replaced in the earnings-related pension 
schemes by a flexible old-age retirement age of 63–68 years. At the same 
time, the basics of the scheme were simplified and standardized between 
different population groups, and coverage improved. After years of prepara-
tion, a large pension reform came into force in 2005. 
The need for reforms led to continuous pension bargaining between the 
labour market organizations. All pension reforms in the private sector were 
negotiated and agreed by those organizations. The reforms were mainly jus-
tified by the economic goals: improving the financial sustainability of the 
pension schemes, expanding working careers, and increasing the competi-
tiveness of firms and society. For the coalition government led by the Social 
Democrats it was easy to execute the reforms because the labour market 
organizations had negotiated and accepted them. When the labour market 
organizations were successful in reforming the pension schemes, corporat-
ist features became even more prominent in pension policy.  
Relating these pension reforms to the current European debt crisis, in-
teresting prospects emerge. Firstly, it seems evident that, without any re-
forms, the financial basis of the Finnish pension schemes and the whole 
economy would be more unsustainable and unpredictable. Secondly, it is 
difficult to see how the strong negotiating power of the labour market orga-
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nizations would have continued to play a significant role in the formation 
of pension policy. Had substantial reforms not been effected, a permanent 
confrontation between the trade union and the government would probably 
have been inevitable. 
Welfare state reforms are still needed in terms of pushing for longer 
working careers. Because the population is ageing, it will become more 
challenging to maintain both economic growth and welfare state institu-
tions. But the persistent slack in the labour market has made it more dif-
ficult to convince the trade unions and the Finnish people of the need for a 
higher retirement age. In the current environment of intense competition, 
big industrial companies utilize ‘exit-options’19 in the global market, which 
makes it more difficult, especially for older people, to find a job. Moreover, 
many in Finland consider that the welfare state institutions have already 
been reformed, even eroded, too radically.
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CHAPTER 10
‘It’s a Mancession’:  
Discourses of gender in the aftermath  
of the US financial crisis
jyl josephson
The ‘mancession’ story
Financial crises create identity crises, at least in advanced capitalist states.1 
In times of crisis, many voices are heard as each tries to make sense of what 
has happened. As the crisis and the discussions about the crisis continue, 
some explanations become more visible than others. The narratives that 
emerge to explain these difficult transitions are particularly revealing of 
many aspects of national identity and self-understanding. In the wake of 
the financial crisis and economic downturn in the United States, one such 
narrative that emerged in 2009 was the ‘mancession’ story. The term ‘man-
cession’, coined by a conservative economist and used widely by the media, 
provided an explanation for the purportedly novel nature of the financial 
crisis and resulting recession, and came to dominate popular understand-
ings of who was harmed by the recession. 
I want to suggest that the story of this term and its representations in 
popular media illustrates continuing anxieties about gender and work, and 
about the role of men and women in both the workplace and household in 
the twenty-first century. Specifically, over the summer and fall of 2009 as 
the coverage depicted the job losses of the economic crisis as a ‘mancession’, 
1 See for example Loftsdottir 2010.
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many of the stories in the mainstream press began to focus on gender and 
especially on how the recession was harming men in particular. The focus of 
these stories also changed, becoming not just about men’s economic losses 
but also about the psychological and social losses that men suffered as a 
result of losing their jobs. As Williams and Tait put it, ‘the larger victim was 
a particular vision of male identity, related to the idealized notion of the 
good provider’.2 In some versions, as I note below, the story was also about 
women’s supposed gains as the result of men’s job losses, but the primary 
focus was on how the recession was harming men.
In this chapter, I offer a genealogy of the ‘mancession’ story in the popu-
lar press, primarily in the United States. I am particularly interested in the 
gender anxieties evident in this story as they are expressed in popular press 
stories speculating on the meaning and consequences of the ‘mancession’. 
And I am interested in how, and whether, several years into the economic 
recovery, the changes that have occurred in unemployment and the econ-
omy along gendered lines since the idea of the ‘mancession’ emerged have 
altered the story told about the recession and its consequences.
The origins of the ‘mancession’ story
Popular and scholarly sources covering unemployment in the wake of the fi-
nancial crisis in the United States noted the different rates of unemployment 
for men and women in the first part of the recession. Because in the early 
part of the recession more jobs were lost in sectors dominated by men—
such as construction and finance—men did constitute a larger number of 
workers laid off in that period. Given the depth of the recession, obviously 
women also suffered significant job losses, but the press coverage showed a 
clear focus on the loss of men’s jobs.
This coverage was shaped by the interventions of several entrepreneurial 
commentators, who coined terms to describe the higher rates of unemploy-
ment among men than among women. The economist Mark Perry is widely 
attributed with coining the term ‘mancession’, which first appeared in the 
2 Williams & Tait 2011.
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print record in June of 2009. David Zinczenko, editor of Men’s Health maga-
zine, penned an opinion piece for USA Today published in May 2009 in 
which he used the term ‘he-cession’. Conservative columnist Reihan Salam 
used this same term in his article, ‘The Death of Macho’. One image that ac-
companies the piece—the male symbol with a drooping member—commu-
nicates the fundamental message of all these stories: men are being emas-
culated in the great recession economy. These two terms—‘mancession’ and 
‘he-cession’--have been the most enduring and the most popular in press 
coverage of the recession since 2009. ‘Mancession’ even made the New York 
Times list of buzzwords for 2009.3 Proving that the term had at least some 
cultural staying power, in 2012, ABC launched a short-lived and widely crit-
icized situation comedy called ‘Work It’ with a plot involving two men who 
can’t get jobs as men, and thus disguise themselves as women to get sales 
jobs.4 My contention here is that these terms and the context in which they 
are used illustrate the persistence of gender stereotypes and reveal a set of 
anxieties about men, women, work, and gender in the United States.
To trace popular press usages of these concepts in coverage of gender 
and unemployment, I searched several English language news databases for 
the following terms: mancession, hecession, he-cession, shecession, mom-
cession and blackcession. While in each database I found hundreds of ar-
ticles with the term ‘mancession’ and ‘he-cession’ from the period from May 
2009 to March 2012, there were less than ten articles for the same period for 
each of the other terms, including just one article for the term ‘momcession,’ 
and none for the terms ‘blackcession’ or ‘black-cession.’5 I chose to use print 
media rather than blogs and Internet-only sources to trace the enduring in-
fluence of the terms. Notably, in the summer of 2009, Nancy Cook’s simple 
Google search of ‘mancession’ led to 13,500 hits; by August 2012 a similar 
search yielded more than 111,000 hits.6
There is a great deal of print coverage of the global financial crisis and 
the resulting recession that does not make mention of these terms. In the US 
3 Liebovich & Barrett 2009.
4 Garnick 2011.
5 The databases were Factiva, Newsbank/Access World News, and Westlaw.
6 Cook 2009.
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press, the term ‘Great Recession’ has been used by much of the print media 
to refer to the economic downturn, which has been the worst in the United 
States since the Great Depression of the 1930s. A search of Access World 
News, again with the same time parameter and limited to print sources, 
found more than 50,000 articles. So the terms of art that I am discussing here 
do not constitute the majority of press coverage of the economic downturn. 
My point is not that these terms have become the only way of understanding 
the financial crisis and great recession. It is rather that the particular way in 
which these terms emerged and the discourses in which they were deployed 
revealed a certain kind of gender anxiety about men, women, and work in 
the twenty-first century in the United States.
As noted, Mark Perry, at the time a visiting scholar at the (conserva-
tive) American Enterprise Institute, is most closely associated with the term 
‘mancession.’ In the first press use of the term in June of 2009, the London 
Times cited Perry as the source of the term.7 Through his blog, he has also 
continued to promote the idea of the ‘mancession’, and in testimony before 
Congress in 2010 he developed this argument further. Noting frequently 
that the differences in unemployment rates between men and women were 
‘historically unprecedented’, Perry concluded that the recession ‘had a sig-
nificantly disproportionate negative effect on men compared to women.’8 
Although Perry notes at the end of the testimony that the picture was actu-
ally better for men in 2010 than it was in 2009, he has continued to argue 
in other articles and in blog posts that the recession has disproportionately 
hurt men and that public policies to address women’s employment are in-
appropriate.9 In all of his postings and papers about the recession, Perry 
poses the issue as a zero sum game of women versus men, in which men 
are the losers. This framing has been influential, as the idea of men versus 
women has been a feature of much of the coverage that uses the terminology 
of ‘mancession’. And the term was also used to criticize economic policies 
such as the Obama Administration’s stimulus plan for being too helpful to 
women and for purportedly leaving ‘burly men’ out.10
7 Baxter 2009
8 Perry 2010a, 1.
9 Pery 2010b.
10 Sommers 2009.
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The press coverage that used the terms ‘mancession’ or ‘he-cession’ fea-
tured much speculation on the potential consequences for the future of 
men’s and women’s employment and for the future of the division of house-
hold labour. Journalists and columnists speculated about a possible sudden 
and dramatic reversal in gender roles in US households, and of an economy 
where women are triumphant and men are left behind. This kind of cover-
age, although it peaked in mid-2009, became the dominant narrative about 
the nature of the recession, despite some contemporaneous scepticism such 
as journalist Nancy Cook’s piece in Newsweek about the use of the term.11
The coverage corresponded with what turned out to be a statistical blip in 
employment data: for a brief period in the summer of 2009, and for the first 
time in the history of employment data collection, there were more women 
than men in the US workforce. Despite steady increases in women’s employ-
ment participation from the 1950s onward, this was the first time that the 
sheer number of women in the US workforce exceeded the number of men. 
This fact was of course worthy of note and was indeed covered by the press. 
Of course, the reason for this change was because of the large number of jobs 
lost by men, not a surge of new women’s jobs, and by the autumn of 2009 
women’s job losses led to a shift back to men as a majority of US workers.
But the press coverage, far from seeing this as a brief statistical anomaly, 
saw it rather as indicative of the gendered political and social meaning of the 
recession. The stories that used the term ‘mancession’ focused on the idea 
that men were losing their identities, not just their jobs. This discourse of 
vulnerable men reflects the theme of what psychologists call ‘gender threat’, 
where the threat is of loss of the male breadwinner role and the social status 
that goes with it. If masculinity is viewed as a social achievement, whereas 
femininity is seen as more ‘natural’, the threat of status loss may be shaping 
some of this discourse about vulnerable men and the economy.12 As feminist 
economist Heidi Hartmann put it, ‘[i]t becomes a problem when white men 
start to suffer’.13
11 Cook 2009.
12 Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford & Weaver 2008.
13 Cited in Cook 2009.
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Just when it seemed that the ‘mancession’ story had faded, it surfaced 
again in 2010 with the publication of an article in the Atlantic Monthly by 
Hannah Rosin entitled ‘The End of Men’. One interesting point is raised in 
the abstract of the article—namely, ‘[w]hat if modern, postindustrial society 
is simply better suited to women?’14 Rosin assumes that there are natural 
differences between men’s and women’s skills and abilities, and that men will 
lose out, and women will therefore gain, because men’s ‘size and strength’ is 
no longer an advantage for the jobs now being created.15 ‘It may be happening 
slowly and unevenly, but it’s unmistakably happening: the modern economy 
is becoming a place where women hold the cards.’16 The women in Rosin’s 
article, even the single mothers working multiple jobs, attending community 
college, who are ‘about to fall asleep in the elevator’17, and who are clearly 
marked as women of colour, explicitly and implicitly, are depicted by Rosin 
as triumphant because they are in charge of their families. The (Black and 
Latino) men are enraged and bewildered by the way that their masculinity 
has been left behind, but they are also ineffectual—unable to change their 
situation. Part of the coded racial message here is the same as that of the 
Moynihan Report, or any book by Charles Murray: the white middle class 
should beware; this dangerous gender reversal is coming to your commu-
nity. And despite the hyperbole of the title, Rosin really does seem to mean 
that there are no more (white) men, and that the alpha female—whether 
cougar or single mom—is the winner in the recession economy.
As women have lost and men have gained ground in the slow job gains 
in the US economy since 2009, there has been some coverage of the ‘he-
recovery’, particularly in response to reports produced by feminist and pro-
gressive organizations. But this phenomenon has not been covered at any-
where near the scale of the mancession trope, which continues to dominate 
explanations of the recession. Putting this coverage into some perspective is 
the task I would like to focus on next.
14 Rosin 2010, 1. The abstract goes on to describe the article as ‘[a] report on the unprecedented role 
reversal now under way—and its vast cultural consequences.’ 
15 Rosin 2010, 5.
16 Rosin 2010, 7.
17 Rosin 2010, 11.
jyl josephson – ‘it’s a mancession’: discourses of gender
197
US unemployment data
The focus of the ‘mancession’ stories was not at all about the role of hyper-
masculinity in the processes that caused the financial crisis, although clearly 
there was something to this point.18 Rather, the story focused primarily on 
the fact that more men than women had lost jobs in the early part of the 
recession. In May of 2009 when these stories began surfacing, the overall 
unemployment rate was 9.4 per cent, and it was still rising; unemployment 
in the United States peaked at 10 per cent in October of 2009. Part of the 
explanation given for the higher rate of unemployment among men was a 
sectoral explanation: because of continuing gender inequality in employ-
ment in certain sectors of the economy—a fact often not discussed but sim-
ply assumed in the coverage—and because more jobs were lost in sectors 
dominated by men—such as construction and finance—men constituted a 
larger number of workers laid off. Depending upon when one measures the 
total job losses, the number of men who lost jobs outnumbered women by 
at least two to one. 
This was a partial truth about the nature of unemployment during the 
recession, but it was more true of the early part of the recession than the 
latter part. But this picture was also too simple, given that sectoral segrega-
tion in employment in the United States is intersectional; that is, shaped not 
just by gender but by race, ethnicity, education, age, and class as well. For 
example, unemployment among African-American men is generally, even 
in periods of economic growth, twice the rate of that of white men, and this 
remained true as unemployment rates for both groups doubled during the 
recession. But this has not led to the coining of any catchy phrases that have 
been picked up by the popular press to describe the economic situation of 
Black men in the United States. Indeed, even a search of ‘Great Recession’ 
and ‘Black men’ in the Access World News database yielded only 115 ar-
ticles, out of the more than 50,000 that contained the term ‘Great Recession’. 
Thus, although this story was not completely ignored, it did not receive as 
18 For a discussion in English of the role of masculinity in Iceland’s financial crisis, see Sigurðardót-
tir 2010, in which she discusses the report prepared by Þorgerður Einarsdóttir and Gyða Margrét 
Pétursdóttir. See also Loftsdottir 2010. 
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much coverage or discussion as did ‘mancession’.19 And at certain points 
during the recession, single women were more than twice as likely to be out 
of work as their married counterparts, but again, no general catchy phrase 
caught on to describe this phenomenon.
The point here is not whether men or women suffered more in the reces-
sion of 2007 to 2009; framing the question this way is precisely the problem. 
But it is important to sort out how much of this coverage was based on the 
available economic information. We will take a look here briefly at the data 
on the recession, primarily as reported through official statistics and as ana-
lysed by economists.
Recessions are identified by economists in retrospect and the recession 
in question here was defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) as beginning in December of 2007 and ending in June of 2009.20 
This made it the longest recession in the US economy since World War II.21 
Economic growth since June of 2009 has been slow, and while job creation 
always lags behind economic growth, this has been a particularly slow re-
covery in terms of job creation. 
Actual unemployment data over the course of the recession shows a 
more complicated picture than the simple ‘mancession’ story. Men did suf-
fer significantly higher rates of job loss in the early years of the recession, 
mainly because, as noted above, these losses were concentrated in industries 
where men are overrepresented such as in finance, construction, and manu-
facturing. It is true that the gap between men’s and women’s unemployment 
rates, which peaked at 2.7 per cent in August of 2009, was the largest gap 
in the postwar era—a statement found in almost all of the coverage of the 
mancession, whatever the perspective of the author. But what this leaves out 
is that in all recessions in the United States prior to the 1980s, those gender 
employment gaps were in favour of men, sometimes by as much as 2.2 per 
cent. Nevertheless, those recessions were not termed ‘womancessions’.
Much of the coverage also emphasized that women workers were con-
19 Grown & Tas 2010, 10, Figure 4.
20 Business Cycle Dating Committee of NBER 2010.
21 Business Cycle Dating Committee of NBER 2010.
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centrated in industries that were described as recession proof, or as growing 
sectors of the economy, such as education and health care. As many feminist 
commentators noted, the coverage rarely mentioned that many of these jobs 
were much lower paying than the men’s jobs that were lost, and were also 
less likely to provide health benefits. Further, downturns in state and local 
government budgets follow downturns in the business cycle, and so the cuts 
to women’s jobs in education in particular occurred later in the downturn 
cycle. The depiction of women as somehow the ‘winners’ in the economy for 
being employed in these sectors was thus rather misleading.
Nevertheless, there is truth in the sectoral explanation for the gender dif-
ferences in unemployment during the official duration of the recession from 
2007 to 2009.22 But there have also been gender differences in the recovery. 
Men began to gain jobs again in the first quarter of 2010, and over the course 
of 2010, men gained jobs while women actually lost jobs, according to a 
recent report by the National Women’s Law Center.23 Men’s unemployment 
rate has dropped over the course of the recovery, while women’s unemploy-
ment rate has continued to grow. From January 2010 through April 2011, 
according to the NWLC, men gained 1.436 million jobs, while women only 
gained 311,000. Of course, since men had greater job losses, it could be ex-
pected that they would also experience greater gains. But men have gained 
proportionately more jobs than their proportional losses.
To see the complete picture with respect to employment and unemploy-
ment, it is also important to look at the course of the recovery period and 
at underemployment as well as the official unemployment figures.24 For, 
while women workers in health and education were less affected during the 
economic downturn, they have been seriously affected during the period 
of the recovery. In particular, since women workers are overrepresented in 
state and local government jobs, the austerity measures that continue to be 
implemented by state and local governments as a result of budget problems 
caused by the recession are having a significant impact on women workers. 
22 Sahin, Song & Hobijn 2009.
23 National Women’s Law Center 2011.
24 See for example Grown & Tas 2010.
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Thus, though women only constituted 57 per cent of the public workforce 
in June of 2009, women lost 74 per cent of the public jobs that were cut 
between July of 2009 and April of 2011.25 As state and local governments 
continue to cut budgets until revenues recover, these losses are likely to 
continue. Thus, in the gender-stratified job market of the US economy, the 
austerity measures being promoted in response to budget shortfalls end up 
targeting women and women’s jobs.
Some of the press did pick up this story, particularly when the Pew Re-
search Center issued a report in the summer of 2011 that showed that men 
were gaining jobs much more quickly than women. This theme also showed 
up in some print media coverage in the autumn of 2011 when the Institute 
for Women’s Policy Research issued a report that showed that women had 
lost jobs during the recovery while men had gained jobs. These stories all 
mentioned the ‘mancession’ as a description of the early period of the eco-
nomic downturn, and primarily focused on public sector job losses as an 
explanation for the gender difference in the recovery.26
Thus, the ‘mancession’ theme captured one aspect of the recession and 
unemployment, but it certainly was used in misleading ways. It is not sur-
prising that mainstream press and public discussions would reflect a sim-
plification and distortion of actual data. What is interesting is the particular 
ways that the term ‘mancession’ was used to put forward a set of arguments 
about the crisis and recession, gender, and the economy. It is to this set of 
distortions and their meanings that I now turn.
Crisis and gender threat
In the midst of the most extensive recession in the US economy since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, when millions of people were losing their 
jobs and homes, the story that came to dominate much of the coverage was 
one of harms to men and gains for women. This kind of framing of the 
meaning of the financial crisis and its aftermath had the effect of channelling 
and narrowing the focus of concern to a kind of gender threat to men, es-
25 National Women’s Law Center 2011, 1.
26 Institute for Women’s Policy Research 2011.
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pecially middle-class white men. Rather than focusing on the origins of the 
crisis in banking deregulation and neoliberal economic policies, the focus 
could be turned to how recession-created ‘gender equality’ threatened men’s 
economic well-being, or more directly, how women’s employment threat-
ened men’s social, economic, and political position in American life.
Of greatest interest here are the larger themes of this discourse and what 
is served up as truth in putting this argument forward. Clearly, as noted 
above, some conservative commentators put forward the terms ‘mances-
sion’ and ‘he-cession’ as a way of framing the meaning of the recession in 
gendered terms. I am not claiming that there was a design on the part of 
any entity, such as the press or political leaders, to make this ‘the’ story of 
the recession. Rather, what I am suggesting is that the very popularity of this 
story is evidence of how the US public and the US political system respond 
to a crisis.
One major theme of the mancession mantra was that women were de-
picted as the economic winners in the recession economy and men as the 
economic losers. Unemployment was still rising among both women and 
men, but the implication was that women were doing just fine. An example 
is the London Times headline: ‘Women are the victors in “mancession”’.27 
The implication was that women’s employment opportunities were better 
and more secure than were men’s. Significantly, this was usually attributed 
to some natural attributes of women as more adaptable to new economic 
realities and to service sector jobs. This argument was often paired with an 
argument about women’s increased educational attainment. In these stories, 
it was often noted that in many undergraduate schools in the United States 
women constitute 60 per cent of the student body, a fact attributed (tauto-
logically) to women’s greater adaptability to changes in the economy and 
the need for higher education, and to the failure of primary and secondary 
education to address the needs of boys. In other words, in these narratives, 
natural differences between men and women (or boys and girls) also cause 
differences in educational attainment. Thus, men were depicted as economi-
27 Baxter 2009.
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cally vulnerable workers, and women as workers with job security, in each 
case due to some natural, sex- and gender-based characteristics. 
Another ‘mancession’ theme was that changes in employment patterns 
would mean changes in gender roles in the household. In particular, a num-
ber of stories included anecdotes about unemployed husbands performing 
more household tasks. This occurred even in stories that noted that these 
men were an exception, not the rule. This coverage highlighted the ‘Mr 
Mom’ theme—namely, that men were doing unfamiliar tasks in the home, 
like laundry and cooking. Overarching all these stories was this question: 
what will it mean for men, women, and gender, if ‘burly men’ are no longer 
breadwinners, but have become househusbands?
Central to these first two themes was the continued naturalization and 
biologization of gender difference. Many articles depicted phenomena such 
as women’s attending and succeeding in college in higher numbers, men’s 
job and income losses in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and 
lower rates of marriage during the recession as artefacts of natural gender 
differences that purportedly advantage women in the current economy and 
therefore endanger men. As Alice O’Connor puts it, ‘the myth of the “man-
cession” ... links up to a larger narrative that, in its starker expressions, pres-
ents a story of female ascendancy and male decline.’28 As she notes, this is 
an old story, one linked to any perceived gains on the part of women, even 
when those gains are in fact losses (that is, less job losses compared to men’s 
job losses).
A third theme of the mancession discourse is the implication that men 
are losing out and continuing to lose out, and that this is somehow the fault 
of women, not of the structure of the US economy. This is comprised of a 
complex web of laments, including the by now quite familiar ‘masculinity 
crisis meme’, as Ann Friedman puts it in her critique of Rosin’s piece.29 Rosin 
seems to be lamenting the end of macho men, even as she mentions that she 
supports equality gains by women. Rosin’s overall argument makes it clear 
that if men are upset about the loss of their jobs, they should blame women.
28 O’Connor 2010.
29 Friedman 2010.
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A fourth theme, present in all of the discourse but rarely treated criti-
cally, is that of explaining the initial disproportionality of men’s job losses by 
invoking occupational segregation, just as the disproportionality of women’s 
losses are now accounted for by reference to the same segregation. Thus, 
occupational segregation also gets naturalized in these stories. If women 
had made more inroads in construction, finance, and manufacturing, they 
would have lost those jobs as well. If men had gone in large numbers into 
education and health care, a smaller percentage of men would have lost 
their jobs in the downturn that followed the crisis. This structural factor 
was generally assumed as a natural artefact of the US economy, rather than 
a gendered one.
A final theme worth mentioning here comes in the form of a desidera-
tum: the lack of attention given to the negative consequences for other fam-
ily members, many of whom are women or girls, of men’s job losses and 
the negative consequences for other family members, many of whom are 
boys or men, of women’s job losses. Such lack of attention is all the more 
conspicuous given the prevalence and extent of changes in family structure 
and family life as a consequence of job loss, independent of whether the job 
lost was occupied by a man or a woman. So the zero-sum game framing of 
the mancession discourse is misleading in many ways in terms of the effects 
of the recession on families and households. Since many households need 
two or more incomes to survive, the mancession discourse seems to call up 
a breadwinner model of family economics that is long outdated.
However, it is encouraging that the press coverage was not completely 
one-sided, particularly in response to women’s job losses in the recovery. 
Moreover, the coverage of men as stay-at-home fathers—though always de-
picted as a result of job loss, not by choice—still augurs some evidence of 
changing ideas about gender roles and families.
This discussion reveals not just gender threat, but also the possibility 
that in some quarters, at any rate, there is recognition that men, and perhaps 
gender stereotypes about men and masculinity, women, and work need to 
change. Families have been changing rapidly in the United States for sev-
eral decades, and US employment and social policy have not kept pace with 
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those changes. Given the growing percentage of married women and single 
mothers who are breadwinners—a growth which is part of long-term demo-
graphic trends in the United States—our ideas about gender, families, and 
work require major restructuring. 
Conclusion
Just as the story of education in the United States has now become a story 
about vulnerable boys, the story of the recession has become a story about 
vulnerable men. The identity crisis caused by the financial crisis has been 
answered in part by a story about how men were losing out, masculinity 
was threatened, and women were victorious. Aside from its misleading na-
ture regarding the actual facts of unemployment, this story has become a 
convenient and perhaps comforting frame to turn attention away from deep 
long-term structural problems in the US economy—problems that threaten 
men and women of all races and classes—and focus attention on the threat 
of gender equality. Further, it deflects attention from the causes of the finan-
cial crisis in deregulation and hubris, and focuses attention on the ‘problem’ 
of women workers.
In such a time of crisis, a focus on structural factors would likely be 
too threatening to US identity. Among other things, it would call attention 
to the discrimination that creates male-dominated and female-dominated 
industries. It would require recognition of the fact that the fiscal austerity 
that conservatives are now demanding, and the resulting severe cutbacks in 
federal, state, and local budgets for education and health and social services, 
disproportionately target women’s jobs. It would call attention to the flaws 
of unregulated markets, to their role in producing the crisis, and to the need 
for fundamental economic reforms.
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CHAPTER 11
Should men have more rights…? 
Gender-role-related attitudes before 
and during the 2008 crisis
ivett szalma and judit takács
Introduction
In different types of European welfare states there are great differences re-
garding women’s labour market position, their fertility-related behaviour, 
and the division of housework.1 In the Nordic social democratic welfare 
states, gender equality is the most developed in comparison to the rest of 
Europe: labour force participation rates of women and men are nearly the 
same, and the difference between time devoted to housework by women 
and men is the smallest. According to previous research findings in present 
day Europe, gender inequalities regarding labour market participation and 
domestic division of labour are most widespread in the postsocialist coun-
tries.2  For example, in Hungary, Slovakia and the Check Republic moth-
ers having children under 3 have the lowest  maternal employment rates in 
the EU (OECD 2012). Our starting point is the assumption that European 
countries are characterized by different gender role attitudes and that these 
attitudes are developed not only at the individual level but also at the level 
of society. 
The aim of this chapter is to focus on the changes in gender role attitudes 
over a given period of time which partly coincides with the recent global 
1 Esping-Andersen 1990.
2 Hobson & Oláh 2006; Puur, Oláh, Tazi-Preve & Dorbritz 2008; Takács 2008; Hobson & Fahlén 2009.
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economic crisis. The present crisis may be affecting gender role attitudes 
due to several reasons. First of all, the unemployment rate has increased 
sharply since the first quarter of 2008 as a result of the economic crisis.3 
According to American scholars, the recession that began in 2007 has af-
fected male workers disproportionately; however, they also emphasize that 
the ‘mancession’ is not a new phenomenon, as all recessions tend to follow 
this pattern.4 When jobs are scarce men’s employment tends to become a 
priority at the expense of women’s employment, reflecting the dominance of 
traditional gender role attitudes.5 On the other hand, female labour market 
participation may become more important from the family’s point of view, 
as it can help in decreasing the risks—including reduction of salaries and 
increased unemployment—exacerbated by the crisis, thus stimulating less 
traditional gender role attitudes.6 
The current crisis followed the mancession pattern at the beginning: in 
many European countries the most affected sectors were those dominated 
by men such as the construction and automotive industries.7 The govern-
ment reaction to the crisis was to cut the public budgets and public sec-
tor employment, thus having more negative impact on female employment 
rates.8 Besides the direct effects of the crisis, increasing unemployment 
rates, decreasing income levels, the indirect effects must also be taken into 
consideration. Among the indirect effects was a rise in fixed-term and part-
time employment at the expense of permanent and full-time employment 
and a stronger sense of insecurity of jobs, while the competition among em-
ployees has exacerbated. 
Two-earner families are more stable than single breadwinner families 
but the numbers of one-parent families are increasing, due to the high di-
vorce rates and the spread of less stable partnership forms. Consequently, 
3 Kiiver & Hijman 2010.
4 Elsby, Hobijn & Şahin; Şahin, Song & Hobijn 2010.
5 Cha & Thébaud 2009; Australian and American scholars also emphasized the key role women’s 
dependence on men can play in the formation of less egalitarian gender attitudes (Baxter & Kane 
1995).
6 Pongrácz & Molnár 2011.
7 Verick 2009.
8 Ruggieri 2012.
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women are more motivated to be employed to decrease their dependence 
on their partners so they are less likely to support traditional gender role 
attitudes in the context of a very competitive labour market.  
The aim of this chapter is to reveal whether any significant changes have 
occurred in gender role attitudes among men and women between 2005 
and 2010 as a consequence of the crisis. The chapter is structured into three 
sections: the first section describes the applied data, variables, and methods; 
the second presents our main hypotheses; and the third discusses the main 
results. 
Data and methods
In this chapter we analyse data of the second and the fifth rounds of the 
European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2004–2005 and in 2010 respec-
tively. The ESS is a large-scale, cross-national longitudinal survey initiated 
by the European Science Foundation in order to study changing social at-
titudes and values in Europe. Since ESS is a repeat cross-sectional survey, in 
each round of data collection, following each other every two years, a core 
module and two rotating modules are used. Rotating modules focus on spe-
cific academic and policy concerns, being repeated not in every ESS round, 
but only at certain intervals. The empirical base of our analyses is a rotating 
module which focuses on work-life balance issues and which has been in-
cluded in two ESS rounds, the second and the fifth, since the first round of 
ESS data collection was completed in 2002. During the second ESS round 
conducted in 2004–2005, data was collected in 25 European countries. Dur-
ing the fifth ESS round in 2010, the rotating module on work-life balance 
issues was repeated. Thus, we are able to examine the temporal changes con-
cerning gender-role-related attitudes as measured by the variables included 
in the repeated module between 2004–2005 and 2010. We examine data of 
only those countries, which participated in both the second and the fifth 
ESS rounds.9 These included twenty-one countries: Belgium, Czech Repub-
9 In the original questionnaire a score of one meant strong agreement and a score of five meant strong 
disagreement, but in the interest of clearer understanding we have recoded the responses. The analy-
ses were conducted with ESS fifth round data, which was made accessible by ESS in September 2011.
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lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. Within each country we 
focused only on those respondents who were aged between 20 and 55, had 
paid work, and lived in couple relationships. These restrictions were made to 
yield a homogenous sample in the countries. This sample makes it possible 
to focus on those who are mainly affected by the crisis on the labour market. 
In 2004–2005 the total sample was 11,774 (6124 men and 5650 women); in 
2010 the total sample was 10,911 (5556 men and 5355 women).
Our dependent variable measured the agreement level with the state-
ments that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are 
scarce on a one-to-five scale, where a score of one meant strong agreement, 
signalling a high level of traditional gender role attitudes, while a score of 
five meant strong disagreement, signalling the rejection of traditional gen-
der role attitudes.10 Figures 11.1 and 11.2 provide illustrations of the mean 
values of the dependent variable in 21 European societies in 2004–2005 and 
2010. They clearly show that between 2005 and 2010 in most countries the 
level of agreement with the statements that a woman should be prepared to 
cut down on her paid work for the sake of the family and that men should have 
more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce decreased, except in 
Greece11, where people agreed more with the first statement in 2010, and in 
Ukraine, where the level of agreement with the second statement increased 
by 2010. It is noteworthy that by 2010 the level of agreement with the second 
statement decreased significantly in Poland12, one of the countries least af-
fected by the crisis.13
10 In the second ESS round the following five variables measured gender role attitudes: A woman 
should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family (G6); Men should take 
as much responsibility as women for the home and children (G7); When jobs are scarce, men should 
have more right to a job than women (G8); When there are children in the home, parents should stay 
together even if they don’t get along (G9); and A person’s family ought to be his or her main priority 
in life (G10). In the fifth round of the EES, however, there were only two such variables included: A 
woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family (G4), and When 
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (G5).
11 Greece is one of the countries that was gravely affected by the crisis (Chritie, Lupu, Milea & Ailinca 
2011): the unemployment rate was 12.5 per cent in 2010, while the average unemployment rate in 
the EU-27 was 9.7 per cent in 2010 (Eurostat 2012).
12 In Poland the unemployment rate fell by 8.1 percentage points to 9.6 per cent.
13 Chritie, Lupu, Milea & Ailinca 2011.
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For analysing our datasets, multiple methods were applied. First, we 
constructed explanatory models by applying multilevel mixed-effects linear 
regression. Our regression analyses were conducted by the STATA 11.1 sta-
tistical programme.  
The statistical argument for using multilevel or hierarchical linear re-
gression models is that citizens of a given country won’t necessarily form 
views independently from each other according to the dimension of the 
dependent variable. For example, if the level of gender inequality is low in 
a country, it is possible that a citizen of this country will be more likely to 
reject traditional gender role attitudes than if he or she were living in an-
other country that is characterized by a high level of gender inequality. In 
this case it cannot be guaranteed that the independence of observations, be-
Figure 11.1.  Agreement level with the statement  ‘A woman should be 
prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of the 
family’ in 21 European countries, 2005 and 2010
Note: 1=strong agreement; 5= strong disagreement.
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Figure 11.1. Agreement level with the statement 
‘A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake 
of the family’ in 20 European countries, 2005 and 2010
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ing a basic assumption of standard regression models, is fulfilled, and thus 
estimate results can become distorted. Applying multilevel models has the 
advantage of recognizing the partial interdependence of individuals within 
the same group—or citizens within the same country in our case. Multilevel 
models are useful for analysing data characterized by a complex variance 
structure in which the complexity of variance is caused by the nestedness of 
individual observations in groups. During data analyses the total variation 
in the dependent variable is decomposed into within-group variance and 
between-group variance, while the two sources of variation can be studied 
simultaneously. 
Men and women were examined in separate models as we assumed that 
certain factors can affect the attitudes of women and men in different ways 
Figure 11.2.  Agreement level with the statement ‘Men should have 
more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce’ in 
21 European countries 2005 and 2010
Note: 1=strong agreement; 5= strong disagreement.
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Figure 11.2. Agreement level with the statement 
‘Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce’ 
in 20 European countries 2005 and 2010
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and we wanted to be able to track these differences. Two explanatory mod-
els were constructed by applying multilevel mixed-effects linear regression. 
We called the first one the labour market model and included the following 
outcome variables: actual work hours measured according to the full-time 
work norm of the given country (whether one works less or more than the 
full-time work norm that is 40 hours per week in all the examined countries 
except in Denmark14); desired work hours15 (whether one wants to work 
less or more and accordingly earn less or more); partner’s work hours16; 
experience of long-term unemployment17; subjective evaluation of financial 
situation18;  employment security19; work autonomy and flexibility index20; 
and, finally, the partner’s actual work hours. Additionally, we introduced a 
new variable into the 2010 data set to see whether the crisis affected the re-
spondents’ work conditions. The crisis was measured by a Crisis Index that 
was constructed from four further variables in turn.21  
14 In Denmark the full-time work norm is 36 hours, which we applied in the case of Denmark in order 
to calculate whether one wants to work less or more than the norm.
15 Desired work hours were measured by the following variable: How many hours a week, if any, would 
you choose to work, bearing in mind that your earnings would go up or down according to how many 
hours you work? (G116 in second-round questionnaire).
16 Partner’s work hours was measured by the following variable: How many hours does he/she normally 
work a week (in his/her main job)? Please include any paid or unpaid overtime (F48 in second-round 
questionnaire of ESS and F57 in fifth-round questionnaire).
17 Measured by the following variable: Have any of these [unemployment] periods lasted for 12 months 
or more? (F28 in second-round questionnaire and F37 in fifth-round questionnaire).
18 Measured by the following variable: Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you 
feel about your household’s income nowadays? 1=Living comfortably on present income; 2=Coping on 
present income; 3=Finding it difficult on present income; 4=Finding it very difficult on present income 
(F33 in second-round questionnaire and F42 in fifth-round questionnaire).
19 Measured by the following variable: My job is secure: 1=Not at all true; 4=Very true (G66 in second-
round questionnaire and G32 in fifth-round questionnaire).
20 Measured by the following two variables: How much the management at your work allows you to 
decide how your own daily work is organized? 0=I have no influence; 10=I have complete control (F18 
in second-round questionnaire and F27 in fifth-round questionnaire); How much the management 
at your work allows you to choose or change your pace of work? 0=I have no influence; 10=I have 
complete control (F19a in second-round questionnaire and F28a in fifth-round questionnaire). The 
work autonomy and flexibility index was constructed in the following way: we summed the values 
of both variables. The maximum value of the new variable was 20, which meant employees could 
have complete control on their work environment, and the minimum value was 0, which meant that 
employees did not have any control on their work environment. The work autonomy and flexibility 
index was inserted into our model as a continuous variable.
21 Measured by the following four variables: Have you had to do less interesting work? (G58 in fifth-
round questionnaire); Have you had to take a reduction in pay (G59 in fifth-round questionnaire 
of EES); Have you had to work shorter hours? (G60 in fifth-round questionnaire); Have you had less 
security in your job? (G61 in fifth-round questionnaire). The index was constructed in the follow-
ing way: we counted all the positive answers, and if one respondent indicated at least one positive 
answer from the four variables, we regarded the respondent as being affected by the crisis.
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The second explanatory model we called the sociocultural model as it 
focused on the following outcome variables that are all closely connected 
to socialization outcomes: political views22, self-assessed religiosity and at-
tendance at religious services23, and whether the mother of the respondent 
worked when the respondent was 14 years old.
Additionally, both models included a country-level outcome variable 
and four control variables: age, place of living, education level, and having 
(young) children were used as control variables in all of the models. As a 
country-level outcome variable, the Female Employment Rate24 was applied 
in the labour market model. The unemployment rate of the country seems to 
be very relevant, but it does not reflect the situation of the labour market in 
gendered aspects.25 For example, a low unemployment rate can mean that 
most men and women are employed, but it can also mean that female activ-
ity rate is very low because women are regarded as second-rate employees. 
In this case, women will not appear in the unemployment statistics because 
they are out of the labour market as a result of the functioning of traditional 
gender roles (raising children, nursing elderly relatives, etc.).
The Gender Inequality Index (GII)26 was applied in the sociocultural 
model. This index measures those differences between men and women that 
imply inequality between the genders. 
22 Political views were measured by the following variable: In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and 
‘right’. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 
means the right? (B23 in second-round questionnaire).
23 Self-assessed religiosity and attendance at religious services were measured by the following vari-
ables: Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? 
0= not at all religious; 10=very religious; Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, 
about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? 1=Every day; 2=More than once a week; 
3=Once a week; 4=At least once a month; 5=Only on special holy days; 6=Less often; 7=never. (C13 
and C14 in second-round questionnaire).
24 OECD 2012. Statistics were calculated using the employment rate of women as a percentage of the 
female population (15–64).
25 Another consideration against using the unemployment rate as a country-level variable is that the 
unemployment statistic varies considerably from country to country.
26 Gender inequality was measured by GII values in 2005 and in 2010, respectively. GII values reflect 
women’s disadvantage in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labour 
market. For more details see Human Development Reports. Gender Inequality Index (GII). Online. 
Available HTTP: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/ (Last accessed: 2 August 2012).
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Hypotheses
We constructed three sets of hypotheses according to our to explanatory 
models: the first hypotheses set concentrates on issues related to labour 
market participation; the second set focuses on religious and political so-
cialization outcomes as reflected in people’s self-definitions, and in the ef-
fects of having (young) children; and the third set focuses on country-level 
effects measured by the Female Employment Rate and the values of the 
Gender Inequality Index.  
H1. Hypotheses related to labour market participation 
According to the first set of hypotheses, we assumed that the labour market 
position has a significant effect on attitudes regarding gender roles. Labour 
market position can play an especially important role among women: if they 
are employed full-time, they have to face work-life balance conflicts, but if 
they work part-time, they may feel that they are a second-rate earner within 
the family. Thus we formulated a labour market position hypothesis as follows: 
H1.1. Labour market position will have an effect mainly on the attitudes 
of women, as they are usually the ones whose work careers are interrupted 
to stay at home with young children. Thus those women who work more 
or would like to work more are more likely to reject traditional gender role 
attitudes than others.
The involvement level of the partner in paid work can also influence the 
attitudes. Accordingly, we formulated the partner’s involvement in paid work 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1.2. In the case of male respondents, the actual work hours of the partners 
can become a determining factor. Thus men with a partner who spends more 
time at work than the work time norm for women in the given society will be 
more likely to disagree with the statement on traditional gender norm attitudes. 
Besides the female labour market involvement in paid work, other ‘soft 
factors’, such as how much the employees feel that their jobs are secure and 
whether they have influence over their work, can affect the gender role atti-
tudes regarding female employment behaviour. We formulated two hypoth-
eses regarding the subjective evaluation of one’s job:
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H1.3.1. Insecure employment will increase the agreement level with 
traditional gender role attitudes in the case of women as well as men. Put-
ting more emphasis on family, motherhood, household duties, and staying 
at home with children in a social environment characterized by insecure 
employment possibilities can then be interpreted as a rational solution for 
women in a structurally constrained situation. For example, in the early 
1990s, after the political system changed in many former state socialist 
countries, female employment rates decreased, while traditional gender role 
attitudes became stronger.27 In the case of men, there are two contradicting 
scenarios. On the one hand, it is advantageous for them if society is charac-
terized by traditional gender role attitudes because then they do not have to 
compete (so much) with women in the labour market as women’s duties are 
primarily household duties and childrearing to be done at home and not in 
the labour market. On the other hand, in a social environment characterized 
by insecure employment possibilities, it can be also seen as a rational solu-
tion if not only men but also their partners are active in the labour market. 
When employment is insecure couples can ease the negative effects of unex-
pected hardship caused by unemployment or illness by one of them staying 
on the labour market.28 
H1.3.2. Besides evaluation of the job security other characteristics of 
employment such as work autonomy and flexibility can also influence tra-
ditional gender role attitudes towards employment. Both factors can help in 
reconciling work and family. By providing a practical framework for achiev-
ing a better work-life balance, work autonomy and flexibility can increase 
the disagreement level with traditional gender role attitudes. 
H2. Hypotheses related to religious and political socialization 
Attitudes are also determined by values and norms. Most major European 
religions prescribe norms for men and women separately, which coincide 
with traditional gender related attitudes. Political views can also influence 
attitudes—for example, right-wing political ideologies tend to prefer male 
27 Tóth 1995; Blaskó 2002.
28 Oppenheimer 1997.
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breadwinner families. We formulated two hypotheses on religiosity and po-
litical views: 
H2.1. People who define themselves as religious and those who attend re-
ligious services relatively often tend to agree with traditional gender role 
attitudes more than others; 
H2.2. People who place themselves on the political right are more likely to 
agree with traditional gender role attitudes than people who place them-
selves on the political left.
H3. Hypotheses focusing on country-level effects 
Besides the objective situation and value orientations of individuals, the 
cultural and economic situation of the country can also have impacts on 
attitudes. Thus we constructed the following two country-level hypotheses. 
H3.1. In countries characterized by higher levels of gender equality, re-
spondents will have a lower level of agreement with traditional gender role 
attitudes. A lower value of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) signals that 
there are no significant differences between the two genders in the follow-
ing three dimensions: reproductive health (based on maternal mortality and 
adolescent fertility), empowerment (calculated on the basis of parliamen-
tary representation and educational attainment), and labour market partici-
pation.29 Between 2005 and 2011 in most of the 21 European societies ex-
amined, GII values decreased, the only two exceptions being Hungary and 
Ireland.30 Thus we assume that in countries with low GII values, traditional 
attitudes will be rejected more than in other places. 
H3.2. If the female employment rate is high in a society, then the dual-
earner family model will become widespread, and respondents will have a 
lower level of agreement with traditional attitudes emphasizing the main 
breadwinning role for men. Thus our expectation is that in countries having 
a higher level of female employment, traditional attitudes will be rejected 
more than in other places.  
29 Human Development Reports. Gender Inequality Index (GII). Online. Available HTTP: < http://
hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/gii/> (Last accessed: 2 August 2012).
30 Human Development Reports. GII: Gender Inequality Index, value. Online. Available HTTP: http://
hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/68606.html (Last accessed: 2 August 2012).
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Empirical results: international comparison
Applying multilevel regression enabled us to examine the effects of different 
level outcome variables within a model. After running our empty model in 
order to check whether the between-country variance level is sufficient for 
examining the effects of country-level outcome variables at all31, we found 
that about 14–24 per cent of the total variation in the dependent variable 
derives from between-country variance. If we focus on the regression mod-
els including data of female respondents only, the between-country differ-
ence is responsible for 14 per cent of the total variance in 2005 and 17 per 
cent in 2010. If we focus on the regression models including data of male 
respondents only, the between-country difference is responsible for 19 per 
cent of the total variance in 2005 and 24 per cent in 2010. Thus it seems that 
the influence of country-level variables, such as Gender Inequality Index 
and Female Employment Rate, became stronger between 2005 and 2010 in 
the case of both genders, while the attitudes of men were shown to be af-
fected more by country-level variables than the attitudes of women. Tables 
11.1–11.4 provide overviews of the findings deriving from the application of 
the different regression models.
Labour market model
Within the labour market model, the country-level variable effects high-
lighted that if the female employment rate is high in a country, then both 
men and women are more likely to disagree with the statement that men 
should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce. The female 
employment rate had significant effects on the views of both genders in both 
examined years. Thus our expectations about the country-level effects of 
female employment rates seemed to be supported by our results.
The examination of the labour market position of our respondents re-
vealed that in the case of men, neither actual work hours nor desired work 
hours had significant effects, while in the case of women those who desired 
to work less than the norm tended to agree more with traditional gender 
31 Bickel 2007.
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role attitudes in 2004–2005. In 2010 both women and men tended to agree 
with more traditional attitudes if they preferred to work less than the work 
time norm in the given country; in the case of men, it also had a significantly 
negative effect if they wanted to spend more time at work than the work time 
norm for men in the given country. Additionally, the experience of long-
term unemployment had different effects on both genders. Women who had 
experience in being unemployed for a long period (at least 12 months) in 
2004–2005 were more likely to disagree with the traditional attitudes than 
others. Among men this experience had the opposite effect in 2010. 
Subjective evaluation of their financial situation had significant effects 
for both women and men in both 2005 and 2010: those who perceived their 
financial situation as being worse tended to agree more with the traditional 
attitudes related to female employment. 
In accordance with our assumptions on the potential effects of the part-
ners’ involvement in paid work on men, perhaps not very surprisingly the 
partner’s working time arrangement had a significant effect on traditional 
views of gender roles only in the case of men. In both 2004–2005 and 2010, 
those men whose partners worked less than the average work time norm 
of the given country were more likely to express traditional gender role at-
titudes than others. 
Focusing on work autonomy and flexibility, in 2004–2005 for both wom-
en and men ‘soft factors’, such as employment (in)security and the feeling 
that they can influence their work, had significant effects: those who felt 
that their employment was insecure tended to agree more with traditional 
gender role attitudes, and those who felt that they could influence their work 
were more likely to disagree with traditional gender role attitudes. By 2010 
the significant effect of work autonomy disappeared in the case of women, 
which can indicate that women felt more defenceless than men during the 
crisis. 
Regarding our four control variables, in 2004–2005 and 2010, age, place 
of living, and educational level had significant effects on the views of both 
men and women: older people, those with a maximum of lower second-
ary level education, and those living in villages were more likely to express 
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traditional views on gender roles than others. In the case of women, having 
(young) children did not have significant effects either in 2004–2005 or in 
2010. However, in the case of men this variable gained a significant effect by 
2010: men who had children younger than 13 manifested more traditional 
attitudes than men not having children younger than 13.  
The Crisis Index had a significant effect only in the case of women: those 
women who were affected by the crisis through their work situation tended 
to agree less with traditional attitudes. This result is comprehensible because 
the traditional attitudes towards gender roles can have a negative impact on 
female employment. In such a period of unemployment growth and rising 
job insecurity, those women who are already affected by the crisis are more 
likely to reject traditional attitudes, while those men who are affected by the 
crisis are less motivated to reject the attitudes which may be of advantage 
to them. 
Sociocultural model
Within the sociocultural model, the country-level variable of gender in-
equality had significant effects for both genders in both years examined.
Religiosity and attendance in religious services were shown to influence 
the attitudes of women as well as men towards the traditional direction. Re-
garding political views in 2004–2005 for both genders, (not too extreme)32 
left-wing orientation had a negative effect on manifesting traditional gender 
attitudes, while right-wing orientation had no effect at all. However, in 2010 
we no longer found any significant effects of political views.
Regarding the control variables, in 2004–2005, age, place of living, and 
educational level had significant effects on the views of both men and wom-
en: older people, those with a maximum of lower secondary education, and 
living in smaller settlements were more likely to express traditional views on 
32 Political orientation was measured by the following variable: In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ 
and ‘right’—where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the 
right? (B23). We recoded this variable into five categories (0–2 left; 3–4 rather left; 5 neutral; 6–7 
rather right; 8–10 right) and those who did not answer this question (11 per cent of the respon-
dents; women were overrepresented) were also included as the sixth category (1–left; 2–rather left; 
3 – neutral; 4 – rather right; 5–right; 6–not answering). We call ‘not too extreme left wing’ those 
respondents who belong to the rather left category.
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gender roles than others. By 2010 most of these effects remained in the case 
of women, while in the case of men who had young children (younger than 
six) the variables also became significant. 
As for mothers’ employment, we found significant effects on both gen-
ders in 2004–2005: those respondents whose mother worked when they 
were 14 years old were less likely to support traditional attitudes. The ef-
fects of this variable disappeared by 2010 in the case of both genders. This 
may indicate that effects related to family patterns are losing importance, 
especially in the context of the recent considerable changes affecting the Eu-
ropean labour markets. 
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Table 11.1. Women 2005
Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
FER 0.04***
Work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.02
Works more than the norm 0.06
Desired work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.17***
Works more than the norm 0.01
Insecure employment -0.07*
Unemployment period lasted at least 12 months -0.12*
Work autonomy/flexibility 0,005*
Partners’ work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm 0.06
Works more than the norm -0.09
Subjective evaluation of  
financial situation
Living comfortably on present income 1
Coping on present income -0.12***
Difficult on present income -0.16**
Very difficult on present income -0.43***
Education Upper secondary level (ref.) 1
Lower secondary or less -0.35*** -0.38***
Tertiary level 0.17*** 0.21***
Having children Not having children younger than 13 (Ref.) 1 1
Having children younger than 13 0.01 -0.01
Having children younger than 6 0.02 -0.0002
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Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
Place of living Capital city (ref.) 1 1
City -0.12*** -0.11**
Village -0.23*** -0.22***
Age -0.01*** -0.01***
GII -3.79**
Political view Neutral (ref.) 1
Not answered -0.06
Left-wing oriented 0.12*
Left-wing oriented but not too much 0.1*
Right-wing oriented but not too much 0.05
Right-wing oriented -0.01
Religiosity -0.01
Attendance at religious services More than once a week -0.41***
Once a week -0.28***
At least once a month -0,06
Only on special holy days -0.07
Less often -0.02
Never 1
Mother worked when respondent was 14 years old 0.07*
Constant 3.69 2.35 -3.87
Variance between countries 0.193 0,095 0.094
Variance within countries 1.168 1.086 1.109
-2Log Likelihood 16992 16562 16578
Number of observations 5650 5650 5650
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Table 11.2. Men 2005
Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
FER 0.04***
Work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.04
Works more than the norm 0.02
Desired work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.08
Works more than the norm -0.04
Insecure employment -0.09***
Unemployment period lasted at least 12 months 0.03
Work autonomy/flexibility 0,02***
Partners’ work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.11*
Works more than the norm
Subjective evaluation of  
financial situation
Living comfortably on present income 1
Coping on present income -0.12***
Difficult on present income -0.25***
Very difficult on present income -0.4***
Education Upper secondary level (ref.) 1
Lower secondary or less -0.24*** -0.31***
Tertiary level 0.28*** 0.31***
Having children Not having children younger than 13 (Ref.) 1 1
Having children younger than 13 0.001 -0.02
Having children younger than 6 -0.03 0.01
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Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
Place of living Capital city (ref.) 1 1
City -0.1** -0.1***
Village -0.15*** -0.13***
Age -0.01*** -0.01***
GII -4.3***
Political view Neutral (ref.) 1
Not answered -0.017**
Left-wing oriented 0.001
Left-wing oriented but not too much 0.14***
Right-wing oriented but not too much -0.02
Right-wing oriented -0.04
Religiosity -0.02***
Attendance at religious services More than once a week -0.08*
Once a week -0.05
At least once a month -0.13***
Only on special holy days -0.24***
Less often -0.17
Never 1
Mother worked when respondent was 14 years old 0.07*
Constant 3.43 1.95 4.68
Variance between countries 0.231 0,043 0.115
Variance within countries 1.122 1.046 1.047
-2Log Likelihood 18168 17706 17733
Number of observations 6124 6124 6124
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Table 11.3. Women 2010
Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
FER 0.04***
Work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.05
Works more than the norm 0.04
Desired work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.15***
Works more than the norm -0.06
Unemployment period lasted at least 12 months 0.03
Insecure employment -0.09**
Work autonomy/flexibility 0,005
Partners’ work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.11
Works more than the norm 0.01
Crisis 0.1***
Subjective evaluation of 
financial situation
Living comfortably on present income 1
Coping on present income -0.07*
Difficult on present income -0.08
Very difficult on present income -0.31***
Education Upper secondary level (ref.) 1
Lower secondary or less -0.28*** -0.27***
Tertiary level 0.2*** 0.22***
Having children Not having children younger than 13 (Ref.) 1 1
Having children younger than 13 0.04 -0.03
Having children younger than 6 0.04 0.02
ivett szalma and judit takács – should men have more rights…? 
227
Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
Place of living Capital city (ref.) 1 1
City -0.06 -0.06**
Village -0.07* -0.05***
Age -0.01*** -0.01***
GII -5.37***
Political view Neutral (ref.) 1
Not answered -0.1*
Left-wing oriented 0.07
Left-wing oriented but not too much 0.05
Right-wing oriented but not too much 0.06
Right-wing oriented -0.01
Religiosity -0.03***
Attendance at religious services More than once a week -0.08
Once a week -0.09
At least once a month -0,1
Only on special holy days -0.07
Less often -0.02
Never 1
Mother worked when respondent was 14 years old 0.01
Constant 3.94 1.72 5.2
Variance between countries 0.251 0,0106 0.081
Variance within countries 1.027 0.962 1.961
-2Log Likelihood 15426 15060 15050
Number of observations 5355 5355 5355
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Table 11.4. Men 2010
Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
FER 0.05***
Work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm 0.02
Works more than the norm 0.04
Desired work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.09**
Works more than the norm -0.13***
Insecure employment -0.08**
Unemployment period lasted at least 12 months -0.12*
Work autonomy/flexibility 0,007**
Partners’ work hours Normative work hours (ref.) 1
Works less than the norm -0.11*
Works more than the norm -0.06
Crisis 0.03
Subjective evaluation of  
financial situation
Living comfortably on present income 1
Coping on present income -0.05
Difficult on present income -0.17***
Very difficult on present income -0.21**
Education Upper secondary level (ref.) 1
Lower secondary or less -0.2*** -0.23***
Tertiary level 0.19*** 0.23***
Having children Not having children younger than 13 (Ref.) 1 1
Having children younger than 13 -0.09* -0.06
Having children younger than 6 -0.09* -0.07*
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Variables Empty 
model
Labour 
market 
model
Socio-
cultural 
model
Place of living Capital city (ref.) 1 1
City -0.02 -0.008
Village -0.07* -0.05
Age -0.004** -0.003
GII -5.86***
Political view Neutral (ref.) 1
Not answered -0.1
Left-wing oriented -0.01
Left-wing oriented but not too much 0.05
Right-wing oriented but not too much -0.01
Right-wing oriented 0.01
Religiosity -0.03***
Attendance at religious services More than once a week -0.01
Once a week -0.01
At least once a month -0,01
Only on special holy days -0.05
Less often -0.01
Never 1
Mother worked when respondent was 14 years old 0.01
Constant 3.67 1.08 5.2
Variance between countries 0.331 0,11 0.081
Variance within countries 1.009 0.961 1.961
-2Log Likelihood 15915 15610 15050
Number of observations 5556 5556 5556
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Conclusion
In the context of European (post)welfare states most international research 
has focused on division of household labour and participation in paid work 
in a comparative perspective.33 However, less attention has been paid to 
attitudes related to these arrangements, and yet on the basis of previous re-
search, it can be assumed that there is a close connection between attitudes 
and the actual division of household labour.34 
Attitudes usually change slowly. However, during more significant social 
transformations—and the current global economic crisis can be considered 
as such an event—changes in attitudes, value-orientations, and norms can 
accelerate. In our present research on the basis of ESS data from 2004–2005 
and 2010, we wanted to explore whether any such changes in gender-role-
related attitudes could be registered before and during the crisis in the 21 
European societies examined.
Our findings show certain changes from both a labour market and a 
sociocultural perspective: by 2010 those women and men whose work en-
vironment allows them to make decisions on the organization and pace 
of their daily work are much more likely to reject traditional gender roles. 
While in 2005 three control variables out of four, including age, place of 
living, education level, and having (young) children, had significant effects 
on women’s attitudes, in 2010 all of the variables remained significant and 
having (young) children became significant for men too. Within our so-
ciocultural model between 2005 and 2010, the significant effect of political 
orientation on gender attitudes disappeared, while that of religiosity and 
attendance at religious services remained. Within our labour market model, 
the desired work hour effect35remained significant in the examined period. 
This result seems to be in agreement with Leon Festinger’s theory on cogni-
tive dissonance (1957), stating that people tend to adjust their attitudes to 
conform to the realities of their everyday lives.
33 Fuwa 2004; Hobson & Fahlén 2009; Takács 2008; González, Jurado-Guerrero & Naldini 2009.
34 Stier & Levin-Epstein 2007.
35 If the respondents preferred to work less than the work time norm in the given country; or only in 
the case of men: if they wanted to spend more time at work than the work time norm for men in the 
given country.
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In the case of men within both models, only a few significant effects 
persisted between 2005 and 2010. These include the effects of religiosity and 
attendance at religious services within the sociocultural model, and the ef-
fect of partners’ actual work hours within the labour market model. 
As for the Crisis Index, we found a significant effect only for women: 
those women who were affected by the crisis in the last three years through 
their work situation—by experiencing shortened working time, decreased 
wages, jobs becoming more insecure, changes in work tasks—agreed less 
with traditional attitudes stating that men should have priority in the labour 
market, when jobs are scarce. However, this did not apply to men. 
The crisis has had direct effects on the labour market by decreasing the 
number of available jobs and increasing the unemployment level. However, 
the crisis has also had important indirect effects: increasing employment 
uncertainties (when jobs are not as secure as they used to be) and employees 
have less control over their work than before the crisis. These indirect effects 
are important because such ‘soft factors’ can also influence the gender role 
attitudes among men and women. Those who feel that their jobs are not se-
cure are more likely to accept traditional gender role attitudes, regardless of 
the gender of the respondent. Such a likelihood seems to be a paradox in the 
case of women, but it may be due to the fact that secure jobs tend to be more 
important for women than for men36: if they feel that they can lose their 
jobs at any time, women prefer not to (re)enter the labour market but to 
exploit other options—for example, remaining at home to raise their (small) 
children or to nurse their elderly relatives. Similarly, when men feel that 
their jobs are insecure, they may be more accepting of traditional attitudes 
in their efforts to decrease the severe competition for jobs. 
This study may point to some significant changes in gender related atti-
tudes in the 20 examined European countries between 2004–2005 and 2010, 
but most of these changes may be seen as being more indirect than direct con-
sequences of the recent economic crisis. For more refined analyses, we would 
most probably need more refined data, including more reliable crisis indicators.
36 Szalma 2011.
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However, a very clear finding of the present research is that gender in-
equalities play a very important role in shaping gender role attitudes, even 
during a time of crisis. In both the labour market approach and the socio-
cultural perspective that we applied, it was true for 2004–2005 as well as for 
2010 that the more pronounced gender inequalities are in society, the more 
traditional are gender role attitudes of men and women. 
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CHAPTER 12
Polarization among Icelandic 
women in the aftermath of the crisis?
ingólfur v. gíslason
The financial crisis that began in Iceland in October 2008 has had many and 
far-reaching social effects. One of these is the impact on gender equality and 
the social roles of men and women. The aim of this chapter is to give a tenta-
tive picture of some of these changes and to try to dissect what can be ex-
pected to be more permanent changes in gender situations and what is likely 
to be reversed when the Icelandic economy recovers. Generally speaking, I 
believe that one of the changes is a certain polarization among women so 
that some will move up the social ladder while others will be pushed down.
I see the changes as having three main characteristics. One is that the 
labour market position of men and women has become increasingly simi-
lar in terms of salary and working hours, for example. The second is that 
women have increasingly moved to positions of decision making—that is, 
women that were in reality already on the brink of reaching the top, both in 
politics and on the labour market, have been helped to take that final step in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. And thirdly, the crisis and the reactions 
of the state and the municipalities may have led to a partial backlash regard-
ing the roles of men and women within families. This third effect does not, 
however, have to be more than a temporary setback, while the other two are 
likely to have come to stay.
Many classical theories regarding women and economic crisis seem no 
longer applicable in societies where the labour market participation of both 
men and women is regarded as the norm, where the sharing of domestic 
work and the care taking of children among couples has been steadily in-
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creasing, and where women have in some ways a stronger foothold in the 
labour market than men due to their educational superiority. Fréttablaðið, 
one of Iceland’s two leading newspapers, had two items in the February 4th 
2011 issue that illustrate these changes. On the one hand there was an adver-
tisement from one of the banks, Landsbankinn, proclaiming its dedication 
to social responsibility and listing what it intended to do to be a positive 
actor in Icelandic society. One of the items on that list was the bank’s inten-
tion to have an equal number of men and women on its executive board as 
well as the boards of its auxiliary firms.1 So they regarded it as one of the 
socially positive things they could do in Icelandic society to promote the 
advancement of women on the labour market or, more specifically, see to 
it that women are well represented in high-powered jobs where important 
decisions are taken.
The second news item in Fréttablaðið was a short notice to the effect that 
one of the municipalities in Iceland was thinking about raising the fees for 
children in kindergartens and raising the age at which they can be admitted.2 
The labour market
Two significant gender-related changes have occurred in the labour market 
during the economic crisis. First, men have been far harder hit than women 
in terms of employment. In the beginning, the crisis mainly hit the financial 
sector and the construction and building sector, both dominated by men. 
Consequently, the unemployment figures for men have been far higher than 
for women from the start of the crisis right up to the present (2012), as can 
be seen in Figure 12.1.
It has often been predicted that this would change when the public sec-
tor would be forced to lay off employees due to cuts in welfare funding.3 
Many more women than men work in the public sector (around 2/3 are 
women), so cuts would hit women harder than men. So far this prediction 
has not materialized even though figures show that the great majority of 
1 Fréttablaðið 4 February 2011, 13–14.
2 Fréttablaðið 4 February 2011, 2.
3 See for example Ólafsdóttir 2010.
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jobs lost within the public sector are women’s jobs: 470 out of 540 jobs lost 
from 2009 to 2011.4 Still the numbers are very low (about four per cent of 
the unemployed) and do not change the overall picture. And as the greatest 
cuts have probably already been made, there seems to be no reason to ex-
pect any real change in this field. According to the prime minister’s adviser 
on gender issues, Hildur Jónsdóttir, the government has explicitly tried to 
protect women-dominated sectors by, for example, reversing decisions on 
cuts in the health sector when it was shown that such cuts would lead to job 
losses for 634 women. Cuts were made instead in public construction work, 
a sphere dominated by men.5
The second important change is that men’s earnings have fallen while no 
significant reduction in women’s earnings has been registered; consequently, 
we have seen an unparalleled diminishing in the gender pay gap, which can 
be seen in Figure 12.2.
4 Smugan 2011.
5 Jónsdóttir 2011.
Figure 12.1. Unemployment in Iceland, 2003–2012 (in %)
Source: Statistics Iceland.
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In 2008 men’s labour market earnings increased from the year previous 
by 3.83 per cent, while women’ earnings increased in the same year by a 
wholesome 7.95 per cent. In 2009 men lost 5.73 per cent of their earnings, 
whereas women increased their earnings by 0.26 per cent. This is probably 
due to three reasons: increasing unemployment, shorter working hours for 
men, and cuts in salaries, particularly among those at the higher end of the 
income scale, mainly men. This closing of the gender pay gap was somewhat 
reversed in 2010 but the figures for 2011 are still not available. It appears 
likely that the gap will widen again but hardly reach the pre-crisis level.
 Here it is interesting to see that the gap closed most rapidly in the age 
bracket 21–40, or by 3.9 per cent, from 2007 to 2010, and a good 3 per cent 
in the age bracket 41–45 in the same period. These are the age brackets that 
mainly should be experiencing the impact of the educational revolution 
among women as well as the effects of the changes in parental leave from 
2000. From 2007 to 2008, women increased their labour market earnings in 
all age brackets more than men did and in some cases dramatically so. For 
Figure 12.2.  Women’s gross hourly earnings as percentage of men’s 
earnings in Iceland, 1991–2010
Source: Own calculations based on information from Statistics Iceland.
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example, men in the age bracket 31–35 increased their earnings by 2.65 per 
cent, while women in the same age bracket increased their earnings by 7.86 
per cent. And while men in all age brackets up to 65 experienced reduced 
earnings from 2008 to 2009, only women up to 35 experienced such reduc-
tions in the same period—and then only far less than men.
The change is much more pronounced in the capital area than outside it. 
The gap closed by 0.6 per cent outside the capital from 2007 to 2010, while 
it closed by 4.6 per cent in the capital area.
So the labour market earnings of men and women have become more 
similar after the crisis. A similar and closely connected development can be 
observed regarding other aspects of the labour market. In terms of working 
hours, men have reduced their hours from 46.3 hours a week in 2003 to 44.1 
in 2011, while women have slightly increased their hours from 35.1 to 35.4 
hours a week in the same period. In 2003 there was a 7.6 per cent difference 
in labour market participation in men’s favour. In 2011 this was down to 6.7 
per cent. Finally there has been an increase in the number of men working 
part-time since the crisis began, while the long-term trend in reduction in 
the number of women working part-time has continued. In 2003, 11.6 per 
cent of men on the labour market were working part-time compared to 40.6 
per cent of women. The figures in 2011 were 13.2 per cent and 35.7 per cent 
respectively.
The unemployment figures and the figures for the gender pay gap certain-
ly confirm the strong position of women in the labour market. This firm foot-
hold of women is probably based to a certain extent on the vast improvement 
in women’s education over the last decades. Women constitute the majority 
of those who have received a university degree since the 1990s; in 2008–2009, 
they made up 66 per cent of those receiving tertiary degrees. Among Ice-
landers up to the age of 74, 28.8 per cent of women hold a university degree 
compared to 21.7 per cent of men. This is much more pronounced among 
younger people, with over 41 per cent of women aged 25–29 holding a uni-
versity degree and less than 23 per cent of men of the same age.6
6 Statistics Iceland 2011.
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As was to be expected, the gender pay gap has widened somewhat again 
as the economy has started to recover, but it seems highly unlikely that it 
will reach the level it was before the crisis. After all, there was a basic trend 
for a pay gap decrease even though change was slow in the early years of this 
century’s first decade. And it should be noted that even though the boom 
was primarily in spheres dominated by men (i.e., in the construction and 
the finance sectors), it was characterized by stagnation in the area of gender 
pay gap rather than increase as might have been expected.
In addition, it is unlikely that the gender pay gap will reach proportions 
similar to those before the crisis because the number of women in (well-
paid) positions has increased, a movement that is likely to continue. And 
changes regarding the situation of families, discussed below, could both in-
crease the pay gap and reduce it. Let us begin with the high-powered jobs.
Positions of power
The crisis changed the political landscape in Iceland. In January 2009, the 
government was forced to resign after a protest movement of unparalleled 
proportions in Icelandic history had demonstrated outside the national par-
liament, Alþingi, for several weeks. The outgoing government was a coalition 
of the centre-right Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party. An 
interim minority government of the Left Green Party and the Social Demo-
cratic Party took over and elections were held in April. The Independence 
Party suffered the greatest loss in its eighty-year history, loosing a third of 
its support and receiving only 23.7 per cent of the popular vote. The Social 
Democrats polled 29.8 per cent and the Left Greens 21.7 per cent, giving 
the parties enough support to form a majority government. The number of 
women on Alþingi rose to an all-time high of 42.9 per cent. The interim gov-
ernment was the first ever in Iceland to have an equal number of men and 
women as ministers and for the first time in Iceland too a woman was prime 
minister. This set the stage for a number of reforms in a feministic spirit.
The execution of these reforms reflected long-standing demands of ‘rad-
ical’ feminists and included such measures as banning the buying of sexual 
services in 2009 and commercial strip tease in 2010. More importantly, a 
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law was passed in 2010 to the effect that the percentage of either sex on the 
boards of publicly owned companies and on the boards of privately owned 
companies with more than 50 employees should be no less than 40 per cent. 
For private companies, this is to take effect from 1 September 2013 and will 
result in an increase in the number of women in positions of power both in 
public administration and on the private labour market.
In 2011 it was estimated that 308 companies were subject to the law. 
Of them, 133, or 43 per cent, already fulfilled the requirements, while 175 
needed to change the composition of their boards, calling for 217 women 
and one man to receive a seat on the boards. The great majority of these 
companies (134) only have to add one woman to their board.7 The real 
change will therefore perhaps not be all that great, though the symbolic ef-
fect is considerable.
Another indicator that the law on quota in company boards mainly sped 
up development already underway is that when KPMG, an advisory com-
pany, surveyed the gender composition of boards in 2011, 75 per cent were 
men and 25 per cent women. However, when only those who had been on a 
board for one or two years were taken into account, the ratio was 62 per cent 
men and 38 per cent women, which may indicate that the number of women 
had been increasing as the boards were renewed.8
Even outside the realm of these laws, the number of women in influen-
tial positions has continued to rise. For example, the municipality elections 
in 2010 saw the number of women in elected municipal office rise from 35.9 
per cent to 39.8 per cent, the highest number so far. Cabinet secretaries are 
now shared 50/50 between men and women (up from 30/70 in 2008) and, as 
stated in the beginning, one of the banks has promoting the advancement of 
women within the bank on its social agenda.
But the changes that have taken place so far, and the changes that will 
come once the laws on gender equality in board rooms take effect, should 
also be supported by the general tainting of masculinities—and (young) 
men—following the economic collapse. The face of the financial bubble was 
7 KPMG 2011.
8 KPMG 2011.
ingólfur v. gíslason – polarization among icelandic women
241
mainly that of a male embryo in an Armani suit. After the financial collapse 
the gendered nature of the debacle has often been pointed out, and Alþingi 
even commissioned a special ‘gendered reading’ of the investigative report 
about the causes of the collapse. The report pointed out that the driving ac-
tors behind the bubble that led to the collapse had mainly been young, smug 
and arrogant males spurred on by a neoliberal ideology.9 So maybe there 
is a tendency in the population at large to be wary of young (arrogant) busi-
ness males, though this cannot be proven. 
The changes in gendered power relations can also be seen in the board 
composition of different organizations of employers. In March 2011, The 
Federation of Trade & Services, the second largest federation within the 
Confederation of Icelandic Employers (SA), elected a new board with a ma-
jority of women and the chairman is a woman.10 Moreover, in March 2012 
The Federation of Icelandic Industries elected a woman as its chairman for 
the first time in its history.11 The third of the eight federations within SA 
with a woman as chairman of the board is The Icelandic Financial Services 
Association.
The Confederation of Icelandic Employers appoints board members in 
a number of Icelandic Pension Funds who are major players in Icelandic 
economy, holding capital close to 140 per cent of the size of the Icelandic 
economy. The Confederation’s policy has been gender balance on the boards 
of these funds and now (2013) 46 per cent of those appointed by the Con-
federation are women.12
As for the bank, Landsbankinn, that advertised its commitment to social 
responsibility, its board is now composed of three men and two women, the 
executive board has four men and four women, and its affiliated companies 
have all in all 19 board members, 10 women and nine men.13
Thus, resourceful women have been occupying high-powered positions 
in the economic and political sphere in the aftermath of the crisis, partly 
9 Einarsdóttir & Pétursdóttir 2010.
10 Samtök verslunar og þjónustu 2011.
11 Vísir 2012.
12 Samtök atvinnulífsins 2013.
13 Information from the bank’s press secretary 28 February 2012.
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helped by the political establishment which has enacted laws on gender 
quotas on the boards of companies. What about the social situation of other 
women?
Families
As most other European countries in last decades, Iceland has experienced a 
general movement towards an increased gender sharing of the joys and bur-
dens of family life. This can mainly be seen in increased sharing of child care 
both within a partnership and after divorce. So, for example, the number 
of parents choosing shared custody over their children following a divorce 
rose sharply once that possibility was introduced into Icelandic family law 
in 1992 (see Figure 12.3).
As of 2012, almost 90 per cent of divorced parents choose shared cus-
tody. In addition, recent studies have shown that in about 25 per cent of 
divorces, the child or the children live with both their parents on a 50/50 
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basis.14 Both these aspects of gender sharing are similar to the development 
in the other Nordic countries.15
The new laws on parental leave from 2000 were a milestone as regards 
the promotion of the ideal of the father and the mother sharing in the care-
taking of their child or children. Parental leave was extended in steps from 
six to nine months and divided into three equally long parts, one for the 
father, one for the mother, and one that parents can share as they like. The 
periods for the father and mother were strictly non-transferable except if ei-
ther parent died before he or she had used the time allotted. Economic com-
pensation was related to wages so that those who had been on the labour 
market were entitled to 80 per cent of their salary during parental leave.16 
The law was an immediate success in Iceland with a take-up rate of up to 90 
per cent by fathers using on average around 100 days. It can safely be stated 
that never before in Iceland’s history have so many fathers been so active in 
taking care of their infants.
But dark clouds began to gather immediately following the economic 
collapse. As mentioned above, the original laws gave parents on leave 80 
per cent of their salary without any ceiling. This was changed in 2004 with 
the introduction of a very high ceiling, originally affecting 2.6 per cent of 
fathers and 0.4 per cent of mothers but rising to 8.3 per cent and 1.9 per cent 
respectively in 2008. Since the onset of the economic downturn, the ceiling 
has been lowered twice, so that it now affects 45.7 per cent of fathers and 19 
per cent of mothers.17 In addition, payments are now based on 80 per cent 
of earnings lower than 200,000 ISK and 75 per cent of earnings over 200,000 
ISK.18 However, these changes were accompanied by promises that the cuts 
were temporary and that once state finances improved the compensation 
would be brought back to former levels. In December 2012 Alþingi began 
that restoration by raising the ceiling and deciding to gradually extending 
the leave so that it would be 12 months in 2016 and divided so that fathers 
14 Arnarson & Bjarnason 2008, 13.
15 Gíslason & Eydal 2011.
16 Eydal & Gíslason 2008.
17 Vinnumálastofnun 2010, 33.
18 Stjórnartiđindi, law no. 120/2009.
part iii: gender effects of the crisis
244
have 5 months, mothers 5 and then they can share 2 months as they like.19
Another change in the laws on parental leave in 2008 was the exten-
sion of the period within which parents can take the leave, from 18 to 36 
months. Because of this we will not know until the end of 2012 how many 
fathers made use of their rights in 2009. However, there are indications that 
the number has decreased and that fathers are using fewer days.20 And even 
if the end result would be that their use has not decreased all that much, it 
seems fair to say that they are to a lesser degree using it in the way that it was 
supposed to be used—that is, to take care of their infants. Paternity leave 
taken when the child is 30 months old is quite different from leave taken 
during the child’s first year with regard to the emotional bonds between the 
father and the child as well as to the experience of being the baby’s main 
caretaker. It is not the same to take a day off here and there to help out dur-
ing a family crisis or just to play, as it is to take several weeks or months off 
from salaried work to be the main caretaker. It is different from the point 
of view of family responsibilities and it is also very different as regards the 
signals it sends to the child and to the labour market.
Moreover, it is difficult to say whether the declining share of men is due 
mainly to cuts in economic compensation or to a more precarious situa-
tion on the labour market as people are now probably more reluctant to 
do anything that might jeopardize their situation than they were prior to 
the crisis. Still, it should be noted that surveys before the crisis revealed a 
somewhat surprisingly positive attitude among employers to parental leave 
by both mothers and fathers. A Gallup poll in March 2003 showed that even 
though employers were certainly the social group that was most negative 
to the laws, 73.7 per cent were still positive.21 An extensive study in 2006 
found that 80.8 per cent of employers had a positive attitude to the laws, 
but it also found that more fathers than mothers felt that their job security 
had been threatened by their taking parental leave.22 A study carried out by 
Auður Arna Arnardóttir in 2008 yielded similar results, with 10.9 per cent 
19 Eydal & Gíslason 2013.
20 Vinnumálastofnun 2010.
21 Gallup 2003.
22 Jónsdóttir & Aðalsteinsson 2008, 73–74.
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of fathers experiencing negative attitudes from their employers and 3.1 per 
cent of mothers.23 When it came to job security, around 15 per cent of the 
respondents in Arnardóttir’s study thought that they had placed their jobs 
in jeopardy, but here there was no statistically significant difference between 
the fathers and the mothers.
Studies done prior to the crisis revealed that parental leave seemed to 
have had a positive impact on gender equality, so that the sharing of paid 
and unpaid labour was more equal among first-time parents in 2003 than 
it had been in 1997.24 On the other hand Arnardóttir’s study showed that 
there had been no change in the division of domestic labour before and af-
ter parental leave. However, since studies from other countries have shown 
that the birth of the first child usually leads to a more traditional division 
of labour in families25, it can be regarded as a plus that this division stayed 
23 Arnardóttir 2008.
24 Eydal 2008.
25 See for example Deding 2010.
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the same. Arnardóttir’s study also revealed a general belief among parents 
that paternity leave had led to a closer bond between father and child, that 
it had increased the father’s understanding for how much work is involved 
in taking care of a baby, and that the fathers were happy with the time that 
they had had with the child.
A strong element in the changes in the gender structure in the Nordic 
countries in the last decades has been the collectivization of child care. Ice-
land is no exception, though it has been a laggard in the Nordic family in 
this respect. But the last few years have seen a change in that respect. Figure 
12.4 shows the percentage of children enrolled in kindergartens in Iceland, 
one of the main aspects of the collectivization of child care.
As we can see, there has been a significant reduction in the proportion 
of one-year-old children in kindergartens since the beginning of the crisis. 
This may be due to raised age limits in some municipalities, to increased 
fees, or simply to a shortage of available places. The last possibility is sup-
ported by the fact that between 2009 and 2010 the reduction in the propor-
Figure 12.5.  Daily attendance in kindergartens, 1998–2011  
(% of cohort)
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tion of one-year-old children in kindergartens is exactly matched by an in-
crease in the number taken care of by private child minders (two per cent). 
But whatever the reason, the reduction means a more precarious situation 
for the parents, who either have to pay more or simply have to take care of 
their child themselves, a task usually devolved upon the mother. 
But of course kindergarten attendance is one thing and the amount of 
time a child spends there is another. Here we see an interesting develop-
ment.
As can be seen in Figure 12.5, there was a steady increase in the number 
of children enrolled for more than eight hours a day in the period until 
2009. From 2009 to 2011 this development came to a halt and was eventually 
reversed. At least two explanations seem possible. On the one hand, parents 
made unemployed in the wake of the crisis could pick up their children 
earlier than before. On the other, and what seems more likely, the changes 
that many municipalities made in the kindergarten fees meant that kinder-
gartens were less affordable for cash-strapped families.
Prior to 2009, every hour in kindergarten was charged the same. But, as 
part of their attempts to curb expenses, many municipalities, among them 
the largest, raised the fee for having children longer than eight hours a day 
in kindergarten. It is in all probability the effects of this rise in fee which we 
are seeing in the statistics. Other municipalities simply reduced the hours 
available and all raised the general fees, some considerably.26
I will completely leave aside the issue of whether it is good or bad for a 
child to spend so much time in kindergarten and concentrate on the effects 
this change may be expected to have on gender relations.
If both parents work eight hours and start their working day at the same 
time, then they need to have their child or children for more than eight 
hours in kindergarten. They could manage it if they start work at different 
hours but unfortunately that calls for two cars in most instances and that is 
somewhat of a luxury after the devaluation of the Icelandic currency (kro-
na) and the steep rise in petrol prises. So it would come down to calculating 
26 ASÍ 2011.
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if it is worth having the child for such a long time in kindergarten. And if the 
result is that it is hardly worth it in economic terms, then one of the parents 
will have to reduce her or his working hours. As Iceland still has the gender 
pay gap as well as the fact that more women work in the public domain with 
better employment security than is usual on the private labour market, then 
it seems a fair guess that it will be the women who shorten their working 
day or, if they are already working part-time, will not go up to a full work-
ing day. This change in labour market affiliation would then mainly affect 
lower-earning couples.
It is possible that this change might lead to a partial reversal of the trends 
over the last years—namely, the increased shared responsibility of fathers 
and mothers for providing financially for the family and caring for their 
child or children. It is also likely to hit single mothers hard, a group that 
is already economically very vulnerable in Icelandic society. They rarely 
have the opportunity to reduce their working hours and so will generally be 
forced to have their child or children in kindergarten for more than eight 
hours a day.
So, to sum up, there are indications that some of the responses to the 
financial crisis, reduction in economic compensation during parental leave 
and the raising of kindergarten fees, could lead to a reversal of the recent 
trends towards increased gender equality in the domestic realm. Such re-
sponses can also lead to a worsening of the situation of single mothers and 
therefore a certain polarization among women so that while the better off 
women move further up the social ladder those in a more precarious posi-
tion head in the opposite direction.
Summing up
What seems to emerge from this discussion is that the crisis has had, and 
can still have, very mixed effects on gender equality in Iceland. The relatively 
strong position of women on the labour market is acknowledged. They are 
far less likely to lose their jobs and while the earnings of men have plummet-
ed, the earnings of women have risen and, consequently, the gender wage 
gap is at an all time low. This is in part due to political decisions resulting in 
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few lay-offs in the public sector, but it is probably also due to the educational 
revolution among women and to changes in the laws on parental leave from 
2000, which have had the effect that an increasing number of fathers have 
been leaving the labour force for a few months following the birth of their 
child. This last item is highly speculative however.
This is indicative of far-reaching changes in the social situation of men 
and women. Their labour market situation for example has become increas-
ingly similar and women are in no way a reserve labour army. There seems 
to be little reason why capitalism should discriminate against women in 
general (though it has clearly done so), or why it should not be able to cope 
with gender equality, which certainly does not automatically imply general 
equality.
In a similar way the financial crash has had a positive effect on the pow-
er position of women. Elections after 2008 have brought more women to 
Alþingi and the municipalities. Women have also increased their share of 
work positions in the major offices of public administration, as witnessed 
for example by cabinet secretaries. Politics will also increase the power posi-
tion of women in economic life as laws guarantee their presence in boards 
both on the private and the public labour markets. There are also examples 
of firms that are making a point of increasing the presence of women in po-
sitions of power as a way to be seen as socially responsible actors in Iceland.
On the other hand, there are indications that the gains of the last decades 
in terms of increasing the sharing of domestic tasks between men and wom-
en—and particularly the task of caring for young children—may be reversed 
for a part of the population—namely for those who are financially worse off. 
Such a reversal would come about because cuts in economic compensation 
during parental leave seriously affect the way that fathers make use of the 
leave. But it would also come about because higher costs of having children 
in kindergartens may lead to mothers cutting down on their working hours 
or at least not extending them. This last item could also lead to an increased 
risk of poverty for single mothers.
Taken together, the effects of the crisis can be seen as strengthening the 
position of those women who were already relatively strong, while cement-
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ing traditional gender roles in some families and pushing women in a weak 
position further down that road. The first effect is likely to be here to stay, 
while the second may be reversed if the economic compensation during pa-
rental leave is returned to pre-crisis level, the planned extension of the leave 
to 12 months carried out, and a place in kindergarten guaranteed when the 
leave is over. Then we would see a strong continuation of the movement to-
wards increased sharing of child care and domestic work, which certainly is 
a prerequisite for continued development towards gender equality.
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CHAPTER 13
Elder care policy in Finland:  
Remedies for crisis?
hanna-kaisa hoppania
Introduction
In 2009 the then Minister of Health and Social Services Paula Risikko de-
scribed the situation of eldercare services as the biggest challenge facing 
Finnish society.1 After the general election in April 2011 the majority of 
the new MPs agreed that the law should guarantee the elderly a subjective 
right to care. Subjective right in the Finnish context refers to a strong, un-
conditional legal entitlement to the service in question. The municipalities 
are obligated to provide these services.2 This suggests that there is a strong 
support for the Draft for an Act to Ensure the Right of Older Persons to 
Care According to Their Needs (hereinafter the Elder Care Bill3) that the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has prepared.4 
In the autumn of 2009 the government started to prepare the Elder Care 
Bill. The work was initiated after the opposition filed an interpellation on se-
curing the rights and care of the elderly, and amid a media scandal about the 
poor level and quality of care in many care institutions. The scandal erupted 
when the Parliamentary Ombudsman received reports by the County Ad-
ministrative Board which revealed that deficiencies in care institutions are 
rife. The reports described commonplace occurrences of inadequate nutri-
tion and diaper changing, few opportunities for outdoor activities, over-
1 PTK 84/2009.
2 Hämäläinen & Rokka 2011.
3 ‘Elder Care Bill’ is used in this paper as shorthand for the draft Act; it is not an official title of the bill.
4 STM 2011:68.
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medicalization, unjustified use of physical restraints, and shortage of staff, 
among other things. The reports also gave an account of the insufficient 
supervision structures of care services. While many of the issues had been 
a recurrent theme in, for example, newspapers’ letters-to-the-editor pages, 
elder care services were now officially recognized as lacking in quality and 
resources. The Ombudsman pointed out that while this was not the case 
everywhere and many care facilities provided good care, overall the reports 
remain insufficient and many deficiencies might have been left uncovered.5 
Generally, the lack of staff and resources is seen as the main cause of in-
adequate care services. Also, poor administration and ‘technical’ problems 
of organization and governance—for example lack of expertise concerning 
the fairly new Public Procurement Act in the context of growing marketi-
zation of care—are seen as factors contributing to the problem. In turn, 
economic constraints and demographic structure cause a lack of resources, 
particularly as unprecedented ageing in the near future in Finland is put-
ting the Nordic model of the welfare state under considerable pressure. My 
contention is that the Finnish context offers a fruitful critical case study of 
some of the trends in social care policies that are common internationally 
over the past few decades. 
In this chapter I investigate the situation of elder care in Finland on the 
level of political analysis, seeing the recent emergence of elder care provi-
sion as a problem of national governance. I search for the subtext and roots 
for such a scandal in a ‘welfare state’ and examine what is at issue politically 
when remedies for this situation are sought. What exactly do the MPs sup-
port when they espouse a ‘care guarantee’, as the leading national newspaper 
dubbed it? What is lacking as regards the elder care services in Finland that 
requires new extensive legislation? And will the Elder Care Bill solve the 
problems of elder care, or is something else required as well? The nature of 
the challenges of care is here understood as a question of social justice.
Care has been studied widely in the context of the welfare state, in ger-
ontology, social work, and policy analysis.6 This literature offers a rich and 
5 Paunio & Linnakangas (2009) .
6 See for example Anttonen & Häikiö 2011; Daly & Lewis 2000; Vega 2008; and Dahl, Keränen & 
Kovalainen 2011.
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detailed account of different aspects of care. On a more ideological and 
theoretical level, care has been developed as an attitude and ethical practice, 
whereby the vulnerability and codependence of people is acknowledged 
and responded to.7 Moreover, feminist research has tackled the gendered 
structures of (re)production and the public-private distinction that shape 
the challenges of care.8 The historical roots of these structures have been 
examined and critical care ethics have been developed in relation to inter-
national relations.9
However, more general political analysis of the empirical challenges of 
elder care seems to be somewhat scarce. The literature on elder care is frag-
mented, with different dimensions studied separately. Often, for example, 
the issues of resource distribution on the societal level are disconnected 
from analysis of the practices of care.10 Likewise, the national administra-
tion of elder care policy in Finland is divided into sections dealing with 
the ‘contents’ of care services separately from the questions of governance 
of resources. I argue that these aspects should be looked at together. Re-
search-wise I believe it is worthwhile to attempt to combine the insights of 
feminist theories of care that have paid attention to both the material and 
the ideological processes which shape gendered care relations with more 
mainstream policy analysis. 
This chapter proceeds by a short review of previous care research, and 
then discusses the main trends and challenges of demography and elder care 
in Finland since the early 1990s. Next, by utilizing a theoretical framework 
drawn from Nancy Fraser, it analyses the aspects of recognition (sociocul-
tural dimensions), redistribution (socioeconomic dimensions), and repre-
sentation (political dimensions) of the politics of elder care. Hence, my aim 
in this essay is to bring together those dimensions of elder care that I deem 
most relevant politically and which require attention in the context of un-
precedented ageing and continuing financial crisis. The Fraserian multidi-
7 See for example Gilligan 1982 and Kittay & Feder 2002.
8 See for example Bakker 2007 and Hom 2009.
9 See for example Tronto 1993; Robinson 1999.
10 Some research combining these dimensions does exist, and I will draw from it over the course of the 
paper.
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mensional framework supplies me with the analytical tools to execute this 
plan. First, however, I present the relevant background information about 
the demographic structure and elder care policy of Finland. Finally I will 
argue that certain elements are not properly recognized as factors contribut-
ing to or affecting the care crisis, and that these elements require more atten-
tion both on the level of research and of policy development. These factors 
pertain to gender relations, the character and valorization of care (work), 
the limits of marketization, and the organization of work more widely. 
The demographic challenge
By the end of 2008 in Finland, the dependency ratio, defined as depen-
dants per 100 working-age people, was 50.3. The ratio has been at this level 
since the 1970s. When the ‘baby-boom generation’ retires, the situation will 
worsen dramatically. According to Statistics Finland predictions, by 2016 
the dependency ratio will be over 60 and by 2026 over 70, a level it has 
never reached during Finland’s independence.11 This prospect is due to a 
low birth rate combined with longevity. It is notable, though, that regional 
differences are big.
In this context, immigration, which has increased rapidly since the be-
ginning of this century’s first decade, becomes significant: If Finland were to 
close its borders and no immigrants entered the country, it would mean that 
the working-age population would diminish even more strikingly. In this 
scenario the dependency ratio would be over 75 already in 2027. Thus the 
demographic structure clearly poses a challenge, and while the same is true 
of most of the EU27 countries, in the coming decades Finland’s situation is 
among the worst. However, as the OSF report notes, what these figures show 
is not necessarily an inevitable development. It only shows how the popula-
tion will look like, if the current trends continue. 
The discourse on the demographic ‘time bombs’ has also been challenged 
and criticized for legitimating the rolling back of welfare provisions by argu-
ing that current services are not economically viable.12 While I agree that 
11 Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) 2009a.
12 MacInnes 2006; Rich 2005; Baker 2000.
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the problems of care cannot be reduced to demography, and that the ques-
tion is not merely one of economic capability but of political commitment 
or ‘extension in morality’13, I maintain that the sort of elder care scandals 
discussed above demonstrate that Finland is not really coping with the aging 
population. I do see the dependency ratio as setting certain parameters for 
what is feasible policy-wise. Thus it seems that to make wide-scale social ser-
vices sustainable, either the dependency ratio has to be ‘fixed’, or the way care 
of the elderly is organized must change significantly. With the simultaneous 
demands for stronger rights for care services, there are clearly tensions here.
Elder care in Finland since the 1990s
The Finnish constitution guarantees those not capable of providing for 
themselves the right for indispensable subsistence and care and basic sub-
sistence during old age. It states that ‘[t]he public authorities shall guarantee 
for everyone, as provided in more detail by an Act, adequate social, health 
and medical services and promote the health of the population.’14 Currently, 
there is no separate legislation concerning the elderly with regards to so-
cial and health care.15 The applicable provisions to the care of the elderly 
are found instead within many different laws. The social services in Finland 
have been built around an ethos of a strong welfare state, universal rights, 
and public institutions responsible for organizing and providing social ser-
vices. However, since the deep recession in the beginning of the 1990s, dif-
ferent types of trends have characterized social policy: Significant reforms 
were started in the 1990s as a response to criticism against public sector 
inefficiency and bureaucracy. The economic hardship of the time, combined 
with a turn toward neoliberal politics, reconfigured the welfare state. Cuts 
in public spending and the suppression of welfare services and benefits were 
common politics in the 1990s. For example, in elder care the number of 
places in institutional care residences fell approximately 20 per cent dur-
ing the 1990s.16 The 1980s have been seen by many researchers as a turning 
13 Hardin 1968.
14 Constitution of Finland, ch. 2, sec. 19.
15 The Elder Care Bill is supposed to come into effect in 2013. 
16 Kiander 2001, 94.
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point for the welfare state and social policy in most industrialized countries, 
but in Finland the constraints and limitations on social expenditure and the 
structural reforms from universality toward means testing and individual 
responsibility started in conjunction with the depression of the 1990s.17 The 
new public management model and market-oriented mechanisms today 
prevail in the municipalities, instead of the traditional administrative-legal-
istic way of running government.18
In a sense, universalist social policies peaked in the early 1990s, and by 
2010 Finland seems to be approaching the form of a liberal welfare state, 
as some Finnish researchers argue.19 The European Union’s role in these 
developments has been considerable, as Finland is committed to EU di-
rectives on public procurement and has started to follow the principles of 
international competition. The Public Procurement Act came into opera-
tion in 1994, transforming the social and health care sector. Many reforms 
and transformations of social service provision are still underway, such as 
a general reform of the social welfare legislation. To give some indication 
of the magnitude of these changes—for example in social services—private 
business has grown almost fivefold between 2000 and 2009, both in terms of 
personnel and revenue.20 
Thus the elder care problems and scandals emerge not only from the 
challenges of the demographic situation but also from the pressures of tight 
budgets, problems and scandals which have escalated since the global finan-
cial crisis of 2008 amid a whirlwind of reforms. A specific law as a solution 
to the problems of elder care is not a new idea though: a draft act concerning 
elderly services was first presented in the 1970s. 
The Elder Care Bill that is currently under preparation strengthens the 
rights of the elderly for an evaluation of service need and for receiving the 
services required. The bill also brings together different laws and regulations 
concerning the elderly. There is a shift of focus toward preventative services 
to improve health and viability, and a strengthening of the leverage of the 
17 Kiander 2001, 86–87.
18 Moisio, Loikkanen & Oulasvirta 2010.
19 Anttonen & Häikiö 2011, 16–17.
20 Ministry of Employment and Economy 2011.
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elderly in matters concerning their own life. The only direct measure in the 
draft bill to assure the quality of caring is an individualized responsibility 
of care workers to inform the authority in charge of any defects, or evident 
threats of defects, in the care services. 
Recognizing, redistributing and representing care
Fraser’s terminology of recognition, redistribution, and representation of-
fers normative and analytical tools to make sense of complex social issues. 
While Fraser develops her ideas mainly on a theoretical level, her frame-
work lends itself to analysis of actually existing cases and practical care poli-
tics too, as for example Hanne Dahl has shown. I share Dahl’s appreciation 
of Fraser’s framework as it ‘bridges traditional dichotomies between the 
socio-economic and the socio-cultural aspects of justice that have too often 
been analyzed independently’.21 The framework distinguishes analytically 
different dimensions of a given issue, and emphasizes the need to examine 
these intertwined aspects together.
According to Fraser, recognition refers to social relations and the ac-
knowledgement and valorization of, for example, identities hitherto denied 
or deemed worthless. To seek recognition means aiming for social status 
and respect. Calls for recognition require changing cultural or symbolic 
value patterns, understandings, and meanings. Redistribution relates to 
goods and burdens, such as income and property. Demanding redistribu-
tion means demanding adequate pay and access to different socioeconomic 
goods. Representation, or the specifically political dimension, pertains to 
membership and procedure. It deals with inclusion and exclusion from the 
entitlement to make justice claims. It also concerns the operation of public 
procedures and processes within which political demands are raised.22 The 
purpose of analysing care in terms of separate dimensions is to pinpoint the 
different elements that factor in the ‘elder care crisis’ with somewhat differ-
ent logics, but interdependent effects.
21 Dahl 2004, 334.
22 Fraser 2008.
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Recognizing the role of care(-givers)
For a long time now recognition has been demanded for care work and 
other informal domestic work within the household as the international 
debates on the ‘family wage’ or, for instance, on childcare allowances in-
dicate.23 In Finland remuneration for informal care work is granted in the 
form of universal public support for long child-care leaves. There is also an 
allowance for family caregivers of other dependents, but it is granted neither 
extensively nor consistently. The Association of Care Giving Relatives and 
Friends is now demanding recognition of the largely unpaid family care of 
the elderly as it is the principal form of elder care in Finland. In their state-
ment on the Elder Care Bill, the Association asserts a need to consider the 
role and importance of family care and to invest in family caregivers.24 In its 
current form the Bill does not mention family care.
The significance of family care and informal care extend beyond the pri-
vacy of the family. Obviously, if people manage to take care of their elderly 
family members at home, it is (or at least appears to be) a cheap arrangement 
from the point of view of the municipalities. In fact, the role of informal 
care and family care has been strengthened by a reform of the Informal Care 
Act in 2006. Although by law people have no obligation to provide care for 
their disabled, long-term ill or elderly family members or relatives, in prac-
tice over 300,000 people (approximately 6 per cent of the total population) 
are doing so. Of these informal caregivers, 75–80 per cent are women, and 
only a minority receives the carer’s allowance.25 The significance of care re-
lations and a wider acknowledgment of care (receiving and giving) as an 
integral part of social life is absent from the current social and elder care 
policy. The disconnectedness of care from other policy and decision making 
is problematic as it causes difficulties for individuals and families struggling 
with lack of adequate support for care. But furthermore, the indirect societal 
costs of care do not figure in the current policy although research suggests 
they should. For instance Peggie Smith has noted that elder care’s hefty eco-
23 See for example Fraser 1994; Hiilamo & Kangas 2009.
24 Omaishoitajat ja Läheiset-Liitto ry 2011.
25 Salanko-Vuorela, Purhonen, Järnstedt & Korhonen 2006.
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nomic price tag extends indirectly to employers. She points to initial re-
search that indicates that care giving for elderly takes a tremendous toll on 
worker productivity, and names elder care ‘The Work-Family Issue of the 
21st Century’.26 This is a pivotal point to consider, especially in the context 
of Finnish politics where one general aim—and an OECD recommenda-
tion—of work and pension policy is to increase the length of working life.
However, a considerable amount of elder care work is now formal and 
provided within state institutions and (increasingly) in the market. And it 
was precisely formal care that came in for criticism in the media scandal in 
2009. As a particular form of labour, the idiosyncrasies of care seem to lack 
proper recognition. Hanne Dahl has elaborated the intricacies of care work in 
the context of the Danish home helpers’ situation. Her analysis reveals a pat-
tern of disrespect for particular features of care-giving work, and she argues 
that the ‘field of elderly care is colonized with a foreign, Fordist production-
oriented logic’.27 In Finland similar trends are visible and become concrete—
for example, in the acute shortage of nurses and practical nurses in social 
and health care services. The Union of Health and Social Care Professionals 
has stressed that increasing the number of students in nursing does not solve 
the problem as 30,000 nurses and practical nurses are currently working in 
other trades than nursing in Finland.28 Hence it is essential to increase the 
appeal of the caring professions. Research suggests that wage alone may not 
sufficiently increase the appeal and that other elements such as contractual 
and working conditions play an important role as well.29 It is the affective 
elements, the ethical attitude and practice that caring requires, and the as-
sociated ambivalences that make care resistant to the frame of paid work and 
cause stress for care workers in understaffed and inadequately resourced in-
stitutions.30 Recognition in the form of good working conditions for profes-
sional caregivers is thus demanded for caring as a specific type of work. This 
is one aspect of care that is mostly ignored in the national elder care policy. 
26 Smith 2004.
27 Dahl 2004.
28 Tehy 2010.
29 Kankaanranta 2009.
30 Mol 2008; Vega 2008; Austin 2009.
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The specificity of caring complicates family caring too. As Smith notes, 
elder care contributes to work-family tensions not only because of insuffi-
ciencies in formal care but also because it involves activities that do not lend 
themselves to outsourcing.31 Similarly, the need for recognition of certain 
aspects of care becomes clear in Laura Kalliomaa-Puha’s research on the 
trend of growing contractualism in the social sector in Finland. She points 
out that contracts are becoming the main tool through which responsibili-
ties and public relationships are channelled.32 Both contracts between pub-
lic and private firms, and between organizations and private citizens, such as 
care contracts with family members of those needing care services, are ever 
more common. The consequences of client contracts are problematic and 
contradictory, according to Kalliomaa-Puha. The potentially emancipatory 
freedom of negotiation can lead to the displacement of the weakest, as con-
tract law presumes that contracting parties are autonomous individuals ca-
pable of deciding for themselves. Demands of contracting are quite high and 
client’s negotiation and self-presentation skills are vital. The danger is that 
the weakest cannot formulate or justify their needs in contractual terms, or 
they tend to agree to these terms too much. Kalliomaa-Puha calls for good 
procedures with efficient legal safeguards if we do not want the social ser-
vices only to be for the contractually fittest.33 
Feminist theory explains many of the challenges discussed above as 
springing from the history of the gendered division of labour. Fraser argues 
that care has not been accordingly valorized because of its associations with 
the feminine sphere of life—namely, the private and the domestic. Andro-
centrism, the authoritative construction of norms that privilege traits as-
sociated with masculinity, goes together with cultural sexism to create and 
perpetuate the pervasive devaluation of things coded as ‘feminine’.34 As a 
devalued practice, care has been misrecognized and remained largely invis-
ible, with much of what it entails and requires left unacknowledged. 
31 Smith 2004, 378.
32 Kalliomaa-Puha 2007, 344–345, 
33 Kalliomaa-Puha 2007.
34 Fraser 1997, 19–20.
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In the discourse on elder care policy the gendered nature of the chal-
lenges of care disappears from view. The ministry policy reports fail to men-
tion gender or discuss the gendered impacts of care policy, although care 
work is still placed heavily and squarely on the shoulders of women. Infor-
mal and formal care workers are overwhelmingly women.35 Understanding 
the entanglements of informal care with the realm of paid work and the 
gendered character of care relations is necessary for a proper recognition of 
care and for the successful and just reorganization of social care practices 
and institutions in turn. 
Redistributing the costs of care
Examples of injustice in terms of redistribution include exploitation, eco-
nomic marginalization (being confined to undesirable or poorly paid work 
or being denied access to income-generating labour altogether), and depri-
vation (being denied an adequate material standard of living.36 What de-
mands of redistribution could be raised along with claims for recognition 
for care? Care is costly in a number of ways: it requires resources, time and 
money. What are the real costs of care? And how is the price of care de-
termined? Finnish elder care policy currently emphasizes the right of the 
elderly to live at home for as long as possible. This is partly due to the per-
ception of institutional care as the more expensive option. However, a recent 
report by the National Audit Office of Finland revealed that home care is not 
necessarily always the most cost effective way of organizing care services, 
nor the most humane. According to the report, neither the Ministry of So-
cial Affairs and Health nor the municipalities have a proper conception of 
the total costs of home care.37 
If the prices of formal care services are already challenging to calculate, 
the monetary value of informal care is even more difficult to evaluate. What 
is clear is that the Finnish Family Care Allowance, which is paid out as com-
pensation for taking care of a family member (typically round-the-clock and 
35 THL 2009; Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) 2009b.
36 Fraser & Honneth 2003, 13.
37 National Audit Office of Finland 2010.
hanna-kaisa hoppania – elder care policy in finland: remedies for crisis?
263
with little free time), is way below the price of care in 24-hour care homes. 
In a comparison from 2004, the gross cost of the Family Care Allowance 
for municipalities was 750 euros per month, whereas the price of institu-
tional care ranged from 2000 to over 3000 euros per month.38 And as already 
pointed out above, the work-life balance is also affected by the dynamics of 
care and can have considerable monetary costs. The current policy of hybrid 
support systems for informal care and care at home, in the form of the Care 
Allowance and for example service vouchers, ‘represent[s] diversity rather 
than uniformity and equal treatment that were typical to the old governance 
of public sector provision’.39
But distributing the monetary resources for care in novel and innovative 
ways, while possibly advantageous in some contexts, neither solves the over-
all imbalance in the demand and supply of care, nor succeeds in overcoming 
the fact that some elements of care work are perhaps impossible to mould 
into calculable units that can be bought and sold. 
The plan for the new Social Welfare Act in Finland is to focus on the 
content and coverage of the services, and things such as financing, procure-
ment, personnel policy, and monitoring are left out, as they are largely left 
out of the Elder Care Bill. These issues are dealt with separately by a working 
group whose task is to prepare a reform of social and health care legisla-
tion concerning organization, development, and supervision.40 The costs of 
social and health care services make up over half of the expenditure of mu-
nicipalities. Elder care services form a significant part of these expenses. The 
main financial sources are state and municipal taxation, mandatory and op-
tional insurance charges, and employer and client payments. For elder care, 
municipalities finance 80 per cent and households 20 per cent through taxa-
tion and client payments respectively.41 The financial situation of munici-
palities has been chronically tight. The municipal tax rate has risen annually 
and the loan stock has grown 2.5 fold within the last 10 years. Municipal 
38 Salanko-Vuorela 2006.
39 Anttonen & Häikiö 2009, 4.
40 STM 2011: 7.
41 STM 2011:7, 20–21.
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expenses are approximately 40 per cent of all public sector expenditure.42 
The ministry report on these issues states that ‘without raising the produc-
tivity of basic services and stopping the growth and reducing the municipal 
statutory responsibilities … we’ll end up with a negative trajectory and big 
increases in taxation.’43
So while one working group drafts an Act giving the elderly strength-
ened rights for care services (which would inevitably increase the need of 
personnel), another group declares a need to reduce municipal responsi-
bilities. When it comes to making these services more efficient, there is a 
limit to how much more productive the municipalities can become, as the 
services in question are very labour-intensive. In any case, the challenge of 
elder care is clear: on the one hand recognition of the need and right of care 
services; on the other a clear lack of resources to make these rights a reality.
Representing and framing elder care
Care concerns us all, as past, present or future care recipients or caregivers, 
and as citizens entangled in the relations of care that have an impact on so-
ciety and the economy in many direct and indirect ways. How then should 
care issues be politically framed?
In Fraser’s terminology, representation concerns the nature of the state’s 
jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation.44 Fra-
ser argues that the dimension of representation is especially crucial in the 
context of globalization, which has called into question the boundaries of 
political community, traditionally taken for granted to be the national citi-
zenry. Today, however, many social processes shaping people’s lives overflow 
territorial boundaries.45 Hence arguments about justice today also concern 
meta-level questions about the proper frame within which to consider first-
order questions of justice and the relevant subjects entitled to a just distribu-
tion or reciprocal recognition in any given case.46
42 STM 2011:7, 21.
43 STM 2011:7, 22.
44 Fraser 2008, 278–279; Fraser 2008b, 18–20.
45 Fraser 2008, 280–282; Fraser 2008b, 13.
46 Fraser 2008, 280–282; Fraser 2008b, 26.
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In Finland the frame is a matter of dispute first of all within the state, as the 
overlapping state and municipality levels of governance affect the practices of 
care. As the municipalities that are responsible for providing social care ser-
vices have not managed to fulfil their duties in a satisfactory manner, claims 
concerning elder care are now made on the national level. Thus the municipal 
borders, but also the different levels of administration from local to European to 
global level, affect the practices of care. The transformations of these borders are 
significant from the point of view of the rights of citizens for social services.47 
Who is entitled to make demands and claims concerning care, and 
through what political institutions can these claims be articulated? In pre-
paring the Elder Care Bill, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health heard 
many actors and parties in the process of its work, including, for example, 
representatives of family carers. It remains to be seen whose voices are taken 
into account in the final version of the bill48. It is notable, though, that cur-
rently the bill deals almost exclusively with the rights and status of the care 
receiver (the client). The challenges of informal caregivers are left out, and 
the assumed care receiver is (implicitly) constructed as a consumer of ser-
vices who has the capabilities to make demands and informed choices. Care 
as a material and ethical relation fades from view.
Similarly, the effects of EU policies on the reality of elder care in Finland 
remain to be evaluated.49 The reach of the politico-juridical duties and en-
titlements of elder care is now being transformed, and attention should be 
paid to the transnational dimensions of care relations too. Some care com-
panies are already bringing in nurses from abroad as a calculated policy 
to fill the lack of Finnish care workers. The rights of migrant workers and 
their transnational family members, in particular their entitlements to so-
cial welfare, is yet another factor to consider. In fact, controversies have al-
ready risen as to the status and right to care of immigrants’ elderly family 
members. Alluding to these ‘global care chains’50 serves to highlight the fact 
47 Kuotola 2009.
48 The final version of the bill came out in late 2012. Due to restrictions of time and space, it cannot be 
discussed here.
49 Cf. Mahon 2002.
50 Yeates 2011.
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that care is also a global question and requires attention in the context of 
international relations too.
The complexities of care
Greg Marston has argued that ‘positivist approaches to policy analysis have 
failed to address the way in which policy language constructs welfare identi-
ties, legitimates policy interventions and functions as an important site of 
ideological struggle over the meaning of human services within the welfare 
state’.51 By applying a Fraserian three-dimensional analysis, I have attempt-
ed to address the different important aspects of elder care policy. I have 
pointed out factors that, I would argue, require more attention in the analy-
sis and development of elder care policy—namely, the role and importance 
of informal and/or family care and its relation to paid work; the affective 
elements and the gendered nature of care (work); care’s transregional and 
transnational dimensions; and the limits to contractualism and consumer 
orientation in care relations. 
If we commit ourselves to a society with extensive care rights, we need 
to think of how to arrange our society in such a way that this is possible in 
practice, given the budget pressures and the demographic structure. Yet the 
current policy concentrates on preventative measures and regulations vis-à-
vis the procedures by which care services are to be organized. An abstract 
right (for care services) is recognized, but no corresponding redistribution of 
resources is delineated. The legal-bureaucratic discourse articulates care re-
lations in terms of ‘services’ and ‘rights’, producing meanings saturated by an 
ideology of commodification of human relations and regulatory governmen-
tality aiming for administrative efficiency. It presents the issue of elder care 
in terms of local procedural issues and demographic structure. It emphasizes 
procedural fairness but says nothing of the (highly gendered) distributive 
patterns of care labour, formal or informal. Also, the communal elements 
of care disappear from view. The subject and object of care policy is an indi-
vidual. His resources to prevent his care needs from escalating are aimed to 
51 Marston 2000, 349.
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be improved and his individual right to services is guaranteed. The informal 
resources of care provision—namely, the care that people provide in their so-
cial networks in their day-to-day life—remain invisible, get no recognition. I 
would argue that we should instead construct elder care policy as requiring 
not only new legal regulation but (transformative) social change too. 
As other chapters in this volume discuss, the currently unfolding crises 
and struggles over welfare emanate from the failures and internal contra-
dictions of expanding neoliberal capitalism. Thus the renewal that is called 
upon, and that is in a sense made possible by the rupture of the present cri-
sis, would require a reorganization and even a constraining of further mar-
ket expansion that only functions in terms of monetary value. ‘The logic of 
care’ is in many ways incompatible with the ‘logic of choice’ inherent in the 
market.52 However, as I have emphasized in this chapter, care as work and 
as ethical practice cuts through the divisions of public and private, in many 
ways affecting our (working) lives. Discussing the dimensions of recognition 
and redistribution, I explicated the ways in which care encompasses mul-
tiple interdependent elements; finally, in terms of representation, I pointed 
to the many possible subject positions and sites of political contestation in 
relation to care provision. My analysis suggests, then, that care has to be 
properly understood not only as a multifaceted, relational practice and an 
intrinsic part of human life, but also as a contingent site of political struggle. 
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CHAPTER 14
Ulysses versus Polanyi:  
Can embedded neoliberalism prevent  
a ‘Great Transformation’
jane kelsey
In the wake of the post-2007 financial crisis Australia’s former Prime Min-
ister Kevin Rudd declared ‘the great neoliberal experiment of the past thirty 
years has failed, that the neoliberal emperor has no clothes’.1 US presidential 
candidate Barack Obama proclaimed it was ‘time to change America’.2 Even 
New Zealand’s Prime Minister John Key acknowledged some of his former 
finance industry colleagues had shown a ‘recklessly complacent attitude to 
risk’ and suggested that ‘lead economies should consider whether monetary 
policy, fiscal policy, and prudential policy should be more counter-cyclical.’3 
There was a fleeting moment when the mantra ‘there is no alternative’ 
(TINA) seemed vulnerable. Yet neoliberalism has proved remarkably resil-
ient, at least in the global North. Limited re-regulation of financial markets 
has failed to tame the dominant players, who are unrepentant and resurgent. 
Policy decisions seem driven, more than ever, by the need to maintain in-
vestor confidence and avoid downgrades by the same private credit rating 
agencies that gave toxic collateralized debt obligations a triple-A rating. 
Countries that were deeply affected by the global financial crisis, with 
the exception of Iceland and (ironically) the US, have responded to the bur-
1 Rudd 2010, 85.
2 Obama 2008.
3 Key 2008.
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dens of recession and debt-funded bailouts with a reinvigorated programme 
of fiscal austerity, privatization, labour market deregulation, and cuts to so-
cial safety nets and education spending, irrespective of the human costs and 
longer-term damage to the nation’s social and economic infrastructure.
The strategies ‘of the 1 per cent, by the 1 per cent, for the 1 per cent’ have 
provoked local and international resistance, but with no discernable impact 
to date on the prevailing orthodoxy. 
That response is not confined to the epicentres of the crisis. In New Zea-
land, hailed during the 1980s and 1990s as a model for the world4, there is 
complacency that the global financial crisis was an episodic event brought 
on by greedy bankers in the United States and profligate governments in Eu-
rope. That illusion feeds a pervasive—although not universal—belief that, 
despite a recession and contrary to the early rush of blood, there is no need 
to rethink three decades of neoliberalism. Instead, the current government 
has used the crisis to justify a further radical cycle of fiscal austerity, priva-
tization, light-handed regulation, and foreign investment, claiming this is 
essential to stave off future financial and economic instability.5 
This chapter asks why the neoliberal paradigm appears to be so effective-
ly embedded in the richer parts of the world that it can survive the contra-
dictions of a massive crisis in the global financial system. Is it that govern-
ments since the later 1970s have, emulating Ulysses in Homer’s iconic poem 
Odyssey, agreed to tie themselves to the mast of neoliberalism so they can 
resist the siren calls of the democratic constituencies in ways they cannot, or 
do not want to, escape? Or is there the prospect of a ‘double movement’ that 
sees people react against and transform the market paradigm, in the manner 
of Karl Polanyi’s ‘great transformation’? 
The first section highlights the way that neoliberalism has constructed, 
legitimized, and sustained the shift from advanced industrial capitalism to 
an intrinsically unstable alternative where finance and credit are the princi-
pal sources of wealth creation—referred to as ‘financialization’. 
4 Kelsey 2003, chapters 2 and 3.
5 English 2012.
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Using New Zealand as a case study, the article then links the material 
aspects of financialization with the regulatory framework of neoliberalism, 
or its ‘economic constitution’. On one hand, the individual elements have 
an internal logic and coherence, and collectively constitute a potent bul-
wark of ‘embedded neoliberalism’. Although conditions in New Zealand are 
very different from Europe or the United States, and closer to Iceland, these 
embedding mechanisms are very similar. On the other hand, intrinsic con-
tradictions are apparent in both the regulatory regime and financialization 
itself. When the economic model is in crisis, cracks emerge in its support 
edifice. To date, however, these fractures have been isolated and contained. 
The conclusion asks what it would take to achieve a genuinely progres-
sive post-neoliberal paradigm, and urges a more sophisticated and forensic 
understanding of embedded neoliberalism and its relationship to financial-
ization as a prerequisite to an effective transformative strategy.
 
Rethinking neoliberalism
Early critics of neoliberalism, including the author6, commonly focused on 
the Washington Consensus policy platform of deregulation, privatization, 
trade liberalization, tax cuts, fiscal austerity, the rollback of social welfare, 
and labour market deregulation. By focusing on who, what and how, they 
often ignored the dynamic relationship between neoliberalism and the shift 
in form and social relations of capital accumulation since the 1970s. That 
limited perspective was reinforced by linear accounts of the transition from 
the Washington Consensus to the Third Way7 and the post-Washington 
Consensus8, echoed by critics.9 This approach failed to problematize the 
contradictions of neoliberalism that have repeatedly forced its reinvention 
and rescued it from a terminal crisis. 
More recently, critics have challenged the dominant narrative of neo-
liberalism that depicts the withering of the state through limited govern-
ment and self-regulating markets. This ignores the state’s active role in re-
6 Kelsey 1996.
7 Giddens 1998; Chatterjee 1999.
8 Serra & Stiglitz 2008.
9 Kelsey, 2002.
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constructing national and international regulatory arenas and repositioning 
the state apparatus to favour capital ahead of the social. David Harvey points 
to a radical reconstruction of the state-finance nexus through national and 
then international deregulation of financial operations, the liberation of 
debt financing, the opening of the world to heightened international com-
petition, and the repositioning of the state apparatus with respect to social 
provision.10 
Critics have also tended to analyse neoliberalism at either a meta-level, 
such as Harvey, or in silos, such as monetary and fiscal policy, free trade, 
labour market deregulation, privatization, or welfare retrenchment.11 Both 
approaches underanalyse how the regulatory and institutional regime serves 
financialization and the cumulative and interlocking effect of its individual 
components. As a result, advocates for a post-neoliberal paradigm, such as 
neo-Keynesianism, underestimate the obstacles that this deeply embedded 
regime will pose to a post-neoliberal realignment. 
Stephen Gill offers one way to confront these various shortfalls, using 
the notion of ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’—which he describes as a ‘discourse 
of political economy that promotes the power of capital through extension 
and deepening of market values and disciplines in social life, under a regime 
of free enterprise’.12 This approach is a synthesis of two analytically distinct 
elements: the social structures of accumulation (financialization) and the re-
gime of accumulation that facilitates and stabilizes those structures.13 
This chapter expands on Gill’s framework by developing the concept of 
‘embedded neoliberalism’ as a way to explain the resilience and potential 
fragility of the neoliberal regime of accumulation. The term conveys the 
cumulative effect of a set of organizing principles, instruments, and institu-
tions for neoliberalism. Each element can be separated for analytical pur-
poses, revealing its particular contradictions. Collectively, however, they 
constitute a regime so extensive, coherent and integrated that it cannot be 
transformed through a regulatory reordering that targets isolated elements. 
10 Harvey 2005.
11 See for example Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh 1996; Boston & Dalziel 1992.
12 Gill 2002, 47.
13 Gill 2003.
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Even when there is a crisis in the social structure of accumulation, the re-
gime erects barriers that are designed to protect the neoliberal paradigm. 
‘Embedded neoliberalism’ is used here in a very particular sense.14 It 
is not simply adding a ‘neo’ to John Gerard Ruggie’s notion of ‘embedded 
liberalism’, coined to describe the international institutions and treaties that 
drove the Post World War II international economic order.15 Ruggie argued 
that shifts in underlying ideational, political, social and material conditions 
explained the prevailing sense of the legitimate social purpose for which 
the state can exercise power. Following the failure of the laissez-faire era, 
the postwar regime recognized the state had a role in mediating between 
markets and society in pursuit of multiple objectives, embodied in the 
Keynesian welfare state. Ruggie’s constructivist approach has explanatory 
power. However, it does not critically address the relationship between the 
regulatory regime and the prevailing mode of accumulation, or how con-
tradictions in each can generate fractures, resistance, and transformation. 
Ruggie’s embedding mechanism is also limited to the subset of international 
institutions and agreements.
Philip Cerny describes ‘embedded neoliberalism’ as superseding Rug-
gie’s ‘embedded liberalism’, constituting ‘a kind of common sense for the 21st 
century’.16 The combination of ‘free-market liberalism, arms’-length regu-
lation, institutional flexibility and international openness’ provides a ‘rela-
tively manipulable and fungible platform’ where diverse actors can adapt it 
as they will. This embedded neoliberal consensus means that alternatives 
proposed, even by the left, involve evolution and reinvention within the 
neoliberal paradigm.
By contrast, ‘embedded neoliberalism’ is used here as tool of critique. 
It identifies a regime of national and international instruments and insti-
tutions with a common, driving objective: to sustain the current mode of 
wealth creation by finance and credit. In diverse and complementary ways, 
its different elements constrain the state from regulating capital, labour, 
natural resources, and information in pursuit of non-market or social ob-
14 I first used the concept in relation to monetary policy in the European Union in Kelsey 2003. 
15 Ruggie 1982.
16 Cerny 2008, 39.
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jectives. They achieve this through highly technical and seemingly neutral 
legal instruments that attain a quasi-constitutional status. Nation states are 
relegated to a self-limiting and ‘enabling’ role vis-à-vis capital within an in-
creasingly sterile spectator-style of democracy; the responsibility to govern 
is entrusted to political leaders and their appointees, technocrats, and ‘voices 
of the market’. The architects of embedded neoliberalism assume, like Cerny, 
that this regime, unlike its precursors, will endure for time immemorial. But 
the intrinsic contradictions of its constituent elements, and of financializa-
tion itself, render the regime potentially fragile and unsustainable. The con-
ditions under which a post-neoliberal transformation might occur become 
a serious matter for intellectual engagement.
The meaning of ‘embedding’ is also quite distinct from Karl Polanyi’s 
use of ‘embeddedness’ to challenge the illusion that the economy can ever 
be autonomous. While there was an economic theory of self-regulating 
markets, the human economy is always enmeshed in economic and social 
institutions. As Greta Krippner points out, Polanyi barely used the term ‘em-
bedded’, despite its elevation to iconic status, especially in economic soci-
ology.17 It was shorthand for Polanyi’s warning against reductionism. That 
understanding of the economic as intrinsically social informs this analysis, 
but ‘embedded neoliberalism’ is a quite different theoretical construct.
Social structures of accumulation
From the 1970s the ‘centre of gravity of the capitalist economy’ in advanced 
industrialized countries shifted from production to finance18, as industrial 
production relocated to countries with lower-cost emerging economies. The 
profitability of increasingly de-industrialized, service-centred economies 
came to depend on the contradictory combination of falling real wages and 
increased consumption, with profits generated from FIRE (finance, insur-
ance, and real estate) bridging the gap. Governments came to rely on capital 
markets to finance their own deficits and private sector debt, and to pro-
vide credit that maintained the purchasing power and standard of living of 
17 Krippner 2001.
18 Foster & Magdoff 2010, 13.
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wage-stagnant households. As a result, highly leveraged economies became 
especially vulnerable to financial volatility and the ‘spillover effects’ of dele-
veraging by foreign wholesale funders during financial crises. 
New Zealand is a prime example. Public debt was almost eliminated 
through fiscal austerity in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, but it was replaced by massive private debt. As of March 2008, of-
ficial New Zealand government overseas debt was only 10 per cent of GDP, 
but corporate sector foreign debt was 115 per cent and later peaked at 126 
per cent of GDP in March 2009. By December 2011, government debt had 
risen to 21 per cent of GDP as a result of recession, limited stimulus pack-
ages, and bailouts after more than 50 barely regulated finance companies 
collapsed (unrelated to the global financial crisis); corporate sector debt was 
still 105 per cent of GDP.19 The commercial banks were heavily exposed 
to short-term commercial paper that depended on readily accessible refi-
nancing. Despite steps by the Reserve Bank to reduce that exposure, New 
Zealand’s Australian-owned banking system remains reliant on rollover 
credit in offshore financial markets. Even the IMF observed in 2012 how 
this leaves New Zealand highly vulnerable to offshore crises.20 
It is not just New Zealand’s government, financial institutions, and com-
merce that are structurally dependent on financialization—ordinary people 
and households are too. Real household incomes of lower and middle in-
come groups dropped dramatically between 1985 and 1995.21 Successive 
governments abandoned the commitment to full employment and pro-
moted a de-unionized, competitive labour market. Real wages in New Zea-
land fell by 25 per cent from their peak in 1982 to the mid-1990s and never 
recovered, despite productivity increasing by 80 per cent between 1978 
and 2008.22 Skilled workers migrated to higher-wage economies and were 
replaced by low-wage immigrants, keeping levels suppressed. Real income 
growth for middle classes since 1995 accounts for a recent slight decrease in 
overall income inequality. 
19 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (n.d.b).
20 IMF 2012, esp. 62. 
21 OECD 2008.
22 Treen 2009.
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Severe cuts to social welfare benefits in the 1990s were compounded by 
a punitive differentiation between beneficiary households and those in low-
paid work in the new century’s first decade.23 At the same time, an unprec-
edented income gap opened between workers and management. Since 1985 
the distribution of earnings has widened by 22 per cent, compared to the 
OECD average of 15 per cent. Capital income in particular has become more 
unequally distributed at a faster rate than in most OECD countries. Further 
regressive realignments of income and consumption taxes were introduced 
in 2010. Income inequality in New Zealand is now among the highest in the 
OECD, despite having plateaued in the first decade of the century.24
Households have sustained their consumption and expected living stan-
dards by borrowing either to generate wealth from the property market or, 
for those on lower incomes, simply to pay the bills. As a result, debt is in-
tegrated into the fabric of people’s daily lives in ways it never used to be. 
Outstanding total household debt has increased more than six-fold in dollar 
terms since 1990, peaking at 180 per cent of households’ disposable income 
in 2008. As of December 2008, 92 per cent of household debt was housing 
debt, with interest costs of servicing the debt as a percentage of incomes 
50 per cent higher than 1990.25 Anecdotal evidence suggests many poor 
households are prey to loan sharks that successive governments have been 
reluctant to regulate, while higher income earners are overexposed to exces-
sively leveraged finance. Added to mortgage and consumer credit are new 
forms of debt associated with privatized education and purchase of private 
pensions.
This snapshot illustrates the structural dependence of New Zealand’s do-
mestic economy and quality of life on the survival of financialization. Even 
without a financial crisis, the economic model seems unsustainable for a 
significant section of New Zealand society whose socioeconomic well-being 
has suffered a relentless long-term decline.
23 Alternative Welfare Working Group 2002.
24 See OECD 2008. 
25 Reserve Bank of New Zealand (n.d.a).
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New Zealand: the exemplary neoliberal regime
The disciplinary effect of financialization on governments and people helps 
to explain why international and national responses to the global finan-
cial crisis have re-stabilized and partially re-legitimized an accumulation 
model that fails. However, its resilience is not due to material conditions 
alone. Since the late 1970s, neoliberalism has constructed, normalized and 
sustained that economic model. Ideology and sociocultural expectations 
helped create that hegemonic platform. This chapter focuses on a less well-
understood factor: an evolving complex of regulatory mechanisms, each 
with discrete functions and internal contradictions, which explicitly aims to 
embed the neoliberal paradigm in perpetuity. 
The details of this regime evolved over time, but the objectives remained 
consistent and clear. The architects of structural adjustment stressed the 
need to initiate the process of economic transformation, and then to consol-
idate it through a coherent policy, regulatory and institutional regime.26 This 
was a conscious political project. Analysing the same process from a critical 
perspective, Gill describes how it sought to lock in the gains of capital under 
neoliberalism and lock out or depoliticize the forces that challenge it.27 The 
state apparatus was reconfigured so that government facilitates, and oper-
ates within, market values and disciplines, and is insulated from pressures 
from below in doing so. New markets were constructed and protected by 
laws that prevent national interference with property rights. States guaran-
teed the unimpeded entry and exit of mobile capital. Ameliorative measures 
dealt with dislocations and ‘externalities’ generated by the purportedly self-
regulating market order, especially in relation to labour and natural resourc-
es. The risk that electoral democracies could pursue a different paradigm 
created demand for supra-nationally enforceable international economic 
treaties that accord primacy to capital and intrude progressively deeper into 
the domestic policy domain.28 
26 Haggard & Kaufman 1992.
27 Gill 2002, 48.
28 Schneiderman 2000.
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Successive New Zealand governments revelled in the kudos of being a 
world leader in devising such arrangements, especially from the 1980s to 
mid-1990s.29
The State-owned Enterprises Act 1986 created a generic framework to re-
define government operations, such as electricity, telecommunications, and 
forestry, as commercial enterprises and to require them to operate as suc-
cessful businesses, subject to private sector governance, management and 
employment practices. In theory they could be contracted to perform social 
responsibilities; in practice those were abandoned. Corporatization pre-
pared enterprises for privatization, the ultimate embedding mechanism—
except when it failed and the state resumed responsibility.30
The Public Finance Act 1987 shifted government accounts from funding 
of inputs to a narrow contractual form of output-based budgeting, com-
bined with accrual accounting, and a wide range of technical reporting re-
quirements. This funding mechanism transformed the nature and role of 
the entire state sector in a highly technical, but deeply profound way.
The State Sector Act 1988 insulated ministries and their chief execu-
tives from their government ministers through contractual relationships 
and mandated the State Services Commissioner to review the ‘machinery 
of government’, including the functions and inter-relationships of depart-
ments and agencies.
The Reserve Bank Act 1989 made inflation-targeted monetary policy the 
Bank’s overriding objective, institutionalized the independence of the Board 
and Governor from the government, and tied the Governor’s performance 
contract to the inflation target. 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 specified principles of fiscal responsi-
bility to be monitored through a series of disclosure and reporting obliga-
tions at specified times, including pre-election, with forecasting periods of 
up to ten years.31 
The Regulatory Responsibility Bill was designed to tie government to 
29 Kelsey 2003, chapters 2 and 3.
30 The New Zealand government nationalized the railways and Air New Zealand and created a new 
retail bank.
31 This legislation was incorporated into the Public Finance Act in 2004.
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statutory principles of pro-market regulation and strict protection of private 
property rights, with private actors empowered to seek a judicial declaration 
of government non-compliance. That law has been promoted unsuccessfully 
since 1994. A diluted Regulatory Standards Bill was endorsed in 2011 as 
part of a post-election coalition deal; if passed, this will provide a statutory 
framework for a 2010 Cabinet Directive on Better Regulation, Less Regula-
tion that embodies the proposed principles.32
Successive New Zealand governments have championed a raft of World 
Trade Organization and bilateral free trade and investment treaties that have 
come to symbolize neoliberal globalization. These agreements impose the 
most potent meta-regulatory constraints because they are negotiated in se-
cret, ratified by the executive, not the New Zealand Parliament, and can be 
enforced by states and foreign investors outside New Zealand’s legal system. 
Obligations restrict options for policy and regulation of industry, services, 
foreign direct investment, capital movements, intellectual property rights, 
financial and telecommunications regulation, government procurement, 
and more. Foreign investors can sue the government directly through pri-
vate supranational tribunals where they claim new measures significantly 
damage their value or profitability.
Economic constitutionalism
All these instruments, aside from the trade and investment agreements, are 
ordinary laws that can be amended or repealed by a simple majority vote in 
Parliament and there is no legal penalty for non-compliance. Yet individu-
ally and cumulatively, they have attained a quasi-constitutional status.
The intellectual architects of the project actively promote that ‘constitu-
tional’ discourse. The nature of the laws imply quasi-permanence: govern-
ments pre-commit themselves and their successors to a prescribed set of 
normative, political and legal disciplines that they are obliged to maintain, 
even in times of crisis. Those norms privilege the economic and the indi-
vidual, and subordinate the social and the collective. 
32 New Zealand Government 2009.
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A favourite metaphor has governments emulating Ulysses by tying 
‘themselves to the mast to escape the siren-like calls of pressure groups’ that 
seek a different direction.33 The crew of Ulysses’s ship are the ideologically 
deaf technocrats, academics, corporate lobbies, and think tanks who suc-
cessfully touted these disciplines. The Sirens who would have lured ‘sound’ 
governments onto the rocks, had they not been tied to the neoliberal mast, 
are any domestic constituencies that resist those prescriptions. Govern-
ments within democratic states have to listen to the songs of the voters, 
because they hold the key to their re-election—they may even sympathise 
with their values and sentiments—but the constitutional constraints will 
save them from responding to their message. 
James Buchanan, one of the fathers of public choice theory, created a re-
search programme on ‘constitutional economics’ that called for a high-level 
‘choice among constraints’ that would set the parameters for governments to 
make ‘choices within constraints’.34 Freidrich von Hayek and Milton Freid-
man made similar arguments for fiscal and monetary constitutions, while 
Richard Epstein championed a ‘regulatory constitution’ that protected prop-
erty rights from ‘regulatory takings’.35 
Their ideological agenda is profoundly hostile to democratic gover-
nance. They believe the fundamental tenets of individual liberty, private 
property, contractual freedom, and the rule of law are threatened by elector-
al democracy36—an antipathy clothed in such euphemisms as minimizing 
the risks of ‘political market failure’37 or ‘political economy challenges’.38 
This discourse has been a prominent feature in New Zealand, especially 
from the ideological vanguard in the New Zealand Business Roundtable.39 
At one event advocating a Regulatory Constitution for New Zealand, Ep-
stein bluntly depicted the temporary majority in Parliament as a threat to 
the national interest.40 
33 Hoekman & Kostecki 1995, 25.
34 Buchanan 1991, 4–5 .
35 Epstein 2000, 842.
36 These principles form the basis of the Regulatory Responsibility Bill, discussed above. 
37 Hoekman & Kostecki 1995, 24.
38 Brook 2011.
39 See for example Kerr 2007.
40 Epstein 2000, 2.
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Critics of neoliberalism also draw constitutional analogies. Gill describes 
the regime of accumulation as ‘new constitutionalism’. David Schneiderman 
contrasts ‘democratising constitutionalism’, which is characterized by open-
endedness of rules and where no single societal force predetermines po-
litical outcomes, with ‘constitutional political economy’, which stresses an 
economic model of citizenship in which the citizen is a market actor.41 
Focus on the regime’s political dimension should not obscure the sig-
nificance of the design features and technical tools that create an invisible 
barrier to paradigm change. Consistent with the ‘Ulyssessian methodology’ 
that constrains governments from responding to current political pressure 
or sentiment 42, the regime operates as a form of ‘meta-regulation’43—a 
process where certain domestic laws and international treaties institutional-
ize the presumption of pro-market governance and embed it within every-
day routines of governmental policy making. These higher-level normative 
instruments set the parameters for more specific policies and laws. 
The normative terminology is crucial. The state’s obligations are clothed 
in seemingly neutral, but ideologically loaded, terms that impel them to re-
sist dissident voices, such as fiscal and regulatory responsibility, price stabil-
ity, free trade, least burdensome measures, efficiency, competitive neutrality, 
cost-benefit analysis, and soundness of the financial system. What govern-
ment wants to be irresponsible, promote instability, be inefficient, or adopt 
unsound practices? Most instruments provide inbuilt flexibility that can act 
as a shock absorber where the economic, social or political costs of compli-
ance would be untenable. However, governments are required to confess 
their non-compliance before Parliament and inform it when they will return 
to the orthodoxy. 
Technical, legal and accounting tools, such as accrual accounting, output 
classes, key performance indicators, and fiscal projections, make the norms 
operational. They are imbued with scientific qualities of certainty, precision, 
and objectivity that disguise their highly subjective and ideological content. 
41 Schneiderman 2008, 10 and 14.
42 For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Elster 2000. 
43 Morgan 1999, 50; Morgan 2003.
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The devil is in the detail. Their novel and highly technical form and meth-
odology restrict critical engagement, especially by politicians who are privy 
to the contractual arrangements and formally tasked with their oversight. 
The design features make sustained non-compliance difficult. In ad-
dition to ministerial confessions when governments deviate, the Treasury 
maintains control of the purchaser-provider method of public finance to 
which the performance contracts of chief executives are tied. The disciplin-
ary mechanisms in free trade and investment agreements are more prob-
lematic still. Other states and foreign investors can enforce rules that intrude 
ever more deeply into the domestic regulatory domain through extraterrito-
rial tribunals, at considerable financial, reputational and economic cost. 
Emergent contradictions
Each of these instruments is exhibiting internal contradictions. The Reserve 
Bank’s monetary policy has used interest rates to dampen the inflation-
ary effects of property speculation since the mid-1990s. That, in turn, has 
fuelled hot money flows, making the New Zealand dollar one of the most 
traded currencies in the world. The constantly overvalued dollar has a dev-
astating effect on exports; but the impact of the inflation-control strategy on 
the productive economy is not part of the Reserve Bank’s mandate. In 2002 
the Finance Minister hinted he might use the exceptional power to give the 
Reserve Bank broader instructions in an attempt to address this quandary.44 
That set off the ‘fire alarms’ among foreign investors, economic commenta-
tors, and international institutions, and so he backed down. 
The preoccupation of successive governments with increasing dairy 
exports through free trade deals reinforces economic dependency on the 
primary sector, which is already pushing the limits of sustainability. These 
agreements are negotiated in secret and signed and ratified by the executive. 
Once agreed, they are almost impossible to undo. Yet there is growing aware-
ness that free trade and investment treaties prevent re-regulation of foreign 
investments, foster the outsourcing of jobs, and restrict local procurement 
44 Infometrics 2002.
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options. A proposed mega-Trans-Pacific Partnership45 faces growing resis-
tance to trade-offs that would hike medicine prices, criminalize Internet us-
ers, stop parallel imports, and empower foreign investors to sue in offshore 
tribunals to stop public policies, such as tobacco control laws. 
The contradictions intrinsic to other ‘fundamentals’ have attracted less 
attention. The mantra of reducing government debt drives fiscal policy in 
a pro-cyclical fashion, despite New Zealand’s low debt level compared to 
other countries and the much more serious problem of private debt. 
Public financing through prescriptive outputs leaves gaps in provision 
and a short-term focus, despite moves to incorporate outputs into broader 
statements of expected outcomes. Perversely, the contractual basis of fund-
ing and public sector employment has eroded direct political accountability 
for policy failure and effective parliamentary scrutiny. Light-touch or self-
regulation has transferred governance roles to commercial entities that has 
spawned a series of disasters, including unsafe coal mines, leaky buildings, 
and fraudulent finance companies; yet re-regulation has been reluctant and 
minimalist, consistent with the neoliberal version of ‘better regulation’. 
The prospects for regime change
The regime’s resilience is partly due to a long-standing bipartisan commit-
ment to the ‘economic fundamentals’ as international best practice. This 
consensus may weaken as its international orthodoxy erodes, but this will be 
a slow and tentative process. The main political opposition remains trapped 
by the ‘orthodoxy’ it has embraced, albeit with adjustments, since 1984. In 
2008 the Labour Party, while still in government, announced an end to the 
consensus over the Reserve Bank Act, but it has still not articulated its al-
ternative. The same can be said for other policies on financial regulation, 
privatization, labour market policy, or social welfare. 
Indeed, since 2009 there has been a resurgence of radical neoliberal 
agenda that has met with resistance on specific issues. Deals in which the 
Prime Minister, a former currency trader, has promised to change laws in 
45 Kelsey 2010. 
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return for foreign investment in pet projects are especially contentious.46 
But the spaces for dissent in the media, academia, and think tanks have 
progressively closed. Public broadcasting has again been fully commercial-
ized. University funding is harnessed to national economic goals, with gov-
ernment threatening to appoint their councils. Public protests and dissent, 
most recently over a new wave of privatizations, have been ignored. The 
government continues to dominate the opinion polls, reflecting a sense, 
even amongst the suffering and disaffected, that there is no alternative. 
Even if a government were minded to make piecemeal changes to indi-
vidual instruments, that would not change the paradigm because the whole 
is more potent than the sum of its parts. Transition from the neoliberal par-
adigm to even a soft neo-Keynesianism would require an overhaul of the 
entire legal framework and institutional arrangements. Just the hint of such 
an idea would spark vocal, organized and potentially damaging resistance 
from those who wield power courtesy of the government/corporate nexus.
For three decades New Zealand governments have ‘stacked the decks’ by 
vesting authority in like-thinking public officials, private bodies, and élite 
individuals who will ring the ‘fire alarms’ at the first signs of deviation47, 
warning of investor flight or a crisis of investor confidence should the gov-
ernment deviate from the ‘orthodoxy’. Credit raters still define acceptable 
policy and regulatory responses, despite their role in the global financial 
crisis.48 
These threats are potent in a country that depends on a steady flow of 
short-term finance. Financialization is not just a material phenomenon: 
it has normative and disciplinary effects on governments, businesses and 
households. Maintaining hegemony requires active consent, or at least ac-
quiescence, and scepticism about alternatives. New Zealanders have come 
to expect a first-world standard of living, with instant access to cheap con-
sumer goods and services funded by credit. Ubiquitous surveys on consum-
46 Campbell 2012.
47 Radaelli 2008, 6.
48 A typical example is the New Zealand Herald report that the 2011 Budget ‘passed its first test yester-
day when credit-rating agency Standard and Poor’s saw no need for any change to its rating on New 
Zealand.’ See Young 2011.
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er and business confidence reflect, and help shape, the behaviour of actors 
on which the consumption-based economy depends—at the same time as 
they are admonished to reduce private debt and save more. New Zealand-
ers’ life options now depend so deeply on access to affordable finance that 
alternatives are currently unthinkable. That lifestyle will not be given up vol-
untarily, short of some catalytic event. 
Pathways to a Polanyian transformation
This rather depressing account, suggests Cerny, might be right about the 
capacity of neoliberalism for perpetual renewal. Yet Polanyi’s analysis of 
the great transformation from laissez-faire to Keynesian welfarism reso-
nates too closely with current conditions to concede that is true. As with the 
1930s, a transition from financialization to a new model of accumulation 
will require a reordering of power relations in the state/finance nexus, wide-
spread rejection of neoliberal ideology, and a radical shift in social values 
and personal expectations. Polanyi attributed the great transformation to 
spontaneous and multifaceted mobilizations, which were triggered by the 
systemic failure of a model that sought to divorce the economic from the 
social and de-legitimized that prevailing orthodoxy. 
This chapter suggests that contemporary neoliberalism is embedded in 
more complex and sophisticated ways. The kind of double movement Po-
lanyi describes seems unlikely without a truly catastrophic upheaval that 
makes ‘solutions’ that try to restabilize financialization untenable. While 
that upheaval will have a global dimension, it will manifest in crises, mobili-
zations, and calls for alternatives at a national level. Even if a crisis triggers a 
radical shift in popular sentiment and expectations, transformation requires 
both a tenable alternative model of accumulation and a strategy to unravel 
the web of constraints woven over the past 30 years and to replace it with 
a supportive regulatory regime. As Naomi Klein has shown, neoliberalism 
thrives in conditions of crisis.49 
49 Klein 2007.
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The author does not pretend to have a template to replace New Zealand’s 
economic constitutionalism or a political strategy to implement it—just a 
sense of urgency that alternatives and strategies need to be articulated, de-
bated and legitimized that engage with the complexity of transforming the 
neoliberal paradigm.
References
Alston, Philip (2002) ‘Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade 
Law: A Reply to Petersmann’. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 4, 
815–844.
Alternative Welfare Working Group (2002) Welfare Justice for All. Wellington: Report of the 
Alternative Welfare Working Group.
Boston, Jonathan, John Martin, June Pallot & Pat Walsh (1996) New Public Management, 
The New Zealand Model. Wellington: Victoria University Press.
Boston, Jonathan & Paul Dalziel (1992) Decent Society. Essays in Response to National’s 
Economic and Social Policies. Auckland: Oxford University Press.
Brook, Anne-Marie (2011) ‘Making Fiscal Policy More Stabilizing in the Next Upturn: 
Challenges and Policy Options’. Wellington: New Zealand Treasury.
Buchanan, James (1991) The Economics and Ethics of Constitutional Order. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan.
Campbell, Gordon (2012) ‘On the Relevance of the Latest Hobbit Revelations’. Online. 
Available HTTP:
<http://gordoncampbell.scoop.co.nz/2012/04/27/gordon-campbell-on-the-latest-hobbit-
revelations/> (accessed 29 April 2012).
Cerny, Philip (2008) ‘Embedding Neoliberalism. The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm’. 
The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy, Vol. 2, 1–46.
Chatterjee, Srikantha (1999) The New Politics; A Third Way for New Zealand. Palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press.
Elster, Jon (2000) Ulysses Unbound. Studies in Rationality, Pre-commitment and Constraints. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
English, Bill (2012) ‘Speech to the Auckland Chamber of Commerce and Massey Universi-
ty’. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-auckland-
chamber-commerce-and-massey-university-0> (accessed 18 April 2012).
Epstein, Richard (2000) Towards a Regulatory Constitution, Wellington: New Zealand 
Business Roundtable.
Foster, John B. (2008) ‘The Financialization of Capital and the Crisis’. Monthly Review, Vol. 
59, 13.
Foster, John B. & Fred Magdoff (2010) ‘The Great Financial Crisis—Three Years On’. 
Monthly Review, Vol. 62, 52–55. 
Giddens, Anthony (1998) The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
jane kelsey – ulysses versus polanyi
291
Gill, Stephen (2002) ‘Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations’. Inter-
national Studies Review, Vol. 4, 47–65.
Gill, Stephen (2003) Power and Resistance in the New World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Haggard, Stephan & Robert Kaufman (1992) ‘Introduction: Institutions and Economic 
Adjustment’. In Stephen Haggard & Robert Kaufman (eds) The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Harvey, David (2005) Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoekman, Bernard & Michel Kostecki (1995) The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System. From GATT to WTO. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
IMF (2012) The World Economic Outlook April 2012. Washington DC: IMF.
Infometrics (2002) ‘The Reserve Bank’s Goal: Aim a Little to the Left’. Online. Available 
HTTP: < http://www.infometrics.co.nz/article.asp?id=1871> (accessed 18 April 
2012).
Key, John (2008) ‘John Key’s Address to APEC CEO Summit’. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0811/S00199.htm> (accessed 18 April 2012).
Kelsey, Jane (2002) ‘The Third Way – A Road to Nowhere’. In Jane Kelsey At the Crossroads. 
Wellington: Bridget Williams Books. 
Kelsey, Jane (1996) The New Zealand Experiment. A World Model for Structural Adjust-
ment?. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Kelsey, Jane (2003) Reclaiming the Future. New Zealand and the Global Economy. Welling-
ton: Bridget Williams Books.
Kelsey, Jane (2003) ‘The Denationalization of Money: Embedded Neoliberalism and the 
Risks of Implosion’. Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 12, 155–174.
Kelsey, Jane (2010) No Ordinary Deal. Unmasking the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade 
Agreement. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books. 
Kerr, Roger (2007) ‘A Regulatory Constitution for New Zealand’. Policy, Vol. 26, 8–13.
Klein, Naomi (2007) Shock Doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto: Knopf 
Canada.
Konings, Martijn (2009) ‘Rethinking Neoliberalism and the Subprime Crisis: Beyond the 
Re-regulation Agenda’. Competition & Change, Vol. 13, 108–127.
Krippner, Greta (2001) ‘The Elusive Market: Embeddedness and the Paradigms of Econo-
mic Sociology’. Theory & Society, Vol. 30, 775–810.
Morgan, Bronwen (1999) ‘Regulating the Regulators: Meta-Regulation as a Strategy for 
Reinventing Government in Australia’. Public Management, Vol. 1, 49–66.
Morgan, Bronwen (2003) ‘The Economization of Politics: Meta-regulation as a Form of 
Nonjudicial Legality’. Social & Legal Studies, Vol. 12, 489–523.
New Zealand Government (2009) ‘Better Regulation, Less Regulation’. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/regulation/statement/release> (acces-
sed 19 April 2012).
Obama, Barack (2008) ‘Barack Obama’s Acceptance Speech’. Online. Available HTTP: 
<www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/us/politics/28text-obama.html> (accessed 18 April 
2012).
OECD (2008) Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. Pa-
ris: OECD. Online. Available HTTP: <www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality> (accessed 
1 June 2011).
Polanyi, Karl (2001) The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time. Boston: Beacon Press.
Radaelli, Claudio (2008) ‘Evidence-based Policy and Political Control: What Does Regula-
part iv: politics of reconstruction
292
tory Impact Assessment Tell Us?’. Conference Paper, Political Science and Internatio-
nal Relations, The University of Exeter, 4 April 2008.
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (n.d.a) ‘Key Graphs: Household Debt’. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/keygraphs/Fig5.html> (accessed 17 April 2012).
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (n.d.b) ‘New Zealand’s Overseas Debt’. Online. Available 
HTTP: <http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/extfin/e3/data.html> (accessed 18 April 
2012).
Rudd, Kevin (2010) ‘Social Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis’. In Robert Manne & 
David McKnight (eds) Goodbye to All That? On the Failure of Neo-liberalism and the 
Urgency of Change. Melbourne: Black Inc., 73–98.
Ruggie, John Gerard (1982) ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order’. International Organization, Vol. 36, 
379.
Schneiderman, David (2000) ‘Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism’. Law & 
Social Inquiry, Vol. 25, 757–87.
Schneiderman, David (2008) Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization. Investment Rules 
and Democracy’s Promise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Serra, Narcis & Joseph Stiglitz (eds) (2008) The Washington Consensus Reconsidered. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2011) ‘Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%’. In Vanity Fair, May 2011. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-
percent-201105> (accessed 18 April 2012).
Treen, Mike (2009) ‘What Happened to Real Wages in New Zealand? 1982–2009?’. 
Auckland: Unite Union. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.unite.org.
nz/?q=node/704> (accessed 18 April 2012).
Young, Audrey (2011) ‘The Shaky Quaky Budget’. In New Zealand Herald, 20 May 2011. 
Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=10726777> (accessed 17 April 2012).
293
CHAPTER 15
The role of globalization in  
Ireland’s turn to austerity politics:  
A discursive institutionalist analysis
fiona dukelow
When the economic crisis began to unfold Ireland’s response was marked by 
two relatively unique interventions. First, in an effort to contain its banking 
crisis, it made an unprecedented and unilateral move to put in place a near-
blanket guarantee of banking debt. Secondly, it rapidly embraced austerity 
measures. This ran counter to early responses elsewhere in Europe, which in 
many cases included improvements to social security and fiscal stimulus.1 
Substantial retrenchment was achieved prior to acquiring assistance from 
the EU/IMF in late 2010, and the programme of support agreed upon large-
ly represented a continuation of existing measures. Since 2008 Ireland has 
incurred the largest costs in comparative terms for its response to the bank-
ing crisis, measured at 38 per cent of GDP.2 This accounted for half the rise 
in government net debt, which rose from 11 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 95 
per cent of GDP in 2011.3 After Greece, Ireland is undertaking the largest 
austerity plan in the OECD, worth 17 per cent of GDP between 2009 and 
2014.4 Meanwhile, since real GDP contracted by 12.4 per cent from peak 
in 2007 to trough in 2010, the economy shows very weak signs of recovery 
with growth of 0.7 per cent of GDP in 2011.5 Yet the idea of no alternative 
to austerity has prevailed within Irish political and economic discourse. 
1 Armingeon 2012.
2 IMF 2011. 
3 IMF 2012a; IMF 2012b.
4 OECD 2011.
5 Department of Finance 2012.
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This chapter examines the conditions in which such a rapid and perva-
sive turn to austerity and public expenditure cut backs occurred in the Irish 
response to the crisis. The analysis is informed by ideational institutionalism, 
which looks at how ideas exert ‘causal influence’6 in institutional change and 
continuity. While not claiming that it is the only influential factor or idea, the 
chapter focuses on the prominence of ideas about economic globalization in 
the reinforcement of the extant policy paradigm which has paved the way for 
welfare retrenchment and austerity. In this context, alternative ideas and ac-
tors are rebuffed as unrealistic, despite the window of opportunity afforded 
by the costly and contradictory nature of the response to the banking crisis 
compared to the fiscal crisis. The analysis concentrates on the first two-and-
a-half years of the crisis from Autumn 2008 to the first general election held 
since, in Spring 2011. This period spans moments of major instability: from 
the onslaught of the financial crisis, the dramatic drop in economic growth 
and escalation of public debt, to external assistance. This period could argu-
ably be considered a critical juncture in Ireland’s political economy and an 
exceptional period of policy debate and reform. However, to date, the critical 
juncture created by the crisis seems to represent a case of ‘continuity through 
and in spite of historical break points’ in which dominant pre-crisis ideas, 
interests and policy goals have maintained their power.7 
The chapter begins by briefly discussing welfare retrenchment and eco-
nomic pressure associated with its occurrence and considers how an ide-
ational institutional approach, drawing on Blyth and Schmidt, provides an 
understanding of how retrenchment can take hold in a particular context. 
The ideational path dependency of the Irish economic and social model is 
then sketched to demonstrate the influence of economic globalization over 
time. This forms the backdrop to a closer investigation of how the crisis 
evolved discursively and how policy goals, problems and solutions were im-
bued with particular ideas about economic globalization that shaped the 
conviction that austerity is the way to economic recovery. 
6 Schmidt 2008, 305.
7 Thelen & Streeck 2005, 8.
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Ireland, austerity, economic globalization and the role of ideas 
Welfare retrenchment is typically considered a difficult policy to pursue and 
an unpopular move for governments to make.8 Periods of welfare retrench-
ment tend to occur in the face of severe economic difficulty and budgetary 
pressure that seem to eliminate room for other policy options or at least of-
fer opportunity for blame avoidance to political actors who implement such 
measures.9 However, a focus on economic drivers, such as budget deficits, 
do not on their own account for why particular policy preferences are pur-
sued and for different national responses to similar pressures. To paraphrase 
Blyth10, negative economic data ‘do not come with an instruction sheet’ 
about how to deal with them. As Blyth argues, crises must be understood by 
attending to how agents use ideas to ‘argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and 
impose their notion of what a crisis actually is on others’ and by recogniz-
ing that ‘the set of available ideas with which to interpret the environment 
and make purposeful collective action possible becomes crucially important 
in determining the form of new institutions’.11 In the Irish case, ‘available 
ideas’ about economic globalization have contributed to a discursive envi-
ronment where austerity is understood as the correct solution to a crisis for 
which there is no realistic alternative. The crisis seemed to clarify belief in 
Ireland’s economic model and the notion that it is in Ireland’s interest to ad-
here to it more rigorously. In this framing, alternative ideas about the role of 
the state in the crisis and in the economy, and the actors who promote them, 
are associated with a lack of realism about the crisis and Ireland’s position as 
a small open economy in the global context. 
In examining how political actors dealt with the emergence of the crisis 
and the instability it created, two concepts from Schmidt’s discursive insti-
tutionalist framework may be brought to bear to analyse how ideas were put 
to work at the micro level. These are actors’ ‘background ideational abili-
ties’ and ‘foreground discursive abilities’.12 The former refer to the ‘human 
8 Starke 2006.
9 Korpi & Palme 2003. 
10 Blyth 2002, 7.
11 Blyth 2007, 76.
12 Schmidt 2008.
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capacities, dispositions, and know-how related to how the world works and 
how to cope with it … [which] underpin agents’ ability to make sense in 
a given meaning context’.13 In the Irish context, the background ideational 
abilities of political actors cohere around the ‘rules’ of the Irish economic 
model, which is an expression of how Ireland as a small open economy fits 
into a world that is understood to work by the logic of economic globaliza-
tion. ‘Foreground discursive abilities’ allow actors ‘to communicate critical-
ly about … institutions, to change (or maintain) them’14 and in the context 
of the crisis provide a way of examining how political actors defended the 
existing policy model and justified an austerity response in the face of rival 
ideas. However, focus on discursive abilities and analysis of ideas about aus-
terity does not imply that the ideas have power in their own right. As Mehta 
observes, ‘it almost goes without saying that the resources “each” side can 
bring to bear are critical in any fight over problem definition’.15 In this regard 
the wider political and institutional context in which political leaders have 
pursued an austerity agenda against the challenges posed by proponents of 
alternatives is significant. The Irish political system has been described as 
politics ‘without social bases’.16 Traditionally, the two main political parties, 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, have pragmatically hovered around the centre, 
and the Labour Party has always been a weaker force gaining power only as 
a junior coalition partner. This weaker position extends to other left-wing 
actors and activists who have generally found it difficult to wield influence 
in a polity where pragmatic articulation of the Irish economic model ob-
scures ideology and policy making and political discourse is tightly con-
trolled.17 The turn to social partnership in the late 1980s did not alter this 
power configuration. Participating civil society groups were to some degree 
disarmed of their capacity to develop alternative ways of engaging with the 
state and to build counter-discourses to policy developments which increas-
ingly came under the influence of a globalized neoliberal framework. This 
13 Schmidt 2011, 55.
14 Schmidt 2010, 4.
15 Mehta 2010, 36.
16 Whyte 1974, cited in McCashin & O’Shea 2009, 262.
17 Kirby & Murphy 2011.
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lack of strength and capacity has followed through in the crisis. Although 
social partnership has broken down, anti-austerity actors, including the 
trade unions and other civil society groups and alliances (who have adopted 
anti-austerity positions to varying degrees), have had limited success in mo-
bilizing resistance and generating support for alternative problem defini-
tions and solutions. Against this background the following section outlines 
the dominant ideational pathway of Irish economic and social policy. 
Irish welfare state development and globalization 
Globalization may have become an object of international debate in the 
1990s but active Irish encounters with economic globalization can be traced 
back even to the late 1950s, when a new direction in economic policy, repre-
senting a major ideational departure, was being pursued. By the early 1950s 
it was clear that the project of autarkic development adopted in the 1930s 
was failing. Radical transformative efforts did not occur until Seán Lemass 
became leader of Fianna Fáil and instigated a major path of reform in the 
government of 1957–1961. The ‘instruction manual’ came in the form of 
a white paper, Economic Development, written by a key policy actor, T. K. 
Whitaker. He articulated the need to alter the objectives of economic policy 
and aligned national interests with foreign capital by arguing that ‘we must 
be prepared to welcome foreign participation, financial and technical, in 
new industrial activities aimed at exports’.18 The state began to invest heav-
ily in attracting foreign direct investment with a range of fiscal instruments, 
including tax exemptions and generous capital grants. This entailed a sig-
nificant shift in fiscal policy and openness to borrowing money to fund the 
new policies.19 However, this did not extend to resourcing the welfare state; 
as Whitaker put it, ‘the national candle can not be burned at both ends.20 
Moreover, Lemass held the view that once Ireland solved its economic prob-
lems ‘a rising tide lifts all the boats’.21 His view of the constraints posed by 
18 Whitaker 1958, 36.
19 Norton 1975. 
20 Whitaker 1958, 24.
21 Dáil Éireann 1964, col. 1791.
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the global economic trends also resonated with much of the later literature 
on economic globalization: 
The world’s economic environment is constantly changing, and we 
must always be prepared to adapt our policies to it, and to ride the 
winds of change, no matter whence they may blow. Failure to do so 
would involve heavy economic penalties. The prosperity of a small 
nation is never a static situation but the outcome of a continuous 
struggle.22 
When the economy expanded, pressure grew to improve welfare stan-
dards and some advances occurred. However, this brief ‘social democratic 
turn’23 comprised a relatively fragmented set of reforms and did not leave 
a lasting ideational legacy unlike the new departure in economic policy. 
Furthermore, these improvements were undermined by the economic crisis 
during the 1980s.24
The 1980s crisis was succeeded by a decade of major growth from the 
mid-1990s, which signified a new phase of global economic integration, or 
at least integration between Europe and the US. With the EU single mar-
ket, Ireland attracted new foreign direct investment by virtue of its relatively 
low-wage and flexible labour market, and its low corporate tax burden. Its 
foreign direct investment inflows as a share of GDP ranked amongst the 
highest in the EU since this period, averaging at 9.4 per cent of GDP per year 
in contrast to the EU average of 2.8 per cent of GDP from 1990 to 2011.25 By 
the 1990s, debates about globalization had also become commonplace and 
Ireland and its prosperity became a frequently cited exemplar in the global-
ist literature. Growing interest in economic globalization became synony-
mous with what Hay observes as the progressive normalization of neoliberal 
economic assumptions in the political economy of Anglophone countries, 
at the centre of which are ‘stylised open economy macroeconomic assump-
22 Dáil Éireann 1964, col. 1790.
23 Bew, Hazelkorn & Petterson 1989.
24 Dukelow 2011.
25 Calculations based on data from OECD investment statistics and analysis (OECD n.d).
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tions of the business school hyperglobalization thesis’.26 Consciousness of 
the need to be competitive and articulation of this in Irish political discourse 
became more evident and greater policy emphasis was placed on tax com-
petition, light touch regulation and managerialism in the public sector.27 Yet 
reference to competitiveness and to economic globalization was not cast in 
negative terms. In keeping with the pragmatism of mainstream politics, such 
issues were not so much debated as accepted as the key to economic growth 
and prosperity. The position of Ireland in globalization surveys attests to 
this. For example, the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook ranks Ireland 
first out of 59 countries surveyed for positive attitudes towards globalization 
and for understanding the related need for economic and social reform.28 
As for social policy development, trends seemed to suggest that the pro-
gressive neoliberalization and globalization of the economy did not extend 
to curtailing the welfare state. Social protection appeared to be on a growth 
path marked by greater recognition of new social risks, growth in social-in-
surance-based schemes and universal benefits, and rate increases. However, 
while real spending grew, it declined as a proportion of the more rapidly 
growing GDP, preserving Ireland’s preference for a low-spend welfare mod-
el. Trends in the tax-to-GDP ratio show that extra expenditure committed 
did not impact on the tax burden; since the mid-1990s income and corpo-
rate taxes were reduced and Ireland remained one of the countries with the 
lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU during the first decade of the twenty-
first century.29 Ireland was able to initiate some modest welfare improve-
ments and still remain a low-tax country. Consequently, it also maintained 
its welfare model of modifying ‘extreme inequalities rather than attempting 
substantial redistribution or universal social provision’.30 For most of this 
period, poverty rates remained above the EU average, reflecting the fact that 
while social protection rates grew they remained low relative to average in-
comes. The poverty reduction effects of social welfare did, however, improve 
26 Hay 2007, 62.
27 Ó Riain 2010. 
28 IMD 2012.
29 European Commission 2010.
30 McCashin & O’Shea 2009, 274.
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by the mid-decade when budgetary decisions were made to increase social 
protection rates beyond the rate of wage growth.31 Yet overall levels of in-
come inequality remained comparatively high.32 
Economic crisis, economic globalization, and austerity
Turning to the present crisis, the remainder of the chapter examines the 
discursive defence of the dominant policy paradigm and its affinity with 
austerity. Key speeches regarding the economic crisis made by the two prin-
cipal political leaders, the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and the Minister for 
Finance in office during the onset of the crisis in Autumn 2008 to February 
2011, are analysed in order to gain an understanding of the ideational con-
struction of the crisis in terms of policy goals, problems and solutions, and 
the influence of Ireland’s relationship with economic globalization. Over 
that period austerity measures of €21 billion (13 per cent of GDP) were im-
plemented, with expenditure cuts accounting for €13 billion (62 per cent) of 
the total adjustment.33 
Policy goals and policy problems
At the outset, the background ideational abilities of political actors were evi-
dent in how efforts were made to orient Ireland in relation to the global crisis 
and how to cope with potential implications. Elements of the Irish economic 
model were upheld as armour against external economic threats. In July 2008, 
for example, the Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, contrasted the sound-
ness of the Irish economy with the problems being encountered elsewhere: 
we have a low level of public debt; our markets are flexible allowing 
us to respond quickly to difficulties; we have a dynamic and well-ed-
ucated labour force; and the tax burden on workers and businesses is 
low. Not many countries anywhere in the world are facing the pres-
ent global economic difficulties from such an enviable position.34 
31 Department of Social Protection 2011.
32 Nolan & Maître 2008.
33 Department of Finance 2011.
34 Lenihan 2008a.
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However, recognition was also evident of how Ireland was particularly 
vulnerable to changes in the global economy: ‘as a small, open economy 
which earns its living by trading on world markets, Ireland is uniquely ex-
posed to this crisis’.35 Despite its vulnerability, reliance on the model was 
emphasized as the key element of the solution to potential problems. The 
past success of the Irish economic model remained the frame of reference in 
understanding and navigating the crisis. 
By 2009 it became increasingly evident that Ireland’s economic problems 
were more severe than anticipated and they were not the product of exter-
nal financial instability but domestic imbalances and mismanagement of a 
booming economy. Emerging analyses of the crisis pointed to the role of 
the housing price bubble and crash, the role of pro-cyclical fiscal policy and 
over-reliance on construction and consumption-related taxes. These ideas 
quickly became a core part of media and economic commentary and were 
crystallized in a series of banking reports that pointed to the ‘home grown’ 
nature of the Irish banking crisis and the failure of banking regulation and 
fiscal policy.36 Notably, however, criticism of domestic policy actors and in-
stitutions did not extend to questioning Ireland’s overall economic model 
and its neoliberal means of navigating economic globalization. This was re-
inforced by the epistemic authority conferred on economic commentators 
and economists in media debates, which became largely restricted to issues 
considered to be matters of technical economic expertise. In this context, 
other civil society actors whose contributions included normative critique 
of Ireland’s neoliberal model and its impact on inequality, and the idea that 
there were political choices to be made in responding to the crisis were mar-
ginalized. The position of the trade unions in particular was weakened by 
diminished political support for social partnership, which broke down by 
the end of 2009, and by the wider view that social partnership—and in par-
ticular the unions—had been responsible for ‘ramped up’ public expendi-
ture and loss of competitiveness through pay increases.37 
35 Cowen 2009a.
36 Honohan 2010; Regling & Watson 2010.
37 Roche 2011.
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Faith in Ireland’s model of economic development also remained the 
cornerstone of government reaction to criticism that its policies were re-
sponsible for the bulk of the crisis. At this point political actors’ foreground 
discursive abilities came into use in their efforts to defend Ireland’s econom-
ic model and adapt to such criticism. While some criticism was absorbed 
into dominant discourse about the crisis, faith in the past model remained 
central to the message of how to solve it. Policy decisions and economic 
trends over the course of the early years of the century’s first decade were 
presented as veering away from the fundamentals of the Irish model. Two 
elements in particular were highlighted: excessive growth in public expen-
diture and a loss of competitiveness. Regarding the former, the Taoiseach, 
Brian Cowen, suggested for example that 
As a society, we became over-optimistic about our recent, seem-
ingly spectacular, economic success, and badly overshot the mark. 
People became impatient with restraint. … The general attitude was 
that we could afford to ramp up spending, while simultaneously 
being a low tax country, as if there were few hard choices to be 
made.38 
As for the loss of competitiveness, essentially another form of excess, it 
was suggested that the economic model faltered because costs were not kept 
in check: ‘our real success was based on producing goods and services which 
were in demand internationally … That was sustainable insofar as our costs, 
including labour costs, were competitive’.39 However, both these problems 
are amenable to being solved within the existing economic paradigm; they 
don’t pose a challenge to the soundness of the model, but represent policy 
mistakes made by not adhering to it closely enough. 
The damage created by economic and banking problems to Ireland’s 
standing as an iconic case of economic globalization also became part of 
the government’s repertoire in diagnosing the crisis. In this context where 
38 Cowen 2010a.
39 Cowen 2009b.
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countries believe they have to act like corporations in attracting a ‘market 
share’ of trade and investment, the notion that Ireland had lost its reputa-
tion as a good place to come and do business was frequently invoked: 
the international spotlight that once highlighted our economic 
transformation is now focused on the pace and scale of the adjust-
ment we are experiencing and the impact on our reputation of recent 
events. International markets, where we trade and on which we de-
pend for borrowing had questioned whether our economic success 
was a transient phenomenon.40 
The ultimate solutions to the reputation problem were expressed in 
terms such as restoring ‘market credibility’ and regaining ‘investor confi-
dence’. These are not amenable to direct tangible solutions in their own right 
but are dependent on getting a number of elements of the Irish model back 
on track. Thus major elements debated in solving the crisis revolved around 
restoring competitiveness and fiscal stability to be achieved through a pro-
gramme of austerity.  
Policy solutions 
A hyperawareness of competitiveness as a problem and a solution was 
evident in the communicative discourse. Yet, relatively scant empirical 
evidence was offered to substantiate this problem. Figurative language was 
used in place of evidence such as, ‘we took our eye off the ball so to speak’41 
and ‘we have slipped in this area’.42 Following this, competitiveness as a so-
lution was consistently presented as a constraint the country has no option 
but to accept if it is to recover: 
This recession has changed the financial world. The lesson we need 
to take from it is that we are in a competitive global market-place and 
40 Lenihan 2009a.
41 Lenihan 2011.
42 Cowen 2009c.
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soft option solutions are not going to provide the basis for sustain-
able growth and the improvement of living standards.43 
The imperative and rewards of competitiveness were also applied to 
taking early action on austerity: ‘right across Europe many countries are 
now facing serious problems in their public finances. Ireland has gained 
an advantage by moving quickly to tackle them’.44 Reducing wage costs be-
came a core element of restoring competitiveness and in that regard public 
sector wages were reduced by an average of 14 per cent in 2009–2010.
In comparison to the communicative presentation of the competitive-
ness problem, the problem of the fiscal crisis was consistently presented 
with reference to data on the gap between government revenue and expen-
diture: ‘As many of you know, for every €50 we spend on services, we must 
borrow approximately €20. Everybody knows that we can’t continue to do 
this’45. The problem was presented as a matter of common sense: ‘people 
know that it is unsustainable for us to be spending so much more than we 
are earning in revenue. No household could afford to do it, neither can the 
State’.46 Cognitive locking, which makes a situation ‘amenable to only one 
“problem description”’47, is evident in how solutions to this dilemma were 
posed against the context of a loss of competitiveness and a loss of reputa-
tion. This problem definition served to constrain the range of solutions to 
the fiscal crisis. Specifically, taxation and borrowing were ruled out as the 
Minister for Finance frequently argued that ‘we cannot tax our way out’ and 
‘borrowing more is not the answer’48. Alternative proposals about how to 
deal with the crisis included a call for a Keynesian-inspired stimulus plan 
and job creation from the trade union sector49 which also argued that debt 
could be addressed in the longer term via wealth generated by its plan for 
economic growth. However, such ideas were equated with fiscal irresponsi-
bility and specifically extra borrowing, which was ‘just not on’.50 
43 Cowen 2010b.
44 Cowen 2010c.
45 Cowen 2010b.
46 Cowen 2009d.
47 Hamilton & Rolander 1993, 10 cited in Blyth 2001, 22.
48 Lenihan 2009b.
49 ICTU 2009.
50 Lenihan 2009b.
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Ireland’s ‘reputation for fiscal responsibility’51 guided tax policy deci-
sions in response to the crisis and beyond. While in the initial rounds of 
austerity income tax was increased (an income levy was introduced in 2009 
and replaced with a more comprehensive universal service charge in 2011, 
beginning at 2 per cent for income over €4,00452), the idea that there were 
limits to how much taxes could be raised and that these were quickly met, 
became part of the budget discourse. As the austerity measures deepened, 
greater emphasis was placed on preserving the pro-enterprise base of the 
Irish tax regime, and the low corporation tax rate was repeatedly referred to 
as one of Ireland’s non-negotiable competitive strengths:
Our Corporation Tax rate of 12½ per cent has become an interna-
tional ‘brand’, known the world over. It is a powerful expression of 
our pro-enterprise ethos … In a time of great uncertainty for interna-
tional business, it is important that we send out a clear message. The 
12½ per cent Corporation Tax rate will not change. It is here to stay.53 
This low corporate tax preference is matched by a similar awareness of 
the need to have a pro-employment income tax regime. In this respect a 
high tax burden on labour was problematized in terms of competitiveness. 
For example, speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce, the Min-
ister for Finance said that ‘[h]igh labour taxes ultimately increase the cost 
of employing workers, especially high-skilled workers. In such a globalized 
world, business leaders who make investment decisions and create jobs can 
easily look to other countries as alternative locations for investment’.54 
In this context, discourse turned to the need to broaden the tax base and 
to consider taxation that does not directly burden investors, employers, or 
employees such as carbon, water and property taxes. However, as the crisis 
deepened the idea of broadening the tax base to include more income earn-
ers also became a feasible policy option. Budgetary decisions made over the 
51 Lenihan 2008b.
52 The threshold was increased to €10,036 in 2012 by the new government. 
53 Lenihan 2009b.
54 Lenihan 2009c.
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century’s first decade to lessen the burden of income tax on low income 
earners were recast as creating an unsustainable situation, taking too many 
low income earners out of the tax net. By contrast at the top end of the in-
come scale, the idea that there are limits to tax increases was justified with 
reference to the global mobility of such labour: 
All of the available evidence suggests that high marginal tax rates will 
discourage high-skilled workers from remaining in Ireland, as well 
as discouraging high-skilled workers from locating here in the first 
place. It is not good policy.55 
Given the beliefs about the limits to increasing taxation, attention turned 
to what can be done on the expenditure side. This was one area the govern-
ment consistently emphasized that decisive action can and must occur. Yet 
there is also awareness that such action risks social unrest and resistance. 
Repeated emphasis was therefore made to needing to ‘share the burden’, and 
cuts to public services were presented as unpalatable. However, beyond this 
lies the idea that they are also important in contributing to the future com-
petitiveness of the economy: ‘no one wants to cut spending but the cost of 
providing public services has to be reduced to bring it in line with sustain-
able revenue levels and to help restore our international competitiveness’.56 
With the exception of pensions, across-the-board cuts in social protec-
tion rates were implemented in 2010 and 2011 (cumulative average 10 per 
cent), with higher cuts and greater conditionality imposed on the young 
unemployed. Both times announcements regarding these cuts were coupled 
with the idea that the system is and remains generous, with rates ‘much 
higher than our nearest neighbour’.57 Retrenchment also included curtail-
ments to social-insurance-based entitlements and reductions to child ben-
efit, the main universal payment in the system. Arguments that refuted the 
idea of generosity, which made comparisons with rates across the EU, not 
55 Cowen 2009e.
56 Lenihan 2009b.
57 Lenihan 2010.
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just the UK, and with the risk of poverty rate made little headway.58 Politi-
cal reference to generosity generated enormous media debate and economic 
commentary about the cost of the social protection, sidelining the social 
purposes of the system and its role with respect to poverty. In this climate 
campaigns such as The Poor Can’t Pay mounted by a broad alliance of civil 
society organizations had little success in mobilizing the public opposition. 
Ideas about generosity segued to ideas about the disincentive effects of so-
cial protection and the problem of ‘a welfare system out of step with labour 
costs in the rest of the economy’.59 This led to reforms based on creating 
a more individualized activation-based system more closely aligned with 
the needs of a competitive economy. These reforms, potentially involving all 
adult recipients of social protection payments, are ongoing. 
Concluding remarks and continuing questions
This chapter examined how, following the emergence of the crisis, main-
stream political actors managed to protect the dominant policy paradigm 
with recourse to ideas that framed unprecedented levels of austerity and 
welfare retrenchment as action necessary to repair it. In this respect the turn 
to austerity did not conflict with the paradigm goal of achieving a success-
fully globalized economy via a cost competitive tax and social protection 
regime suited to the needs of investors. As such, the Irish case demonstrates 
how crises can be ‘an object lesson in the way that [a] regime reproduces 
and stabilises itself ’.60 In the period succeeding the analytical focus of this 
chapter, the ideational pathway that set the context for austerity has, for 
the most part, remained dominant. The results of the 2011 general elec-
tion indicated that Fianna Fáil, the main political party in power during the 
period examined, suffered a major loss of legitimacy for its role in creating 
the crisis. However the election of a Fine Gael/Labour Party coalition sug-
gested limited support for more radical anti-austerity measures. Reaching 
a near majority, the election was the most successful in its history for Fine 
58 EAPN 2009 and 2011.
59 Lenihan 2009b.
60 Hudson & Martin 2010, 111.
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Gael whose policy manifesto indicated substantial continuity with the pre-
vailing ideas, promising for example to focus on ‘budget cuts rather than 
job- destroying tax increases’.61 The coalition’s programme for government 
affirmed commitment to EU/IMF conditions regarding fiscal consolidation 
and structural reforms. Absence of major public resistance to austerity is 
however open to multiple interpretation, including the possibility of pas-
sive or disaffected consent,62 and this is not necessarily open-ended. Some 
groups have recently succeeded in resisting cuts announced in areas such as 
educational disadvantage and disability support, but whether instances of 
specific sectoral resistance would extend to broader opposition to welfare 
retrenchment framed in terms of generosity and disincentive effects is an 
open question. So too is the question of the implications of a recent cam-
paign against the household charge in which about 50 per cent of eligible 
households paid the charge by the relevant deadline in 2012. The charge 
was introduced on a self-assessment basis as a precursor to a property tax 
due for 2013. However, lack of compliance may reflect an anti-tax attitude 
as much as an anti-austerity one. At the same time, such trends indicate the 
increasing pressure the government may encounter in continuing to per-
suade the public of the necessity of austerity. In this regard political dis-
course has shifted somewhat to focusing on the need for economic growth 
as part of the solution to the crisis. To date, however, it would appear that 
the concern with growth does not involve substantial departure from the 
ideational context that shaped the austerity response. Policy measures have 
largely focused on supply-side measures designed to enhance Ireland’s low-
tax, pro-enterprise competitive economic model. Whether that growth, if it 
materializes, would have a beneficial impact on the Irish welfare state and 
redistribution is also an open question. It would entail a much stronger shift 
from the orthodoxies and interests currently associated with economic glo-
balization in the Irish context. 
61 Fine Gael 2011, 4.
62 Clarke & Newman 2012.
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CHAPTER 16
A comparison of welfare state criticism in 
Denmark in the 1970s and post-2008 
michael kuur sørensen
Introduction
This chapter addresses the following question: Is the criticism of the welfare 
state during the present crisis fundamentally different from that of the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1970s? In the following I will examine how the criticism 
of the welfare state in Denmark developed in two periods of crisis, the first 
in the 1970s and the second after the crisis in 2008. The aim of the chap-
ter is to compare the discourses in these two periods in order to bring out 
similarities and differences. Are the political parties advancing the criticism 
of the welfare state along the same ideological lines? Do they use the same 
critical discourses? 
First it is necessary to establish when one can speak of critical discourses 
towards the welfare state. This chapter works with the following definition: 
Being critical of the Danish welfare state means to question its universal 
characteristics, such as benefits for all citizens and tax financing of social 
insurance. In addition to this definition, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
it is two fundamentally different periods in Danish history that are being 
compared. The initial situation in 2008 differed from that of the 1960s and 
1970s. Already in the 1990s the fiscal problems of the welfare state were 
apparent, whereas they were not in the 1960s.1 In addition, there is a funda-
mental difference in the fact that it was a mature welfare state that entered an 
1 Esping-Andersen 2002, 1–25.
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economic crisis in 2008, whereas it was a ‘young’ welfare state that entered 
a crisis in the 1970s. The demographic challenge reflected in the population 
aging process is, for example, of recent origin. The age-group 15–64 years is 
expected to shrink by 10 per cent between 2002 and 2040.2 In the context of 
the politics of social policy, the 1990s were defined as a period of ‘permanent 
austerity’3, and although scholars have continued to debate the actual im-
pact of factors such as economic globalization, ageing population, and the 
unfolding of postindustrial society, the existence of these problems is real. 
The nature of the capitalist economy has also changed in the period from an 
industrial society to a service society. In the 1970s Denmark was an indus-
trial society, while in the 1990s the Danish economy was proclaimed to be a 
postindustrial knowledge economy with a large service sector. Agriculture 
has diminished in importance and now rests on subsidies from the Euro-
pean Union. Furthermore, the economic globalization of goods and services 
since the 1980s has changed the conditions for the Danish economy. 4 In 
addition to the economic and social differences, the political parties have 
also changed. Throughout the period the two main right-wing parties were 
the Liberal Party of Denmark and the Conservatives People’s Party both 
of which were flanked in the 1960s by the small Independent Party (with 
roughly 2–3 per cent of the votes) and in the 1970s by the Progress Party 
(with 14–16 per cent of the votes on average). Since 1995, the two parties 
have been flanked mainly by the Danish People’s Party (with 12–14 per cent 
of the votes on average). On the left of the political spectrum, the main party 
throughout the period was the Social Democrats, which was flanked by the 
Socialist People’s Party, the Communist Party and the Left Socialists in the 
1970s; in the present crisis, they are now flanked by the Socialist People’s 
Party and the Unity List (or the Red-Green Alliance).
Bearing these differences in mind, it is interesting to compare how the 
criticism of the welfare state evolved in two distinct periods of crisis. There-
fore this chapter is divided into three: the first section provides an overview 
2 Velfærdskommisionen 2005a, 13.
3 Pierson 2000, 410–456.
4 Velfærdskommisionen 2005b, 31.
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of the discursive developments from the 1960s to the 1970s; the second sec-
tion describes how the political parties looked upon the welfare state in the 
2008 crisis; and the third section compares the discourses that emerged in 
the two different periods in order to identify similarities and differences. 
The criticism of the welfare state in the 1970s
In the prosperous 1960s most people in Denmark believed that the future 
would hold more of the same: more state-provided welfare, more social 
rights, and continuous economic growth. The Social Democrats and the 
Danish Social Liberal Party successfully expanded the universal welfare 
state together with the main opposition parties, the Liberals and the Con-
servatives in the 1960s.5 From around 1963, the Liberal and the Conserva-
tive Parties chose to argue that it was not in the area of social policy that 
the dividing lines existed in Danish politics. On the one hand, the ideology 
of the Liberals and Conservatives continued to be critical of the increasing 
scope of the state in the 1960s; on the other hand, both parties chose to vote 
for all of the policies that expanded the welfare state.6 However, this con-
sensus on expanding the universal welfare state broke down at the end of the 
1960s, when the Liberals and Conservatives increasingly became critical of 
the welfare state. By comparison, the Social Democrats continued to believe 
in the expansion of welfare throughout the 1970s.7 
This process of welfare expansion met the harsh reality of economic crisis 
in the 1970s, however, a crisis which strained public budgets and therefore 
also the amount of resources that could be allocated to new welfare initia-
tives. The contrast in economic growth in the two decades is striking. Aver-
age growth in GDP from 1960–1973 was above 4 per cent. From 1973–1979 
the economic recession meant a drop in GDP growth rates to 1.5 per cent. 
Low growth became more or less permanent for the decade to come and 
continued in the period from 1980–1993 with an average growth of 1.1 per 
cent.8 The effect on the unemployment rate was dramatic. Whereas the un-
5 Pedersen 1967.
6 For more on this dilemma, see Sørensen forthcoming.
7 See Petersen 2011.
8 Danmarks Statistik 2001, 17.
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employment rate had not exceeded 2 per cent in the 1960s, it rose dramati-
cally after 1974, reaching 10.3 per cent in 1983.9 The main economic worry 
of the 1960s was related to the current account deficit caused mainly by a 
chronic balance of trade deficit. The oil crisis in 1973 intensified the cur-
rent account deficit and the trade balance, which in the mid 1980s meant 
that foreign debt rose to nearly 40 per cent of GDP.10 The ideological climate 
changed on both the left and the right at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Before the economic crisis that began to take hold in Denmark in 1973–
1974, the Liberals and Conservatives were influenced by an early form of 
neoliberalism advanced by the populist, provocative lawyer Mogens Glis-
trup, many years before Reagan and Thatcher launched their attack on the 
public sector. The new party that entered the political scene in the 1970s, the 
Progress Party, got popular support by pointing to the perverse effects of the 
welfare state. The party was created in August 1972 by Glistrup, who became 
infamous in Denmark for comparing tax evaders with the Danish resistance 
movement during World War II.11 The party played on common prejudic-
es about the public sector and advocated various populist policies such as 
abolishing income tax. Glistrup even proposed that the Danish military be 
replaced by an answering machine that would say in Russian ‘we surrender’. 
As a charismatic leader of the Progress Party, Glistrup toured Denmark with 
radical and often populist slogans on how to deal with public administra-
tion, the bureaucracy, and social policy, claiming, for instance, that ‘[w]hen 
people become free from paying tax, we12 will not have to give them13 public 
support for their theatre tickets, table tennis instruction, rent, and the like.’14 
Glistrup argued that the welfare state was ironically contradictory and per-
verse in its nature. Another strand of Glistrup’s argumentation was directed 
at the clients of the welfare state, whom he claimed were lazy parasites living 
on public welfare: 
9 Danmarks Statistik 2001, 16.
10 Danmarks Statistik 2001, 34–35.
11 Danish Television, DR, Focus, January 1971.
12 Refers to those who pay tax.
13 Refers to those who receive various forms of social and economic help from the state.
14 Nielsen 2000, 87. Own translation.
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When one looks at the number of people receiving disability pen-
sions, one would suppose that a nuclear war had swept across the 
country! To my knowledge this is not the case. But my God, I will 
not deny that we in Denmark still have a number of good old invalids 
without arms and legs, and that they of course also must receive their 
pensions in the future. But all the others whose disability consists in 
having become stressed through running around public offices—of-
fices that should be closed down anyway—yes they must go out and 
work with a shovel if they want food on the table.15
Compared to the Independent Party in the 1960s, Glistrup had more po-
litical power and electoral support, gaining 15.9 per cent of the votes com-
pared to 2–4 per cent that the Independent Party won in the 1973 election. 
Because of this political threat to the right wing, it came as no surprise that 
the Conservatives and Liberals did everything they could to portray Glis-
trup as an irrational person on the one hand and to make parts of Glistrup’s 
discourse their own on the other. By being a political threat on the right, 
Glistrup above all legitimized a more radical criticism of the welfare state 
among the Liberal and Conservative parties. Glistrup’s success showed the 
Liberals and Conservatives that there was popular support for a frontal at-
tack on the welfare state, an attack to which the two large right-wing parties 
had to respond. A reduction in the tax level and the discourse of persistent 
public cutbacks remained a noticeable change in Conservative policies from 
the 1960s in response to Glistrup’s politics. In 1974 it even became the offi-
cial policy of the party to scale down on free social services: ‘In a number of 
areas the principle of free universal benefits must be rolled back at the same 
time as the tax rate is lowered.’16 All of a sudden it was legitimate to utter 
liberal slogans with the full consent of the potential voters of the Conserva-
tive People’s Party. 
The Liberals did the same as the Conservatives in their dealing with 
Mogens Glistrup’s political success. They made parts of Glistrup’s discourse 
15 Nielsen 2000, 87–88. Own translation.
16 Vor Tid, 8.
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their own only to reject and ridicule the more radical and provocative ele-
ments of his thinking.17 At the very same time as they portrayed Glistrup as 
a mad man, they explicitly, albeit moderately agreed with the central feature 
of Glistrup’s programme—namely, those features relating to income tax and 
social policies.18 
Much of what became popular among young Liberals and Conserva-
tives in the 1970s reflected the ideas of ‘public choice’ and neoliberalism.19 
Bertel Haarder, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and Claus Hjort Frederiksen, all 
later influential politicians in the Liberal Party, adhered to some form of 
neoliberalism. Bertel Haarder aired ideas similar to those originating in the 
public choice discourse in the United States. In Haarder’s view, the people 
employed in the public sector acted in line with their own self-interest—that 
is, their interest was in wage increases, new employment positions and more 
employment for themselves.20 The bureaucracy’s pursuit of self-interest was 
a fiscal problem for state finances and created the need for ever-higher taxes 
in Denmark. Therefore this trend had to be stopped before the bureaucracy 
would ruin society, according to Haarder’s argumentation. Also derived 
from the theories of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman was the idea 
that the welfare state made people lazy and unwilling to work.21 This idea 
was often found together with arguments about the perverse nature of hav-
ing free public services. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, who was later to become the 
leader of the Liberal Party, argued in an article written in the early 1980s 
that the time had come to render free public services in the Danish welfare 
state obsolete.22 
To recapitulate, there were both internal forces as well as wider interna-
tional ideological movements behind the Liberal Party’s and the Conserva-
tive Party’s abandonment of the welfare state consensus. The ideologist and 
populist Glistrup had an impact on both parties, as well as the neoliberal 
wave that internationally gained ground in the 1970s. 
17 Hartling 1975, 5.
18 Hartling 1975, 5.
19 Buchanan & Tollison 1972; Bellone 1980.
20 Hårder 1973, 25.
21 Frederiksen 1980, 57–58.
22 Ellemann-Jensen 1980, 42.
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In the 1970s the Social Democrats remained optimistic about the expan-
sion of the welfare state and social policies. The crisis in the 1970s coincided 
with a political turn to the left within the Social Democrats, which meant 
that they continued to ideologically support the universal welfare state and 
even tried to expand it. The Social Democrats in this period were even criti-
cal of the welfare state because it did not produce enough equality23, and 
they still identified themselves as the guardians of the welfare state, a role 
whose solidity first began to show signs of erosion close to the new millen-
nium, as will be shown later.
 In opposition to the Social Democratic optimism, the radical left ar-
gued that the welfare state was a mere parenthesis that was linked to the 
boom of the 1960s. The economic crisis in the 1970s provided an impetus 
for the left wing in Denmark to revive some of the ‘old Marxian’ ideas of eco-
nomic crisis and the tendency of the profit rate to fall and the resulting fall 
of capitalism. According to several Marxists, the crisis of the welfare state 
was connected to recurrent crises of capitalism. These ideas were linked to 
Paul Baran’s24 and James O’Connor’s25 analyses of the economic crisis in the 
1970s. In the 1960s, the dominant idea on the left was that the welfare state 
was another form of capitalist alienation and that the welfare state was a 
necessary and useful institution for capitalism, safeguarding it against social 
conflicts and providing capital with services it could not produce itself. 26 
In connection with the economic upturn in the 1960s, more emphasis was 
put on the alienation of the worker rather than on unemployment, crisis, 
and material misery.27 The change of mindset among those on the left wing 
is striking, and they even usually added that they went from being quite 
optimistic to becoming severely pessimistic. Martin Korst of the Socialist 
People’s Party describes this change of heart: ‘From being highly optimistic 
... I must admit that I have moved all the way down the scale to a conviction 
23 Petersen 2001.
24 Baran 1957.
25 O’Connor 1973.
26 Socialistisk Folkeparti 1963, 3; see also Venstresocialisterne 1969 and Danmarks Kommunistiske 
Parti 1965.
27 Venstresocialisterne 1969, 16.
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that the classical Marxist economic analysis is correct, even if it is more than 
a hundred years old’.28 In the Socialist People’s Party, the crisis-rhetoric was 
revived and taken as a natural part of the capitalist system, although the 
same party in the 1960s expended little ink on the question of capitalist cri-
sis. In the 1970s this changed with the disappearance of the 1960s optimism 
and its replacement with the rhetoric of capitalist crisis.29 Like on the right, 
the bureaucracy was seen as an economic problem for society, especially the 
tax levels for ordinary workers.30 In Jørgen S. Dich’s well-known book Den 
herskende klasse (The Ruling Class), the economic logic of the public sector 
is also seriously questioned. Dich was sceptical of the power of the bureau-
cracy and was convinced that the ‘ruling class’ in the welfare state was made 
up of public employees in the social sector, the healthcare sector, and the 
educational system.31 
As the above analysis shows, the Social Democrats remained optimistic 
regarding the prospects of expanding the welfare state in the 1970s, whereas 
the radical left increasingly began to see the welfare state as an interim phase 
of capitalism that rested on the high growth rates of the 1960s. The crisis in 
the 1970s did not therefore alter the balance regarding the consensus on the 
welfare state on the left to the same extent as it did on the right, where the 
neoliberal discourse took hold in this period.
The discourse in the wake of the current crisis
When the crisis hit in the autumn of 2008 the initial political task in Den-
mark, like in the rest of the world, was to save the banks from collapse. 
Financial meltdown was on the horizon and the major parties in the Dan-
ish Parliament came together in a feeling of national emergency to save the 
financial sector after Lehman Brothers had collapsed.32 The credit market 
was frozen and credit was becoming tight. Therefore the majority of the po-
litical parties in the parliament decided to facilitate liquidity to the banking 
28 Korst 1975, 19.
29 Socialistisk Folkeparti 1980, 17.
30 Talamas 1976, 9.
31 Dich 1973.
32 Politiken 2008.
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sector, as well as to guarantee private savings stored in the Danish Bank. In 
addition, the government created a publicly owned company called ‘Finan-
cial Stability’ that would take over troubled and insolvent banks in order to 
guarantee the continuation of financial transactions.
The most common discourse on the right before and after the 2008 crisis 
was the discourse on cost containment. Cost-containment was important 
because of the external pressure from the European Union. The govern-
ment argued that it was necessary to have drastic cutbacks in the public 
budget in order to satisfy the capital markets and the EU demands. In order 
to curb the economic crisis, the Danes had to raise the retirement age and 
receive less public transfers in general. This was the line of argumentation 
that was behind the plan of the Liberal-Conservative government (in office 
from 2001–2011) to abolish the early retirement scheme and postpone exit 
from the labour market. The Prime Minister from 2009 to September 2011 
Lars Løkke Rasmussen of the Liberal Party argued in the New Year address 
to the nation on 1 January 2011 that it was necessary to make some adjust-
ments with regard to public spending in order to safeguard financial stabil-
ity in times of crisis.33 One of these necessary reforms was the abolition of 
the early retirement scheme known as ‘Efterløn’: ‘The government therefore 
proposes that we gradually abolish the early retirement scheme.’34 
The abolition of the early retirement scheme was seen as one of the ob-
stacles to create a viable fiscal situation. Prime Minister Rasmussen argued 
during the election campaign in September 2011 that Denmark had to make 
necessary reforms if the country were to remain economically viable and 
not end up in a debt crisis like Greece.35 In February 2012, Ulla Tørnæs, 
a member of the Liberal Party, argued that unemployed people below the 
age of 30 should have their unemployment insurance cut in half in order to 
encourage them to undertake education.36 Likewise the former leader of 
the Conservatives Bendt Bendtsen proposed to abolish the universal old age 
33 Rasmussen 2011.
34 Rasmussen 2011.
35 Venstre (n.d).
36 DR Nyheder 2012. 
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pension for rich citizens in June 2010.37 Compared to the 1970s, the neo-
liberal arguments after 2008 were embedded in a broad consensus shaped 
by economic globalization and the need to stay competitive in the global 
market.38 This was not the case in the 1970s, where the Social Democrats 
still held on to the ideal of expanding the welfare state, although they were 
unsuccessful in their strivings during these years. The only real victory at 
that time was the adoption of the early retirement scheme in 1979. Where 
an ideological consensus emerged in the 1960s stressing the importance of 
a universal welfare state, an ideological consensus emerged in the 1990s that 
stressed the need to stay competitive in the global market39; a trend which 
has been reinforced after the crisis in 2008. As Robert Cox has noted, there 
was a qualitative break in the way in which social policies were framed in the 
1990s and the first decade of this century compared to the ‘classic’ universal 
welfare state logic. Measures were introduced that changed the logic of the 
system to becoming more means-tested40—changes which the advent of the 
economic crisis after October 2008 have accentuated. The question whether 
a radical break from the universal welfare state has taken place is however 
contested among scholars.41 This move towards a more critical stance to-
wards the universal welfare state can be seen among several political actors 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008.
The left-wing parties in parliament backed the Danish bailout of the 
banking sector in October 2008, just after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. 
The only party that refrained from adopting the bailout plan was the Unity 
List. Whereas the parties to the centre and right of the political spectrum be-
lieved that cuts in welfare were necessary, the parties to the left of the Social 
Democrats have repeatedly tried to frame the debate differently. According 
to the latter, instead of cutting back on the welfare state, the government 
should make the banks and those financial institutions that caused the fi-
nancial crisis pay for it by increasing the tax on bank profits and financial 
37 Børsen Nyheder 2010.
38 Pierson 2000; Green-Pedersen 2011, 135–150.
39 Crouch 2011, 22–23.
40 Cox 2001, 463–498.
41 Kautto, Heikkilå, Hvinden, Marklund &Ploug 1999; see also Brooks & Manza 2006. 
part iv: politics of reconstruction
322
transfers.42 Leftists once again aired the Marxist rhetoric of predicting the 
inevitable collapse of capitalism that had been virtually forgotten after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.43 This ‘economic turn’, which is reminiscent of 
much of the 1970s, was, however, bolstered by a new effort on the radical left 
to safeguard the universal welfare model in Denmark. In contrast to the criti-
cism of the Left Socialists and the Communists in the 1970s, the Unity List44 
argued after the economic crisis in 2008 that it was their goal to preserve the 
Danish welfare model.45 It seems that, in the wake of 2008, the parties on the 
far left increasingly saw themselves as the guardians of the universal welfare 
model, while the Social Democrats became sceptical of that very model.
In March 2012 the Social Democrats initiated an intra-party debate 
regarding universal benefits. Several of the leading members argued that 
existing universal benefits should be reformed to become means-tested ben-
efits. The reform agenda, called ‘Priorities in the Area of Welfare’, paves the 
way for a higher degree of means-tested benefits in the future organization 
of the welfare state. The Social Democrats explicitly stated that it was the 
economic crisis that has led them to formulate a reform agenda that ques-
tions the universal welfare state and its logic: 
We are in an economic situation where it is necessary to consider 
whether or not we can afford universal benefits. It is possible that 
some benefits in the future can be prioritized differently and that 
some can be phased out. Perhaps it will be necessary to a greater 
extent to distinguish between those in need and those who are not.46 
As can be seen from the above description, the current economic crisis 
has produced a different attitude towards the welfare state from the one that 
prevailed in the 1970s.
42 Poulsen 2011.
43 Andersen 2009, 4.
44 The Unity List was created after the end of the cold war as a fusion between different small leftwing 
parties, most notably the Communist Party and the Left Socialists.
45 Enhedslisten 2011, 48–55.
46 Socialdemokraterne 2012, 2. Own Translation.
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Another indicator of the fact that the sentiment has changed is that 
several leading Social Democratic politicians avoid using the term ‘wel-
fare state’ and have preferred ‘welfare society’, as the director of the Social 
Democratic think tank, CEVEA asserts: ‘Actually we do not use the word 
“welfare state” any more’.47 The Social Democrats argue that the state con-
stitutes a problem in itself because it works too bureaucratically: ‘Today a 
large part of the public sector functions too bureaucratically, in reality with 
elements of mistrust.’48 According to the current minister of employment 
Mette Frederiksen, the way forward is to focus on ‘self-governing institu-
tions’ and ‘volunteers’ as actors that function outside the realm of the wel-
fare state.49 It is one of the ironies of history that the Social Democrats in 
the year 2012 have taken up the term ‘welfare society’, a term which the Lib-
eral Party had launched as part of their neoliberal campaign in 1985 against 
the welfare state.50 This suggests that the social Democratic identity as the 
natural defenders of the welfare state is changing. They now openly argue 
in favour of scaling down on the universal coverage such as unemployment 
insurance, health care, and the educational system. In all of these sectors the 
Social Democratic agenda seeks to strike a new balance between the role 
of philanthropic organizations, volunteer organizations, private institutions, 
and public institutions.51 On the radical left, the new policies of the Social 
Democrats have been met with scepticism: ‘I am a bit confused, for is it re-
ally a Social Democratic policy that they want to win the next election by 
renouncing Social Democratic principles?’ asked Per Clausen, a member of 
Parliament for the List of Unity.52 Where this ideological turmoil on the left 
will settle no one knows.  
47 Weise 2012, 1. 
48 Frederiksen, Mette  2012.
49 Frederiksen, Mette 2012.
50 Rasmussen & Elleman-Jensen 1985, 3–4.
51 Socialdemokraterne 2011.
52 Clausen 2012.
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Conclusion: comparing the 1970s and the present crisis
This analysis suggest that though the majority of the political parties—led 
by the Social Democrats—formed a consensus in establishing and expand-
ing the universal welfare state in the 1960s, the consensus was short-lived. 
Beginning in the 1970s the Liberals and the Conservatives increasingly 
identified themselves as being ideologically opposed to the universal welfare 
state. In the 1970s the Liberal and Conservative parties, partly influenced by 
the literature on public choice, and partly influenced by the populist right-
wing politician Mogens Glistrup, began to question the legitimacy of central 
elements of the universal welfare state, such as providing free health care, 
universal benefits, and other transfer payments. In the 1970s the left-wing 
began to refer to the idea that the welfare state was only possible during the 
economic upturn of the 1960s
This scepticism towards the legitimacy of the universal welfare state has 
been reinforced with the advent of the current economic crisis. The dis-
course of necessity has, not surprisingly, been advanced across the board 
of political actors that now face huge public deficits and a European Union 
that is increasingly sceptical of governments that cannot control their public 
finances. The Liberal Party, the Conservative People’s Party, as well as the 
Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party all argue that cuts in 
welfare are necessary to the point where the universal welfare state is to be 
cast in doubt. After 2008 the Social Democrats have become increasingly 
sceptical of the state and its remedies for creating welfare. Interestingly, 
whereas the radical left-wing parties were highly sceptical of the welfare 
state in the 1960s and 1970s, they have become defenders of that state in the 
wake of the 2008 crisis.
In comparing the development of the 1970s to the present crisis one 
striking feature emerges—namely, the gradual erosion of support for the 
welfare state. The consensus that once was the backbone of the welfare state 
has been eroded through the process of economic crisis. In the 1960s the 
criticism of the welfare state was marginal on the right, whereas in the 1970s 
it intensified with the resurgence of neoclassical economics and neoliberal-
ism. During the 2008 crisis the right did not devote much time to an ideo-
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logical criticism of the welfare state, arguing instead that the fiscal pressures 
on the welfare state necessitated reform. This chapter has proposed that this 
change towards implicit neoliberalism occurred because some of the neolib-
eral doctrines that seemed provocative in the 1970s have, by 2012, become 
mainstream, shaped as they are by the need to stay competitive in the global 
market. The left-wing discourses have also changed decisively, moving from 
an emphasis on the welfare state in the 1960s as an entity that alienates the 
population towards an interpretation of the welfare state in the 1970s in 
terms of a more Marxist political economy discourse. In addition, in con-
trast to the 1960s and 1970s, the radical left has defended the universal 
welfare state after 2008, whereas the centre-left and the right-wing parties 
more or less agreed that major reforms of the welfare state are necessary. In 
contrast to the center-left, center-right consensus, the radical left calls for an 
alliance between all parties that are ready to defend the welfare state. 53 The 
major change on the left has been that the Social Democrats have gone from 
being the self-proclaimed guardians of the universal welfare state in both 
the 1960s and 1970s to becoming its critics after the 2008 crisis. In the 1990s 
and the first decade of this century, the Social Democrats still argued that 
they wanted to preserve the universal welfare state, whereas they after the 
crisis in 2008 have questioned the logic of universalism. As described above 
there are a lot of arrows that point to the fact that the Danish welfare state is 
now experiencing a series of reforms that will question the universal welfare 
state, not least because the Social Democrats are now openly discussing a 
move away from universalism. In light of Klaus Petersen and Urban Lund-
berg’s analysis of social democracy and the welfare state, it seems that almost 
all political parties have exited the welfare state consensus that existed in 
the 1960s.54 Overall this chapter has shown that an economic crisis makes 
such a consensus vulnerable. The first blow was the rise of neoliberalism in 
the 1970s; the second blow was the questioning of the universal principles 
on the part of the Social Democrats in the present crisis. It is a piece of 
historico-political irony that the radical left was most critical of the welfare 
53 Frederiksen 2012.
54 Petersen & Lundberg 1999.
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state in the 1960s, when the centre parties supported it, and has been most 
endorsing of the welfare state after the 2008 crisis, when the welfare state has 
come under attack from the centre parties. 
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CHAPTER 17
Financial collapse and democratic  
reconstruction in Iceland
vilhjálmur árnason
In the wake of the collapse of the Icelandic banks in October 2010, the par-
liament set up a Special Investigation Commission (SIC)1 the task of which 
was to ‘search for the truth about the events leading up to and the causes 
of the collapse of the Icelandic banks and related events’.2 In relation to this 
commission, the parliament also established a Working Group on Ethics 
(WGE) to deal with the question whether the collapse of the Icelandic banks 
could to some extent be explained by morality and work practices, not only 
in the financial sector but in other areas of society as well. The concluding 
words of the WGE report state that although several individuals in the fi-
nancial, administrative, political and public sphere showed negligence and 
sometimes reprehensible action, the most important lessons concern weak 
social structures and public institutions that are needed to sustain a well-
functioning democratic society.3
In this chapter, the main reasons for this conclusion of the WGE are clar-
ified and related to the political development after the collapse. The analysis 
is framed in terms of Habermas’s three normative models of democracy.4 In 
his account, the liberal model enables citizens and social actors to pursue 
their private interests within the boundaries drawn by law and constitution. 
While election results give legitimacy to political power, no particular atten-
tion is paid to how voters’ preferences are formed. In the republican model, 
1 Special Investigation Commission 2010. 
2 Law no. 142, 18 December 2008.
3 Cf. Árnason 2010.
4 Habermas 1996.  
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the main emphasis is upon political will-formation as a praxis of self-leg-
islation. Citizens engage in dialogue in which they articulate their collec-
tive self-understanding and the values constitutive of their identity. In the 
discourse theory model, the emphasis is neither on the expression of voters’ 
preferences nor on an engaged citizenry but on the institutionalization of 
deliberative processes of will-formation and on the practices of public ac-
countability for policies and political decisions.5 
My argument is that (i) events in the period preceding the collapse 
showed major flaws in the type of liberal democracy practiced in Iceland; 
(ii) events in the wake of the collapse showed serious mistrust in the liberal 
model as republican views came to the fore; (iii) distorted republican reac-
tions to the collapse have resulted in a certain type of democratization which 
exploits the weaknesses of Icelandic society; and (iv) deliberative democrat-
ic theory points towards the kind of remedies that need to be made in order 
to strengthen the practices and public institutions of Icelandic democracy. 
Flaws of the liberal democratic state in Iceland
The broad mandate of the WGE made it possible to place the SIC analysis of 
events in the financial and administrative sector into wider social and politi-
cal context. The reports demonstrated how crucial political decisions facili-
tated the course of events that led to the crisis.6 In the 1990’s a liberal politi-
cal agenda was implemented, with the privatization of the Icelandic banks 
in 2002 and a general deregulation of the financial sector. The principle of 
distributed ownership—the backbone of the process of privatization—was 
discarded. The two state banks were each sold to two small groups of indi-
viduals with little banking experience. These two groups were each favoured 
by one of the ruling political parties, turning the privatization into a de facto 
political deal aimed at maintaining the balance of power and influence. In 
this politically favourable environment, the financial sector was allowed to 
expand beyond control and become dominant in Icelandic society. Coupled 
with easy access to loans on international financial markets, the Icelandic 
5 For other models of democracy, see Held 2006. 
6 See also Wade and Sigurgeirsdóttir 2012.
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banks grew excessively, and, their collective capital became approximately 
nine times the gross national production of the Icelandic state. This resulted 
in political paralysis within the government when signs of impending crisis 
were shown. No one dared to take decisive action because doing so might 
initiate a process of systematic financial collapse.
A major theme in the political justification of privatizing the banks was 
the necessity of uprooting the corruption of political influence in the banks 
and the achievement of this uprooting by giving the laws of the market free 
reign. This theme squares well with Habermas’s liberal model of democracy, 
which hinges ‘on the legal institutionalization of an economic society that 
is supposed to guarantee an essentially nonpolitical common good by the 
satisfaction of private preferences’.7 Later, the liberalization of the financial 
market was legitimized by the apparent success of the banks, which created 
conditions for extremely high levels of private consumption, partly through 
easy access to loans and the favourable exchange rate of the Icelandic krona.8
However, the way in which privatization was executed paved the way for 
cross-ownership and mutual lending relationships that were largely hidden 
in a complex and non-transparent structure of conglomerates. The political 
message of the government was to make supervision less burdensome for 
financial companies so as not to place obstacles in their way to increased 
profit.9 A report from the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce argued that it 
would be much more sensible to let players on the market set their own rules 
and implement them rather than rely on public regulation which is burden-
some and costly.10 Effectiveness was the euphemistic term for the light touch 
regulation policy preached by the main stakeholders in the financial sector, 
supported by many intellectuals—especially by those at the semi-private 
University of Reykjavík, which is partly owned by the Chamber of Com-
merce—and implemented by the politicians.
It is a characteristic feature of Icelandic politics that the leaders of the 
ruling coalition parties—usually the prime minister and the secretary of 
7 Habermas 1996, 22.
8 Cf. Jónsson and Helgason, chapter 8 of this book.
9 Ólafsson 2011.
10 Icelandic Chamber of Commerce 2007, 19.
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state—are dominant figures in their respective parties, which together have 
majority in parliament. Attempts of the opposition to raise critical questions 
are often dismissed simply for the fact that they originate from the opposi-
tion and the strategic rhetoric of the political discourse tends to ignore ques-
tions of truth and legitimacy in favour of partisan bickering and winning the 
battle of words. Ministers are responsible for their set of issues and can make 
key decisions without consulting the parliament or even the government. 
Another characteristic of Icelandic politics of relevance in this context is 
the close personal relationships and informal interaction between powerful 
financiers, public officials, and political ministers. This type of interaction is 
particularly characteristic for the relationships within the government and 
civil service. For example, the chair of the Board of Governors of the Central 
Bank of Iceland had formerly been the prime minister for 13 years. This af-
fected his relationship to former political allies and foes, with some of the 
key high ranking public officials hired by him as a former prime minister, 
and with influential people in the banking sector, some of whom had been 
favoured by him when the banks were privatized. The WGE argued that it 
is one of the weaknesses of a small society that there is a lack of the profes-
sional distance and detachment needed for efficient regulation. The imper-
sonal space created by objective moral rules that protect the values at stake is 
especially important in a situation of personal proximity, close connections, 
and naive trust. Such space was all the more needed in Iceland’s case since 
the legal framework for the financial sector was rather slim. It has been ar-
gued that the ‘prevalent nepotism’ in Icelandic society was the main reason 
for the collapse of the Icelandic banks.11 This can be regarded as symptom-
atic of a systemic corruption that goes unobserved by the parameters used 
by international monitors in whose quality checks Iceland has always scored 
high as a country putatively free of corruption.12
Another indication of this systemic corruption is that there was no 
democratic resistance to the bankers’ own version of their unprecedented 
success. Attempts by the opposition in parliament to raise critical questions 
11 Vaiman, Sigurjonsson & Davidsson 2011.
12 Transparency International 2008.
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were swept aside in the strategic rhetoric that dominated the political dis-
cussion. Most politicians had also received financial support from the banks 
in order to finance their participation in primaries, which did not encour-
age critical thinking among them about the financial sector. For example, a 
proposal in the parliament to carry out a study on the distribution of power 
in Icelandic society, similar to those carried out in Scandinavian societies,13 
was ‘put to sleep’ in a committee, indicating a lack of concern about how 
dominant the financial sector had become in the social and political sphere. 
As the financial sector in Iceland grew excessively the agencies of admin-
istration and politics entrusted to maintain the balance of power and protect 
the public interest failed to do so. The key elements of liberal democracy—
such as elections, party competition, parliamentary discussion, and the me-
dia—indirectly contributed to the crisis instead of providing resistance to 
the impending threats. Most professionals of law and accountancy working 
in the financial sector uncritically serviced the companies they worked for, 
disregarding the public interest. The media, mostly owned by the major fi-
nancial groups, framed the discourse about the banks in a favourable light 
and did not pursue opportunities for investigation when critical voices were 
raised. After the collapse, members of the media complained that they had 
been working in a close-knit society where it was hard to get hold of reliable 
information. They correctly criticized specialists from universities for their 
unwillingness to contribute to the public debate. The WGE argued that the 
public sphere in Icelandic society in the boom years leading up to the col-
lapse was very weak and provided poor conditions for enlightened public 
debate. 
Republican development of democracy after the crisis
In the liberal model, it is a key test of democracy whether a transfer of power 
takes place when the majority demands it. From this perspective, it can be 
said that liberal democracy as a security valve against ongoing misuse of 
power did function in Iceland. It is interesting to note, however, that in the 
13 Togeby, Andersen, Christiansen, Jørgensen & Vallgårda 2003.
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wake of a major social crisis which was largely due to incompetent politics, 
no political figure resigned. Nor were any of the key administrators that 
were responsible for overseeing the financial sector forced to resign. It was 
not until after serious riots in January 2009 that the government resigned 
and new elections were announced. When a new left coalition government 
had been formed, the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iceland 
were forced to resign. 
In the wake of the collapse, there were signs of raised political conscious-
ness among Icelandic citizens. Hopes of a new beginning and signs of a re-
publican model of democracy as described by Habermas were in the air: 
‘According to the republican view, … political rights—preeminently rights 
of political participation and communication—are positive liberties. … 
through the exercise of which citizens can first make themselves into what 
they want to be—politically autonomous authors of a community of free and 
equal persons’.14 When the republican model is given a communitarian in-
terpretation, the democratic will-formation draws its legitimating force from 
a ‘previous convergence of ethical convictions’15 and not from the power of 
arguments that come into play in a process of informed deliberation.  
The republican tradition has not been strong in Iceland. Referendums 
have been rarely used and public trust in political institutions and authori-
ties has been relatively high. After the financial collapse, this trust faded 
rapidly and republican tendencies set their mark on Icelandic politics. Three 
examples can be taken to substantiate this claim. First, two national forums 
were held in which participants were selected randomly from the popula-
tion to have roundtable discussions for a day in the major sports arena in 
Reykjavik.16 The first was held in November 2009 with 1231 participants 
and its objective was ‘to give a nation the task of articulating its values and 
creating a future general policy for a whole country’.17 The organizers called 
themselves ‘The Anthill’ after their guiding analogy and methodology: ‘the 
theory that crowds—like ant colonies—possess wisdom, or “collective intel-
14 Habermas 1996, 22.
15 Habermas 1996, 22.
16 Cf. Árnason 2013. 
17 Helgadóttir and Kristjánsson 2009.
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ligence,” that is inaccessible to individuals, unless it is extracted using the 
methodology of market research.’18 The key word here is ‘extracted’; the em-
phasis was not on facilitating an informed and reflective dialogue but rather 
on registering the several values articulated by participants and calculat-
ing their frequency. The results of the first forum—for example, optimism, 
integrity, and honesty—were regarded as the true values of the Icelandic 
nation. These values were loosely related to the main sectors of society such 
as the systems of welfare and education. Very little time was allotted for this 
complex task.
The meeting was formally endorsed by the government and used as a 
model for the next national forum with 950 randomly selected participants 
that met for a day in November 2010. The meeting was to precede a specially 
elected assembly whose task was to rewrite the constitution: ‘The National 
Gathering shall endeavour to call for the principal viewpoints and points of 
emphasis of the public concerning the organization of the country’s govern-
ment and its constitution.’19 A handbook describing  the methodology and 
instructions for the ‘navigators’ at the National Gathering on the Constitu-
tion states that the ‘key element of the National Assembly is to start the meet-
ings by creating a frame of mind conducive to a discussion about the attitudes, 
values or visions that the subject is based upon’. After this general discussion 
about values, the main task was to answer the question: ‘What do you want 
to see included in the new Icelandic Constitution?’ The authors of the Act 
on a Constitutional Assembly saw ‘discuss[ing] what kind of society we want 
the new Icelandic Constitution to reflect’ ‘as important and beneficial’.20 The 
results of this national forum were reported by a special Constitutional Com-
mittee and presented to the Constitutional Council, which was to take the 
results of the national gathering into account in its deliberations. 
These two national assemblies are interesting attempts to engage citi-
zens in the political process. However, as a result of the anthill methodol-
ogy and the limited time and size of these gatherings, they could hardly be 
18 Helgadóttir and Kristjánsson 2009. 
19 Act on a Constitutional Assembly 2011.
20 Act on a Constitutional Assembly 2011.
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described as forums for critical reflection. Participants were not expected to 
assume a public standpoint by engaging in informed debate, but merely to 
express relatively unreflective viewpoints. Consequently, the conversation 
that took place could at best be described as ‘a hermeneutical process of 
self-explication of a shared form of life or collective identity’, as Habermas 
characterizes discourse in the spirit of communitarian republicanism. Po-
litical questions are ‘reduced to the type of ethical questions where we, as 
members of a community, ask who we are and who we would like to be’.21 
In the national forums, the emphasis was on teasing out the national col-
lective identity and then translating this identity into the ethical discourse 
of values and felicitously phrased descriptions of a collective vision—but 
not the identity, the discourse, or the vision was tested in a critical debate. 
The results of this national forum have been referred to as providing wide 
democratic legitimacy for the proposals of constitutional assembly and the 
procedures leading up to it.22 And instead of feeding into a public discussion 
about the new constitution in an open democratic process, the results of 
the national forum were used by the major spokesmen of the constitutional 
council as a “conversation stopper”, an authoritative will of the nation that 
should not be tampered with.23
Another key development from a democratic point of view in Iceland 
since the collapse is a much more active role the president has carved out for 
himself, primarily by activating Article 26 of the constitution, which enables 
the president to submit a bill to a referendum.24 In the history of the repub-
lic since 1944, no president has ever activated this article until the present 
president did so in 2004 when he decided not to confirm a most controver-
sial bill on the media. In the last three years, the president has twice refused 
to sign in a law on an agreement between the Icelandic state and the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands respectively concerning reimbursement of 
the savings that were lost in these countries when the Icelandic bank Lands-
bankinn collapsed (Icesave accounts). 
21 Habermas 2006, 23–24.
22 Gylfason 2012, 12.
23 Cf. Gylfason 2012b.
24 The Constitution of Iceland.
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In arguing for his decision, the president has appealed to the will of the 
nation and direct democracy, emphasizing a cleavage between the parlia-
ment and the nation. The president’s statement after the vote in 2011 was 
characteristic of republican discourse: 
The people have now spoken clearly on this matter on two occasions 
in accordance with the democratic tradition which is Europe’s most 
important contribution to world history. The leaders of other states 
and international institutions will have to respect this expression of 
the national will. ... The two referendums on the Icesave issue have 
enabled the nation to regain its democratic self-confidence and to 
express sovereign authority in its own affairs and thus determine the 
outcome in difficult issues.25 
The Icelandic people used the opportunity given in the referendums 
to refuse to repay the people in the United Kingdom and Netherlands 
part of the money that the authorities in these countries decided to pay to 
the holders of the Icesave accounts. The position voiced by the majority of 
voters in the debate preceding these elections was that ordinary citizens 
should not pay for the debts of private bankers. In the years preceding 
the crisis, the Icelandic president had developed his own theory of the 
unique qualities of Icelandic bankers claiming roots for these qualities in 
Icelandic history and heritage.26 In the wake of the collapse, however, he 
has led the flock of those who argue that by refusing to repay our share in 
Icesave we are defying the capitalistic system. This strategy has fed into 
a damaging nationalistic mentality that before the crisis painted Iceland-
ers as victors and since the crisis as victims bullied by other nations. As 
a result, Icelanders are presently defying a hard-won and fair agreement 
that was made between the countries at issue and demanding that the 
public in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands pay our part as well 
as their own.
25 Grímsson 2011.
26 Cf. Grímsson 2003.
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From a democratic point of view, the referendum on the Icesave agree-
ment in 2011 was a clear case of an issue that was badly suited for an exercise 
in direct democracy. The nation has been in a state of frustration, sadness, 
and anger after having been exploited by a risk-taking band of financial mo-
guls who robbed the banks from within, partly because of incompetent au-
thorities and the naïve political ideology which facilitated the process. Many 
people lost money and every citizen is paying the cost of the collapse in one 
form or another. When this grieving and resentful population is given the 
opportunity to say ‘no’ to the repayment of debts that were instituted by the 
financial moguls, it is understandable that they would do so. 
Furthermore, Iceland is a country where the media is both profession-
ally and financially weak and the conditions for enlightened public opinion 
are poor. Many voters nourish their resentment and reinforce their prede-
termined ill-informed views on the Internet. The official media also suffers 
from serious shortcomings. To take one example, the current editor of Mor-
gunbladid, one of the two major newspapers in the country, is the former 
chair of the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iceland (who was 
forced to resign after the new government took over in 2009). As former 
prime minister of Iceland, he oversaw the privatization of the banks and was 
a key player in implementing the laissez-faire ideology that enabled them 
to grow. As of 2012 he holds one of the key positions for influencing public 
opinion and heavily invested interests in directing the attention of the pub-
lic from the internal causes of the collapse to the ‘hostile world’ around us. 
The other main newspaper, the main private TV station, and a radio station 
forming a media conglomerate are still mainly owned by one of the pre-col-
lapse financial moguls and the chair of the board is none other than his wife. 
Since the time of the collapse of the banks, the demand for a more direct 
democracy by the increased use of referendum has been in vogue in Iceland. 
Out of the 25 candidates for the constitutional assembly, 21 said that they 
were in favour of more frequent national referendums.27 Not surprisingly, a 
major aim of the newly drafted constitution is ‘to boost direct democracy’.28 
27 Gylfason 2012, 16.
28 Gylfason 2012, 18.
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While retaining the president’s right to refer laws to a referendum, it adds 
new clauses about the rights of citizens to petition for a referendum on leg-
islation and to submit a legislative bill to the parliament. In both cases, only 
10 per cent of the electorate is needed. The question is whether such at-
tempts to boost direct democracy are likely to provide the remedies for the 
weaknesses of Icelandic democracy pointed out by the SIC and WGE. There 
seems to be no reasons to believe that increased direct democracy would 
have made any difference in the years preceding the crisis; on the contrary, 
given their popularity direct democracy might have given the popular fi-
nancial moguls stronger legitimacy to carry on as they did.
The value of direct democracy is contextual in the sense that it is depen-
dent on the background conditions of the political culture and institutions 
in the society at issue. If these conditions are poor, citizens can be easily ex-
ploited by populist appeals to direct democracy and the will of the nation.29 
As consequence, the republican model of democracy can only appear in a 
distorted form as has happened in Iceland. For enhanced political participa-
tion such as that evidenced in referendums to be informed and effective, 
the conditions for popular autonomy need to be the strengthened through 
democratic institutions—institutions that, inevitably, serve as the vehicle of 
democratic will-formation.  
Deliberative politics and the task of democratization
Contrary to a popular understanding of deliberative democracy, Habermas 
does not emphasize direct participation of the public in deliberation and 
decision making. On this point he is very clear: ‘Discourse theory has the 
success of deliberative politics depend not on a collectively acting citizenry 
but on institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions 
of communication’.30 He also goes on to argue that discourse theory rejects 
certain premises of the philosophy of consciousness that he takes to be a 
precondition both for the republican view of civic self-determination and 
for the liberal view of isolated private subjects under the rule of law: 
29 Cf. Beramendi 2008.
30 Habermas 1996, 27.
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Discourse theory works instead with the higher-level intersubjectivity 
of communication processes that flow through both the parliamen-
tary bodies and the informal networks of the public sphere. Within 
and outside the parliamentary complex, these subjectless forms of 
communication constitute arenas in which a more or less rational 
opinion and will-formation can take place.31 
This understanding of democracy is of major importance in responding 
to the political situation in Icelandic society. It concentrates on the strength-
ening of institutions and channels for informed democratic discourse rather 
than on the expression of the popular will each time. While Habermas de-
scribes the forms of communication that would saturate the political struc-
tures and the informal networks of the public sphere as ‘subjectless’, the 
communicative power required for public accountability and deliberative 
practices can only be active if citizens acquire the discursive competencies 
needed to support these structures and networks. The structures of democ-
racy could possibly become semi-autonomous, but without reflective citi-
zens they will not be of much democratic value. This requires strengthening 
of the media, citizenship, and the political culture, a strengthening of a dif-
ferent kind than has been emphasized by the liberal and republican models 
of democracy.
The following is a sketch of issues that are of primary importance in the 
task of reconstructing Icelandic democracy in light of discourse democratic 
theory. 
The media
From a republican viewpoint, Icelandic newspapers have for a long time 
been quite democratic as their doors have been wide open for contributions 
from the public. There is a strong tradition in Iceland of people from all sec-
tors of society expressing their opinions in articles and letters to the editor 
31 Habermas 1996, 28.
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and other columns. From a discourse-theoretical point of view, however, 
it is much more important in democracy that the media is professionally 
strong and sufficiently independent to provide the public with conditions 
for ‘rational opinion and will-formation’, to use Habermas’s words. Such 
conditions can only be provided by having well-educated, professional and 
vigilant reporters who are in a position to delve into major social and politi-
cal issues. This crucial feature of the media in a democratic society is, how-
ever, almost nonexistent in Iceland, and it is questionable whether such a 
media can be brought into being without actions on the part of the state. The 
state could earmark money, for example through grants, for this purpose 
while giving competent investigative reporters complete freedom to pursue 
the important issues. 
Since the tendency in Iceland now is to increase ‘vote-centric’ democ-
racy, improving the media in terms of strengthening its professionalism 
and independence would be crucial to improving the conditions for the 
dissemination of public information and the provision of public delibera-
tion preceding elections. However, these conditions are threatened by vari-
ous forces in contemporary society.32 I have already mentioned features of 
the Icelandic media that should be of concern from the liberal-democratic 
viewpoint because members of the media have not been in an effective posi-
tion to act as a watchdog of the power structures that affect the well-being 
of the public. The question of ownership is a delicate issue in a small society 
where it is inevitable that relatively large corporations are needed to stand 
behind a privately owned newspaper. A major problem has been the lack of 
transparency of ownership. A new law on the media (no. 38, 2011), as well 
as articles in the bill for a revised constitution, should increase transparency 
of ownership and also the independence of editors against media owners.
32 Cf. Curran 2011.
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The constitution
The discussion about the recent emphasis in Iceland on direct democracy 
and referendums requires clarification in the constitution vis-à-vis what the 
formal conditions should be for setting up a referendum. As of 2012, it is 
still basically left to the judgment of a single person, the president of the 
Republic, to decide whether he refers a bill to a national referendum or not. 
The reasons provided for his decisions, such as the number of voters who 
signed a petition for him to refuse to sign a bill, or the number of MPs 
who were against the bill, have not been consistent, and it is hard to foresee 
how the president will react. Of major importance for the development of 
Icelandic democracy is that the role of the president and the conditions for 
referendums be made constitutionally unambiguous.
Another important task for the constitutional council has been to clarify 
the distribution of power in the constitution and to limit the supremacy of 
the executive branch in Icelandic politics. In the bill for a new constitution 
drafted by the council, there are also articles concerning independent state 
agencies, equal weight of votes, and right to information, all of which can 
serve an important function in strengthening democratic culture, although 
it remains to be seen how they will eventually be fleshed out.  
Improving political culture
While institutional changes are necessary, they will certainly never be suffi-
cient for improving ‘the communication processes that flow through … the 
parliamentary bodies’, to quote Habermas again.33 One of the issues criti-
cized in the WGE report was the prevailing rhetoric in Icelandic politics, 
which, it argued, is characterized by strategies aimed at winning debates by 
one party claiming to have a stronger appeal to the ‘opinion of the many’, as 
Plato put it in The Republic, than the political opponent.34 The source of a 
statement—that is, whether it stems from the opposition or from the ruling 
side—is seen as more important than the substance of the statement. As a 
consequence, conditions for political dialogue (at least that aspect of po-
33 Habermas 1996, 28.
34 Cf. Schofield 2006.
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litical dialogue visible to the public) are poor in Iceland: participants rarely 
engage in a process of argumentation in order to understand the matter at 
hand and to reach a reasonable agreement. This is one of the major reasons 
why the public is fed up with political discourse. Though it is realistic to 
expect that this kind of inter-party battling is an inevitable part of politics, 
there are nevertheless sensible ways to facilitate a more healthy climate of de-
liberation in politics in which the power of the stronger argument—through 
better evidence and sounder reasoning—is favoured over strategic rhetoric. 
Both internal and external means could be used as attempts to remedy 
this. One way to proceed internally is that members of parliament set them-
selves a code of conduct in which they clarify for themselves and others the 
main obligations and responsibilities implied in their role as politicians. It 
is essential that the politicians themselves are the authors of this codex and 
that they go through the deliberative exercise of discussing it and writing it 
down. The process of self-clarification and education that can take place in 
such an exercise may even be more important than the product, although 
the product would play a crucial role in the self-regulation of a political 
assembly or political party. Among the obligations and responsibilities to 
be discussed in such an exercise would be the norms of political discourse. 
By thematizing their own mode of discourse and holding it up for critical 
scrutiny, politicians, it is hoped, would greatly improve the conditions for 
healthy deliberation. 
The task of strengthening institutions external to the government that 
are entrusted with the role of guarding the public interest against misuse 
of power both in the public and the private spheres is also crucial from the 
viewpoint of deliberative democratic theory. In addition to supervisory in-
stitutions of the financial market and competition, other institutions are 
also important in this respect. For example, the Office of the Althing Om-
budsman, which has the role of monitoring the administration of the state 
and local authorities and safeguarding the rights of the citizens vis-à-vis the 
authorities35, and the Icelandic National Audit Office, whose mandate is to 
35 The Althing Ombudsman (n.d.).
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audit the financial statements of central government bodies and to moni-
tor and improve the financial management of the State.36 These institutions 
play a crucial role in strengthening the practices of accountability—that is, 
in enhancing the quality and the rationality of the reasons brought to de-
fend policy, law, and political practices. As succinctly described by Simone 
Chambers, such institutional oversight is in the spirit deliberative democ-
racy: 
Deliberative democratic theory … studies and evaluates the insti-
tutions, forums, venues, and public spaces available for delibera-
tive justification and accountability. It looks at the social, economic, 
political, and historic conditions necessary for healthy deliberation 
as well as the attitudes, behaviours, and beliefs required of partici-
pants.37
The task of strengthening these structural conditions is much more im-
portant for developing Icelandic democracy than the exercises in direct de-
mocracy that have been dominant in the years after the financial collapse.
Strengthening the professional and public structure of consultation
There is a need in Icelandic politics to seek much more professional and 
expert council in the process of law making and parliamentary delibera-
tions. In some Scandinavian countries, there are practices of parliamentary 
hearings in which committees working on complex and controversial issues 
of public concern hold meetings within the parliament to which experts 
and major stakeholders are invited. These practices reflect a political culture 
of consensus that fosters a high level of harmonization of interests in the 
labour market and encourages compromises in a political system in which 
stakeholders are given an active role in influencing legislation.38 The par-
liamentary hearings are often held in cooperation with national commit-
36 Althingi’s Independent Monitoring Body (n.d.).
37 Chambers 2003, 309.
38 Cf. Hilson 2008.
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tees such as national councils of ethics if the subject matter is in the area 
of biopolitics. However, none of this is done in Iceland where there is no 
national ethical council charged with the task of raising public debate about 
bioethical developments and policy. This lack of official consulting practices 
relates in fact to the weakness of the media in the country because, among 
other things, it is public meetings and the reports published by these expert 
bodies t among the major platfomrs he coverage that should e media ional 
council? Transition between sentences could be smoother. tthat call for and 
feed into an informed and critical media discussion on such pressing ethical 
issues. Hence, by strengthening the structure of consultation and mobilizing 
expertise, conditions for the formation of more enlightened public opinion 
would be improved, providing resistance to entrenched forces in the eco-
nomic sphere that influence political decisions.
Moreover, instead of the kinds of national forums where participants 
in the spirit of the republican model of democracy articulate their core val-
ues and ethical identity, Iceland could be an optimal place for deliberative 
exercises designed to enhance and facilitate public deliberation on issues 
for public policy. Because of the country’s small and relatively homogenous 
population, deliberative groups would be quite representative of the popula-
tion at large. From a democratic point of view, several mini-public meetings 
about issues for political decision making could provide much more food 
for political thought than the anthill type of gatherings in which the ‘opinion 
of the many’ is the accepted wisdom.39     
This feature of deliberative democracy should not be confused with di-
rect participatory democracy where the primary emphasis is on the outcome 
of elections and on widening the scope and increasing the amount of issues 
about which citizens can have a direct say. In deliberative democracy, the 
main rationale behind the deliberative forum is to facilitate better informed 
and more reasonable decisions. The results of deliberative forums feed into 
policy decisions by informing policy makers about the arguments, view-
points, and concerns of the citizens. It goes without saying that citizenship 
39 Cf. Fishkin 2009.
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education from an early age could contribute to a more literate, thoughtful 
and vigilant citizenry. The law on obligatory schooling in Iceland states that 
pupils should be prepared for participation in a democratic society. From a 
discourse-theoretical viewpoint, this should involve exercising each citizen’s 
abilities for critical thinking and competencies for participation in public 
dialogue, which would also improve conditions for national referenda. 
I take these tasks aimed at strengthening institutions and practices for 
more informed decision making, public deliberation, and consultation to be 
crucial from the viewpoint of discourse theory of democracy. They are also 
appropriate reactions to the criticism of policy making and working prac-
tices conveyed in the SIC and WGE reports. If these tasks are systematically 
worked upon, the Icelandic nation could possibly build a better functioning 
democratic society.40
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Abstracts
The conceptual morphology of welfare:  
A site of ideological indeterminacy
michael freeden
The chapter explores the trajectory of welfarism as an ideology since its 
emergence over a century ago and identifies the developments that initiated 
it. Those included an organic view of social structure and human interde-
pendence in which the wellbeing of the parts was crucial to the health of 
the whole, a shift from a view of human nature as mainly entrepreneurial 
to one that was also fragile and dependent, an appreciation of the normal-
ity of risk and uncertainly, and a rich notion of welfare as the flourishing 
of every member of a society, with creative work being a part of welfare. 
The role of the state changed from that of protector to that of enabler, a 
benevolent entity under democratic control. But there were problems with 
those understandings from their inception, and these can illuminate some 
of the current crises of the welfare state. One of them relates to the exagger-
ated unity ascribed to society, discounting its internal pluralism. A second 
was a disregard of the possibility that a democratic society may legitimately 
turn against welfarism. A third was a divergent perception of human needs 
either as finite and manageable, or as infinite and uncontrollable. Recent 
ideological assaults on welfarism are linked to the decline of the state as a 
positive term, and the diminishing of the language of citizenship. Different 
conceptual combinations have pulled proponents of welfare in diverse di-
rections, and their opponents’ positions also depend on varying decodings 
of ostensibly shared concepts of liberty, justice, power and equality, each of 
which contain multiple conceptions.
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Welfare state and capitalist crisis
christopher lloyd
Social democratic welfare capitalism (SDWC) with its integral redistribu-
tional welfare and equilibration system, the hegemonic regime of the West-
ern world since the late 1940s, is under threat from three interconnected 
main forces—the collapse in fiscal capacity of states, the decline in power 
and legitimacy of its chief institutionalized agents such as unions and politi-
cal parties, and the rise in influence of social and cultural forces that reject 
the authority of the liberal-capitalist state and its corporate allies. Under-
lying these forces are the deeper, longer-term, economic and geopolitical 
changes of de-industrialization and growing inequality in the West, the rap-
id industrialization of the East, and the massive global imbalances brought 
about by the post-Bretton Woods financialization of the world’s markets.  
This crisis is one of the Western model of capitalism only and we have to 
ask if we are witnessing the beginning of the end of this model. Will SDWC 
emerge intact from this crisis or be transformed into something else? Is this 
a moment of regime transformation in the West? Can there be a popular 
political foundation any longer for the Western model? And if not, what will 
supplant it? In seeking answers we must look to new understandings about 
the interconnections between political economy, organizational regulation, 
culture, sociobiology, biopolitics, and the long-run evolutionary processes 
of diversified capitalism. The chapter examines pessimistic and optimistic 
arguments for the survival of SDWC, which will probably require a new 
kind of community-based politics.
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Gender, inequality and the crisis
diane perrons
The global financial crisis was sparked by mismanagement of capital mar-
kets in the financial centres of the Western world, but underlying causes are 
deeply rooted in rising economic inequalities associated with the neoliberal 
model of global development, which prioritizes the economy and freedom 
for self-regulating markets above social needs. This chapter outlines the 
processes leading to social and gender inequalities and the relationship be-
tween inequality and the crisis by drawing on the Keynesian-inspired work 
of feminist and heterodox economists. Both approaches are critical of the 
austerity policies being pursued in the United Kingdom, United States, and 
Southern Europe and similarly to Karl Polanyi, argue that it is necessary to 
re-establish social control over the markets to secure social well-being. The 
feminist analysis goes further by arguing that more transformative policies 
are required to redress gender and social inequalities and the mistaken pri-
ority given to production over reproduction in order to establish a genuinely 
inclusive society. 
The new politics of austerity in the United Kingdom  
and the United States
daniel béland and alex waddan
The 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession it brought about have had 
direct consequences for the politics of social policy in both the United King-
dom and the United States, two countries often categorized as having a ‘lib-
eral welfare regime’. One consequence of the Great Recession has been the 
deterioration of the fiscal situation of governments, which helped push 
austerity to the centre of the social policy agenda in both countries. Thus 
far, budget cuts affecting social welfare programmes have been much more 
explicit in the United Kingdom than in the United States, which reflects in-
stitutional and electoral differences between the two countries. This chapter 
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will explore the politics of social policy during the Great Recession in both 
countries, with a focus on ideational and institutional factors shaping differ-
ences in agenda setting and policy outcomes between the United Kingdom 
and the United States.
Crisis and recovery in Iceland
stefán ólafsson
This chapter gives an account of the characteristics of the Icelandic finan-
cial and economic crisis. It outlines the political developments in 2009 and 
the policy emphasis of the social democratic-left green government that as-
sumed power in early 2009. The stated goal of the government was to pur-
sue Nordic welfare policies in order to shelter ordinary families against the 
crisis as possible. This was no doubt difficult to achieve, given that govern-
mental finances were devastated by the crisis, with great needs for reduc-
ing the public deficit, either by expenditure cuts or tax increases—or both. 
The findings indicate that the goals of sheltering lower and middle earning 
households against the worst consequences of the crisis have to a significant 
degree been achieved in Iceland. This outcome seems to deviate significantly 
from the paths undertaken in Ireland and the UK.
Ireland’s economic crises in recent historical perspective:  
From resilience to retrenchment in the Irish welfare state?
mairéad considine and fiona dukelow
In the 1980s Ireland experienced a protracted economic recession, the fall-
out from which took well into the 1990s to resolve. By the end of that decade 
Ireland became feted for its capacity to embrace globalization, resulting in a 
rapidly growing economy. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, this reputation was quickly displaced given the rapid onset of se-
vere economic crisis. This chapter explores this turbulent economic trajec-
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tory with reference to these most recent crises, examining their respective 
impacts on the Irish welfare state. The chapter outlines how these crises were 
manifest in economic and social terms, and explores the policy responses 
and the manner in which these were framed. The chapter demonstrates that 
while the economic and fiscal narratives were broadly similar, the degree 
to which economic, political and social circumstances differed had a sig-
nificant bearing on the extent to which narratives of retrenchment became 
embedded in policy changes in each period. Relevant factors include the 
degree of European economic integration and economic globalization more 
broadly; internally, the level of welfare state development and relative stan-
dards of living are examined. Considering the present crisis in recent his-
torical perspective, the chapter identifies the drivers that have led to deeper 
and more rapid welfare retrenchment in the current crisis. This argument is 
borne out when the case of social welfare is examined; ideas about how so-
cial welfare expenditure needs to be restrained are not new but gained more 
traction and have influenced policy changes to a greater degree. The impact 
would appear to be significant, the consequences of which are potentially 
much more far reaching than those previously experienced.  
Icelandic consumers in boom and crisis
guðmundur jónsson and magnús sveinn helgason
Consumer boom fuelled by economic growth and easy credit was an impor-
tant facet of the bubble economy leading up to the crash in the Autumn of 
2008. Iceland offers one of the more extreme cases of the shifting fortunes 
of consumers from boom to crisis and how the transition from a period of 
carefree consumption to times of austerity has affected consumer behav-
iour.  The chapter presents on the one hand detailed quantitative analysis 
of the rapid rise of private consumption between 1994 and 2008 followed 
by the dramatic contraction in 2009 and 2010. The focus is on changes in 
consumption patterns, growing debt financing of household consumption 
and inequalities between consumers. The analysis shows unprecedented 
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accumulation of material wealth and consumer durables during the boom 
years. From a different perspective, we explore people’s perceptions of the 
social and economic impact of the boom and crisis on consumer behaviour. 
For this purpose we use interviews with 80 Icelanders to shed light on the 
consumption choices of people and discuss the ways in which people under-
stand their own participation in the consumption boom. 
Economic crisis and the ageing welfare state: Reforming pension 
schemes in Finland in the 1990s and early 2000s
matti hannikainen
In the early 1990s the Finnish economy plunged into the deepest peace-
time recession in the twentieth century. The economic crisis was exacer-
bated by an ageing population who saw their pension schemes and other 
social benefits scaled down in its wake. Major pension reforms were made 
to public-sector pensions as public-sector benefits were aligned with those 
in the private-sector. And employee contribution share was introduced to 
the earnings-related pension schemes, even as early retirement schemes 
were weakened. The pension reforms continued after the recession and 
mostly entailed decimations of benefits and a slowing down of future pen-
sion expenditure growth. Moreover, a change in the financing environment 
required extensive reforms to pension companies’ investment operations. 
During the recession the trade unions succeeded in preventing and delaying 
many radical changes. When the labour market organizations were success-
ful in reforming the pension schemes after the recession, corporatist features 
became even  more prominent in the pension policy. This chapter highlights 
how the strong and long-lasting position of labour market organizations can 
be explained by their success in reforming the pension schemes.
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‘It’s a Mancession’: Discourses of gender in the aftermath of the 
US financial crisis
jyl josephson
Popular and scholarly sources covering unemployment in the wake of the 
financial crisis in the United States noted the gendered nature of unemploy-
ment. Because more jobs were lost in sectors dominated by men—such as 
construction and finance—men did constitute a larger number of workers 
laid off. This led to speculation in press coverage of the recession of a pos-
sible reversal in gender roles in US households, as for a brief period there 
were more women than men in the US workforce. This kind of coverage 
peaked in mid-2009, with coverage such as the ‘Mancession’ chapter in the 
Atlantic Monthly.   Such coverage has not been duplicated as women have 
lost ground, and men have gained ground, in the slow job gains in the US 
economy since 2009. This reflects a familiar pattern in US discourses about 
gender and inequality: that the real problem of gender is that men are vul-
nerable, and social policies must respond and put resources into shoring 
up men to relieve this gender imbalance. This discourse, however, serves a 
broader function than simply justifying sustenance of gender inequalities in 
access to resources.  Rather, this discourse of vulnerable men serves to sim-
plify understandings of the interaction between social inequality and public 
policy, making the simple binary men/women into a zero sum game and 
ignoring the larger structural issues that would be called into question if we 
looked beyond the purportedly vulnerable male to the wide range of groups 
actually harmed by the economic downturn and its aftermath in state aus-
terity measures. This chapter analyses and reflects on what these discourses 
tell us about the role the ‘vulnerable male’ in turning our attention away 
from larger structural inequalities.
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Should men have more rights…? Gender role-related attitudes 
before and during the 2008 crisis
ivett szalma, judith takács
This chapter will examine whether this gendered perspective concerning 
labour market positions has changed due to the economic crisis. We expect 
the rapid erosion of more traditional gender attitudes, in particular concern-
ing women’s obligation to stay at home with small children, and concerning 
the priority, which should be given to men in periods of job scarcity, while 
in order to avoid financial difficulties and stabilize the financial situation of 
families with children female employment is necessary in most Hungarian 
families. The new period of recession raises important questions about the 
future implications of these trends. To analyse the short-term effects of the 
financial crisis on gender role attitudes, the third and the fifth waves of the 
European Social Survey database will be used. In both waves (2006, 2010) a 
rotated module is included, focusing on work, family and well-being issues, 
which will enable us to compare the attitudes before and after the crisis. In 
order to explore the changes in gender role attitudes in Hungary we will ap-
ply descriptive statistics as well as factor analysis. This analysis can also be 
extended to include data from other European countries when these data 
will become available.
Polarization among Icelandic women in  
the aftermath of the crisis?
ingólfur v. gíslason
In the wake of the financial collapse in Iceland in October 2008 important 
changes have been observed in the situation of men and women in the coun-
try. Mainly these changes have accentuated development already observ-
able. So for example women’s political representation has risen, their share 
among high state officials has increased, men’s share of unpaid household 
work has increased and the gender pay gap has diminished at an unparal-
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leled rate. In almost a quarter of the households in the capital area the wom-
an is the main breadwinner. Many more men than women are unemployed 
and predictions that the situation on the labour market would change to 
women’s disadvantage following cuts in the welfare system have so far not 
materialized. On the other side there are indications that fathers use a small-
er part of the parental leave than before the collapse and there has been a 
partial reversal of the collectivization of child care. The question is which 
of these changes, if any, are sustainable changes and which are likely to be 
reversed now that economic growth has begun. In this paper I will mainly 
look at the changes on the labour market and discuss their possible sustain-
ability. I will also discuss whether we are witnessing a polarization among 
women, where those with a strong position have moved on while those in a 
weaker position remain there or have even moved backwards.
Elder care policy in Finland: Remedies for crisis?
hanna-kaisa hoppania
This paper analyses the current situation of elder care policy in Finland. 
Since the deep economic recession in the beginning of the 1990s, Finnish 
welfare policy has undergone structural reforms from universality toward 
means testing and individual responsibility. The current crisis is putting 
further pressure on elder care services in particular, and a care deficit is 
looming close. According to Statistics Finland, in 2030 Finland will be in 
the worst situation of the EU countries in terms of the dependency ratio. 
Concurrently, a new separate Act concerning the services for the elderly 
is being prepared. In this paper, I analyse the policy reforms of elder care 
provision in the context of growing demands for the elderly’s rights to care, 
of demographic and budgetary pressures, and of neoliberal trends. I utilize 
the conceptual framework of recognition, redistribution, and representa-
tion developed by Nancy Fraser to search for the subtext and roots for such 
a ‘care crisis’ in a ‘welfare state’ and to examine what is at issue politically 
when remedies for this situation are sought. 
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Ulysses versus Polanyi: Can embedded neoliberalism prevent a 
‘Great Transformation’
jane kelsey
This chapter asks three inter-related questions: Does the latest financial cri-
sis signal a terminal phase of neoliberalism and the emergence of a post-
neoliberal era? Why has it been possible to use the crisis as an opportunity 
to re-secure and advance the neoliberal paradigm, irrespective of the social 
and political damage? Is neoliberalism so effectively embedded that it can 
contain its intrinsic contradictions in the medium term? The chapter argues 
that neoliberalism in New Zealand has been embedded through normative 
and coercive disciplines in domestic legislation, economic integration trea-
ties and international institutions. These disciplines are increasingly brittle 
as self-regulating markets repeatedly fail and new crises of climate, energy, 
food and livelihoods expose the limits of market-driven ‘orthodoxy’. Despite 
this the agenda of less state, more market has been revived with a vengeance 
through fiscal austerity, privatization, job losses, cuts to services and safety 
nets, and restoration of corporate power, especially in the financial sphere. 
This suggests that neoliberalism is so effectively embedded that it can sur-
vive these contradictions for the medium term?
The Role of globalization in Ireland’s turn to austerity politics: A 
discursive institutionalist analysis
fiona dukelow
Ireland has experienced enormous economic damage following the global 
financial crisis, recording some of the most severe banking and fiscal prob-
lems amongst the countries most affected.  Its response was marked by a 
rapid self-directed turn to austerity subsequently reinforced by conditions 
attached to an EU/IMF loan agreement. This chapter is concerned with 
exploring the ideational conditions which enabled such a response, cast-
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ing austerity as the only feasible and realisable option. The chapter argues 
that beliefs about economic globalization and Ireland’s position as a small 
open economy played a central role in the nature of the response taken and 
how that was discursively constructed.  After examining the policy legacy 
of earlier ideational departures in economic policy and their impact on so-
cial policy development, the chapter details the way in which austerity was 
framed and pursued as the policy solution to resolve the problem of Ireland’s 
damaged economic model and restore its position as a successful globalized 
economy, trading competitively and winning foreign direct investment. At-
tention is paid in particular to how policy decisions taken in respect of taxa-
tion and public expenditure were linked to particular beliefs about global 
competitiveness that significantly narrowed the field of policy options.  At 
the same time these beliefs framed rival ideas about the crisis and how to 
recover as unrealistic and irresponsible.  As such this case study provides an 
example of a critical juncture in which dominant pre-crisis ideas, interests 
and policy goals have so far, managed to maintain their power. 
A comparison of welfare state criticism in Denmark in the 1970s 
and post-2008 
michael kuur sørensen
The chapter analyses how the criticism of the welfare state developed in two 
periods of crisis: the first in the 1970s; the second after the crisis in 2008. The 
chapter takes a look at the discourses that were developed in the 1970s on 
both sides of the political spectrum and how they differ from the discourses 
that emerged after 2008. By comparing these discourses, the chapter sug-
gests that the welfare state consensus that was created in the 1960s is vul-
nerable to economic crisis. In the 1970s the Liberals and the Conservatives 
became increasingly sceptical of the welfare project, a scepticism which was 
then shared by the Social Democrats after the 2008 crisis. 
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Financial collapse and democratic reconstruction in Iceland
vilhjálmur árnason
A parliamentary Working Group on Ethics looking into the causes of the 
2008 collapse of the Icelandic banks argued that the most important lessons 
are about weak social structures and public institutions. In this chapter, the 
main reasons for the conclusion of the Working Group are clarified and 
related to the political development after the collapse. The analysis is framed 
in terms of Habermas’s three normative models of democracy. It is shown 
that events in the period preceding the collapse revealed major flaws in the 
type of liberal democracy practiced in Iceland. Drawing upon democratic 
deliberative theory, this chapter argues that attempts to strengthen Icelan-
dic political practices in the spirit of republican democracy in fact exploit 
their weaknesses. The chapter also argues that features of deliberative de-
mocracy are crucial for a genuine reconstruction of Icelandic democracy. 
Such is the case not least because of the emphasis that this approach lays 
upon the practices of accountability—that is, the quality and rationality of 
the reasons brought to defend policy and law, and on the conditions neces-
sary for informed deliberation among the citizens and their representatives. 
This, for example, requires improved political and educational practices and 
a strengthening of the constitution, supervisory institutions and the media.
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